“Islam factor” and “National Army”

* * *

No doubt that we are facing a new scenario, showing – among many other crucial points – how important and fragile is the US-Russian relationship (or alliance?), the intriguing turnaround of the US-China rapprochement, and the pragmatic check of political reconstruction in Iraq and the Middle Eastern puzzle. Vis-à-vis these impending, realistic challenges, new forces are coming into being, which in their turn force a new analysis of the global political system: threat spirals towards disaster and new confrontations, or democratic reforms and dialogue? Which peace and which talks, and which war-makers? The Eurasian context is not immune to this new reality. In this context we have, however, two unknown quantities: military power and religious forces - Islam. These two elements are of specific interest: the Islam factor and the build up of a “national” army. Both intervene. Both seem destined to continue to do so with increasing authority in the more or less distant future. Both are deeply rooted in the traditional humus of the Eurasian region, and both are of particular significance, especially in the context of an analysis of those factors which could influence the stability - or otherwise - of the region.


1. Legal versus Criminal Protection?
With the break-up of the Soviet Union, there can be no doubt that a new age is dawning, conventionally referred to as the “post-bipolar age”, the age of non-distance, the age of revolutions and new ideologies. The historical frame of reference may conclude that the Gulf crises of 1990-1991/2003, and especially 11/9 marked a turning-point for the whole system of security and international relations: they put the final seal on the undisputed political-military and economic-financial superiority of the United States, on the intensification of the process of economic and market globalisation, and on the build-up of a new world order.
On the threshold of the third millennium, in an atmosphere of anachronisms and contradictions, dominated and conditioned by scientific discoveries, new ideas seem to take flight and regional barriers are collapsing to give way to a new form of globality. The Information and Communication Revolution is giving way to a new and more frightening revolution, the Bio-Technological Revolution, which is emerging onto the world stage as a new power. In this context, the dominant factors are uncertainty, violence, terror, micro-macro criminality, abuse of power and oppression, regional conflicts and new forms of conflictuality. Corruption prevails, together with illegal trafficking and crime. The indiscriminate exploitation of the environment adds natural disasters and new forms of human catastrophe. All these realities represent a worrying, new challenge and demand a positive reshaping of civil and political society (1) .
To this new reality, the Eurasian context is not immune (2) .
Thus, instead of a well-coordinated and uniform criminal system, Russia and the ex-Soviet Central Asian Republics developed a rather heterogeneous, mosaic-like system, where territories were divided in many different ways between criminal groups of various origins, relying on the individual clan structures. There were very few features in common, except for the means available to them - that is, organised force (3) .


2. Limitations of freedom becoming independent.
The Alma Ata meeting of the 21st December 1991 concluded with the declaration of independence of the Central Asian ex-Soviet Republics. Their adhesion to the CIS positively transformed the region into a new Eurasian club. To quote Field-Marshal I.E. Shaposhnikov’s words in Paris 1992, “...the end of the bipolar geopolitical structure of the world, due to the break-up of the USSR, has created a propitious climate for regional and local politico-military contradictions, and led to profound changes in the system of international relations, and, as a result, to the emergence of new ‘risk factors’ and new military conflicts” (4) .
Without doubt, the collapse of the Soviet order unleashed new forces, new equilibriums and strategies. With an insistent rhythm, new regional and inter-regional scenarios were being shaped. New options for national and collective security were faced with a series of old and new challenges. Each newly independent state had to face a series of tasks. All however were conscious of the vulnerability of their country and, above all, the vulnerability of its premature birth as a “nation”. Independence made it essential to choose a nationalistic and democratic model which would justify, not only in the eyes of the internal public opinion but also in those of the outside world, the territorial survival of the states which were no more the artificial creations of a recently deceased regime. It is also true that, following the collapse of the Soviet apparatus, the old Party structure broke into “groups” competing with each other for the control of the new states. The various new leaderships found themselves, almost everywhere, challenged by political movements or associations defining themselves as “democratic”, which, however, de facto reflected the resurgence of traditional social forces and of the mechanisms on which they traditionally turned. Very schematically, the true problems that these leaders had to face in the immediate aftermath of independence included: a national identity, the definition of territorial borders, existing minorities, the need to break out of their economic isolation and create financial and banking systems capable of supporting economic re-conversion, systemic-structural reforms capable of dealing with the new political status and the requirements resulting from independence, communication networks which would enable fast and regular connections with the outside world to develop, education and human resources in order to create autochthonous officials and technicians, etc (5) . But, at this very point, two other factors emerged, increasingly important in order to achieve that internal stability destined to play a decisive role in such a delicate moment of institutional and economic transition:
1. the Islam factor - agreement with the religious powers (Islamic) and, therefore, also with those political forces which Islam can represent in given contexts
2. the recruiting of a “national” army.
Both issues must be viewed within the area tradition. Both issues are strictly correlated. Both issues present very significant differences, the cultural legacy - or heritage - of deeply rooted forces.
These two threads have specific significance in Central Asia, also in consideration of the potential for future developments and in terms of the involvement of regions which border on or are to some degree interested in this area from a global, strategic point of view (6) .

3. “Nation” and “Institution” re-building.
Very schematically, let us make an analysis and try to make any prediction concerning post-independence political evolution of the five Central Asian Republics. One could pose the hypothesis of dissolution of the idea of a party in favour of a cult of the individual personality (as occurred in four over five Republics. Namely, Kazakstan, Turkmenstan, Uzbekstan and Qirghizstan), a de-politicising of the State itself in the name of technocratic efficiency and economic re-conversion and development (again, as in the four said Republics), the great priority of this region. Tajikstan is a case per se. One may foresee the frantic action of an increasingly central and centralised (or despotic), but frequently inefficient, government; the inability of the ruling classes to create a “consensus” even though they continue to maintain a monopoly of power; the resurgence of increasingly violent inter-ethnic, inter-tribal and/or family rivalry, favoured and bolstered by generous external contributions thanks to the fluid nature of borders (this is the case of Tajikstan in particular); the decline of the various ideologies in favour of a bureaucracy increasingly under the control of the ruling class; a growing exploitation by the élite of the benefits and privileges related to power...without much benefits to the other elements of the population which would continue to pay a higher and higher price for the power of others. Moreover, the problems of economic re-conversion and development, unemployment, the exploitation of rural areas and the misuse of valuable water resources, the exploitation of mineral resources in which the region is especially rich, unproductive reforms (if any) of the financial and banking systems, of communications in general - all these problems would tend to worsen rather than find any rational solution.
This scenario would be further complicated by external interests and interference which would find, in the internal division, a fertile ground on which to act. This is also a scenario where coercion and the repression of every opinion or freedom of association could provoke another kind of protest: the religious, or rather Islam. Islam in its most radical and exasperated form, an informal Islam, with flexible structures as seen in other Islamic areas (Senegal, for instance, Lebanon or Somalia), which manage to escape from institutional control and to express themselves through religious-political action and movements, sometimes of an extremely militant and violent nature. An Islam which, as we have seen in other areas and in various historical epochs, represents the only refuge for exasperation and desperation of the exploited, oppressed and impoverished social classes, but also of those who - although having riches of their own - have no access to power or to the economic wealth of the region. And, within this scenario, the Military comes to the forestage and acquires a centrality of its own: the Force to maintain stability and provide that security which is the only pathways out of terrorism, civil war and chaos towards economic and social development.
Central Asia and the five ex-Soviet Republics have reproduced this pattern. But the Central Asian model has two variants: the Military and the Religious factor.
Currently - and given that the five leaders in power had, to a great degree, accepted de facto their respective borders as a fait accompli, as inevitable for the moment as independence - the question “which national army” and “which weapons and armaments” capable of facing the many problems of internal order and stability and of guaranteeing the security and stability of the national borders within a regional order and stability led the Eurasian region to delegate its order and stability to the Russian Federation on the basis of precise individual agreements.
Islam, apart from being a refuge, in many cases has become the open means of expression for dissension.
September 11 definitely reversed any theoretical pattern, making any prediction regarding post-independence political evolution merely hypothetical. In the course of an international meeting in London, Robert Hunter stated “the United States owns the world”. It is a harsh statement, but it represents a fact, that one has to bear in mind when outlining a scenario or making any analysis and evaluation. On the Central Asian chessboard, too, and especially after 11/9, the United States are undoubtedly coming to represent an undisputed force and reality. In any case - presently - with their military bases - they are a positive presence in terms of both military strength and financial-economic power. And against the background of a lively and controversial debate within the Russian Federation, Moscow has taken its final decision. The US is the only superpower, a globalising super-structure (7) . Right or wrong, this attitude once again reflects the logic of the Eurasian historical-cultural heritage: a pragmatic choice based on the mere logic of power and force. Without indulging in simple repetition, since much has been written and said in more than one official forum, there is a general consensus that today security is the product of stability; however, stability is neither one moment nor a given fact. Both are the product of a process and, in the medium term, the outcome of a cooperative system. Under the new rules marked by 11/9 it, now, appears almost impossible to talk of a region as representing a scenario per se or as an isolated security system. The Eurasian region is no exception with its geographical configuration as a bridge between Europe and Asia. Whether it is considered as the Silk Route or “the route” for invasions from the East and from the West, Eurasia has always been a crucible for cultural syncretism, for powerful speculative synthesis, institutional patterns and different models of statehood. To speak of the Eurasian region without bearing these elements in mind would, therefore, be limited and misleading.

4. Then, which “Islam factor” within this framework?
From a methodological point of view, emphasis should be placed on territorial micro-analysis, aimed at identifying and analysing those elements - namely ethnic components and their respective historical-cultural roots, traditional ways of life and society, traditional political forces and related dynamics, religious structures - which today represent as many elements emerging once more in an extremely clear and - occasionally - virulent manner. Awareness and perception of these factors is a precious key to the understanding of the possible uniting-disintegrating elements at play in this post-Soviet region. Moreover, awareness of these factors enables us to identify further factors which may prove decisive for both internal and regional-interregional stability and security.
In this more global context, external protagonists must also been taken into account, who - especially since independence - motivated by political and strategic interests of differing nature and content, interact with regional politics and thus may contribute to a shift in internal and regional balances.
As far as the Islam factor is concerned, although not officially in power in any of the five Central Asian republics, this continues to play a central role.
The post-Soviet socialist establishments often became victims of their own strategies regarding the Islam factor. In their attempt to isolate the nationalist (pan-Turkish/pan-Islamic) opposition, they undermined their own legitimisation. They neither recruited nor accepted new Islamic groups into their own ranks, and when (or whenever) they did, they did so without adequate acculturation through education and new institution building. Therefore, these insurgent Islamic movements often became interlinked, giving rise to sectarian groups and de-territorialized neo-fundamentalist waves (8) .
Inherent to local culture, Islam sinks its roots into an often distant past. It is deeply rooted in the popular conscience. However, it takes on particular connotations and features which distinguish it from the Islam of neighbouring regions (such as the I.R. of Iran, for example, or the more northern “Tartary” or Turkish Anatolia in general (9) . Here we are dealing with a rigidly Sunni and - from an “official” point of view - orthodox Islam, characterised by a very particular syncretism, by a strong cult of pirs and ‘holy men’, and by complex rituals, even including shamanism and sacrifices.
Following the re-conversion process, we find both the Western model and a society closely tied to its traditions. And to day we find a particularly active Islam, also part of the cultural tradition of this area. Islam constitues a force. Even when we cannot talk of an “Islamic church” or of a “clergy” - as in the Shi’ite sense - it is true that Islam has organised informal and flexible structures which, under certain circumstances, are capable of developing an incredible Force. In this geo-cultural region, these structures are based on the “loyalty” of pupils to their teachers, especially in rural areas, where traditional Islamic structures have an increasing impact on education. Mosque schools (madrasahs) and ulemas have a new centrality of their own - notwithstanding the official lines of today’s governance - and are rapidly recovering the ground lost under the previous régime. It is often a very mystical Islam, marked by the presence of religious Fraternities (tariqas) with their spiritual ties and their loyalties, and small communities united by the cult of local saints. It is a very mystical Islam, increasingly marked by the revival of the tablighi phenomenon. This Islam stands out for the personal nature of relationships. It represents the local modern response (and challenge) to the Western philosophy of “Globalisation”. It does not recognise territorial borders or administrative barriers, it does not identify with ethnic groups, but constitutes a close-knit network of contacts, frequently underground, capable of surviving any official form of control or repression and of inciting, in reaction to such, a form of religious group solidarity, which can also unite other ethnic-tribal groups with common socio-political ideals.
This Islam may also represent a political Force. Above and beyond these ideals, external aid and internal consensus have often created another equally close-knit network of more material interests, real economic interests, such as the control of certain markets (drug trafficking, for example) through the collaboration of the “faithful” and their solidarity, the concession of “protection” and, where possible, posts and offices, the generous distribution of aid to the poor and the needy, education and distribution of cassettes, books, copies of the Koran, sacred texts etc. Here, we are facing a tightly formed network of “worldly” interests, which gives these “spiritual” forces an unequivocal earthly power.
These are positive structures which, precisely as a result of their informal and personal nature, are particularly flexible, escaping normal institutional control, crossing borders recognised by individual states and which, in the hands of a capable personality, can be transformed into a formidable political instrument.
This is the true power of such Islamic society, a power that certainly exists de facto, and which today is acting, moving and shaping policies. The resulting power balances are extremely delicate and fragile, particularly problematic when we find, on the one hand, administrative structures and institutions moulded on the “Western” model of statehood and democracy (secular tendencies) and, on the other, traditional forces (such as this Islam) coming again to the forestage and proposing their model of life and society as the founding element of national identity. During the Soviet era, “official Islam” found expression in the institution of the Mufti, living alongside the “other Islam”, a parallel, popular Islam. In certain periods and within given political-cultural contexts, popular Islam gave birth to movements, authentic political and militant forces capable of presenting themselves as alternatives to the forces in power.
The wahhabi and salafi movements, and the tablighi phenomenon, may represent the religious in its most radical and exasperated form: Islam, with its fluid, informal, personalised and flexible structures, which manages to escape from institutional control and to express itself through political action, sometimes of an extremely militant nature. These same elements are emerging again as a result of both local and external impulses (or the combination of both). Be that as it may, these are forces which are, in effect, reorganising themselves as “transversal” religious-political-social forces which may have different aims but share the same principle of trying to direct official policy towards Islamic lines, when they are not presenting themselves as the only alternative to the current political management (10) .
There is no doubt that the establishments in power are aware of this situation, and, precisely because of this awareness, have responded in differing ways to the demands present throughout the entire region. Putin’s choice to concentrate on internal tasks has not eluded the problem of post-Soviet borders and security. This has raised a very pragmatic choice: close association in this respect with the U.S. within global and without limits war to terrorism. Michele Brunelli’s contribution provides us with concrete numbers and figures.

5. The recruiting of a “national” army, or “ethnic criminal groups”?
The Islam factor today represents a trans-ethnic force, transversal and horizontal, which goes beyond all frontiers and territorial barriers. Diametrically opposed to this we have the case of the creation of a national army.
In the vast basin of Central Asia, local forces had always represented the traditional support for the traditional leadership in power: militias based on a “client-patronage system”, expression of a precise balance of powers between clan/family and/or tribal links. This has always been the typical model of the concept of statehood and of a “national” army.
“National” integration is an inherited, imposed factor. This reality is well stressed by the Pakistani literature of the 1990s, “the most significant achievement of the Soviet colonial rule in Central Asia may be the extent of its success in ‘colonising’ the minds and consciousness of the peoples...The incorporation of Central Asia Muslims into the Soviet colonial state...A colonial state, which had a social, political, economic and military order” (11) .
Thus, with the break down of the Soviet order, ethnic, tribal-clanic divisions have re-emerged, as have the problems related to social groups, political movements, various forms of association, economic development, etc., pervasive expression of traditions and “their” concept of sovereignty, power and authority. These are numerous and vary according to the cultural and ethnic-cultural context. However, it is well possible to identify some common realities consolidated by political practice. Amongst these the most important are:
· the personal concept of power, which is concentrated in the hands of a single “personality”;
· the concept of power itself as “contract” between the society and those who are freely chosen to lead in war and at peace;
· the clan/family and/or tribe client-patron system, which means that posts become a means of compensation for services rendered and loyalty demonstrated by the “client” to their “patrons” (the leaders);
· the virtual nature of any concept of “territory” or of territorial borders, these being the result of ethnic, tribal or religious influence. Although groups often claim control over given territories, the subjects of their divisions, rivalry and cooperation have historically been the result of opportunities rather than territories or sectors of the economy as such.
Now, following independence, the opposition movements and forces which have emerged everywhere seem to repeat the same model and system: tribal divisions, inter-ethnic and inter-clan/family rivalry (and/or truces - agreements) encouraged and/or revitalised by generous external contributions thanks to the porosity of the borders. Power is connected to specific interests of social groups and political forces which, in turn, today are also the expression of local, traditional political forces. The Administrative state apparatus increasingly tends to identify itself with an administrative-political power or, rather, with the bureaucratic state apparatus. There is no doubt that the new leaderships viewed the process of democratic and economic re-conversion with a certain apprehension, finding it difficult to renounce those privileges linked to the exercise of power. They continued to seek understandings and agreements with the various traditional political and social forces in a period of transition, which seem to be ever more uncertain given: a) the fluidity of these very forces themselves; b) 11/9 and the upheaval of the global context. Any distinction is only a matter of nuance.
However, if one wishes to continue in an analysis, we have witnessed the frenetic action of an increasingly central and centralised government determined by the opportunities opened by the emerging market and the failing state. We have also witnessed the inability of the ruling class to create a consensus even though it continues to maintain a monopoly of power; the resurgence of increasingly violent inter-ethnic, inter-tribal, inter-clanic/family rivalry, favoured and bolstered by generous external contributions thanks to the porosity of borders; the decline of the various ideologies in favour of an administration increasingly under the control of the ruling group; and, in support of the personal security of this group, the creation of personal (or party) militias who would be increasingly well-trained and armed; a growing exploitation by the élite of the benefits and privileges related to the exercising of power...without sharing such benefits with the other groups (or social classes) of the population which pay a higher and higher price for the power enjoyed by others. The problems of institutional reforms, financial-economic re-conversion and development, education associated with urban unemployment, over-exploitation of the rural areas, abuse/misuse of water and mineral resources, ecological disasters... all these problems have deteriorated an already deteriorated situation, rather than finding rational solutions or benefit from systemic-structural positive action.
This scenario - up to September 11 - was further complicated by external interests and interference, which found, in the internal division, particularly fertile ground on which to act. It was a dramatic scenario, further complicated by repression of every opinion or association, that provoked another kind of protest: the religious, or rather, Islam in its most radical and exasperated form, that Islam mentioned above with its tariqas and its ulemas, with its tablighis and pious movements, an Islam which, apart from being a refuge or the need for a new political culture vs. the Soviet “scientific atheism”, in many cases became the open means of expression for abuse and misery, for the elimination of any pluralistic context.
Islam, however, is not the only form of protest and opposition. Generally speaking, as already mentioned there might have been another category “excluded” from the division of the spoils of power: the Military.
The post-colonial experience has seen a repetition of the same cliché in more than one African and Asiatic region: at a certain point, the Army - excluded from power and its privileges - began to place the legitimacy of the government in doubt and to view a coup d’état as the only means of bringing about change and - why not? - enjoying those benefits so closely linked to political power. In a situation in which the Party was identified with the State, the Military - often perfectly aware of its role, position and Force - had played a central role, conscious of being the only instrument capable of protecting civil society, internally torn and often without a solid political culture, incapable of opposing the régime to any good effect or overthrowing it. In addition, many heads of State - well perceiving the danger of an Army which tended to present itself as a Force independent of state control - had increasingly begun to surround themselves with personal or party militias recruited from their own tribes/clans or even real mercenary forces from outside the country, all of whom enjoyed the privileges of power. History has considered such a situation to have further affected the Army’s morale in that it reduced their prestige and power. At this very point, a coup d’état would become the only way for the Armed Forces to reacquire their status and related privileges...and to change the institutions. This phase - which many African and Asian states passed through following independence in the course of the second half of the 20th century - also witnessed the disappearance of the idea of party, pluralism and democracy, a general de-politisation of the State in the name of global reforms, on the basis of technology and technical efficiency, social and economic development and justice (12) .
Returning to the reality of the Eurasian region following independence, it is interesting to evaluate the extent to which such a theoretical model could be achieved or repeated. Certainly, Central Asia has followed the road to the centralisation of power: the de-politicising of the party (or parties), client-system recruitment, indolence in relation to ecological catastrophes and real problems related to systemic-structural reforms, economic and social development of all classes of society, justice vis-à-vis repression of opposition groups and movements, the organisation of personal militias. Following the scheme outlined above, the step from this phase to the subsequent - that of “the military coup d’état” - seemed to be imminent. However this has not occurred: the newly independent Central Asian states do not have a National Army!
In other words, the Central Asian Republics still lack an institutional military structure which could be put forward as an alternative to the government in power.
There is no organised or clearly identified structure possessing Force to represent an example of order, discipline and unity. But, more precisely, it would seem that the leaders have never desired the existence of such a structure.
It is not, however, correct to say that this structure is inexistent. It is simply “not national”. Up to September 11, the Army proper, in at least four of the five Republics, consisted of the previous Red Army, units of the Red Army who had gone over to the Russian Republics and who were stationed, in one form or another, in one or other of the Republics.
Then the US - in the name of global war against terrorism - came to an agreement with Moscow, and placed their bases and equipments, armaments and units in this crucial region.
This is the major Central Asian variant. Brunelli’s paper well complements both analysis and scenario with figures and material data which enhance this reality.
Beyond the undoubted difficulty posed by sudden independence in terms of “national” security, arms and armaments, specific evaluations can be seen in the decision by each of the five new Presidents to take a different road from that represented by the usual clichés of independence.
The most curious aspect is that - beyond any ideological evaluation - such a road is, all things considered, the most practical, providing a solid element of internal and regional stability. This once again takes us back to the traditional roots of the past.
Given the strongly traditional structure of local society it follows that any recruitment must take into consideration ethnic forces and local tribes, their traditional balances and, equally, their traditional rivalry. Above all, it must take into consideration one aspect typical of the regional social systemic structure: “loyalty” is never to the Institutions but to the Person.
These are the very forces from which the previous nomenklatura - and the current ruling groups - have always drawn their authority, legitimacy and consensus. These are the same forces which, today, provide the various leaders with their private guards, or “National Guards”. But if we wish to speak of a real “national” Army, any such organised army - rather than being a horizontal structure, an impartial guarantor of internal order and national security and stability - would be a structure lacking internal cohesion, where inter-ethnic, inter-tribal and inter-clanic/family divisions would soon infiltrate the ranks, leading to chaos and disorder, with all of those consequences already seen elsewhere (13) .
In conclusion, it is possible to say that there exists a clear logic in the choice of the current leaderships to surround themselves with well-organised and well-armed and trained militias whose loyalty - thanks to their means of recruitment - is well proven and whose task it is to ensure the personal security of the individual leader.A National Army - whose ability, training and discipline would prove fundamental in protecting the territory, maintaining order and ensuring internal security and stability along the borders - has to wait for better and more mature times.
It follows that any security dimension in this region today can only be the result of a collective, cooperative and multi-dimensional action, the U.S. now becoming a major partner.