The tragic, thorny terrorist events happening on the international scenario over the last decade have until now shown that legal protection has been inadequate to counteract the terrorist threat - be it on a national or international level. It should be noted that this has been complicated by the inability to arrive at a common definition of terrorism at an international level (1) . Even though, however, on a national level, the UK Parliament was already aware of the growing need to adopt more adequate anti-terrorism provisions in 2000 with the Terrorism Act 2000 (2) . After the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York on 11th Sept 2001, other European nations adopted legislation to strengthen the fight against terrorism and the UK was obliged to amend the earlier Act by passing the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ACSA 2001) (3) .
The main difficulty in applying legally effective procedures in this field is a linguistic one, that is, to arrive at a proper definition of the term terrorism. It is not by chance that national criminal codes - where they exist, of course - lack a satisfactory definition from the point of view of the ingredients involved in the term. What is more, a major political difficulty has emerged on the international scene, given that it has not been easy to arrive at a common definition of the term based on specified criminal conducts. This is clearly illustrated in the international provisions adopted so far and the difficulty for the States to commit themselves to the adoption of other decisions in this field. The terrorist conduct itself cannot, on the other hand, be easy to identify and classify, given that terrorist organizations make recourse to tactics and methods in constant change in relation to the objectives to be achieved.
What is intended for in this article is to look into the term terrorism as found in European legislation. Here, a distinction is made between mere terrorism and other phenomena, this distinction referring to the use of terrorist techniques to achieve particular objectives, not necessarily of a political character. On this point, it is worth emphasising the tendency in the various legal systems across Europe to draw a line between violent action of a terrorist nature and the force lawfully exercised by law enforcement agencies and military staff. Therefore, if we analyse the language used in the various European legislative texts, it comes to surface that the tendency exists to define terrorist action regardless of either the ideological or political motivation underlying the act being committed.
Against this background, the following is intended to give a short analysis of the relevant measures against terrorism which have been, or are shortly to be, adopted in some EU countries after 11.9. On the contrary, the relevant measures adopted in Italy will be examined in more detail.
In many EU countries proper legislative measures exist to prevent and repress terrorist action, some of which are also established in the framework of international conventions and agreements. The main features found to be in common to all of them can be summarised as follows:
(a) attempting to provide a more precise definition of key terms such as, ‘threat’, ‘terrorist crime’, ‘terrorist association/organization/group’, ‘terrorism financing’, ‘criminal association/organization/group’, ‘association/organization/group’, etc;
(b) qualifying certain actions, such as, money laundering, insider trading, terrorist financing and other similar actions as crimes. These actions now amount to specific crimes where they apply;
(c) establishing bodies to liaise between competent national authorities dealing with the exchange of information in the fight against terrorism, while also providing more powers to the national intelligence agencies;
(d) establishing provisions affecting those who formerly acted as collaborators of justice as well as penalties for participatory conduct (the basis of liability for those who engage in criminal activity for terrorist purposes).
Where Italy is concerned, it should be stated beforehand that until late in the last century at least the law in this country did not rely on a legislative definition of terrorism in line with the legislation emanated after 11.9, nor was there a definition of terrorist offences, these however being created and loosely defined on a statutory basis to apply specifically to participatory conduct. However, viewed more generally, the concept of terrorism is one which appeared in the Italian legislation in 1978, at a time when the reference was made to the phrase purpose(s) of terrorism in article 289bis of the criminal code, this phrase however denoting a matter of aggravation, otherwise termed aggravating circumstance, of the offence being committed. In the wake of such a principle, the rules did not change until 1980 when two other articles were added to the criminal code: article 270bis and article 280, both invariably referring to the phrases purpose(s) of terrorism and subverting the democratic order as appea
ring in the 289bis. To put it differently, the meaning of the phrases gains substance because: on the one hand, the approach taken by the legislator is one which avoids the term terrorist conduct being defined ex se by providing certain types of offences being committed for particular purposes to come simply under the category of conducts amounting to more severe offences; on the other, the critical and explanatory analysis of criminal provisions referred to above is one which makes it possible for the term terrorism to be defined by deductive reasoning, that is, denoting act(s) of violence, in which the conduct is such as to generate politically motivated terror.
So far, the interpretation given to the term by the Italian court decisions in a variety of cases has in fact derived from the assumption that the substance of the term aggravating circumstances rests on the purpose, thus giving weight to destabilising political demands by way of violent actions in such a way as to stir up panic among citizens. In these grounds, however, the Italian Constitutional Court held that the phrase the purpose(s) of terrorist action amounts merely to a ‘matter of aggravation for any type of offence’. This the Court held by maintaining that any criminal action, the purpose of which is to impede, in whatever way, a proper performance of the democratic and constitutional order, will inherently amount to a similar action carried out for terrorist and subversive purpose(s).
In line with the above analysis of the concept, it may be of interest to note how the term terrorism (in particular, the political terrorism of the mafia) was used in Italy above all during the 90s to refer to certain actions carried out by organized crime - actions (4) which by their very nature or intended effects on the Italian Institutions, made the mafia political involvement clear (for example, the passing of a law concerning pentiti or repentant terrorists, and prison treatment). In those years, the raison d’etre of the powers vested in intelligence agencies to cope with organized crime (5) spread from an awareness of the threat (including serious terrorist, mafia-like attacks) likely to be brought about by criminal organizations to national security and economic well-being.
Other provisions however are to be found in the Italian criminal code, that is, articles 305, 306, 307, 309. These articles, while not expressly referring to the phrases purpose(s) of terrorist action or subverting the democratic order, acquire relevance by virtue of a separate type of offences relating to those above.
Following the events of 11th September in the US and the implementation of EU regulations and UN resolutions in this field, three law decrees, which were subsequently made law (6) , have been adopted by the Italian government, the purpose being to counteract terrorism by relying on new, effective instruments. Law n. 438, for example, is concerned with the establishment of penalties for those who engage in the promotion, organization, financing and supporting of associations in the national territory, whose intended purpose however is to carry out violent conduct against persons or property for terrorist purposes outside the national territory. While also creating new offences, such as association having international terrorist purposes and assisting members of a terrorist association, this new law gives more powers to investigation and repressive structures dealing specifically with national and international terrorism action (e.g. preliminary interceptions, or police detention) and has so-called ‘premium measur
es’ extended to cases of international terrorism, these measures being designed to provide incentives to those who help internal disruption of terrorist associations. Law n. 415 establishes penalties in the event of an infringement of the measures adopted against the Afghan faction of the Talebans with the inclusion of pecuniary and detention penalties for those who unlawfully engage in transactions involving dual-use products and technologies (military - civil), which are related to activities carried out by Afghan physical or legal entities or organizations being under the control of the Talebans. Finally, Law n. 431 deals with penalties to be imposed against those who break the rules affecting prohibited transactions, which involve property, services or financial activities relating to terrorism.
This having been said, it becomes apparent that the Italian legislator acted in two ways: on the one hand, he tightened up the penalty system and strengthened the investigatory system; on the other, he extended provisions to cases of international terrorism already provided for in the case of terrorism and organized crime. This was established by providing benefits to those who either intend to detach themselves from terrorist activity, or who are willing to disclose information about terrorist associations (apart from reducing punishment, special protective, assistance and security measures are established for those who are exposed to serious and real danger as a result of their collaboration or disclosure of the relevant information during criminal trial proceedings concerning offences committed for terrorist purposes, provided they contribute in a way which is inherently reliable and relevant for the development of the investigation process, or for the purposes of the trial judgment, or for the purposes of the investigation inquiry into organizations, aims and operational methods of terrorist-subversive organizations).
Within the framework of such legislative measures against terrorist action, mention should be made of a draft bill, now being examined by Parliament, which is directed at upgrading operational capacity of Intelligence Agencies, by providing for new intervention methods in the fight against terrorism, this however including protection measures which are needed to ensure that effective and functional activity is carried out by intelligences agencies.

In the UK, since 1974 the main legislation for the prevention and investigation of terrorism has been included in the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, this however being supplemented by further counter-terrorist statutes - the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the Prevention of Terrorism (Additional Powers) Act 1996 and the Criminal Justice (Conspiracy and Terrorism) Act 1998. These statutes have however been reformed and extended by the Terrorism Act 2000, the provisions of which are given more specificity given that they are largely put in transparent, all-inclusive statutory form. Being originally intended to counter terrorism in Northern Ireland with some provisions also being extended to certain categories of international terrorism, the TA 2000 is designed to provide measures to counter terrorist actions of all forms, national, Irish and international. These features of the TA 2000 then acquire a higher degree of specificity and all-inclusiveness in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. In essence, this statutory text makes significant inroads into the law of terrorism in a way in which the language of terrorism itself makes the relevant statute throughout more accurate and legally certain than earlier statutes in pari materia (7) . In building on the existing legislation (that is, the TA 2000), the ACSA 2001 is intended to ensure that the UK is as ready as possible to defy terrorism in a way in which a major emphasis is placed on the law enforcement agencies rather than the security and intelligence agencies. These informational data are implicitly signalled in the descriptive component of the Act, the long title, which appears at the beginning of the public Act. This title is a helpful summary of the Act’s contents inserted for the reader’s convenience and which owes its presence to the procedural rules governing parliamentary Bills. The long title reads:
An Act to amend the Terrorism Act 2000; to make further provision about terrorism and security; to provide for the freezing of assets; to make provision about immigration and asylum; to amend or extend the criminal law and powers for preventing crime and enforcing that law; to make provision about the control of pathogens and toxins; to provide for the retention of communications data; to provide for implementation of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union; and for connected purposes.
The above wording is one which sets out a statement of purpose: ‘An Act to amend the Terrorism Act 2000’, this however being textualised by the following purpose clauses (set out in general terms):
to make further provision about terrorism and security;
to provide for the freezing of assets;
to make provision about immigration and asylum;
…
to provide for implementation of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union;
and for connected purposes.
By way of implication, these purposes occur to summarise the nature of remedies, otherwise spoken of as the mischief of the Act (8) , by filling in a gap of the legal provisions against terrorism in earlier legislation, therefore strengthening the law of terrorism. On these grounds, in the wording of this modern British public Act, which lacks a preamble and does not contain a section designed as a statement of purpose of the Act, the long title is the only guide to summarise the mischief in an informative manner (9) . For the purpose of this analysis, the mischief may be either a social or a purely legal mischief. In fact, if we look more closely at the ACSA 2001, we find however that the term mischief, as used in English statutory interpretation, refers to two different meanings: on the ground or in the law. Where the mischief on the ground generally refers to a factual condition (causing concern, such as: an increase in mugging, or a decline in the birth-rate), for the purposes of this analysis the term may be renamed as social mischief, and which refers to a defect in the pre-existing law on terrorism (before 2000) which is inadequate to meet the threat of international terrorism, therefore implying a legal defect (in the law).
On reading the text and in order to provide a summary of the provisional content to the reader, the above purposes underlying the mischief will become easier to understand if paraphrased in the following terms:
(a) prohibit terrorist funding when ordered or directed;
(b) ensure that government departments and agencies can share information required to counter the terrorist threat;
(c) enable suspected international terrorists to be detained for an unlimited period of time awaiting decision for deportation on grounds of national security;
(d) ensure that nuclear and aviation industries are kept secure;
(e) upgrade the level of security of dangerous substances likely to be targeted or used by terrorists;
(f) extend the powers of law enforcement agencies (police powers);
(g) ensure that the UK can fulfil its EU obligations and duties in the field of police and judicial co-operation and UK international obligations to counter corruption and bribery.

On first looking at the language of the whole of the 2001 statute, it becomes clear that it is changed and updated where necessary to take into account the latest developments of the law and of changes in terminology and definitions, as well as to ensure it is expressed in modern plain English. In fact, the lexical and morphosyntactic style of the statute is one which cuts away the verbiage and long winded forms of legislative expression found in statutes drafted in the traditional style. It is based on the principle that the words and phrases used should convey the concepts involved in language which will be understood by the audience at whom it is directed, be it the lay or expert reader, and which apply mainly to the English rather than American common law context, but without sacrificing the precision needed to avoid potential ambiguity.
In addition to modern English, the style of the statutory drafting is marked by the use of words and phrases in a way in which their common or everyday meaning is intended to prevail over (‘authorization’, ‘cordon’, ‘government’, ‘serious’, ‘stop and search’, ‘violence’ etc), or alternate with the technical meaning (‘act and action’, ‘chemical weapon’, ‘driver’, ‘explosive’, ‘terrorist property’ etc). This is done throughout the statutory text in a way in which traditional technical terms derived from criminal language occur together with non-technical terms, whether these derive from the position at common law over the years or statutory definitions.
The content of the 2001 drafting is divided into short paragraphs with the heading given in bold-type, to assist the reader to digest the content. On reading the provisional content, however, it becomes apparent that the matters relating to the notion of terrorism are expressed in a concise manner, the object of which being to ensure that such matters are presented in an acceptable form and do not lose their meaning through undue prolixity or poor syntactic arrangement. Consistency in the use of definitions and terminology is maintained throughout the text to ensure that, for instance, two different definitions are not used to refer to the same thing. However, a lower degree of consistency is to be found in the text as to how certain definitions are drafted: there are instances of terms being left undefined or poorly defined (10) .

The term ‘terrorism’ has for long been included in the category of ‘political offences’, otherwise known as ‘offences against the state’ (11) . The political character of such an offence is still taken to refer, in broad terms, to the use of violence for political ends, including the use of violence for putting the public in fear, and which holds similarity with the Italian concept.
Under the Treason Act 1351, the following prohibited acts constituted the offence of treason:
(a) compassing the death of the King, the Queen, or their eldest son and heir.
(b) levying war against the King in his realm.
(c) adhering to the King’s enemies in his realm, giving them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere.
The Treason Act 1351 was originally intended to apply to breach of the feudal and personal duty of loyalty to the reigning monarch. Although the concept of treason remains a breach of the duty of allegiance (12) , the tie is now political, it referring to a system of government under a constitutional monarch, rather than to a particular individual.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the wording of the 1351 statute was adapted to the altered needs of the time. The acts of treason under the new statute came to be described as ‘constructive (13) treasons’, that is being held as such by judicial construction. The resulting statute, the Treason Act 1795, enacted that such constructive treasons were definitely treasons, but under the Treason Felony Act 1848, almost all of them constituted felonies, usually known as ‘treason felonies’.
In relation to the first head (a) of the definition of treason in the 1351 Act, although the wording appears to cover mere thoughts, it was held, on account of a subsequent clause in the statute, that an overt act manifesting the criminal intention and tending towards the accomplishment of the criminal object is necessary to render the accused guilty. Words spoken in the course of conspiring or inciting to kill the Sovereign (14) were held to be sufficient to give rise to criminal liability, but not loose words spoken without reference to any act or project, such as saying that the Sovereign is no more fit to be King than an ignorant shepherd. By judicial construction, however, the phrase ‘compassing the King’s death’ came to include compassing the end of his political existence, as by someone who promoted a revolt in a colony, or by inciting friendly aliens to invade the kingdom (15) .
In relation to the second head (b) the doctrine of constructive treason was fully developed. The phrase ‘Levying war against the King in his realm’ was held to include a riot or insurrection for some general public purpose, such as changing government policy, effecting an alteration in the law, etc (16) .
In relation to the third head (c) of treason, the phrase ‘Adhering …’ is clear in that any aid and comfort to the enemy may amount to adherence (17) .
More recently, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989 contains a number of offences as well as other provisions (relating to matters such as arrest, detention and interrogation), necessitated by the situation in Northern Ireland. In using such phrases as ‘proscribed organization’ as in ‘if any person belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organization’ also found in the ACSE 2001, an offence of terrorism is committed by ss. 3, 9, 10 and 18 of the 1989 Act under the following terms:
‘soliciting, inviting or receiving a contribution in money or other property towards acts of terrorism connected with Northern Irish affairs or the affairs of the United Kingdom or any part of it other than Northern Ireland; soliciting or inviting a contribution in money or other property to a proscribed organization, or making or receiving any such a contribution to its resources; and failing without reasonable excuse to disclose information, knowing or believing that it may be of material assistance either in preventing an act of terrorism connected with Northern Irish affairs or in securing the arrest, prosecution or conviction of a person for an offence involving such an act of terrorism’.
The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991, while also creating provisions for the questioning, searching, arresting, and trying of suspected terrorists, defines a ‘terrorist’ as a person who ‘is or has been concerned with committing or attempting to commit any act of terrorism or directing, organizing, or training people for the purpose of terrorism’.
The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 amends the 1989 Act by making it an offence to be in possession of an article reasonably suspected to be for a purpose connected with an act of terrorism. Section 16A of this text reads:
‘A person is guilty of an offence if he has any article in his possession in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the article is in his possession for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism to which this section applies’.
The section goes on to describe similar acts of terrorism, these being however either those connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom or those of international terrorism. Under this statute, it is also an offence to collect information or be in possession of information likely to be useful to terrorists.
Leading on from a similar historical account, then, the statutory definition of terrorism as we know today is one which, while denoting a politically or otherwise driven action involving serious violence against any person or property, causes particular consequences to the people. In Part I (Introductory) of the TA 2000, the term ‘terrorism’ is defined as:
[1] the use or threat of action where:
(a) the action falls within subsection [2],
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and
(c) the use or threat is designed for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.
[2] Action falls within this subsection if it:
(a) involves serious violence against a person,
(b) involves serious damage to property,
(c) endangers a person’s life,
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.
[3] The use or threat of action falling within subsection [2] which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection [1](b) is satisfied. (Section 1). (the author’s emphasis)
This definition is wider than that of previous legislation (18) , in that it now fully embraces international terrorism and action by domestic extremist groups both in the United Kingdom and throughout the world and includes action against any Government.
The drafting of the definition in [1], [2] and [3] is an example of a comprehensive definition, in that it sets out to provide stipulatively a full statement of everything which is to be included in the term. It is also an example of a referential definition, in that it attracts meanings established throughout the statute. Viewed as a comprehensive definition, then, the meaning of the term is one which is also given by way of cumulative (and) and alternative (or) conditions or cases introduced by the words where and if, all of which must be satisfied within the system of paragraphing.
On reading the statutory definition and the whole of the statute, it becomes apparent that they are both silent about the precise meaning of ‘seriousness’ of action, the result being that the statute provides both the lay and expert reader with no guidance as to the interpretation of the word (19) . In such instances, therefore, the linguistic issue is raised as to the semantic value of ordinary language occurring in the statute, that is, the boundary of synonymy, hyponomy, variation of meaning, contextuality and intertexuality of indeterminate statutory terms. Faced with such an indeterminacy, however, under the current law, what constitutes a ‘serious’ violence or damage will be a question of fact in which there is room for judicial discretion. Indeterminacy also holds good for the term ‘violence’, this also being undefined in the Act. But, viewed intertextually in those texts which are in pari materia, it is presumed that the term bears the same meaning as found in s. 8 of the Public Order Act 1986 to mean ‘any violent conduct’, in which the use of the determiner any is such as to suggest that whether or not action is violent is a question of fact, which is left up to judicial discretion.
These comments also apply to ‘use’ and ‘threat’. The term ‘threat’ seems to bear the everyday meaning of ‘an expression of an intention to harm someone with the object of forcing them to do something’ or ‘other hostile action’. Although the ‘threat’ or the ‘action of threatening’ is an ingredient of many crimes, in which it must also be qualified as ‘immediate and unavoidable’ conduct, one may assume that the threat may, as in common speech, either be by gestures alone (e.g. brandishing of a weapon) or be by words alone, or be a combination of both (e.g. waving a car-jack accompanied by words like “I’ll get you with this”). Although in the case of words, they will normally be spoken, on the face of the legislative wording it seems that they will equally apply if the threat (for terrorist purposes) involves one of the situations described in s. 2(a) to (e), or is communicated by influencing the government or intimidating the public or by advancing a political, religious or ideological cause
(s. (b) and (c), or involves the material use of firearms or explosives with intent to endanger life (s. 3). To put it differently, the indeterminacy of the legislative wording seems to suggest that the threat may either be verbal or material or a combination of both. However, the phrase ‘endangers a person life’ is somewhat misleading in that this offence does not require, under s. 1[2] of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, that life is actually endangered, it only requires that the accused (e.g. the terrorist in the ACSE 2001) intended to do so or was reckless as to whether life would be endangered (20) . As is clear, the level of guilty mind (mens rea) varies from intention to recklessness, the latter being either subjective or objective recklessness.

4.1 ‘Act & action’, ‘property’, ‘public’, ‘government’, ‘terrorist’, etc: how defined?

While some definitions are contained within the relevant sections, others are to be found in s. 121. For ease of reference, the following are illustrations of the drafting style of some of the statutory terms in the 2001 Act.
To begin with, the term ‘government’ is left undefined in the Act. Regarding ‘act’, Part VIII, s. 121 reads:
In this Act:
“act” and “action” include omission.
but in Part 1, s. 1[3] which is concerned with ‘Action taken for the purpose of terrorism’, it is stated that action:
includes action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organization (21) .
The meaning of ‘public’ is given by way of implication in relation to the compound structure ‘public place’, therefore being an example of a poorly-defined term. In Part VIII, s. 121 states that:
“public place” means a place to which members of the public have or are permitted to have access, whether or not for payment.
The term ‘property’ is defined in Part VIII, s. 121 in which it is provided that:
“property” includes property wherever situated and whether real or personal, heritable or moveable, and things in action and other intangible or incorporeal property.
Like the term ‘public’, the definition of ‘property’ also occurs in relation to ‘terrorist property’. Part III, s. 14 states:
[1] In this Act “terrorist property” means:
(a) money or other property which is likely to be used for the purpose of terrorism (including any resources of a proscribed organization),
(b) proceeds of the commission of acts of terrorism, and
(c) proceeds of acts carried out for the purposes of terrorism.
[2] In subsection [1]:
(a) reference to proceeds of an act includes a reference to any property which wholly or partly, and directly or indirectly, represents the proceeds of the act (including payments or other rewards in connection with its commission), and
(b) the reference to an organization’s resources includes a reference to any money or other property which is applied or made available, or is to be applied or made available, for use by the organization.
The term ‘terrorist’ is defined in Part V, s. 40 as:
[1] In this Part “terrorist” means a person who:
(a) has committed an offence under any of sections 11, 12, 15 to 18, 54 and 56 to 63, or
(b) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.
With the exception of poorly-defined or undefined terms, the drafting technique of the above definitions illustrates however the mere intention of the legislator which is to clarify a term used in the text which may leave doubt in the mind of the reader as to exactly what is or is not intended to mean or be included in it. This is due to the fact that the ordinary dictionary meaning of the term is not wide enough to cover every eventuality arising in the circumstances, therefore not establishing a more precise, legal meaning. Being designed for the avoidance of doubt, therefore, such definitions also ensure that legal certainty is achieved. However, the drafting technique is one which ensures that they will work in the context in which they are used and that their content (that is, what is included in or omitted from them), will not cause difficulties when interpreting the provision.
Moreover, the above drafting technique is one in which definitions are loaded with material, that is it expresses multiple definitions for one meaning. This feature not only points to the need for the legislator to be as strict as possible in the formulation of legislative sentences, but also justifies the social mischief referred to previously, as well as the legal defect. In such instances, while not referring to specific duties, powers or privileges, consideration should be given to whether some or all of the material concerned should have been set out in separate sections. Perhaps, the reason for not doing so lies in the fact that the reader may overlook it, or find it difficult to retain the additional information in mind when reading separate sections.
The use of ‘include’ (4 occurrences in the definitions under analysis) further illustrates the need for the legislator to have the ordinary meaning of the term extended by a definition which includes something which is not within its ordinary material meaning. This case does not, however, fully apply to the term ‘organization’ which seems to be left to merely a general, ordinary meaning also in the statutory definition of the ACSA 2001, which then comes to bear a degree of similarity with the dictionary definition.
For example, the New Oxford Dictionary of English (1998) defines the term as:
‘[organization] an organized body of people with a particular purpose, especially a business, government department, or charity’
whereas in section 121, Part VIII of the ACSA 2001 the term is given an inclusionary, though rather vague definition as:
‘[organization] includes any association or combination of persons’
therefore resulting in a poorly-drafted definition.
In contrast, the use of ‘means’ (2 occurrences in the definition under analysis) is one in which the term is defined so that it is restricted to the narrower meaning for the purposes of the Act, that is to indicate one single object and nothing else. This is done in the Act by indicating in the definition what is excluded, by implication, from the meaning of the term as used in its defined sense. In such instances - it should be emphasized - a difficulty seems to arise from the use of the connective or in the definition of ‘terrorist’. Although or is usually interpreted as exclusive so that it calls for a choice between the matters which it links - for example, black or white coffee, it may however be inclusive so that, in some circumstances, both of the matters that it links can be fulfilled. Thus, or may, in an appropriate context, be interpreted as and (conjunctive). In such instances, any attempt to linguistically identify or either way, would be inconclusive, given that it would again be for the judge to properly identify the criminal liability of the agent (the terrorist) on the instant case. This is due to the fact that criminal liability can in this case arise either in relation to the situations described in [1] (a) or in (b) or both, the latter however raising liability for participatory criminal conduct of the alleged terrorist and of organization. This is displayed by the phrase ‘concerned in terrorism’ which acquires a specific meaning outside general, ordinary language (22) .
Leading on from this, the concrete use of statutory terms, whether ordinary or technical in the ACSA 2001, is one which suggests the need for the Act to apply stringent rules in order to meet the threat of terrorism in such a way that the legal community is likely to understand and act upon immediately. This in turn makes the provisions of the Act all-inclusive, specific and transparent.

In this article, the author has attempted to describe how the recent terrorist events have forced EU countries to either introduce or increase legislation in order to counteract terrorism. Up until these events, the definition of the term ‘terrorism’ was a loose one, also often being misused for one reason or another. However, the use of the term in EU legislations is found to carry a political meaning. The meaning of the term in the Italian legislation is one which is derived deductively in relation with the purpose(s) of the terrorist conduct, this amounting to a subversive, political action against the democratic order.
Where the UK is concerned, in building on earlier legislation, the wide statutory term ‘terrorism’ has for long been included in the category of ‘political offences’ to extend to a variety of other offences.
The notion of terrorism has made significant developments in the TA 2000 and ACSA 2001, the latter signalling the need for the notion to have a wider application and scope to cover international threats in a way in which emphasis is laid on the law enforcement agencies.
The need for the relevant statutory texts to avoid potential ambiguity and make the legal rule certain, is signalled by the plain English drafting style in which the meaning of words and phrases flows between ordinary and legally established usage, whether by statute or common law.
Except for instances of undefined terms importing indeterminate meaning and which are open to room for manouvre by the court, the remainder is an example of definitions being drafted comprehensively by way of loaded material. While expressing multiple definitions for one meaning, a similar drafting technique is one in which the one-only concept (means) or extended, inclusionary ordinary meaning of terms (includes) provide the language of the 2001 statute overall with a specific and all-inclusive character, therefore ensuring that it will work in the context in which it is used.









Reference

ACSA 2001 and related Acts available at www.hmso.gov.uk (under Legislation - United Kingdom - Acts of the UK Parliament - full text Public Acts - 2001)
Italian Law Decrees 438 of 15 December 2001, 415 of 27 December 2001, 431 of 14 December 2001 available in this site.
Pearsall (ed), 1998, The New Oxford Dictionary of English. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Simester, A.P. & Sullivan, G.R. (2001), Criminal Law. Theory and Doctrine, Hart Publishing, Oxford.
Case law
Damaree (1709) Foster 213
Hensey (1758) 1 Burr 642, 19 State Tr 1341
Lynch (1903) 1 KB 444, 72 LJKB 167
Longhorn (1679) 7 State Tr 417