(1) The end of the bipolar confrontation and with the subsequent radical change in international relations have both contributed to the emerging of new threats which the intelligence world will have to face in the near future.
The concept of national security is expanding towards new fields: economy, environment, demography, computer science, migratory flows, communications.... Among these, the economic dimension, in terms both of protection and of development of the national economic system, certainly plays a leading role. This calls for a rethinking of the traditional concept of national security.
In such a context and with a view to encourage concrete co-operation among European Intelligence Agencies, an international Seminar on "Economy and national security: the task of a modern intelligence Service" took place in Rome on the 1st and 2nd of March 2001.
The Seminar allowed participants to share experiences in relation to economic intelligence, both at the operational and organisational level, within a context where the need for information exchange and international co-operation has become more and more pressing.
A wide and in-depth debate developed during the Seminar following the contributions by renowned speakers, which we publish hereafter, confident that they will be of interest to our readers.

The aim of the present paper is to examine some practical aspects of Economic Intelligence (EI). I will not define it, as the previous speaker has already done that in a most exhaustive way. I would nevertheless like to underline that the ways of dealing with EI should differ from those used in general security intelligence. EI has its own peculiarities and patterns which differ from those present in other fields of the intelligence activity.
In order better to define the scope of this paper, I believe it necessary to start from the concept of collective interest, as EI represents within this concept an extremely significant element.

We need to place our perspective against the current, ever changing background, in fact:
a) we witness an increasing globalisation of economic and productive processes, with the progressive fading away of the so called "economy of Institutions", which is being replaced by the "market economy";
b) we observe the widening of the areas where wealth is present, with the economy of the United States of America losing its centrality (also with respect to currency) and a marked tendency towards geographical diversification in the distribution of income and wealth;
c) we note that this wealth has, at the same time, an extremely volatile nature - consequence also of the new technologies spreading in the financial and trade markets all over the world.

These developments do not seem to be coupled to an adequate and proportionate harmonisation of the legal and institutional monitoring instruments. It is now therefore necessary to put into place some forms of monitoring and control over strategic economic and financial activities, both at a domestic and international level, in order to carry out an effective contrasting action against those using economic means with destabilising aims.

Each country should therefore create intelligence structures specifically geared towards economic-financial information gathering activity, also in view of the fact that today the threats against national security are not easily identifiable (there is not one single enemy), but are markedly diversified and can take the following forms:
a) computer hacking against computerised stock exchange centres;
b) formation of cartels by large international economic groups, through "concealed" agreements;
c) penetration by foreign interests into vital, national strategic economic sectors (like energy);
d) pollution of the legal economy by criminal organisations.

This latest point is of particular relevance because money laundering may affect:
· the domestic scene by way of its impact on the macro-economy, that is on the circulating currency and on real interest rates with the ensuing alterations - and on operators, like banks and financial brokers;
· a country's international position, undermining its credibility and that of its system.

In this perspective, economic intelligence becomes an instrument for the protection of the national economy yielding advantages also to the financial community in the defence of democratic security as a common interest.

As to the contents, the intelligence activity in the economic and financial fields should aim at:
· verifying short-term economic and financial processes, in order to recognise possible anomalies or elements of interest;
· processing information and transferring the ensuing evaluations to the Government Authorities;
· foreseeing medium-term developing trends.

How can we recognise EI relevant information?

EI relevant information is not represented anymore by individual pieces of intelligence, valuable as they may be (i.e. a patent for a weapon or a military strategic secret). It should instead be the result of a combination of intelligence elements gathered in a wider perspective (i.e. considering together market quotas, economic and financial indicators, stock exchange indicators etc...). In other words, for EI the individual datum does not carry any value if it is not inserted within a wider flow of intelligence.

On such a basis, we therefore state that the current intelligence operative approach should undergo some changes: as a matter of fact, the agent's role, his function as a "sensor" centred on the physical presence on the location where the information may be produced has lost most of its significance. While a shift in favour of a new operative approach, assigning priority to the specific know-how and to the ability to analyse and interpret events and more complex economic trends should take place.

Firstly it should be clear that any form of monitoring or control in the EI sector should be based on a precise selection of objectives and then translated into an accurate operational activity. This the task of the political Authority, called upon to closely interact with EI operative branches.
In order to create a successful EI operational structure, three aspects can not be overlooked:
· structural characters of the service (planning of the macro-structure);
· definition of the organisational roles, with the assignment of specific tasks (planning of the micro-structures);
· management "procedures" with reference to human resources and to the definition of the relations and the intelligence systems (planning the operative mechanisms).

Undoubtedly, the most significant aspects of EI peculiar are its operational traits. As I said before the intelligence gathering activity should not be carried on a occasional basis and with a restricted perspective, rather it should be based on a broad, far-reaching approach. That is, in EI the information gathering activity cannot be confined within the investigative police methods, know-how and expertise. An additional effort by way of the assembling and processing of the data available is needed. Further, because of the huge variety of sources to consider, a specific ability is needed in selecting and evaluating the relevant information, this is vital for any agent or agency operating in this sector. The threat in fact may not be easily identifiable in one single piece of information, it sometimes may be hidden within a whole information flow. The ability is not so much in searching for the danger, but rather in recognising it through selecting, processing and evaluating intelligence.

In the arrangement and distribution of professional profiles, priority should therefore be given to:

· specific backgrounds in economic and financial analysis, with knowledge of a specific sector be it related to products, operators or markets, to a geographical area or to a country;
· specialisation in socio-political-institutional analysis in an international perspective;
· specialisation in criminal analysis, with knowledge of the criminal-economic field;
operative and liaison capabilities.

In order to translate into practice what has been so far said, the first step to take is to define accurately the objectives we want to achieve. We must distinguish between:
· wider ranging strategic objectives. In other words the areas, the interests and the economic-financial functions whose protection is vital for national stability; and
· more selected tactical-operational objectives in specific contexts to be protected in order to preserve a credible, competitive and efficient national system.

In practice the strategic objectives of EI could be the following:
· commercial competitiveness of national enterprises;
· balance of competition within a specific sector as to the offer and ensuing protection of market demand in order to guarantee a fair level of competition - both in terms of quality and quantity - with the control over the development of concentrations, on agreements (and on the market levers, that is on the quantities on offer and on the selling prices), on "hyper-competition" and on the abuse of dominating position;
· critical geo-economic international scenarios, (i.e. European actions to support the socio-economic development in the Mediterranean area, or economic crises in the Balkans due to continuous civil conflicts);
· protection of economic policy instruments from interference by large foreign groups or by financial market operators, which could render them uncontrollable.

With reference, instead, to the tactical-operational objectives, we underline the need for greater intelligence resources to be destined to the monitoring and control of pathological aspects within national financial trade operations. Just as an example I would like to mention the impact on Italy of the Albanian crisis in the second half of the nineties. An extremely deep financial crisis, brought about by transnational criminal organisations, which caused panic and chaos in that country, and was followed by an immigration wave whose consequences we are still experiencing today.
So in order to be able to monitor and control effectively both the threats and the opportunities provided by the economic and financial sectors it is necessary to identify some specific areas of interest:
· financial frauds and false social communications. Within this context specific attention should be focused on those frauds carried out using computerised channels for remote payments or financial transactions (remote banking). In this respect a successful intelligence action should be based on specific know-how in computer technologies, analysis of companies' balance sheets, financial brokerage and on financing contract-instruments.
· insider trading and market disturbances, both causing alterations to the normal conditions of information diffusion and to operators' expectations;
· "underground" credit channels, as in the case of "money-worthy goods" (gold and valuables, art and antique objects, archaeological finds, flight tickets) used for non official, unregistered transactions;
· money laundering, directly threatening national credit and saving sectors and, indirectly, the legal economy and the peaceful living together of the national community;
financial havens. This area calls for a sharpening of the intelligence action rather than for threat-identifying effort.

Finally, I would like to focus the attention on a controversial problem area: the legal framework within which the Services' intelligence and preventive activity (within national borders) takes place.

When considering also the recent developments in organised criminal activities, we should with no hesitation call for a strengthening of the Services' means and powers. Only with regulations allowing "undercover", infiltration activities and granting wider protection to the agents working in the field, we could hope to achieve significant results.

In the same way, the provisions on the upholding of official secrecy by members of the judicial or administrative sectors should in some way be limited.
In this perspective we would like to see the development of a new way of considering intelligence, with respect to the defence of national interests, as a precious instrument for the improvement of the common well being.

The end of the world conflict in the middle of the last century and of the cold war between opposing geopolitical blocs thereafter was a boost for world-wide economic growth, albeit in a reality of considerable imbalances between differing geographical areas. In the context of growth and economic competition we find, on the international level, also the struggles between state systems for political supremacy. The dominance of markets is no less important than the dominance of territory, eventually pursued through military means.

Economics and especially finance exercise a pervasive influence on politics and on social relations: on the orderly and fair functioning of markets in large part depends also the very structure of democracy. In Europe itself, the path to forms of political integration has to pass through the achievement of a high level of harmonisation among economic systems, the abolition of national currencies, the introduction of a single currency and the unification of economic policies.

The 'economisation' of society and of national and international relations requires a substantial level of integration and interdependence of economies at the international level. In a situation like this, 'contagion' spreads rapidly and 'epidemics' flourish.

Organised crime reaches into the markets with its harmful influence and at the same time infects the white-collar sector. The defence of what makes up democratic society and the security of its citizens rests upon the safeguards provided by the public economic order, national and international. Confrontation at the financial level constitutes an important part of the overall strategy.

The entry into the financial circuits of money from illegal activities has the potential to injure the efficiency and stability of both markets and the single players in them. Alongside the aspects relating to money laundering and their impact on the functioning of normal mechanisms, there are also risks to security, which demand particular attention: The concentration of illicit resources in countries and territories that afford them asylum through services that disguise and reinvest them weakens the overall system of international struggle.

The poverty of controls and defences found in some countries and the inadequacy of supervision of their markets offer opportunities to organised criminal gangs who, through the manipulation of illicit means, can also pursue their plans to take over significant areas of political power.

In Italy, as in other countries, attention to economic phenomena, especially the financial area, is of vital importance for those authorities which, in various sectors of the public life, exercise controls, safeguards and guarantees: the civil and penal magistracy, investigating bodies, the appropriate supervisory authorities, the Italian Foreign Exchange Office as the anti money laundering body, and the Intelligence Services.

Prevention, unmasking and opposition to anomalies and illegal situations cannot be other than a multi team effort and of international import.

2.1 Between Countries
Differences between national money laundering regulations and the respective instruments for control are the determining factors in money laundering decisions. It can be taken for granted that international flows of illegal money gravitate towards systems with less intensive and less extensive constraints and controls. The different regulatory systems are assessed and weighed to discover the more favourable ones, especially in terms of the costs of money laundering operations and of risks of detection.
If faced with the choice between different regulatory regimes criminal groups will seek out the less stringent environment, and once illicit funds have emerged clean and legal they will be re-routed back to the home country of the criminal gang that produced them.
It is well known that anti money laundering systems are for the most part based on assigning to financial intermediaries 'collaborative' tasks than demand, among other things, organisational duties, information gathering, and reporting. The absence of homogenous regulations in different countries, therefore, could produce a double 'crowding out' effect: money laundering flows tend to be attracted to the less rigorous regimes and enterprises (especially intermediaries) in virtuous countries have to bear the burden of eroded competitiveness at international level.
Obviously, uniformity of regulations must be established at the highest possible levels of rigor. National policies must be supported by research, at international level, for a level of harmonisation adequate to eliminate or keep to a minimum the disadvantages arising from regulation arbitrage and competition between regulatory systems.

The illicit gains produced by organised criminal gangs in those countries where they are strongest, find in other countries services for disguising and reinvesting. What comes into being are specific policies for attracting wealth of dubious origin from abroad: this is done by providing conditions of substantial anonymity for operators, of poor transparency of ownership, by easing procedures for the creation of entities and companies, by putting up obstacles to international collaboration with other authorities involved in investigations into illegal activities.
The international community is addressing this by means of initiatives geared to the isolation of such systems and by adopting adequate countermeasures. The International Group for Financial Action (IGFA), which was set up in 1989 on the initiative of the G7, has proceeded to identify those systems which, because of poor attitudes towards anti money laundering can be classifies as 'non-collaborative' in the economy of international action. Beginning with the Forty Recommendations with which the IGFA, in 1990 and 1996, set down the basic principles for anti money laundering systems, specific criteria have been identified for measuring attitudes towards contributing to the collective effort for the prevention and confrontation with money laundering.
The list of 'non-collaborative' states, after analytical assessments, was published on 14 February 2000.


2.2 Between Money Laundering Authorities (UIF)
The seriousness of money laundering goes beyond the field of penal law. In its major forms it appears in the markets as a financial phenomenon. The system of prevention and struggle rests on two basic co-ordinates: first, involving the intermediaries operating in those markets where the phenomenon exists, intermediaries who have obligations for detecting and reporting anomalies and second, creating functions for the investigation and financial research into suspicious cases, assign them to special public authorities who usually will be different from the investigative bodies whose task is to ascertain (also in the courts).
For the EU member States, the first steps are contained in the EEC Directive 91/308 which refers to 'authorities responsible for the fight against money laundering' as those to which intermediaries are to send their reports of suspicious operations and the appropriate supervisory authorities are to signal the suspicions of money laundering detected during their controls.

Updates of the anti money laundering regulations of the EU, and a new Directive on this are being drafted at the moment. In the decision adopted by the European Council on 17 October 2000, in the context of the 'Third Pillar' (on the question of investigative-judicial matters) and sent to the Member States, the principles and regulations to which collaboration between the 'Financial Information Units (FlU)' must conform are set down in detail. Above all, these latter are identified as the central national authorities empowered to receive, investigate and transmit to the competent bodies reports of suspicious operations. Two observations must be made here. First, the FIUs must be 'one unit for each Member State', leaving to the member States the choice of the nature (administrative, investigative, judicial or mixed) of the body. Second, the necessary and important functions are 'the reception and investigation into' the reports: these are administrative tasks of financial analysis without any investigating aspect so much so that, as expressly stated, the reports, after examination, are to be sent to different 'competent bodies' of the FlU.
The reception of the EU Decision into Italian law was rapid. In the regulations that came into force on 1 January 2001, the Italian Foreign Exchange Office was recognised as the Financial Information Unit for Italy.
The exchange of information with peer foreign authorities is, for the UIC, an indispensable instrument for the complete evaluation of the reports of suspect transactions.
On the one hand, there is the membership of the 'Egmont Group', an informal body made up of anti money laundering Authorities from various countries. In this forum, common problems of co-ordination are confronted and initiatives are taken to improve standards of collaboration. Particular attention is given to Memoranda of Understanding as bilateral instruments for sanctioning and regulating information sharing.
On the other hand, UIC pays especial attention to the writing of protocols through which collaboration with foreign counterparts is reinforced and made more efficient. Up to today, seven agreements have been reached; five more are under examination.

The EU has started the FIU.Net Project, which will set up a computerised network for the exchange of information among Anti Money laundering Authorities. This is different from the traditional model of bilateral collaboration in that the project envisages the possibility for widening the sphere of the Authorities involved in the information sharing beyond the requesting and requested ones, in order to include in a multilateral system third Anti money laundering Authorities who may possess relevant information.

Collaboration among FIUs is crucial to the introduction of the single European currency: in the present transitory phase and in the conversion and retiring phase of national banknotes, the highest attention must be paid to identifying 'anomalous' operations.

3.1 The role of the Italian Foreign Exchange Office
The functions and powers of the UIC in matters of money laundering derive from at least a decade long evolution of regulations.
In September 1997, UIC received reports of suspect transactions from banks and other intermediaries. It proceeded to examine them in detail and through financial analyses to detect possible evidence of money laundering. The reports, set out in a technical report, were sent to the competent investigative bodies who in turn carried out their own investigations.
The basic safeguards against money laundering were recently extended to persons carrying out non financial activities considered especially important for the prevention and fight against money laundering on the financial plane.
In the framework of interventions designed to bring Italian regulations into line with the introduction of the single currency, the structures of the UIC were reorganised in 1998 as well as the areas that come under its functions.
Italian legislation followed the indications of the EU to extend the range of functions to be attributed to UIC. From 1 January 2001 UIC was entrusted with advisory functions to both Parliament and Government in matters pertaining to the prevention and struggle against economic crime at the area of finance.
Furthermore, UIC was charged with detecting cases of particular seriousness in which regulatory and administrative provisions of a general nature could permit the emergence of conditions favourable to money laundering. Such cases are to be reported and where possible together with opinions on possible counter initiatives to adopt.

3.2 The Role of the Intermediaries
Collaboration from banks and other financial intermediaries by means of periodic reports on suspect operations are the conditio sine qua non of anti money laundering activity. This is guided by rules of behaviour and instructions formulated by the Bank of Italy in its so-called Ten Commandments.
It is important that full 'active co-operation' be encouraged by removing the more significant obstacles to it at the moment. Climate and environment in areas with highest criminal presence also have significant impact since they breed intimidation especially for the smaller intermediaries and those operating in small towns and villages. Yet another problem arises from the distancing between banks and customers being caused by new forms of banking like Internet Banking, Trading On-Line, and so on.
Investigations into suspect reports have enabled the identification of recurring financial behaviours in reports carried out as a result of similar suspicions. This allows us to re-construct operational schemes - 'discovered - in examining specific cases and thereafter in finding well-established practices - which, once known to be a common factor and signalled back to the reporting intermediaries, make it easier to uncover other similar activities. Thus 'active collaboration' is further strengthened.

3.3 The Role of the Supervisory Authorities and the Investigating Authorities
Anti money laundering activity depends on dialogue and co-ordination between UIC and both the Supervisory Authorities and the Investigating Authorities.
Money laundering and economic crime are complex activities and can be tackled only through multi-disciplinary counter actions.
Existing regulations on supervisory authorities, on banks, financial intermediaries and insurance envisage modes of collaboration and co-ordination. Supervisors inform UIC about operations possibly linked to money laundering uncovered during inspections. They also participate directly in investigations on such suspect reports. Between UIC and the Investigating Authorities with responsibilities involving suspect cases there exist multiple flows of information. These latter must be notified about cases in the files. Likewise, other information that the Investigating Authorities will communicate to UIC is that on 'circumstances in which facts and situations emerge and knowledge of which may be useful for preventing the use of the financial system for purposes of money laundering'. But rather than on the creation of new, autonomous powers, the structure is based on setting up relationships between authorities, according to a 'network' in which the flow of information and experience is crucial.
In this prospect, situations can be identified in which UIC, as the FlU, and information services, within respect of their spheres of responsibility, exchange information and experiences, outside references to specific cases. In the case of UIC, whenever they receive information on anomalous financial operations that, even apart from aspects relating to money laundering or financial crime, still raise suspicions about their possible impact on security, may signal the case to the latter. And vice-versa, if the Services when carrying out investigations uncover suspect financial activities relating to the work of UIC, they too may communicate such to UIC.
Reciprocity can become an important element within the new advisory duties and the oversight regulations entrusted to UIC in matters of money laundering and economic crime.
Possible urgency with the introduction of the euro could well be a good testing ground for the kind of collaboration based on reciprocity in information sharing on risks and on the identification of tools, behaviour or geographical areas deserving particular attention.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the liberalisation of world trade, the recognition spread that a State's economic security was becoming at least as important as military security, if not more important. This reality, in turn, means that intelligence services are faced with the need to re-structure their organisations and rethink the way they train their personnel.
At the same time the onrushing pace of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), together with the spread of global competition – these being the main components of the new economy – leave government officials and business executives with no choice but to carefully analyse economic perspectives and to select the most effective development strategies in a geo-economic as well as a geopolitical context. Not long ago it was only the multinational corporations that were faced with these critical decisions, but now even small and medium-sized companies find themselves up against the same challenges. As a result, the organisations charged with national security face new and even more challenging responsibilities.
This burgeoning demand for economic intelligence raises a second problem: what limits should be set on such operations given the natural theoretical tendency and the very real pressures to expand them? A survey carried out by the IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Études de Defense Nationale) in Paris extends the content of the term intelligence to include any sort of information-gathering, its analysis, and its transformation into strategic decisions to help businesses to compete internationally.
As in the case of public order, the manifold questions raised by the IHEDN survey impose a clear separation between the role of intelligence operations mounted by companies and the State's intelligence services. It would be better to stick to the traditional definition – that is relating to national security – but it will be difficult to avoid a comprehensive use of the term. The rapid broadening of the concept of intelligence is very likely to become a problem in itself. The suspicion is bound to grow that intelligence services are preparing to interfere into the economy to an even greater extent than is the case today, creating a new form of government control over the market and new obstacles to the growth of truly free competition. In practical terms it is true that a relationship does exist between the various forms of intelligence, since an efficient level of public order and of national security can no longer exist without a satisfactory level of strategic planning on the part of business leaders and of economic policy-makers, so that the country remains competitive in an economic environment open to global competition. Having said that, however, it is vital to define very firm limits to the activities of intelligence services in the economic sphere, to avoid having national security concerns gnaw away at the advantages of a global market that is truly free and competitive.
While we can say, therefore, that both the business sector and the State need to know the economic, political, and social environment in which they operate, analysing information in order to ensure their continued growth, it is still preferable to restrict the concept of intelligence to the activities that guarantee national security in the military and civil spheres, including – in the latter – all the economic aspects that might endanger that security.

We should start by rejecting the thesis that Nations are now obliged to turn over their decision-making powers to the market, or, alternatively, to supra-national authorities, thus progressively giving up their sovereignty (democratic, monetary, or fiscal). The basic idea underlying the research carried out by IHDEN is that the State is no longer the key actor in the field of economic intelligence. This idea derives from a distorted concept of the relationship between the State and the market. The Cold War ended, as we all know, with the victory of free market systems over centrally planned economies.
Only a sovereign State, which reflects the popular will, can protect its citizens from the effects of a massive concentration of economic power, from monetary and financial excesses, and from business operations that are criminal in nature. In a recent research co-authored by Carlo Pelanda and myself, we identified the political vacuum that accompanies globalisation as one of the dangers to the security of the democratic State, and therefore to world security (5) .
We proposed that each nation should establish an exclusive collaboration with international organisations (the UN, the IMF, the WTO, the EU, the ECB, etc.) -- once they have been reformed -- aimed at recovering the sovereignty "lost" to the market. In brief, it should be the task of the supra-national organisations to recover the sovereignty that has fallen into the market's hands in areas where the market has no right to possess it (monetary and fiscal policy, the protection of the job market and of savings, and, in general, the broad policy choices that take place in a democratic system), not in order to keep that sovereignty, but to restore it, strengthened, to the nation States.
The State must never abdicate from its responsibility for managing popular sovereignty, since a political vacuum will sooner or later degenerate into social chaos – thereby threatening the security of its democracy.
Today, unfortunately, we are witnessing an opposite trend. On the one hand, there is a widespread and passive acceptance of the expropriation of national sovereignty by the global market which fixes the rules and imposes them on individual countries. This situation must be dealt with politically. Until the problem of who should exercise sovereignty is resolved, the role of intelligence becomes compromised because the State no longer has a true strategy of economic security, which is instead imposed by the markets and by international organisations. The resulting confusion over the role of intelligence is not limited to economic intelligence. Rather, it is part of the more general problem of where the State's sovereignty is now domiciled. At this point it is up to the countries themselves – and their respective intelligence services – to collaborate in establishing regulations and mechanisms that can enable them to recover their sovereign economic powers from the market.
That effort also implies a new conception of the State's intelligence apparatus, based on the realisation that in a world of ever-increasing freedom, information, and globalisation, it is impossible to conceive the security of a democratic State without a high degree of collaboration between countries, and between the countries and the supra-national organisations – a collaboration founded on a growing sense of trust in both directions. The challenge is to seek – through commonly accepted rules – a balancing of those regulations with economic freedom on the one hand, and with the important role of the international organisations themselves.

To explore the challenges posed by economic intelligence, the Italian government established two committees. The first was chaired by the late Ambassador Egidio Ortona in 1992, and the second by General Roberto Jucci in 1998. Three main problems need to be resolved in organising intelligence services specialised in economic information:
· to identify the precise economic risks that affect national security;
· to establish very firmly drawn areas of competence for the different information and security agencies;
· if a new intelligence bureau needs to be set up, make sure that it is designed to do the job.

In line with the findings of the Jucci Commission and bearing in mind the evolution of national economies and of the global market, we can identify ten categories of potential risks to the economic security of the State.
1. modifications in the international economic order;
2. anarchic migratory flows that have as their purpose the economic destabilisation of certain countries;
3. biological and ecological manipulation;
4. crises of cultural or religious identity;
5. changes in the equilibrium between different geographical regions;
6. systemic domestic or international banking or financial crises;
7. crises and distortions in production set off by economic alterations;
8. industrial espionage (as well as espionage for military purposes);
9. an increase in the vulnerability of IT and telecommunications equipment;
10. the growth of crime-related economic activity through any form of "distorted" capitalism (usury, the exploitation of minors, damage to the environment, abuses in the management of savings, etc.);

The Jucci report lists three fundamental principles to follow in tackling problems shared by all the countries examined.
· the competence of various agencies concerned with economic intelligence should be delineated by the basic concept of a democracy's "physical and economic" national security;
· particularly in its start-up phase, the activities of intelligence in the economic field must be kept one step behind its potential pace so as not to create the idea that the State intends to meddle in private economic transactions,
· it is necessary to broaden the amount of information available through the collaboration of all the institutions of the State.

In organising an economic intelligence service, it is important to concentrate on the following steps:
· identifying and contacting every economic data bank that is already involved in national security;
· motivating individuals in the field of defence, in the fight against crime, and the maintenance of public order;
· always and exclusively focusing on the threats to democratic security;
· collecting information in order to act on it, using adequate technical tools;
· employing an effective system of internal controls to compare the objectives with the instruments being used.

The intelligence service can be organised around six centres that will have these functions:
· a technical one for gathering all the pertinent information;
· a technical one responsible for analysing the data to identify potential risks;
· a technical-political one charged with weighing both the data and the analyses in order to determine what action should be taken;
· a political one that must evaluate the proposals for action;
· a technical one to operate internal controls;
· a technical-political one responsible for external relations;

My conclusions are these: the rapid change of political and economic conditions in the world involve every aspect of the lives of nations and their citizens, imposing a parallel evolution in traditional attitudes and a profound ongoing effort at cultural and professional adaptation. Intelligence services are in no way exempt from this process. They must constantly update their ability to control the risks that nations now face in the vast field of "economic security" due to the ever-freer flows of goods, of capital and of labour that are synthesised in the term "globalisation," and to the rise of virtual spaces compared to physical ones. Just as there is a new economy that presents us daily with its traumatic effects on economic activity and on social cohesion, so there must also be a new intelligence.
This paper has proposed a number of reflections with the aim of outlining a more precise configuration of what its operational goals should be.

Modern organised crime has for some time been undergoing changes in relations to the illicit markets it get involved in, to the instruments it uses and also to its structure. Markets, in particular have widened significantly and in time they have considerably grown and diversified. Today "goods" of all kinds - from tobacco to drugs, from arms to toxic waste produced by big industries to "dirty money" to be laundered and reinvested - are traded from "producing" to "consuming" countries. Recently organised crime running illegal networks, has also started to use human beings as "goods" to be traded for profit or used for prostitution and labour exploitation. Further evidence is emerging that even newly born babies and organs of young men and women may be the objects of illicit trade by criminal organisations wishing to increase profits and wealth.
Furthermore, another element of novelty is to be found in the instruments organised crime can today use. They are not only the channels for the quick transfer of illicit goods, which in some areas is made easier by the elimination of borders controls, nor the technological developments in communications but mainly they refer to the global dimension of financial markets and the appearance in this sector of technological means which are very difficult to monitor successfully. Further more it should be considered the option of trading on line which means to be able to trade through the Internet. The birth of the electronic Communication networks (systems which allow investors to trade in stocks anonymously) could lead to the creation in the future of a world stock exchange.
Therefore, the widening of illicit markets, the mobility of "goods" traded in them and then transferred from one country to another, the globalisation of financial markets needed to invest the huge profits, the technologies available in this and in many sectors have all had a significant impact on the structure of criminal groups which have recently assumed a transnational dimension. During investigations carried out on multiethnic or multinational groups and on the illicit trade networks in various countries, a new reality has been uncovered: these structures are made up of people from different ethnic groups and nationalities who co-operate successfully gaining benefits in term of criminal power from each organisation and from the interaction with the other groups.
In facts, the transfer of illicit goods from the producing country to the final one, through "transit countries" would not be feasible without co-operation from local criminal groups. The same also applies to investments: "dirty" money is produced in one country but thanks to international accomplices is often laundered and invested in a different country.
Even those criminal groups (like the Sicilian Cosa Nostra or the "ndrangheta from Calabria" for whom the control of the territory has always been vital) are changing their outlook and are thinking more in terms of "networks", adopting a structural scheme suitable to the new markets and the globalisation of financial and economic systems.

The experts of criminal economy have signalled two events: the agreement reached within the WTO which established that starting on March 1st 1999 banking and financial services could be offered in 102 countries with no limitations or discriminations for brokers; the second event relates to a report by the World Bank, for the year 1997, signalling the increase of illicit production and trafficking and the multiplication of co-operation agreements between criminal organisations of different nationalities. This confirmed the "globalisation" of organised crime .
Experts underline that banking and financial markets have a crucial importance for a significant and long lasting growth of the legal economy, but at the same time these markets have become absolutely necessary for the development of the illegal economy. Individuals with criminal intentions can enter the legal economy more easily now through operators or through banking and financial markets and instruments. Therefore, criminal groups are placing in high ranking decision-making positions individuals with specific expertise in the economic or financial fields. In this way criminal groups are able to launder and invest money successfully, but they are also able to "launder" their people introducing them into the high finance world. Criminal economy needs the financial markets and, over the last two decades, this interconnection has become more complex and articulated. The demand for financial services by "globalised" illegal markets, has significantly widened.
During a recent conference held in Gand on January 23-26, 2001 on EU and US policies for fighting organised transnational crime, the Belgian Prime Minister, the Swedish Minister of Justice and a delegate from the US Ministry of Justice rightly stressed how the changes undergone by organised crime in the last decade are so deep that it is often extremely difficult to distinguish legal operators from those acting as "front men" for criminal groups active in different continents. In Italy, too, the Mafia-type enterprise has developed significantly in the production of legal goods and services,, in other words in those activities which can better fit into the legal economy thus polluting it. First we saw the birth of criminal - legal enterprise, where the registered holder, formal or real, is an associate of a criminal organisation, and the capital of the company comes entirely from criminal activities. The "goods" produced are instead legal and the company‘s activity is carried out in a formally legal way. Then, the situation has evolved (with the aim to protect the business activity from new legislation aimed at hitting illicit wealth with seizure and forfeiture) in the illegal - legal enterprise, the capital still has a criminal origin and the effective owner is the "mafioso". The formal holder is instead an apparently clean and respectable individual a "front man" who runs the company with legal means and rules. This is the current, and most common mafia owned enterprise. At present this enterprise is developing in a more modern and dangerous form the so-called "legal - illegal" one. It is an enterprise born legally but that at a certain time starts to interact with mafia - type groups and with their capitals. In this instance, the enterprise formally appears legal and operates according to markets rules, unlawfulness lays in the joint presence of legal and illegal interests, partners and capital. The trends outlined have caused active Mafia-type enterprises which carry out productive business to be cleaned and legalised and registered in the name of new criminal entrepreneurs. Modern organised crime represents a threat for democracy both for the traits it has acquired and for its pervasive action within the legal economy and also because it can influence the development of the entire society.

In this perspective the need and the legitimacy of an intelligence activity in the field of criminal economy become unquestionable. The aim should be to uncover, to identify and possibly to eliminate that "grey area" in the economy which makes it more difficult to separate what is "clean" from what is "dirty".
On the basis of what has just been said our national legislation provides in this sense. SISDe (sec.6.1, L.801/1977) "fulfils all intelligence and security tasks for the defence of the democratic State and of the institutions the Constitution has placed at its foundations against anybody undermining them and against any form of subversion". The intelligence activity carried out by the Service on the criminal aspects of economy is therefore functional to protecting a constitutionally guaranteed right (freedom of economic enterprise) and of the State's democratic structures. Furthermore, sec.1.D.345/1991, conv. into Law.410/1991 thus provides "it is within SISDe's and SISMi's competence, respectively for the internal and the external area, to carry out intelligence and security activities against any threat or subversive attempt by organised criminal groups to undermine institutions and the development of the civil living together". Para 2 sec.3 L. 509/1996 ("Institution of a Parliamentary Enquiry Commission into the Mafia phenomenon and on other similar criminal associations") states that "State secrecy can never be upheld in cases of facts linked with Mafia, Camorra or other similar criminal organisations, in so much as they represent subversive acts against the constitutional order".

Considering the transnational character of organised crime and its economic activity - production, laundering, reinvestement of proceeds into the illicit markets but also in enterprises producing licit goods and services - it becomes evident that intelligence can have an effective impact only if a reciprocal exchange of information among institutions of different countries is available. The principle of co-operation has now become the connecting element between democratic States and, as stressed in the Gand Conference, it is necessary to operate along three mains lines: co-operation among EU countries, between EU and countries aspiring to EU membership and between EU and the United Stated. Co-operation structures are already operating in the law enforcement and the judicial sectors: EUROPOL, the European Judicial Network created on the basis of the EU Council Joint Action of 29.6.1998, and also EUROJUST is due to allow a co-ordinate approach to transnational crime investigations.
The principle of co-operation is further stated in the UN Convention for the fight against transnational organised crime, opened to signature to all UN Nations in Palermo on December 2000. In the specific sector of suspect financial operations covering money laundering activities worthy of a mention is the EU Council Decision of October 17, 2000 which provides for the member States to assure that Financial Information Units - function carried out in Italy by the Ufficio Italiano Cambi - would exchange all information available which could be useful for the analysis or the processing of information and for investigations by the Financial Information Units on financial operations connected with money laundering and on natural or legal persons involved.
My belief is that in dealing with criminal economy intelligence organisations it is important that each State should seek closer co-operation for the exchange of information between the intelligence and the financial sectors in order to prevent and fight successfully money laundering and other aspects of economic crime.