"Culture is a system for creating, sending,
storing and processing information ..."
E. Hall

The term "culture" is certainly among the most misused ones nowadays.
Evoked more and more frequently in debates, public discussions, reflections and analyses of various kind, it portrays a concept as abstract as superficial and vague.
How many times have we heard simple comments but also complex conceptual debates dismissed with the expression - good for any circumstance but sometimes depressing - "it's a cultural problem" or "we must change the culture"?
A similar conclusion often implies confusion and misunderstanding of the flow of events, at best (it is implied) it means that the solution will require a very long time, the variables are independent and that any kind of intervention is of difficult handling.
The risk in the use of this "secret weapon" within intellectual reasoning as well as in planning innovations, is the same present in any postulate that wishing to encompass everything inevitably ends up meaning nothing.
If everything is culture, nothing is culture.
It is true, on the other hand, that the concept of culture is expressed by a term which has been interpreted in many different ways.
Originally elaborated by anthropologists (the first definition goes back to 1871 to the English anthropologist Edward Burnett Tylor: "Culture is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society") this term, perceived at first in the field of social sciences as somewhat lacking concrete references, has over time assumed different meanings and connotations more specifically linked to the human experience where the concept is frequently applied.
A peculiar but significant fact is that a vast bibliography deals exclusively with the many definitions of the term "culture" from the philosophical, psychological, normative, historical or sociological point of view. Likewise, a large number of in-depth studies have been devoted to the "individual" dimension of the definition of culture, that is to its interpretation in a social perspective, starting from the relations among individuals and developing the subject in connection with the older word of "civilisation".
The evolution of social life has, undoubtedly, enabled us to perceive the plurality of the different cultures.
Luckily, the times when somebody (real or fictitious) would dread hearing the word "culture" have long gone. The same can be said for those theoretical generalisations (at times still emerging) which tended to reduce the wealth of human experience mingling culture with scholarship or with some other form of knowledge linked to the peoples' evolution, social classes, human experiences.
And luckily, in contemporary terms, we can state that a clear awareness of a common meaning for "culture", the one we perceive in a museum, among the architectural beauties of an old city, in the pages of Borges or Calvino, or inside one of Mozart's ingenious scores does not prevent us from referring daily also to the youth culture, the business culture, the political or academic culture as well as to the new age or to the underground culture.
This is not the place to go further in-depth on this issue also in consideration of its vastness, but nevertheless if the purpose of these reflections is to remain within the two definitions indicated in the title (intelligence culture and institutional culture) we need to understand exactly what we are talking about, going directly to the core of the subject. So, leaving aside the question on what is culture, we should now look at the kind of culture we are interested in.
The main risk which we have foreseen (if everything is culture then nothing is culture) is that abstract or inadequate terminology and definitions become an obstacle to planning, to innovation or to change. Playing on what has previously been said we could talk of a "cultural alibi". Thus, in order to avoid such a risk we need to search for some linguistic or conceptual parameters able to improve mutual understanding, to make communication virtuous and constructive and to avoid the danger, valid for culture, that talking about change might be an obstacle to change.
In this sense, the wide debate on culture, in its universal aspects from the definitions of the Latin masters to the significant statements by Voltaire and Montesquieu, in the European experience has been squeezed into a single container where the peoples' history of culture and civil history have been joined together in a symbiotic process.
We could say, instead, that the history of culture coincides with the history of values, that is with social development in its expressions, as a synchronic whole of different "cultures".
From the socio-political point of view, the values expressed by the various cultures are closely and necessarily interrelated and are objectively linked to the scale of fulfillment of social values.
Within the rule of law, the summa of such values is present in the Constitution. It must be kept in mind, however, that even Constitutional principles on the one hand tend to become obsolete, therefore needing change, and on the other are continuously subjected to a search for balance in order for them to be fulfilled.
In this framework the institutional culture and, more specifically, the intelligence culture find their natural placing.

This Magazine bears the subtitle "intelligence and professional culture magazine".
The declared intention is to move away from a certain abstraction, inevitably intrinsic in the logic category, and to link the concept to the intelligence organisations' internal and external profiles.
From without the organisations, "intelligence culture" could mean a widespread and recognised awareness that the intelligence gathering process - with the ensuing analysis aimed at supporting political decision-making on threats to national security - is an unavoidable step in a modern State.
This awareness, beyond the mere normative aspect, should be translated into Government policies and implies the acceptance of the intelligence modus operandi. This is marked by confidentiality, sometimes by secrecy and, in a State respectful of constitutional guarantees, is carefully monitored. In other words, the intelligence activity is not that of a Secret Police which is obviously incompatible with the principles in force in any advanced legislation. It is deeply different, it does not necessarily develops in connection with criminal phenomena, it has a marked preventive connotation and entails specific methods justified by the Constitutional significance of the objective pursued (sensitive intelligence for national security). Such an objective can at times be achieved only through a modus operandi, if not legally codified, legitimate in its objective.
From within the organisations, instead, intelligence culture could mean first of all a rooted awareness of the delicacy of the task, a qualified and thorough preparation, strict ethics and a loyal acceptance of all the controls provided for by law.
The two stages of such a (welcomed) cultural development have to rely on two driving forces closely interrelated. It is in fact impossible that such a culture could develop in presence of inefficient and disloyal organisations. On the other hand it is obvious that the community could not fully benefit from such a service if those involved feed upon diffidence and suspicion, manipulation and the obsessive search for hidden motives behind public events, without political guidelines which are essential to the intelligence activity.
The two driving forces move, or should move, within the domestic and the international realities.
Such a context is in itself variable, thus any process of change can turn into a path full of obstacles. This applies in general terms to the scarcity of information which is often another considerable obstacle for the solution of intelligence problems. But also, in particular, when examining one of the typically Italian legal paradoxes: the existence of strict rules to protect minimal secrets versus the absence of provisions to protect necessary secrets.
One can easily assert that in Italy a culture of intelligence - under the two aspects we are examining here - has never existed. Only recently, as will be explained later, a development in this direction is starting to take place.
It is hard to believe that in the past the institutions or the Intelligence Services could welcome a culture of intelligence. Beyond evaluations that are not appropriate here, countless legal records and parliamentary committees confirm that for a long time the activity of intelligence gathering was regarded as an exclusive military function. And, when carried out internally was considered only as a collection of data on people and movements, not always legitimate and heavily influenced by external factors linked to the changing historical contexts. This probably followed the overall functioning of the institutions at the time.
The intelligence bodies, for their part, possibly lacked a modern and democratic approach. They did not seem to possess clear identity and role, lagged behind international developments and appeared to maintain a subordinate and unaccountable position.
And yet Law n. 801 of 1977 (still in force) opened new perspectives. Now that we are discussing a necessary reform of the intelligence system we appreciate this modern and fine Law which about 20 years ago, for the first time in Italy, gave way to a modern intelligence.
Worth mentioning are some of the most significant innovations introduced by this piece of legislation, which are still valid and must be considered corner stones of any modern conception of intelligence. In the first place the establishment, like in all modern democracies, of two intelligence services, one tasked with internal security. Then the clear distinction between these bodies' role and that of law enforcement agencies - Intelligence Services' members do not possess the status of law enforcement agents - in this way the law recognises the peculiarity of the intelligence activity. Further, the aims of the Services' activity are clearly provided for together with an oversight system at parliamentary level. Finally, the possibility to manage the administrative and personnel aspects with a certain amount of controlled flexibility.
Notwithstanding, from recent experiences we have learnt that the sole rule is not sufficient. The development of a "culture of the common interest" is the key to bring about effective change. In other words, in order to bring about real innovation it is not enough to reform the legislation, a general social and political awakening is also necessary.

Even though some clues can sporadically be found in the Constitution and in some judgements by the Consulta, our doctrine lacks specific indications as to the concept of national security. Our country's institutional development has, over the years, delayed the consolidation of a national identity and of common interests as unifying elements of the society. Political instability, policy makers' diffidence towards the "intelligence community" increased by the absence of mid to long term plans and coupled with some responsibilities by the Security Services, have for a long time caused intelligence to be perceived by institutions merely as confidential information, rather than what it should be: a valuable policy contribution closely intertwined with the State's most vital interests.
In other words, a sort of "culture of the common well being".
Only recently, despite difficulties and contradictions, a yet to be consolidated institutional change, inspired by political events and other factors (e.g. the end of the Cold War and the developments of the Clean Hands revolution) has led to focusing the political debate on elements previously unknown within the political-institutional system, giving the clear impression that there is a real opportunity for a new innovative phase.
The wide acceptance of concepts such as "government culture", "opposition culture", stability as well as alternation; the relevance the institution of referendum has acquired in recent years as a tool for bringing about fundamental changes in the institutional policies; the reinterpretation of the political parties' role (considered by some as champions of the national identity and by others as a hindrance, with all the ensuing new patterns of organisation of political consensus and support) are all indications of a movement towards a new "culture of the national interest". This is slowly spreading to the institutional system bringing into it new logics of a common identity and "super partes" common interests.
This new frame is a bound reference for a fair rather than neutral intelligence, committed to the protection of the community's interests.
This perspective will allow our system to get closer to the highly-appreciated Anglo-Saxon patterns, whose intelligence fairness, efficient organisation and protection of basic State interests have been widely recognised.
The above mentioned Law n. 801 of 1977 has probably represented a lost opportunity, proving that intelligence cannot rise from nothing. The renewal of our institutions could represent a historical opportunity for planning, efficiency and updating.

In other words, a valid security policy should be able to identify the fundamental needs looking beyond everyday requirements and party interests. The handling of foreign policy in Britain and in the United States in key historical moments has clearly demonstrated that such a perspective is feasible. It is not a question of reducing Government guiding powers but rather of gaining access to a new culture.
It would be too simple and unfair to assert that Intelligence Services can only work if the security policy and the institutions work in the way we have here tried to highlight. However, it is a fact that the diffusion of an institutional culture, conceived in a wide sense as a joining point of strategic public and private values and interests of the Nation-system, represents an essential step in a modern democracy.
We have already dwelled upon the circumstance that Law n. 801 could in the past, but still today can, supply an efficient scheme to follow. Experience has brought about a widely shared need to intervene and integrate its contents only on three items (operational guarantees, oversight system, State secrecy) confirming that the overall framework remains valid.
Further, it is necessary to integrate intelligence in the Government action in order to establish cooperation and ensure constant information during the decision making process. Thus, the Intelligence Services must cooperate not only with Police Forces but also with the whole administrative system. In other Countries, intelligence "covert operations" are carried out by means of exclusively administrative agreements with State bodies, who recognise the Services' special function. French and British decision making panels use the intelligence product together with other important contributions from the civil society and from institutions to support the decision making process.
Is it possible to follow a similar path in our Country?
There are some encouraging indications for the future. The activity carried out during this Parliament by the Parliamentary Oversight Committee on the Security Services is certainly remarkable in this respect.
Setting aside any preconceived idea the Parliamentary Committee accepted to take on significant institutional responsibilities, qualifying the Services' work and protecting them, without sparing the appropriate remarks, from manipulations. This is just to demonstrate that the monitoring activity can be carried out without questioning the function.
An important example of such a situation is represented by a recent instance of "State secrecy upholding" before the Judicial Authority. The Government brought it before the Constitutional Court and this resulted in two instances of clash of competences versus the Public Prosecutor's Office to the Bologna Court. The Parliamentary Oversight Committee on the Intelligence Services has unanimously defended SISDe's activity, on a key intelligence issue.
There are more considerations in favour of our thesis. As an example we can mention that only a few years ago a debate on Intelligence Services' non-conventional operations, that is covert operations involving "ultra legem" activities, met with diffidence and doubt. Instead today, and already for some time, the creation of a regulation system for warrants, controls and protection for intelligence operators has been called for by many.
Bills aimed at regulating this issue and presented by all political parties are evidence of the rise of this new cultural awareness. Parliament is then responsible for the ensuing legislative initiatives. Worth mentioning is the fact that despite what happened in the past now when the Goverment submits its periodical report to Parliament, drawn from the analyses and forecasts elaborated by the Services, meets an attentive and qualified audience.
On such a new basis one would hope that the security policy too can be part of an overall institutional renewal. This should follow a pattern (so far never applied) but already present in our legislative structure.
Thus, the old culture which pushed the Services into the background is doomed. Intelligence Bodies should instead fulfil an essential constitutional function, representing a resource which, like every other public body, the Government should make full use of in the interest and as a security guarantee for the whole community, which so demands.