Routine protective measures fall under several technical headings, primarily installation security, personnel security, document security, and communications security. During times of prevailing domestic and international tranquillity, all of these security measures contribute to the deterrence and prevention of incidents entailing malicious penetration and violence. On the other hand, during times of turmoil or in preparing for domestic and international contingencies, success against actual or potential aggression is predicated upon early detection of the aggressor's capabilities and intentions.
In the case of the classical battlefield, knowledge of enemy capabilities is the focal point of interest at the tactical level, while knowledge of the enemy's intentions is paramount at the strategic level. The need for this knowledge has been translated into criteria and procedures aimed at producing essential elements of information (EEI), other intelligence requirements (OIR), and, more comprehensively and systematically, order of battle (OB) intelligence. With regard, in particular, to the imminence of aggression and the avoidance of surprise, indications-and-warning intelligence (I&W) criteria and procedures have likewise been developed.
These procedures and criteria are not entirely or indiscriminately applicable to terrorist aggression, which, on account of its nature and manifestations, not only rejects the principles governing a civil and democratic contest but also lies outside the dynamics of the classical battlefield. Nevertheless, if terrorism, domestic as well as international, is to be countered, it is precisely the capabilities and intentions of the various terrorist groups and their supporting networks that must be identified and dissected early on from an intelligence perspective. The skillful adaptation, as opposed to the direct adoption, of time-tested classical intelligence methods, particularly indications-and-warning intelligence, constitutes an essential step in this direction.

A series of grievous incidents recorded in recent years in such disparate places as Paris, Jerusalem, Oklahoma City, Algiers, Dhahran, Lima, Karachi, Nairobi, and Dar es Salaam - and accompanied elsewhere by a myriad of less serious ones - dramatically confirms that, on the eve of the third millennium, no community is immune to terrorism. Even more disquieting is the realization that contemporary terrorism, now approximately thirty years old, still foils the adoption of a definition based on broad consensus and continues to defy classical crime prevention and repression criteria. To this negative situation must be added a widespread tendency to label as terrorist a variety of heterogeneous acts of violence and intimidation whose only common denominator is the inducement or spreading of fear.
Although universally used, the term terrorism lacks precision and is highly controversial. The ensuing consequences are several and interrelated. First. In the absence of definitional consensus, international resolutions on counteraction are adopted without specifically defining the threat. Second. Even national criminal codes and statutes rarely and unsatisfactorily define terrorism. Third. The term is subject to indiscriminate use or blatant abuse by journalists, bureaucrats, activists, and policy makers frequently bent on discrediting adversaries. Fourth. The interpretation of the terrorist phenomenon is repeatedly based on perception as opposed to objective findings. A considerable portion of all reporting and analysis constitutes therefore a low quality product. Statistics are likewise often unreliable.
This unhealthy state of affairs is facilitated by the complexity of the factors behind terrorism and the methods employed by terrorists to exploit them. Moreover, terrorist structures, tactics, and sources of support afford limited predictability since terrorism is neither a monolithic nor a static phenomenon. Even when certain patterns are discernible, the phenomenon is accompanied by spasms. In the presence of many variables, predictions are naturally risky.
Despite these difficulties and constraints, a working definition of terrorism based on empirical findings must be formulated and indications-and-warning intelligence criteria must be specifically tailored to meet the ongoing terrorist threat.
In practice, terrorism constitutes politically-motivated criminal violence perpetrated by clandestine groups and means domestically and internationally. Three fundamental elements consequentially differentiate terrorism from other phenomena.
Criminal violence distinguishes terrorism from the exercise of legitimate force by law-enforcement agents and military personnel pursuant to pertinent legislation. Moreover, contrary to their claims, terrorists do not qualify as combatants, since they fail to meet the provisions of international law regarding warfare. Ultimately, a terrorist act is a crime because of its nature (murder, abduction, malicious property damage, etc.) and finds no legal justification in either the ideological commitment or the political intentions of the perpetrators. While in terms of perception it frequently happens that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter," in legal terms a terrorist is always a criminal.
Political motivation distinguishes terrorism from common and organized crime. Terrorists pursue political aims, whereas common criminals and crime syndicates seek non-political objectives, predominantly of an economic nature. To be sure, there are frequent cases entailing criminal self-financing by terrorist groups, as evidenced by robberies and kidnappings for ransom. At the same time, there are even more frequent cases of collusion, as part of reciprocity arrangements, between organized crime, on the one hand, and political figures and/or administrative entities, on the other, as evidenced by electoral favors and money laundering. However, in each instance these activities or relations are purely instrumental. The political motivation behind terrorism and the economic motivation behind organized crime remain unchanged and certainly distinct. This fundamental distinction is not altered by the fact that the incidence of organized crime can and does undermine the authority of the organs of government and does disrupt the orderly workings of the nation-state itself.
Conversely, religious fanaticism can be an integral part of political motivation when religious extremists, instead of practicing their religion as faith, pursue it as ideology and thus enter the realm of politics. The analyst must, however, differentiate between theocratic-motivated terrorism and the violent acts of deranged individuals as well as pseudo-religious sects. The violent actions of a deranged person are by definition senseless and cannot therefore be either politically or religiously categorized. The violence of a pseudo-religious sect constitutes, in turn, a highly complex psycho-sociological phenomenon, which, contrary to terrorism, is usually harmful almost exclusively to the members of the sect itself, whose sectarian aspirations and practices by definition lie outside the boundaries of both conventional and unconventional political dynamics.
Lastly, clandestinity distinguishes terrorism from ordinary political violence - such as clashes between ideological/ethnic adversaries or unilateral civil disturbances - whose dynamics are always overt. Indeed, even the violent and unlawful acts of so-called autonomists (of the left) and skinheads (of the right) normally do not reflect the element of clandestinity and are not therefore classifiable under the rubric of terrorism. The same can be said with respect to the disorderly, violent, intimidating, and illegal behavior of any politically-motivated rioting mob.
Closely linked to the above-formulated working definition of contemporary terrorism are two additional characteristics of this phenomenon. First, its date of birth coincides with the widespread pursuit of ideological and political goals through forms of unconventional conflict inaugurated in urban areas in the mid to late 1960s. Second, it reflects "terror from below" or, more accurately, the dynamics of subnational groups, which should not be confused with "terror from above" perpetrated by totalitarian regimes within their respective states or against dissident expatriates abroad. "Terror from above," also known as state terrorism, is a considerably older manifestation of terrorism that coexists with the more recent subnational variety.
It should finally be noted that terrorism manifests itself either as a stage within the spectrum of unconventional conflict or, sporadically, as a tactic. As a stage, terrorism follows subversive agitation - which combines routine non-violent methods with less-frequent violent ones - and precedes, if successful, insurgency, the third stage. A significant distinction between the second and third stages is the power to control national territory: while insurgents exercise partial control at least part of the time, terrorists totally lack this capability. Moreover, terrorists tend to be urban-based, whereas insurgents tend to be rural-based. Extremists often graduate from the subversive agitation stage to that of terrorism, but far less frequently do terrorists become insurgents. Still, a major concern posed by the stage of terrorism is the fact that failure to contain it invites insurgency. As a tactic, on the other hand, terrorism can be present in any stage of unconventional conflict from subversive agitation up to and including civil war and revolution. When utilized as a tactic, terrorism has short-term goals. It is predominantly at the international level that terrorism constitutes a tactic.
Terrorism assumes an international character when it involves citizens or territory of more than one country. International terrorism is normally the result of "spill-over" or extended activity by ideological or ethnic formations operating independently or in concert with foreign kindred groups. Moreover, in a number of cases, international terrorist operations enjoy the support of sponsor states that resort to terrorism, or exploit it as an instrument of policy. Acts of state-sponsored terrorism are inherently more menacing, because they threaten not only domestic tranquillity but also national security.

The above summarized empirical findings provide a frame of reference for developing a specific set of indicators for terrorist threat assessment in terms of both terrorist strengths and weaknesses, in other words, indications-and-warning intelligence. What follows is a list of tentative steps, which, if properly adapted to different geopolitical settings, may serve as a substantive element in planning terrorism counteraction. Both components of terrorism counteraction - anti-terrorism or passive/defensive measures and counter-terrorism or active/offensive measures - are predicated upon the collection, evaluation, and analysis of timely and accurate intelligence.
Although this collection-evaluation-analysis process is usually regarded as falling within the jurisdiction of the nation-state, it should also be conducted - through public domain sources and governmental liaison - by the private sector to the degree and extent that passive/defensive measures legitimately contribute to enhancing individual and corporate security. It should not be forgotten that business certainly remains the most frequent target of international terrorism.
First: Identify exploitable societal conditions: historical, political, economic, social, and religious.
Terrorism does not develop in isolation but feeds upon and exploits a wide variety of societal conditions present in a given community, country, or broader geographical area at a given time. External geopolitical factors can also serve as a stimulus for terrorism in a specific area. Terrorist attacks are in fact frequently conducted out of sympathy for causes extraneous to the venue where perpetrated. By way of example, the recent simultaneous attacks against the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam appear at this time to be extraneous to issues concerning either Kenya or Tanzania.
Second: Determine the presence of one or more radical subcultures.
While societal conditions strongly influence the birth and viability of domestic as well as transnational terrorist groups, particular attention should be devoted to a dominant factor: the presence of one or more radical subcultures. These subcultures draw their inspiration from well-defined or even hazy ideologies corresponding to leftist, rightist, ethnic, theocratic, or mixed schools of thought. Subversive agitation - the first stage of unconventional conflict - is the offspring of a milieu directly traceable to a radical subculture. In turn, terrorism, in its "terror from below" variety, grows out of subversive agitation. Hence, a triangular relationship, facilitated by exploitable societal conditions, stands out: radical subculture, subversive agitation, terrorism. In the absence of a radical subculture, negative societal conditions are likely to generate civil strife, disturbances, and other forms of overt and violent protest rather than terrorism in the strict sense of the term.
Third: Monitor subversive agitation: revolutionary publications and propaganda as well as anti-institutional demonstrations and activities.
Because subversive agitation constitutes the operational cradle of terrorism, it is imperative that it be closely monitored. Subversive agitators typically recruit additional subversive cohorts, incite the populace to disobey the laws, create civil disorders, and resort to overt street violence. Moreover, since groups of subversive agitators who have not reached the terrorist stage often coexist with ideologically kindred terrorist groups, the former can provide recruitment and support pools for the latter thus reinforcing the terrorist ranks. In turn, the presence of subversive agitators belonging to different radical subcultures increases the potential emergence of terrorist groups with contrasting ideological or political orientations, thus producing more sources of terrorism. Not least, subversive agitators from time to time resort not solely to ordinary - that is, overt - political violence but also to terrorism itself as a tactic.
Fourth: Analyze terrorist ideological tracts and responsibility claims to identify ultimate goals and intermediate objectives.
Terrorist literary production, though often untruthful or based upon an ideologically-biased perception of society, furnishes nonetheless valuable insights regarding the mindset, self-image, aims, and preferential targets of a given terrorist group. Terrorist manifestoes and declarations can also indirectly provide data to assess a given group's organization and capabilities.
Fifth: Record systematically all terrorist incidents to establish modus operandi.
Modus operandi, whose sophistication varies according to group, includes recruitment, training, and employment of personnel; targeting (selective and/or indiscriminate); tactics (weaponry selection, ambush attacks, raids, abductions, hijackings, hostage situations); patterns (time element, coordinated attacks, target clusters, major and complementary actions); internal security and communications; logistics and finance; responsibility claims; and captivity rules. Modus operandi reflects both current and potential capabilities of specific groups. The fact that two or more groups issue from the same radical subculture is not necessarily indicative of shared operational methods and practices. Modus operandi is also subject to modifications over time.
Sixth: Determine the structure of terrorist groups to assess capabilities.
The structure of a terrorist group is indicative of immediate as well as longer-term potential. Unicellular or multicellular and compartmentalized, terrorist groups are rigidly or loosely structured with centralized or decentralized leadership. In some cases they can also serve as an umbrella for lesser aggregations. Militants are part-timers, full-timers, or mixed. In many cases terrorist groups reflect an ephemeral or ad hoc aggregation. Structure - and size - will affect not only security, discipline, training, command, control, communications, planning, operations, and logistics, but also a group's life span. Groups belonging to the same radical subculture do not necessarily, and in fact often do not, adopt the same structure.
Seventh: Identify overt and semi-covert support organizations, movements, and networks.
These aggregations of external supporters facilitate terrorist propaganda, recruitment, logistics, and intelligence. Some of them are institution-based: in schools, factories, labor unions, unemployed societal strata, extra-parliamentary political circles, refugee camps, immigrant communities, or extremist religious congregations. Others are area-based, particularly where ethnic/separatist terrorism is active. In some cases, terrorist groups are flanked by political parties, usually extra-parliamentary but with certain notable exceptions. Some groups are further supported by unlawful finance-gathering networks totally dedicated to the terrorist cause.
Eighth: Verify the presence of possible international linkages with kindred foreign groups and/or sponsor states.
When present, these linkages are precarious, generally range from ideological solidarity to logistical cooperation, and occasionally entail operations. Nonetheless, they constitute a clear threat since they broaden the terrorist support base and sphere of action. State sponsorship, which is a notable exception but by no means the rule, is more readily available to terrorist groups having a dual structure: an overt one for socio-political action and a covert one for terrorism itself. State sponsorship for subnational terrorist groups is generally self-serving and predicated upon plausible denial.
This explains in part why terrorist groups are known to have sought multiple and alternate sources of support at the level of both state sponsors and private circles. The financial and logistical support allegedly provided by millionaire Osama bin Ladin to Islamic radical groups that practice terrorism is a most current example of private sponsorship. It is reminiscent of an earlier millionaire and private patron, Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, whose ideology and aims differed from bin Ladin's, but not the resort to violent and clandestine means.
Ninth: Probe exploitable terrorist structural and operational weaknesses and failures.
Terrorist groups thrive primarily on the elements of initiative and surprise, both highly dependent upon clandestine structures and dynamics. At the same time, these groups are subject to constraints exploitable by terrorism-counteraction agencies. To begin with, the necessarily clandestine nature of terrorist aggregations is a double-edged dagger. Clandestinity requires on the part of its practitioners discipline, commitment, and the ability to cope with stress. The application of security rules, particularly compartmentalization, must be constant: there is no room for exceptions or relaxation. Terrorist groups must also foreclose internal dissent and schisms. Likewise, the mood and reactions of supporters and sympathizers must always be gauged by the terrorist core. Indiscriminate recruitment can also constitute a fatal flaw. Personnel renewal is contemporaneously a challenge. Finally, failure to achieve its ultimate radical or revolutionary goal within the expected time frame can prove to be devastating to
any terrorist group. Terrorism-counteraction agencies must be prepared to exploit all of these factors.
Tenth: Determine the type and extent of terrorism-counteraction assistance available from the governments of allied and friendly states.
States often entertain different perceptions - accompanied by conflicting national interests and priorities - regarding the threat of terrorism and, more so, the adoption of suitable countermeasures. Unanimity or divergence of views among states contributes to weakening or strengthening the operational options of international and, at times, domestic terrorist groups as well as their respective supporters, particularly sponsor states. Concurrently, in the absence of international or, as a minimum, regional consensus, the options available to the terrorism counteraction agencies of single states are seriously downgraded.

The ninth and tenth steps operationally fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the organs of government. The private or business sector should nonetheless be aware of them, and of their underlying implications, in so far as these two steps indirectly assist in entrepreneurial decision-making and in the adoption of defensive/passive measures in the broad area of physical security.
Although conceptually sequential, the above-outlined steps in practice usually require nearly concurrent application, particularly if multiple and separate actors account for subversive agitation, terrorism, or both. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that even after the emergence of terrorism, when prevention has obviously failed for political or technical reasons, indications-and-warning intelligence can still play a major role in the containment and repression phases of terrorism counteraction.

Indications and warning intelligence, as adapted to the terrorist phenomenon, is a valid instrument for identifying terrorist threats and trends and, if its findings are properly processed and utilized, it will surely contribute to both the prevention and repression of the terrorist menace. But it is not per se an infallible recipe for countering terrorism. The 1990s attest to the complexity and challenges inherent to the evaluation and analytical process that follows the collection of intelligence on pre-terrorist and terrorist dynamics. Forecasting is, in turn, even more problematic, as evidenced by frequent less-than-fully substantiated predictions.
In the course of the ongoing decade, a vast array of observers has repeatedly voiced concern over a disquieting trend to resort to violence for an ever increasing number of aims. This observation manifestly corresponds to reality. However, within the same context, many commentators have alleged that terrorism is being practiced in support of criminal business ventures, social issues, ethnic conflicts, religious zeal, traditional political power struggles, and insurgencies. Such a broad and heterogeneous listing overlooks the fact that while terrorism does constitute violence, it is indeed a particular brand of violence or, more specifically, a particular brand of political violence. Failure to make such a distinction inevitably generates confusion and downgrades the usefulness of collected raw intelligence.
High-placed as well as lesser figures concerned with terrorism counteraction have further alleged that in recent years most acts of terrorism were not attributable to state sponsors and their agents or to organized terrorist groups. These sources contemporaneously emphasized that an increasing number of terrorists lacked a specific affiliation. This assessment is misleading as it does not take into account the historical record, according to which most acts of terrorism, particularly those of comparatively minor entity which do make up the majority, are perpetrated by loosely structured formations or even ad hoc aggregations, in either case without any sort of state sponsorship. Many lessons about terrorist structures and dynamics can still be learned from the extensive West European experience with respect to domestic and transnational terrorism, even though overall statistics have generally reflected a downward trend during the 1990s in the region.
In relation to the lack of specific affiliation, it is worth noting that the criminological record includes serious acts of violence committed at the personal initiative of single individuals (one sole human being) in no way connected with an accomplice or a group. In some cases, such loners have operated clandestinely and may have been motivated by a certain political vision. In these instances do the acts of a loner fall under the rubric of terrorism? Some commentators have answered in the affirmative. However, since the political sphere implies group interaction (ubi homo ibi societas), most notably with respect to community organization and dynamics, these acts of violence perpetrated by isolated individuals constitute, if at all, atypical terrorist incidents lacking group aims and should analytically be treated accordingly.
A more sensitive question is the issue of terrorist utilization of weapons of mass destruction. Focusing on international terrorism, many observers have noted a decline in overall annual statistics accompanied by an increasing number of comparatively more violent attacks. From this observation they have deduced a greater willingness on the part of terrorists, especially those having religious (theocratic would be a more suitable term) and/or ethnic motivations, who are in fact the most active at this point in time, to seek greater destruction. These considerations have in turn produced such catchy terminology as superterrorism and megaterrorism and generated the formulation of apocalyptic scenarios.
To prevent equivocation and inordinate concern, some clarifications are in order. First. Technological progress does make traditional terrorist weapons - explosives and firearms - more destructive and accurate. Second. It is conceivable that some terrorists may consider acquiring for intimidation purposes, or even resorting to, weapons of mass destruction, formerly referred to as nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC). But these weapons entail numerous problems regarding their manufacture, storage, transportation, and effective utilization. Direct acquisition from sponsor states is at the same time unlikely, since these weapons are jealously held devices. Moreover, the relationship between a sponsor state and a sponsored terrorist group is precarious. Third. The strategic or simply tactical employment, in military terms, of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups - terrorist groups in the strict sense as opposed to pseudo-religious sects and the like - would constitute overkill and even possible self-destr
uction by aggregations whose ultimate aim is political change, albeit through violence. Fourth. More probable is the adoption by terrorist groups, for their own purposes, of chemical agents employed by police forces for riot control. Fifth. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a very serious post-Cold War concern, substantially applies to states and, in the interest of clarity, this term should not be applied to other aggregations. Sixth. Needless to say, weapons of mass destruction must not fall in unauthorized hands, since the possibility of their misuse in whatever direction cannot be excluded. In essence, however, even when indiscriminate or blind, terrorist attacks have been and, as a matter of course, are likely to continue to be circumscribed to objectives not comparable to the mass casualties produced by military conflicts or civil wars.
To date terrorist incidents that have produced considerable casualties - in this context a more accurate term than mass casualties - are in fact a rare exception, when considered within the context of 12,906 international terrorist incidents recorded worldwide from 1968 to 1997, and therefore fall under the conventional heading of spectacular attacks. The following constitute the most cited instances with respect to both domestic and international terrorism:
· 23 October 1983. 241 deaths resulting from the explosion of a truck-bomb driven against the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut. Perpetrator: Islamic Jihad.
· 23 June 1985. 329 deaths resulting from the explosion, off the coast of Ireland, of a bomb placed in luggage loaded aboard an Air India Boeing 747. Perpetrator: Sikh separatists.
· 29 November 1987. 115 deaths resulting from the explosion, at the Thai-Burma air space crossing point, of a bomb planted aboard a Korean Air Boeing 707. Perpetrator: North Korean agents.
· 21 December 1988. 270 deaths resulting from the explosion, in the air space above Lockerbie, Scotland, of a bomb placed in luggage loaded aboard Pan Am Flight 103. Perpetrator: involvement of Libyan intelligence is suspected.
· 19 September 1989. 171 deaths resulting from the explosion, in the Chad air space, of a bomb placed in luggage loaded aboard a UTA DC-10. Perpetrator: involvement of Libyan intelligence is suspected.
· 19 April 1995. 168 deaths resulting from the explosion of a truck-bomb parked in front of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Perpetra- tor: rightist extremists.
· 7 August 1998. 263 deaths resulting from the simultaneous bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Perpetrator: Islamic radicals have been blamed by the U.S. authorities.
To these can be added a sizably larger number of incidents entailing deaths in the two digit range, but even these do not constitute the rule, as the vast majority of lethal terrorist attacks has been directed to date against a single individual or a small number of persons at the time. To be sure, abortive or failed terrorist attacks could have caused considerable casualties that cannot be effectively assessed.
The last major issue worth addressing in this section is cyberterrorism, another catchy term of recent coinage used not only to cover situations extending far beyond the sphere of terrorism itself, but also to formulate dire predictions. Unquestionably, domestic and international critical infrastructure systems are increasingly dependent upon computer and information technology, which is highly vulnerable to computer-based penetration or attack. Potential aggressors are indeed many: foreign military personnel, foreign intelligence agents, organized and common criminals, competing business companies, computer hackers, and even terrorists. In practice, however, these potential aggressors must first develop and then maintain an electronic capability of varying sophistication in a constantly evolving field. This is a major challenge to all terrorist organizations, formations, and ad hoc groups. The public record to date reflects that terrorists have availed themselves of information technology as a complementary tool for communications, training, propaganda, and, occasionally, for the delivery of threats. There is no evidence as yet of terrorist utilization of information technology as an operationally offensive instrument. Occasional terrorist targeting of computer facilities has taken place through traditional terrorist methods. As in the case of hypothetical terrorist employment of weapons of mass destruction, protective measures and surveillance are in order, while horrific forecasts serve no valid terrorism-counteraction purpose.

Intelligence, including its indications-and-warning branch, is an integral part of terrorism counteraction. Besides its intrinsic function, indications-and-warning intelligence is a particularly valuable element, at the methodological level, in designing realistic scenarios and conducting effective exercises required for terrorism-counteraction training. All fundamental considerations that go into the planning of terrorism simulations directly or indirectly must take into account this aspect of the craft of intelligence. The following exercise guidelines are an indication of the ultimately central role of the various branches of intelligence.
· Focus on law and order when presenting a domestic terrorism scenario:
- Any terrorist episode constitutes a violent crime or an act in preparation therefor.
- It is perpetrated by a rigidly or loosely structured group or ad hoc aggregation.
- It is politically motivated and its purpose transcends the immediate consequences of the terrorist act itself.
- Its dynamics are clandestine.
- Its target or targets are symbolic, pragmatic, or both.
- Its preferred target or targets are accessible and lucrative.
- Responsibility for the act may or may not be claimed.
- A terrorist act is in many cases part of a series or a prelude thereto.
- If domestic terrorism is externally supported, it acquires international character, which calls for broader focus.
· Focus on law and order as well as national security when presenting an international terrorism scenario:
- The above outlined considerations also pertain to international terrorism, but additional ones also apply.
- Citizens or territory of more than one state are involved.
- Operational dynamics are frequently transnational.
- The international/transnational nature of the act, incident, or situation transcends law and order and affects national security.
- Evidence or probability of state sponsorship for international/transnational terrorism increases the threat posed by the single act or plurality of acts of terrorism.
- Sponsorship is a violation of international law which can trigger specific responses to the act or acts of aggression.
· Focus on foreign-policy-interests implications when presenting a terrorism-abroad scenario:
- Single acts or series of acts of terrorism occurring abroad may, under certain circumstances, be damaging to the foreign policy interests of nations not directly targeted.
- These interests include regional stability, alliance posture, and business investments.
· Cases requiring liaison with foreign governments:
- Terrorist incidents at home involving interests of foreign governments.
- Terrorist incidents abroad involving own national interests.
- Situations when assistance of foreign governments would contribute to resolving the terrorist incident(s), but national terrorism- counteraction policies differ.
· Application of pertinent lead agency criteria and procedures:
- Response to domestic terrorism scenario.
- Response to international/transnational terrorism scenario.
- Non-lead agency contribution in resolving incident or collateral damage in specific scenarios.
· Option to deploy military forces abroad:
- Rescue missions.
- Response to state sponsorship of terrorism.
- Liaison with foreign governments: procedures and actual/potential problems.
· Option to resort to covert action when presenting scenarios that extend beyond immediate contingency situations:
- Intrinsic risks.
- Considerations outlined above under liaison with foreign governments.

A seasoned observer has pitilessly remarked that terrorism is an ill defined subject which attracts phonies and amateurs as a candle attracts moths. Because it is a special form of political violence rooted in unconventional conflict, terrorism must not in fact be confused with other phenomena and must be countered with specific competence and means. Intelligence, particularly indications-and-warning, is an indispensable tool in terrorism counteraction and its criteria and procedures should be included in terrorism simulations for training purposes. Indications-and-warning intelligence is ultimately aimed at acquiring timely and accurate information in the interest of finding real world solutions in real time. As entertaining as they can be, thriller scenarios should be left where they rightfully belong: in novels and, by all means, on the screen.