It is customary to add a summary to an extensive report on a completed study in which the core elements of the research are described. However, with respect to this study, this has created a few problems.
The report in which the normative framework of the special investigation methods per country studied has been described gives, besides the necessary legal technical information on these methods, a broad idea of the legal-culture in which the rules came into being and in which the rules are applied. Summarizing this idea leads to a distorted picture and does not do justice to reality because even the more detailed background information on the societal, legal-political and organisational framework of the rules cannot be more than a rough outline. The size of the report and the time available render elaboration of this outline impossible.
If one only reads the summary of the normative aspects of the special investigation methods, without looking at the above mentioned framework, one will obtain a distorted picture of the situations in the various countries.
This report describes the normative aspects of twenty special investigation methods. The starting points are the methods listed in the report of the working group on the preliminary inquiry of investigation methods, the Van Traa Committee (1) . All those special investigation methods are also used in the five legal systems that have been studied, although they are often not mentioned as such in the law or in regulations. In a number of cases the authors have concluded, on the basis of an analysis of rules, case law and practice, that the method is nevertheless used - even though it is not mentioned or at least not under the same name. In this summary that analysis cannot be discussed in detail. In addition, in all systems that have been studied, the normative framework of the investigation methods has many 'ifs' and 'buts'.
That is why an explicit word of caution seems to be appropriate here. A pure picture of the nature and extent of the standardisation of the special investigation methods can only be obtained after reading the integral text. The tables annexed at the end of this summary should, a priori, be used with great caution.

It may be inferred from the study that the standardisation of the special investigation methods in the form of legislation, case law or guidelines has often been the result of incidents. Many incidents occurred due to the fact that the police investigation methods were used in a way that was subject to severe criticism; particularly in Scandinavian and French law examples can be found of rules on investigation methods following incidents.
In Germany the reason for a drastic standardisation of investigation methods was the so-called Census judgment, in which the German Constitutional Court derived from the first articles of the Constitution a right to informationelle Selbstbestimmung, which will only allow infringement on the basis of a statutory rule. This resulted in very detailed rules.
The list of special investigation methods included in the report of the Van Traa working group seems exhaustive.
In the systems that we studied we have not found any methods, used in the framework of the fight against organized crime, which essentially differ from the special investigation methods listed by Van Traa.
In nearly all countries a marked cut-off line between the proactive and reactive phase is absent. Consequently, this is reflected in the rules on the special investigation methods. These rules can be found in the prevailing Codes of Criminal Procedure which can also be applied in the informative phase. German law is an explicit exception to this rule.
In Germany the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to the informative or proactive phase, but only to the reactive phase. For the informative phase the police acts apply and these have been drawn up per Land (16) and - although they are harmonized - may differ considerably in certain respects.
Major differences can be seen with respect to the discussion on the use and standardisation of investigation methods. In Denmark, Norway and Germany extensive discussions have been held on the special investigation methods. In this connection the discussions in Denmark and Norway were more criminally and politically oriented and were held against the background of the wish to keep the use of these methods limited and controllable, while in Germany the discussion mainly concerned the use of special investigation methods in the reactive phase and had a dogmatic character. In France and Italy heated discussions were held on certain parts of the issue (e.g. interception of telecommunication), but otherwise there was major consensus about the use and standardisation of special investigation methods.
In all systems that we studied, the special investigation methods applied in practice have been given a legal framework, although the sources of standardisation vary considerably from one system to the other. In Germany, France and Italy there are more or less detailed rules governing the special investigation methods; in Denmark and Norway a number of methods have not been standardized by law but have their legal basis in guidelines and case law.
Some special investigation methods are expressly forbidden. For instance, in Denmark, France and Italy using citizens as infiltrators is not allowed and in Germany this is not allowed in the reactive phase.
However, if there is no express declaration that special investigation methods are not allowed, this will not mean that the investigation method can therefore be used in any of the systems studied.
Without an explicit normative basis - whether in legislation, guideline, or case law - a special investigation method will in principle not be used.
The legal frameworks of the special investigation methods focus on the regulation of four elements.
The first element concerns cases in which the use of special investigation methods is permitted. Often only categories of offences are listed - although they are not always of exactly the same character - and sometimes the method may only be used with respect to offences which are described in more detail.
A second element of the rules concerns the grounds on which the special rule may be applied. The formulation of these grounds often also includes the principle of proportionality and subsidiarity. The Danish and German systems contain apposite examples of the effects of these principles. Furthermore, the standardisation provides for instructions from the authority which is competent to order, approve or give permission for the use of special investigation methods. Nearly all systems provide, with respect to the investigation methods which the competent authority has to approve in some way, for a substitution of that authority in the event that it is not possible to wait for this permission, although the competent authority will still have to grant such approval afterwards. However, if such approval is not received at a later date, this seldom affects the lawfulness of the use of the special investigation method.
Finally, if necessary, the standardisation provides a term within which the application of the method is allowed. The fixing of this term often serves to determine the time at which a decision will have to be made as to the need for the possible continuation of the method.
The latter general remark concerns the consequences of the use of a special investigation method by the police or the public prosecutions department which is not standardised in some form or other or which, though standardised, is applied in a way contrary to such standardisation. All systems studied provided for far-reaching legal consequences, ranging from a prosecution bar to invalidity of the investigation activities. However, all systems also provide for some form of repercussion for the person on whose authority or under whose supervision and/or with whose knowledge a special investigation method has been used unlawfully. This will often result in an annotation in the personal record, which will block chances of promotion, but it may also - and this has indeed been the case in practice - lead to dismissal or even criminal proceedings. Many of our respondents considered these 'disciplinary' measures as a guarantee against abuse of police or judicial powers.

In Denmark observation may take place only by Danish police officers at the request and under the supervision of a team of detectives. Only in special circumstances is this method reported to the police management or the prosecutor. There is no explicit legal rule (which is also the case in Norway) but the guidelines and case law do make mention of observation. Germany only has rules governing prolonged observation, i.e. longer than 24 hours and applicable to the proactive phase. Observation is only allowed outside someone's home. In the proactive phase the order to that effect will be given by the chief of the force. For the reactive phase there are no regulations as long as no use is made technical aids. In this respect it should be pointed out that observation in the reactive phase is always allowed. However, observation with the help of technical aids is regulated by law.
According to French law observing people in the proactive phase is only allowed in public places. However, this matter is not regulated by law.
In Italy observation is also not regulated by law, because there it is considered to be a perfectly legal police activity. However, the law does contain a tacit reference to the competence to observe persons.

In Denmark this matter is regulated by Chapter 71 Rpl. which contains a general rule governing all interventions in the information secrecy, including tapping telephone conversations, intercepting and opening mail and direct bugging. It is only allowed in investigations into facts carrying penalties of six years or more, or in the case of specific offences. These actions take place at the request of the team of detectives or the public prosecutor on the basis of a court order. This order will only be granted after an assigned lawyer (Art. 784 Rpl.) has given his opinion in the matter. The person of the assigned lawyer is a special feature in Danish criminal procedure law. The lawyer is assigned to the suspect without the latter being aware of this and the lawyer is not allowed to contact him. His task is to see to the proper application of the special means of coercion. He can, for instance, appeal against the order of the judge to allow the installation of a telephone tap. When the order granting authorisation to tap the telephone cannot be delayed, the police may proceed to do so of its own accord, but must request authorisation from the court within 24 hours. If the judge is of the opinion that the installation should not have taken place, he will have to notify this to the Ministry for Justice. Such notification will affect the promotion of the police officers and the officials of the public prosecutions department who went ahead with the installation of the telephone tap. The period of time during which a telephone may be tapped is four weeks but may be extended. After the telephone tap has been ended, in principle the person who was tapped has to be notified.
Under German law the tapping of telephone conversations in the proactive phase is not allowed. But, on the basis of a decision of the Bundesgerichtshof, with the permission of one of the parties to the telephone conversation the police may tap that telephone conversation.
So, a distinction is made between tapping and co-tapping. In the phase of criminal proceedings tapping is allowed during an investigation relating to the so-called Katalogtaten, which for instance include offences against national security, serious crime, organized crime and drugs-related crime. Telephone conversations may only be tapped by order of the Ermittlungsrichter. In urgent cases the public prosecutions department may also give an order to that effect, but this order will become inoperative when it is not confirmed by the judge within three days. This court order is in force for three months and this period can be extended each time by another period of three months, assuming that the grounds for this means of coercion continue to exist. Besides the rule governing the interception of telecommunication, contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, there is also the so-called G 10 - Gesetz. By virtue of this law, officials of the Verfassungsschutz of the Bund and the Länder, the military intelligence service and the Bundesnachrichtendienst may intercept any form of telecommunication and take note of its content if this is required to avert an imminent danger to the free democratic order or to the continued existence or security of the Bund or a Land. The request to intercept telecommunication can be made by the president of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, the head of the Verfassungsschutzbehörde of the Land or the president of the Bundesnachrichtendienst. The order to intercept telecommunication can be given by the highest competent body of the Land or, if it its a federal matter, by the federal minister designated for that purpose by the Federal Chancellor.
In France the tapping of telephone conversations has been regulated by law, i.e. in the Code of Criminal Procedure (articles 100-100-7 CPP), since 1991. The examining magistrate is competent to give an order to tap telephone conversations. In addition, the chambre d'accusation which during the preliminary enquiry is competent to act as court of appeal, can also order a telephone tap. The order must be given in writing for a maximum period of four months, but this can be extended for the same period of time. A telephone tap may be installed where offences are concerned which carry a maximum prison sentence of two years.
And there is the additional condition that tapping will only be allowed if the need for the information demands it. The law is silent on the control of taps installed in the framework of criminal proceedings. In addition to taps installed in the framework of criminal proceedings, there are also security taps. The aim of these taps is to protect national security, to protect the scientific and economic potential of France and to prevent organized crime.
Permission for such security taps may only be given by the Prime Minister at the written and reasoned request of the Minister for Home Affairs, the Minister for Defence or the Minister responsible for customs affairs. The security taps are controlled by the parliamentary Commission national des Interceptions de securité.
Italian law also offers extensive possibilities to enable interception of conversations and other forms of communication. Interception is allowed in both the proactive and the reactive phase and governed by, among others, articles 266 to 271 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Interception is possible in the framework of crimes which may carry a prison sentence of more than five years, or of crimes relating to organized crime, drugs, weapons, explosives and smuggling. Permission to intercept conversations and other forms of telecommunication will be granted by the examining magistrate, at the request of the public prosecutions department, if there are strong suspicions with respect to an offence and the interception is absolutely indispensable for the continuation of the investigation. In matters of urgency the public prosecutor may, by means of a reasoned order, grant permission to intercept, provided that the examining magistrate is informed of this immediately and in any case within 24 hours. The examining magistrate must confirm the order of the public prosecutions department by a reasoned decision and within 48 hours at the most. Interception may take place for a maximum period of 40 days and this period can be extended each time by 20 days. Interception of telephone conversations is also possible in the proactive phase. There are various rules to that effect. In so far as offences are concerned relating to Mafia crime, the anti-Mafia district public prosecutor is empowered to grant permission to proceed with proactive interception. So, in this field - as opposed to the tapping of conversations in the reactive phase - the examining magistrate has no jurisdiction. Contrary to interception in the criminal proceedings phase, the police may use this method of gathering information by tapping telephone conversations in the proactive phase only for internal purposes. The tap reports cannot be used as evidence in criminal proceedings. The above statements about tapping telephone conversations also largely apply to the recording and registering of fax messages and computer data.

In Denmark the police is to a large extent free to take photographs and make video recordings in public places. Recordings that have to be made in secret and in private, enclosed areas require authorisation of the court. At the moment there are no explicit legal standards governing this competence, but in legal practice taking photographs and making video recordings is, for now, allowed pursuant to the regulation of such interventions in the information secrecy for direct bugging in Chapter 71 Rpl. and the powers in the field of entry in Chapter 73 Rpl.
Under German law it is allowed to take secret photographs or make secret video recordings of persons regarding whom there are reasons to suspect that they intend to commit serious offences and of persons who are keeping company with such persons or are in contact with them, provided that the information is necessary to prevent these offences. Taking secret photographs or making secret video recordings in or outside the dwelling will only be possible if this is done to avert direct imminent danger to life, freedom or physical integrity.
Taking secret photographs or making secret video recordings requires the permission of the chief of the force. Where recordings in or outside a dwelling are concerned, the authorisation of the Ermittlungsrichter is necessary. If there is no time to wait for the order of the ermittlungsrichter, the measure may be ordered by the chief of the force but in that case a court decision has to be requested by return of post.
In the reactive phase taking photographs or making video recordings in secret will be allowed if it is necessary to clarify facts or to establish the offender's place of residence. The police may make such recordings as soon as a person is suspected of any offence, irrespective of its gravity and without any special conditions having to be met.
Under French law taking photographs or making video recordings in private, enclosed places is not allowed. If such recordings are made, the judge will not be able to admit the acquired material as evidence because it will be declared invalid. The taking of photographs and making of video recordings by the police in the framework of the observation is not regulated by law but is generally considered to be allowed in so far as this is done in public places.
A recent law, Law no. 95-73, of January 1995, provides for the possibility to install video equipment in places determined by law. These are places along or on the public road or other accessible places. The video cameras are placed to provide protection to persons and goods and the law expressly stipulates that it is not allowed to place the video cameras in such a position that they will be permanently directed at dwellings or their entrances.
Under Italian law taking photographs and making video recordings in public places is not subject to any restrictions. In the proactive phase, Italian law empowers police authorities to film and take photographs also inside dwellings or areas designated as such. The same rules that govern the interception of telephone conversations largely apply by analogy to this investigation method.

Under Danish law, bugging conversations with the help of a concealed microphone or with remote-control surveillance microphones is only allowed in the case of suspicion of a crime endangering the life or well-being of people or jeopardising important societal interests. Authorization for direct bugging must be requested by the public prosecutor. The authorisation of the court will be granted by the judge. The lawyer who has to be assigned pursuant to article 784 Rpl. may appeal against the decision to grant such authorisation. Bugging conversations other than telephone conversations by means of concealed technical means is regulated in detail by German law. Bugging at the proactive stage is allowed to obtain information about persons, in so far as the facts justify the supposition that they intend to commit serious offences, and about persons who are keeping company with such persons or are in contact with them, provided the information is necessary to prevent these offences. In this respect it should be pointed out that only conversations not taking place inside the dwelling may bugged. Secretly bugging conversations with the help of technical means requires permission from the chief of the force. Under certain circumstances bugging conversations taking place in or outside the dwelling may be necessary. The law provides for the possibility to do so when this done in the event of direct imminent danger to life, freedom or physical integrity. However, in that case, permission is required from the judge. If there is no time to wait for this order, the measure may be ordered by the chief of the force, but in that case a court decision has to be requested by return of post. Bugging conversations in the reactive phase is also regulated by law. It will be allowed if certain facts give rise to the suspicion that a person is guilty of one of the offences for which also the tapping of telephone conversations is allowed. Bugging conversations will only be permitted if other ways of clearing up the facts or other forms of inquiries as to the place of residence of the offender are unsuccessful or are considerably impeded. Bugging requires the authorisation of the court. If there is no time to wait for this authorisation, bugging will be allowed by order of the public prosecutor. If there is no time to wait for that authorisation either, one of the assistant public prosecutors will be competent to issue the order. However, in such cases the judge must, without delay, be asked for confirmation. The parties involved must be informed of the fact that their conversations have been monitored as soon as this can be done without jeopardising the purpose of the investigation, public security or the body or life of a person, or the continued use of a person as police infiltrator. Bugging conversations with the help of technical means inside a dwelling has expressly not been laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, because the Parliament wishes to deliberate on the particularly difficult legal and, especially, constitutional questions on this matter. Meanwhile, the discussion on the possibility of direct bugging is continuing without abate.
Under French law bugging conversations with the help of close-range surveillance microphones is allowed neither in the proactive nor in the reactive phase. Entering a dwelling to secretly install bugging devices also constitutes an offence.
Under Italian law the possibility of bugging conversations is governed by the same rule that applies to the tapping of telephone conversations and the same conditions and requirements apply. An additional condition for bugging conversations inside dwellings is that there must be grounds for believing that criminal activities are taking place there.

Under Danish law breaking into computer files is not allowed. However, with a court order for the delivery of goods liable to seizure, computer data from a data bank may be obtained. In Germany the chief of the force can, in the proactive phase, submit a request to the ermittlungsrichter to requisition data files from public, semi-public and private services with the aim to couple these files to the judicial data files to enable persons fitting the offender's profile to be subjected to closer investigation. This is the so-called Rasterfahndung (electronic data matching) which is limited to cases which present an immediate danger to the life, freedom or physical integrity of a person or to cases in which any danger to the continued existence or to the security of the Bund or a Land has to be averted.
In the criminal proceedings phase a Rasterfahndung may be used if there are suspicions regarding an offence which is specified by law and can be qualified as serious and if other ways of clearing up the facts or other forms of inquiries as to the place of residence of the offender would be far less effective or substantially more difficult. The order to provide computer data and to proceed with a comparison of files, is given by the judge. If there is no time to wait for the order of the judge, it may also be issued by the public prosecutions department which has to ask for the judge's confirmation of the order without delay. If this confirmation is not obtained within three days, the order will become inoperative. Inspection of computer files other than police files is not regulated by law. Inspection of certain files requires authorisation of the court, particularly authorisation of the examining magistrate during the preliminary inquiry.
In France inspection of computer files other than those which are already in police possession is regulated by law. If the police wish to inspect certain files, it will be able to enforce inspection by means of an authorisation of the court during the preliminary inquiry. The computer files will then be seized after the rules governing the search of premises are declared applicable in this respect.
In Italy, too, computer files may be seized and used by the police for the purpose of investigating offences.

In Denmark there are statutory provisions governing the opening and withholding of post by the police. It is an intervention in the information secrecy within the meaning of Chapter 71 Rpl., to which the general conditions for interventions laid down in the information secrecy apply. Intercepting and opening post requires authorisation of the court. The judge may grant authorisation only if, pursuant to article 784 Rpl., a lawyer has been assigned to the person against whom the intervention is directed and if this lawyer has had the opportunity to give his opinion as regards the request of the police.
In Germany intercepting post in the proactive phase is not allowed. Intercepting post in the reactive phase will be possible if the postal item may be of importance as evidence in the investigation. The judge is competent to proceed to the seizure of the postal item, but the postal item may also be seized by the public prosecutions department if there is no time to wait for seizure by the judge; however, the decision has to be confirmed by the judge within three days. The power to open post lies with the judge, but he may delegate this power to the public prosecutions department if this proves necessary to prevent the results of the investigation from being jeopardised due to delay.
In France intercepting post is not explicitly regulated, but the examining judge is empowered to have postal items withheld during the preliminary inquiry. He may open the post although this will only be allowed in the presence of the addressee or, in the letter's absence, of two witnesses. Intercepting post is not allowed in the proactive phase.
In Italy intercepting post in the proactive phase is not regulated by law. In the reactive phase there are possibilities to take cognizance of the content of postal items or parcel post. The police may seize postal items but must forward them unopened to the public prosecutions department. The public prosecutions department is authorised to open the postal item. If, in the opinion of the officer of the criminal investigation department, the postal item contains information which is of overriding importance for the continuation of the investigation, he may request the public prosecutions department for permission to open the postal item without delay.

In Denmark localisation equipment is used in practice, but this matter is not regulated by law. The police management decides on the application of localisation equipment.
In Germany installing localisation equipment in the proactive phase is not regulated. The Code of Criminal Procedure does however contain a regulation stipulating that localisation equipment may be used to investigate facts or to discover the place of residence of the offenders, provided an offence of considerable importance is concerned. The police may apply this measure on its own authority, on condition that the subsidiarity requirement is met.
French law does not regulate the placing of localisation and scanning equipment. It appears to be allowed unless entrance has to be gained to a dwelling in order to install the equipment. Secretly gaining entrance to a dwelling is absolutely forbidden. Installing localisation equipment in a generally accessible place is allowed without permission of the judicial authority.
If the police has to enter an area belonging to the personal and private property of the individual in order to install the equipment, Italian law requires the judicial authority to give its permission. The judicial authority competent in this matter is the public prosecutions department.

Under Danish law there are two variants of covert entry. The first one is the secret search of premises, in which case the police gains entrance to a building with the authorisation of the court. The other variant is that the police requests the authorisation of the court to install microphones in a private, enclosed area. For this purpose the police may then enter this area secretly. In the case of the first variant of the secret search of premises, the conditions for searching premises, laid down in article 73 Rpl. have to be met. In the case of authorisation to install microphones, the conditions for interventions in the information secrecy of article 71 Rpl., have to be met. There is no special legal rule governing covert entry.
Under German law, secretly entering dwellings in the framework of technical observation is possible, albeit under very strict conditions, i.e. entering will only be allowed if it is necessary to avert real danger to life, freedom and physical integrity.
In France covert entry, in the sense of secretly searching premises, is not regulated by law either. The forms of house visits and search that are allowed pursuant to the general competence of the examining magistrate, as laid down in article 81 CCP, are based on the assumption that the home-owner or two independent witnesses are present.
Covert entry as such is not regulated by Italian law but it may be covered by the regulation governing the searching of premises. There are various rules for searching but, in principle, these do not relate to secret operations.

This matter is not covered by Danish law. One of the problems is that the police cannot guarantee informers anonymity because in Denmark the law does not allow the use of anonymous witnesses.
Norway is currently developing guidelines for dealing with informers. These guidelines will be standardising in character and, in all probability, will also be used in the framework of Nordic police cooperation.
To acquire information on a person in the proactive phase the police in Germany may use informers or agents if with regard to that person facts justify the presumption that he will commit serious offences. It will also be allowed in respect of persons who are keeping company with such a person or are in contact with him, provided the information is necessary to prevent these offences. The conditions for using informers or using information supplied by an agent are therefore identical to those for taking photographs or making video recordings and for bugging conversations; however, there is one exception: nothing is said about the informer's actions in the dwelling of the person.
In France informers are used on a large scale, but they are kept out of the trial. Information is gathered under the supervision of the public prosecutions department. There are neither laws nor other rules governing the running of informers.
Italian law contains a provision on the person of the informer, which stipulates that his anonymity will be guaranteed and that the judicial authority (public prosecutions department, examining Judge, or the trial judge) cannot force policemen and officers of the criminal investigation department to reveal the identity of their informant. The result, however, is that the information obtained from an anonymous informer is not legal evidence and cannot be used in court.

Danish law does not contain provisions governing financial rewards for informers and nothing goes to show that informers are rewarded for their information by the government.
Under Norwegian law, financial rewards for informers are expressly forbidden.
German law does not allow the use of citizens as informers in the reactive phase and consequently there are no rules governing financial rewards for informers. As regards the proactive phase, study shows that the agents do receive a financial reward for their activities from the police.
In France there are no official rules for financial rewards for informers. However, this does not mean that financial rewards are never given. In particular with respect to informers from groups of drugs users it seems likely, based on some interviews, that drugs users are sometimes provided with drugs in exchange for information.
Under Italian law criminal informers may be eligible for tip-off money. As regards tips given to the fiscal intelligence and investigation department, guidelines have been drawn up which provide for the payment of informers. Payment of tip-off money by the Polizia di Stato and the Carabinieri is based on unwritten rules. The amount of tip-off money depends on the value of the information.

Under Norwegian and Danish law, making deals is forbidden. A view which has been confirmed in the case law of the Danish Supreme Court. However, under Danish law, there are extensive possibilities for reducing the sentences of accused persons who plead guilty or for qualifying them for preferential treatment, in exchange for confession.
Under Norwegian law rewards to criminals cannot go beyond a demand for remission of the sentence with a notification to the judge that the person concerned has cooperated with the police. There are confidential guidelines containing detailed indications as to how far the police may go in this respect.
As far as Germany is concerned it is not possible to gain any insight into deals with criminals. There are explicit rules governing the use of criminals as crown witnesses and in so far as other kinds of deals are made with criminals, these are not based on a legal provision. The German law of criminal procedure does contain a few possibilities for negotiating with a criminal in the framework of the decision concerning the prosecution for offences.
In France making deals with criminals is also a grey area in the law. There are no official rules governing this matter, but it is not impossible that it occurs in practice. For instance, it does seem to happen that the police negotiates with criminals on their keeping the spoils.
Under Italian law deals with criminals are not made separately, but only in the framework of the rule that applies to the so-called Pentiti, the crown witnesses.

In Denmark it may occur that in exchange for information criminals qualify for remission of their sentence or for another type of special treatment. This provision is not considered as a regulation on crown witnesses. A regulation on crown witnesses according to which impunity follows information is not known in Danish law and is rejected.
The same applies to Norway. Deals with criminals are out of the question; the only option the Norwegians may perhaps consider is that evident remorse could lead to a reduced sentence.
Since 1989 Germany has had detailed rules governing the concept of the crown witness. Since 1994 these rules also apply to perpetrators of or participants in organized crime. If a crown witness provides judicial authorities with information which can prevent or clear up offences of an organized nature or can lead to the arrest of perpetrators of or participants in organised crime, the offences that have been committed may either be dismissed or remain unpunished or punished by a lighter penalty. In Germany there is still no statutory witness protection programme as an extension of the rules governing crown witnesses. Besides, the rules governing crown witnesses will only apply for a short period of time and expire on 31 December 1995.
France does not have specific rules governing crown witnesses, but there are various possibilities to qualify perpetrators of offences who later show remorse for a reduction in their sentence. By virtue of article 450-2 CP a person's sentence may even be fully remitted if that person reveals a criminal group or cooperating persons whose objective is trading drugs.
The most extensive regulation concerning the crown witness can be found in Italy. There are four types of crime regarding which a reward system is used to induce co- accused persons to cooperate with the judicial authorities. These crimes are terrorism, abduction with a view to obtaining a ransom, manufacturing of and trading in drugs and, finally, organized crime.
Application of the regulation on crown witnesses can lead to a considerable reduction in the sentence. The sentence to be determined by the judge which he first imposes without considering the mitigating circumstances can, by virtue of the regulation on crown witnesses, be reduced by at least one third and at the most two thirds. Italy is the only country where extensive measures have been taken to protect the threatened crown witnesses. The protective measures may lead to the witness being given a completely new identity.

In Denmark pseudo-purchase takes place on a very small scale, which is due to the fact that the pseudo-purchaser in Denmark is governed by the rules concerning infiltrators. If the purchase takes place abroad or is arranged by telephone from abroad, this will not be subject to the rules on infiltration. The decision about the pseudo-purchase is made by the team of detectives in consultation with the competent public prosecutor. The pseudo-purchase is not subject to conditions except one, i.e. the pseudo-purchase may not involve entrapment.
The same applies to Germany where, in the framework of a pseudo-purchase activity, it is not allowed to entrap others to commit a punishable act. However, if the bounds of entrapment are exceeded, this has to lead to the remission of the sentence of the entrapped party. In Germany pseudo-purchases are usually made by a police infiltrator to whom the rules governing infiltrators apply and whose actions must be fully controlled by the public prosecutions department pursuant to the guidelines regarding infiltrators. The Länder have rules for the provision of sample money and sums of money necessary for pseudo-purchase and pre-purchase.
In France a new statutory regulation concerning pseudo-purchase took effect in 1991, after major problems had arisen in 1990 with the pseudo-purchases taking place pursuant to a guideline dating from 1980. The pseudo-purchase may only serve to secure evidence and may not be aimed at giving rise to prohibited practices. The pseudo-purchase must have been notified to or approved by a magistrate. This may be the procurator but also the examining magistrate if a preliminary inquiry is concerned. A provision has been included in the Penal Code which will explicitly render pseudo-purchase, sample purchase and pre-purchase unpunishable if the conditions in this respect have been met.
Italian law contains a similar regulation. Article 97 of the Narcotics Act provides immunity from prosecution to the specialized staff of the criminal investigation department, who - to secure evidence of crimes involving drugs - infiltrate into the criminal world and make simulated purchases of drugs. A similar rule applies to participation in the laundering of money, and in trading arms, ammunition and explosives. Immunity will only be guaranteed for certain police officers. Another condition for immunity is that it must concern an action in the framework of project-related infiltration set up by central police services, and not an independent action of investigating officers. Finally, another condition is that the police officer will not be liable to punishment only if he has committed the offence in a simulated manner, the sole objective being to secure evidence against the perpetrators and other persons belonging to the criminal organisations. Responsibility for controlling compliance with these conditions has been given to the public prosecutions department.

Under Danish law only police officers are allowed to infiltrate and only if three conditions are met. There must be particularly strong suspicions that a crime has been committed, there has to be no other investigation method appropriate for securing the required evidence, i.e. the use of infiltrators must be ultimum remedium, and, finally, there have to be suspicions of a crime carrying a prison sentence of six years or more. The decision to infiltrate is taken by the public prosecutor after authorisation of the court has been obtained to that end. In the event of urgency the police may deploy an infiltrator, but this has to be approved by the judge within 24 hours. Because of these strict conditions the current rules are considered to be a fiasco. At the moment a discussion is going on as to whether the rules should be changed.
Norway has a comparable regulation, but here it is based on guidelines of the Norwegian procurator-general, and the suspicion criterion is not stressed as much as it is in Denmark. In Germany there are detailed statutory rules for using police infiltrators both in the proactive phase and in the phase of criminal proceedings. In the proactive phase a police infiltrator may only be used by order of the chief of the force. Using an infiltrator will be possible if facts and circumstances justify the presumption that serious offences will be committed and the use of a police infiltrator is necessary to prevent criminal practices. The powers of the police infiltrator are regulated by ministerial guidelines. The guidelines state expressly that the police infiltrator is not allowed to commit offences. In the criminal proceedings phase the police infiltrator may only be used to investigate offences of a serious nature relating to drugs, arms trade, counterfeiting, national security, major or professional crime or organized crime. To use a police infiltrator, permission from the public prosecutions department is required, unless there is no time to wait for this permission. In that case the police management will decide, but permission from the public prosecutions department must be sought without delay. If the public prosecutions department does not grant permission within three days, the infiltration will have to be terminated. If a police infiltrator is deployed against a certain suspect or if an infiltrator has to carry out his activities in a dwelling which is not generally accessible, thus infringing the domestic peace as laid down in the Constitution, permission from the judge will be required. If there is no time to wait for such permission, the public prosecutions department will have to give its approval. If obtaining such approval in time is not possible either, the police management will decide and the public prosecutions department will have to be asked for its permission without delay. Infiltration will have to be terminated if the judge has not confirmed the permission within three days. Persons whose dwelling was entered by the police infiltrator must be informed of this as soon as this can be done without jeopardising the purpose of the investigation, public security, the life and physical integrity of a person, or the continued use of the infiltrator. As stated earlier, during the infiltration the police infiltrator may not commit any offences. The problems arising in that context are usually solved in careful consultation with the public prosecutions department.
In France infiltration is regulated by law. In addition, there is a guideline on infiltration methods. Infiltration mostly takes place by police infiltrators and only sporadically by citizens.
The competence to deploy infiltrators with the public prosecutor and the officers of the police judiciaire, who are under the supervision of the public prosecutors. Police infiltration takes place in cases involving drugs or related products and is supervised - as far as controlled delivery is concerned - by the procureur de la République and as far as controlled resale is concerned by the procurator or the examining judge.
In Italy there are no general rules governing the person of the infiltrator. However, since 1990, in the framework of special legislation, various regulations have been drawn up to govern the actions of the infiltrator in a number of specific cases. These are, for example, rules concerning the use of infiltrators in the fight against organized crime, money laundering and drugs-related crime. As regards all regulations, three conditions have to be met to prevent the police infiltrator from being liable to punishment for an offence committed within the framework of the infiltration. The first condition is that only special categories of police officers may be used as infiltrators. Secondly, police of officials may not infiltrate independently but only in the framework of a project-related infiltration. And, finally, the police officer will not be liable to punishment only if he has committed the offence with the sole objective of securing evidence against the perpetrators and other persons belonging to the criminal organisations. The judicial authorities must be informed immediately of the fact that infiltrators will be used. This means that the public prosecutions department is informed in advance of the use of infiltrators.

There are practically no countries that use non-police (i.e. civil) infiltrators, usually because it is expressly forbidden. Only Germany works with citizen informers. The chief of the force decides whether they will be used. Non-police infiltration will only be allowed if it is needed to prevent offences of a serious nature.

In Denmark controlled delivery can be distinguished into controlled resale and controlled delivery. Controlled delivery means that the transport does not stop in Denmark but elsewhere, where it will be seized. The decision to accept the controlled resale is taken by the team of detectives in consultation with the public prosecutor involved. A controlled resale in the sense of intervention not taking place on Danish territory may only take place if the interest of the case justifies such means and if there is a guarantee that the drugs will be seized elsewhere. If controlled resale means that the police does not take action before the delivery is actually made on Danish territory, this controlled delivery will have to meet the conditions contained in the rules governing infiltrators.
In Germany controlled delivery takes place on a large scale. Controlled delivery is not regulated by law, but in 1984 a joint decision of the procurators-general regarding this matter was incorporated in the guidelines for criminal proceedings. The guidelines provide for three forms of controlled delivery, i.e.: controlled transit, controlled export and controlled import. A condition for controlled delivery is that there is no other way to trace the other perpetrators or to dismantle the network. Furthermore, controlled delivery must be designed in such a way that it remains possible at any time to arrest the perpetrators and seize the illegal goods. So, this means that the transport may not escape the control of the police or the customs officials. If a controlled transport involves transit and export, the state to which the transport is moved will have to give its permission. The power to take a decision about controlled delivery lies with the public prosecutor within whose jurisdiction the border area is situated where the import or transit commences or within whose jurisdiction the transport within Germany begins.
In France controlled delivery is regulated by article 706-32 CPP. This article stipulates that investigating officers may proceed to the monitoring and surveillance of the shipping of transported drugs or their proceeds. Controlled delivery may only be realized by special police officials and if explicit permission has been granted by the procurator or the examining judge. One guideline regulates, among other things, the matter of jurisdiction. If the goods come from abroad, the public prosecutor's office in the place where the goods enter the national territory will have jurisdiction. If the goods are already within French territory, jurisdiction lies with the public prosecutor's office in the place where the goods are found. The procurator involved will be obliged to notify his colleague from the public prosecutor's office concerned if the destination lies within the latter's jurisdiction.
Under Italian law controlled delivery will be possible if an offence involves drugs, extortion and money laundering or the abduction of a person with a view to obtaining a ransom. In such cases the investigating authority can postpone or fail to comply with the legal rule to find and secure evidence without delay. For such postponement the police requires permission from the judicial authorities. The judicial authority supervises the controlled delivery by giving instructions. The various rules governing controlled delivery vary in detail.

In Denmark project infiltration does not exist. The statutory rules governing infiltration do not allow this variant.
German law does not contain separate regulations for project infiltration; such infiltration takes place in the framework of the general infiltration rules.
The same applies to France where project infiltration is not regulated separately either and where it is incorporated in the general rules governing controlled delivery.
As we have seen, infiltration in Italy always takes place in the form of project infiltration.

Little is known about front-store organizations. This also applies to Denmark where the law leaves no room for front-store organizations.
In Germany front-store organizations play a role in the framework of infiltration. Under the provisions of the law infiltrators may participate in legal transactions in a false capacity. On the basis of these provisions front-store organizations are established. In Germany front-store organizations exist particularly in the framework of the fight against drugs-related crime.
In France front-store organizations exist as an extension of the rules on controlled delivery.
In Italy front-store organizations are known to exist in practice but this matter is not regulated by law. Although it is doubtful as to whether the use of cover documents is permissible, the use of front-store organizations is not controversial.