Political Zionism and the historical and political
evolution in Palestine before the British Mandate

The armed fight and the institution of clandestine movements for the liberation of Heretz Israel, in Hebrew “The Land of Israel”, are inseparably tied to the development of the Zionist ideology. Therefore, it is not possible to discuss the history of the paramilitary groups without referring to the institutional pillars which led to the decision to embark upon a military struggle for the right of the Jews to return to the Biblical land.
The Zionist movement lies at the base, not only of the motivational processes behind the development of military formations, but today, it is still at the base of the policy of the State of Israel. Towards the end of the 19th Century, following the polemics which flared up after the Dreyfus affair and the anti-Semitism connected with it, a Hungarian Hebrew journalist, named Herzl, in 1896, dedicated himself to the drafting of a short treatise, entitled “The Hebrew State”. The text deals with the necessity of putting an end to the stateless existence of the Jews in the world and, partially utilizing the ideas already expressed by Nathan Birmbaum and other authors, a few decades before, emphasizes how the primary objective should remain the constitution of a Hebrew State in the land of Zion, one of the ancient names used for Jerusalem.
The Herzl text was, in fact, the beginning of what is now widely understood as political Zionism. It was not only a theoretical treatise, but the outline of policies of defence and the actuation of same, which appealed to many representatives of the Jewish communities, particularly in Europe, so much so that it became possible to hold the first Zionist Congress, in Basle, in 1897. Political Zionism develops in the same way as secular humanism, in the footsteps and, in a certain parallel measure, to the messianic religious ideals which are part of the culture of the Hebrew communities. So the Hebrews find themselves again united, not only under the protection of the common religious creed, but also in the shade of a relatively secular political ideal, endowed with the necessary pragmatism which stresses the idea of a Nation and localizes the desirable place of rebirth. The development of Zionism goes side by side with the growing emancipation of the Jews in Eastern Europe. In fact, already before the publication of Herzl’s text, many Jewish authors had identified in the absence of a native land, the main cause of disrespect towards the Jews in the world (Sachar 2005, 259).Following the tsarist anti-Semitic campaign, and not necessarily as a consequence of the ideological line proposed by the Zionist Movement and by Herzl himself, about 24.000 Jews immigrated to Palestine between 1881 and 1903, bringing the number of the Jews in Palestine up to 56,000, at the beginning of the 20th Century, against a predominantly Moslem Arab population of about 600.000 (Shlaim 2000, 7). At the end of the 18th Century, the Jewish immigration to the Holy Land was mainly composed of working class people, together with a minor component of students who started to arrive due to the influence of the solution proposed by the political Zionism. Thus, a small number of Jewish colonies began to populate Palestine.
The necessity to guarantee for oneself a certain security in a place where the Ottoman Empire was certainly incapable of keeping law and order beyond the major inhabited places, led the new colonizers to hire guards to protect the settlements against attack by common criminals. It was not a matter of organized militias, but simply of individuals, generally armed with a rifle or gun, who could respond to the need for survival of small newly settled communities (Pa’ir 2003).
The events caused by the 1st World War and the diffusion of the Balfour Declaration, together with a bitter increase of anti-Semitism in Europe, contributed to increased immigration of the Jews to Palestine. At this point, the settled communities began to feel the natural necessity of security. This need was mainly dictated by the aggressive reaction of the Arab population in Palestine. A sort of scarcely organized militia was established under the name of Ha-Shomer, in Hebrew, “the sentry”. Ha-Shomer was one of the first secret paramilitary structures formed, exclusively, of Jews (Sachar 2005, 282). It never numbered more than 100 elements and it had no unitary structure (Van Creveld 2002, 13). Ha-Shomer, for the most part, furnished training in the use of firearms and equestrian instruction, thus representing an embryonic reply to the real need of protection in a land where law and order were practically absent – just as absent as the governors, who did not appear to be concerned over the increase of Arab attacks.
The members of the Ha-Shomer were mainly connected through family ties and the genuineness of their vocation to defend other Jews in Palestine is questioned in several reports regarding their actions. The discussion evolves around a merely defensive function as opposed to that of a mafia-like one: in other words, protection in exchange for money. There are, in fact, reports of the time, which suggest how such organizations were responsible for threats against settlers who refused their services (Goldstein 1993, 21).In the meanwhile, and up to November, 1917, the Zionist ideal was still very slow in gathering consensus, not only among Europeans, but also among the European Hebrew communities. It was the constant and indefatigable work of the Zionist leaders in Great Britain which convinced the British war cabinet of the time that an actual alliance with the Zionist leaders could, in future, confirm British sovereignty in the Holy Land (Sachar 2005, 356). This was, in synthesis, the basic motivation of the famous Balfour Declaration. Through this Declaration, the British Crown expressed to the President of the Zionist Federation in England, Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild, its sympathy for the Zionist idea and for the creation of a “National Home” for the Hebrew people in Palestine, while still safeguarding the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities on the same territory. Furthermore, the King of England committed himself to facilitate the creation of such a State (Stein 1956). On the 25th of April 1920, the Paris Peace Conference confirmed the assignment of the Middle-East Triangle to France and Britain, thus disappointing the territorial expectancies of the Zionists, who saw Palestine deprived of the most important hydro resources and of its historic borders. The Balfour Declaration was, however, integrated into the text of the treaty to confirm the renewed British commitment in favour of the Hebraic State in Palestine. The facts follow the words.
General Allenby successfully developed a civil administration planned to defend the Jewish minority and to revitalize the entire Palestinian economy (Sachar 2005, 358-365). In the wake of these events and because of the persecutions of the Jews in Central Europe, the new inflow began to expand the existing settlements and to create new ones. At a certain point, the Hebrew people who were entering Palestine were, in the majority, refugees, poor and scarcely educated.
In order to ease the Hebrew integration and settling process in the Holy Land, the Executive Committee of the Zionist Organization assumed the additional title of Hebraic Agency as established by the Paris Peace Conference, and subsequently, confirmed by the Society of Nations, charged the Agency to work in coordination with the British Authorities. The endemic Jewish communities and those created at the beginning of the 20’s, organized themselves in a similar manner to the Zionist movement in Europe, i.e. with democratically elected assemblies with the task, in their turn, to participate in the formation of a National Congress.
Scores of parties emerged from this community system; in the majority, adhering to the workers’ movement.
This movement saw its origins rooted in the Jewish Labour Federation in Palestine, in Hebrew, Histadrut, founded in 1920. The success of this Federation probably lies in its capacity to furnish not only labour but also services, including health assistance. In order to furnish the necessary solidity with its associates, and also expanding its power, Histadrut created a construction company, known as Solel Boneh, other industries and even a bank. In addition, it participated actively in the creation of settlements based on socialist ideals and of a clear Zionist nature and, finally, in the constitution of the first organized force in defence of the new Jewish communities in Palestine: the Haganah, Hebrew for “defence”.
It was in these very first years of the formation of an ‘almost-State’ that the Zionist movement saw a new type of movement grow from the heart of its own.
In 1923, the pro-British Ze’ev Jabotinsky left the Zionist movement, accusing its leaders of an overly moderate attitude towards the British. Jabotinsky was, in fact, a Zionist who wanted to see more rapid progress. In particular, with regard to two factors: the creation of a real army, and the increase in immigration to Palestine (Segev 2000, 208-211). Jabotinsky’s opinions had a large following also because of his inclination towards the creation of a free society in the Land of Israel, compared to that preached by Zionism, based on socialist schemes.
The movement created by Jabotinsky and known as Zionist revisionism saw, furthermore, different and more radical ways of reaching the objective in a shorter time. This was the situation at the beginning of the British Mandate and these were the elements which led to the creation of movements which, for their paramilitary, and in a certain respect, revolutionary nature, were forced to go underground to continue the work necessary to achieve their ambition of forming a Hebrew State in Palestine.

The visible secrecy of the first Jewish
defence forces: the birth of the Haganah


The outbreak of the 1st World War and its extension to the Middle-East area, gave the Zionist movement the first occasion to play a role, also at the military level, by the side of the British ally.
In reality, the Ottoman domination and its brutal conduct was not forgotten by the 10.000 Jews who, in March 1915, were forced into exile. More than half found asylum in Egyptian refugee camps, and there they were supported only thanks to funds from the Jewish communities. It was among these very refugees that the efforts towards the creation of a Jewish Military Legion found fertile ground. The Zionist activists, Vladimir “Ze’ev” Jabotinsky and Joseph Trumpeldor, a Russian Hebrew, immigrated to Palestine after being awarded for heroism during the Russian-Japanese war, launched a recruiting campaign with the approval, as much cautious as tacit, of the British Authorities. (Sachar 2005, 345).
In the spring of 1915, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel John Henry Patterson, the Zion Mule Corps was founded as part of the British Expeditionary Forces (Me’ir 2003). This transportation Unit, formed by circa 500 Jews, was permitted to wear the Star of David as a shoulder badge.
The Unit was assigned to the Gallipoli campaign in the Dardanelles, but when, in the Winter of the same year, the British troops retreated from that area, the Unit was dissolved (Sachar 2005, 345). However, the perseverance of Jabotinsky and Trumpeldor contributed to convince the British Command, in September 1917, to form a new infantry regiment composed of a hundred or so of the Zion Mule Corps veterans and other Russian Jews landed in the United Kingdom.
It was in this way that the 38th Rifle Regiment was constituted, which was followed by the creation of two more Regiments (the 39th and the 40th), also formed by Jewish military. The Regiments, assigned to Egypt, started to absorb Palestinian Jews, recruited locally; even though almost all the men of the three Regiments were discharged at the end of the conflict. It was then that the Zionist executive, probably conscious of the importance of the existence of a Jewish military force, again managed to convince the British Crown to form a voluntary Jewish regiment based in Palestine. It was constituted in 1919 in the present-day Tsrifin and called the First Judeans, (Regiment) (Me’ir 2003).
The Regiment was put under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Eliezer Margolin, but when, in 1921, this commander, on his own initiative, sent his troops to intervene in the violence which had flared-up between Jews and Arabs in the Tel Aviv and Jaffa zones, the British Authorities immediately dissolved the Regiment.
In any event, the Jewish military participation in the 1st World War was a very important element, since it furnished the occasion for a large number of men to be trained in the use of arms in a relatively advanced Army, like the British one. The birth of the first Jewish militia, organized under the British Mandate, goes back to precisely this period. Following the intensification of the Arab attacks against Jewish settlements, often for the purposes of robbing and, therefore, not immediately identifiable as politically motivated actions, Jewish activist groups formed defence committees, purchasing light arms in the Tel Aviv and Jerusalem zones.
Il was Ze’ev Jabotinsky himself, who headed the Jerusalem group. Such committees were called Haganah and, as previously mentioned, were organized in the Labour Federation, the Histadrut. The Haganah played a role in the defence of the Israeli in Jerusalem when, in April 1920, Arab groups triggered revolts during the Jewish religious celebration of Pessah. Notwithstanding the Haganah action, six Jews lost their lives and about 200 were wounded. The British Authorities, who had military control of the region, arrested several members of the Haganah which, being de facto, an armed group, was illegal and in violation of the military orders of the British Authorities.
It is important to underline that the Haganah did not present the usual characteristics of an Army, both in terms of chain of command and as far as the training and equipment was concerned.
The importance of these elements, essential for a military organization, was undoubtedly understood, at least, by certain more expert members of the Haganah who, for instance, in 1925, promoted an experimental course for commanders, for the benefit of 20 selected elements.
However, such initiatives remained isolated and never became part of an organic strategy directed towards the creation of a solid and compact military force. Many components of the Haganah remained faithful to the initial objective of its founders and continued to promote the expansion of popular militias, the ranks of which remained open to all members of the Jewish communities, coherent with the Zionist ideology from its very beginning. During the revolts of 1929, it was particularly evident that the Haganah could not dispose of a sufficiently cohesive force in all areas and that the weapons and the training of its members did not permit the effective engagement of fights against enemy forces organized in all areas of the country.
Notwithstanding the efforts made for the reorganization of this force, practically each unit remained, until the 40’s, essentially tied to a colony of origin, forming a force of several thousand unequally trained men (Bower 1977, 127-128) and insufficiently cohesive, due to the lack of an effective chain of command.
However, the creation of theHaganah, assumes a special relevance, not for its military capacity, but for its symbolic significance. In fact, it represents the birth of a clandestine armed group answering to a self-organized and democratically elected civil authority. This embryo of a defence force was, in fact, put under the control of the Jewish Labour Federation: the Histadrut representing the great majority of the workers. The decision to entrust Histadrut with the control of defence was really dictated by particular political caution in a sensitive moment in the relations between the Zionist organization and the British Crown.
It seems probable that the Zionist leadership did not want to push the creation of a military organization in Palestine too far, because of its illegal nature before the British authorities, especially so soon after the Balfour Declaration, which made British support a crucial instrument for the realization of a Jewish State in Palestine.
At the same time, partially for ideology and partially, perhaps, not to rouse British suspicion, Histadrut itself spoke of the duty of the Jewish people in Palestine to volunteer participation in the Haganah. Notwithstanding this, many of the members of the original nucleus who went to form the Haganah came from the dissolved Jewish regiments absorbed into the British Army.

The ideological base of this clandestine militia, however, remained dominant until the creation of the State of Israel. The attempts aimed at the realization and promotion of regulations to be the guide lines of Haganah members, based on equality among comrades-in-arms, confirm the original aspiration of a popular militia in line with the tradition of the Zionist Left. At first, in virtue of this aspect, the secrecy of the Haganah concerned the planning of armed defence operations, but did not regard the secrecy of its existence. On the contrary, it was discreetly publicized for obvious reasons connected with political-national aspirations.
With regard to weapons, the Jewish communities developed a certain productive capacity by importing industrial equipment for the fabrication of light arms; this machinery was usually placed in underground hiding places called slikkim, where a part of the arms for the Haganah started to be fabricated (Van Creveld 2002, 25). However, a remarkable change took place following the Arab revolts in 1929. The limited, but significant successes obtained by the Jewish militias in Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem suggested the expansion of this military force throughout Palestine.
It is more than likely that the death of more than 100 Jews by Arab hands and the ethnic cleansing of the city of Hebron gave the sufficient impetus and motivation to put in motion the process of a serious change towards the creation of an authentic army. It is however a fact that 1929 represented a turning point for the armed actions of the Jewish militias in Palestine, and to the expansion of new ideologies, in primis, the Zionist revisionism of Jabotisnky.


The revolts of 1936-39; the development
of the Haganah and the birth of the Irgun

Up to the end of the 20’s, the Haganah had maintained a merely defensive function, clearly tied to the development of the Jewish settlements in Palestine under the umbrella of the Zionist Left. It was in 1930 that a small group of the members of the Jewish defence founded a second organization called Haganah Beth or Irgun Beth, with the purpose of launching offensive attacks.
This organization, after acquiring its political identity and a secessionist leadership, became known, in 1937, by the new name of Irgun Zvai Leumi: National Military Organization. This group, emerging from the ranks of the Haganah, distinguished itself for its different way of conceiving the struggle to reach the Zionist objectives and for its different political base which drew its solidity from the Zionist revisionism of Jabotinsky.
The birth of a more extremist group came together with the great revolt of 1936, where the numerical superiority of the Arab groups and the use of violence against the Jewish minority, contributed to produce tactical changes. The British forces, in fact, realized the importance of having an order-keeping force which counter-balanced the numerical superiority of the Arab communities. This was the real reason which led the British Authorities to create the Jewish police force, known as Notrim. The new force also furnished excellent cover for the clandestine Haganah organization which started a shadow coexistence with the members of Notrim. Thus started a period during which British tolerance with regard to the visible secrecy of the members of the Haganah became even more obvious: a demonstration of how His Majesty’s men tried to utilize the local political and military movements in order to control the growing tension in Palestine.
It is not by chance that the creation of the Irgun follows, by one year, the institution of the Special Night Squads. This force was the first body in which British and Jewish soldiers were grouped together. This anomalous novelty was, in fact, the direct result of the passion for Zionism nourished by Charles Orde Wingate, British intelligence officer and creator of this special Corps. Brought up by a missionary family, Wingate was purposely educated under the influence of Christian Zionism and certainly did not hesitate to use any means at his disposal to support the Jewish people in Palestine. Wingate even personally took care of the selection of elements to swell the ranks of the Special Night Squads, among whom we remember Moshe Dayan, Yigal Allon and others, with the purpose of preparing them for non-conventional tactics and actions.
The actions entrusted to this group were particularly effective and the relations maintained, although illegally with the Haganah, greatly helped the military development of the latter. As often happens when a foreign occupation force is confronted with internal risings connected with aspirations of independence, the British army, in this way, found that they had reinforced the conflicting side which revealed to be more determined and effective than initial expectations.
In this context, the Irgun represented the first real militant force to entrust to the military force a crucial role to obtain the Zionist objective. Its creator, Avraham Tehomi, with the intention of creating an organization which did not depend ideologically on socialist principles integrated within the ‘first hour’ Zionism and which better answered the needs of repressing or eliminating the Arab threat against the Jewish communities, became the promoter of a policy based on force and massive military counter-attacks on any attack launched against the Jews (Lapidot 2006). This modus operandi was immediately in contrast to that adopted by the Haganah, which sustained a blander use of force and was more bound to the criteria of proportionality.
Many attributed this difference exclusively to the different political origins of the two groups, where the Irgun emerged as the right wing faction and, more importantly, was contrary to the integration of socialism into a modern Zionist idea.
There is no doubt that such elements are inter-connected and that the processes which led to the creation of the Irgun also had political connotations. However, all these processes are to be placed in an historical context where politics and fait accompli merge with the rapid evolution of historical events which only the protagonists of the time can describe with adequate sharpness and, in a certain sense, with due simplicity.
In fact, beyond any historical analysis made afterwards and based on what, only in a second moment, became political movements, it is clear that the creation of the Irgun and its expansion became concrete at the moment when the migratory processes of the Jews towards Palestine reached proportions never known previously, due to the Hitler persecutions. This phenomenon triggered a deeply felt preoccupation among the Arab population in Palestine, which feared to imminently lose their demographic supremacy. Such fears produced two principal consequences: the Arab request to the British Authorities to stop the Jewish immigration to the Holy Land and also stop the violent riots which targeted the Jewish colonies in Palestine.
In the light of this state of affairs, it is not difficult to imagine how a clandestine force like the Irgun found it comparatively easy to gather consensus among the Semite population. In fact, for many, it was a matter of giving a legitimate answer to the violent oppression of the Arab groups. Such feelings did not necessitate a specific political base and did not necessarily see their beginnings in Right or Left ideals.
It concerned sentiments which were tightly woven in ethnic and social factors, framed within a nationalist dimension straining to reach the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine. As confirmed in an interview with the author, Geula Cohen, several times member of the Israeli Knesset and herself activist of the Irgun and then of the Lehi, it was the natural necessity of responding to a situation which had developed, by giving the right support to the Irgun.
On the other hand, we can add that there were, indeed, such elements to produce the right spark for the formation of political forces which emerged from the original Zionist block. As proof of the fact that the political ideology was not the spur which characterized the difference existing among the clandestine movements, it is important to remember how, in 1936, the publication of the so-called “White Paper”, in which the British Crown supported the creation of an independent Palestinian State, pushed the two sides towards more extreme and hostile positions.
From the Arab viewpoint, the White Paper did not appear sufficiently effective in confirming their supremacy, while on the Jewish side; the immigration limitation to Palestine, imposed by the British legislation was certainly not willingly accepted. Violence against the Hebrew colonies exploded in an even more vehement manner and various Jewish leaders, including Jabotinsky, declared their determination to commence actions against the Arabs, even at the cost of sacrificing innocent victims (Lapidot 2006).Also the combat tactics adopted by the Irgun reflect its irregular militia vocation. The attack squads of the Irgun Zvai Leumi were normally composed of three members: one in charge of transporting the weapons from the clandestine deposit to the site of operation, one employed in the use of these weapons, and the last in charge of removing the weapons from the place of the ambush (Lapidot 2006). A rather simple tactic which was, however, very effective when supported by a capillary presence on the territory which was able to launch multiple attacks in different localities, thus impeding and slowing the intervention of police forces.

Geula Cohen recalls how the passion for their land and the legitimate fight against the foreign occupation were the propulsive elements for the Irgun. Such were these feelings that, after the intentions expressed by the British to limit the Jewish immigration to Palestine, the Irgun was in the first line to promote and actively organize the illegal immigration to the Holy Land. Various ships set sail from the European coasts to reach Palestine secretly, where the landing and the caring of the passengers was usually assisted by Irgun. In 1943, the situation changed when the victory of the Allies over the Nazis seemed inevitable.
In the eyes of the members of the revisionist movement and of the Irgun, this was the right moment to proclaim a true revolt against the British occupying forces. Immediately, Menechem Begin was selected as Commander of the Irgun, and its work of anti-British propaganda was not left unheard. It was emotionally met by many Jews who saw, in that moment, the vital phase for the coronation of their national ambitions.
The propaganda and the call to the Jewish youth to join the Irgun were crucial for the development and success of the movement against the occupiers. Geula Cohen recounts that the British Authorities showed an increasing apprehension over the success obtained by the clandestine Jewish radio, used as a means of inducement and recruitment. She herself was arrested during a clandestine transmission and when the British military magistrate condemned her to two years’ imprisonment for the detention of a microphone - a means of illegal propaganda - and to seven years for the possession of a pistol, she did not refrain from showing her surprise for having obtained such a mild sentence for what, in her estimation, was her more powerful weapon: a microphone.
The revolt invoked by Begin was not long in arriving and the guerrilla activities of the Irgun became more frequent, thanks to the growing experience gained in the field through an always more consistent number of actions. This was how the combatants of this faction became protagonists of a number of attacks against the British installations, provoking a considerable number of victims. These activities encountered not only always harder resistance and reaction from the British forces, but also from the Haganah, which did not approve of the independent initiatives of militant Hebrew groups, since they were initiatives taken outside of the democratically elected bodies (Lapidot 2006).
This historic version is confirmed by Geula Cohen herself, who re-confirms how the Haganah, had somehow expressed hostility towards the Irgun, and since the Haganah had never gone against the other organization, there seemed no apparent reason. On the contrary, up to 1943, episodes of collaboration between the two factions were recorded. In the meantime, a third organization was born in the shadow of the 2nd World War. The components of this 3rd organization were those who refused to support the Hanagah and the Irgun in adhering to a temporary truce with the British, who although they were enemies in Palestine, were fighting the Nazis in Europe.
This group, known as Lehi or the Stern Gang - the name of its founder - presented itself as a totally independent faction, launching several attacks against the British forces and, after 1943, was a protagonist, with Haganah and Etzel, of fratricidal clashes. (Van Creveld 2002, 55-56).


Conclusion

The political situation at the end of the 2nd World War and the barbaric massacre of the Jews by the Nazis, functioned as an essential stimulus for the creation of the Hebrew State. However, the actions of the militant groups were no less useful in convincing the British forces that the keeping of law and order in Palestine would be nothing but a problem for the British Crown. The actions and acquired war experience had, in fact, led the Jews to several tactical successes that the stability, so much desired by the British, appeared a real mirage. In this sense, one could say that the objective which was common to all the underground groups had been reached. This, together with the elements which formed the complex political scenario of the time, led to the creation of the State of Israel.
What is more, in treating this subject, it is important to remember that the motivation of the members of these groups was crucial for maintaining the necessary level of perseverance in the struggle which, during the first years, seemed lost before it had begun, in light of the military might of the occupying forces and the preponderant number of the Arab population.
Moreover, it is also necessary to recall that beyond the political and military developments, it was the fervour, passion and emotions spent to obtain a homeland that had been craved for over a thousand years, which played a crucial role in the formation and operation of the Jewish clandestine movements in the Palestine under the British Mandate.


Special thanks in the realization of this article go to Ms Geula Cohen for accepting to share with the author, her passion and love for the State of Israel.


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