The discontinuity of the strategic scenario

If the arms race during the “cold war”and the, more or less, official rules of the game connected to it (1) , have efficiently performed the desired role of a deterrent to a possible world-wide conflict; it was seen immediately that something had changed with the “Fall of the Wall”.
The emergence of many regional conflicts, but with repercussions on a larger scale, already pointed out the necessity of new abilities and qualifications with respect to the previous scenario: control of hostile territory, flexibility of operating on more than one field at the same time; rapidity of deploying forces: capability of minimizing human losses; to mention only a few of these requirements.
The real discontinuity, however, is represented by the preponderant impact of terrorism on the scene. This factor radically changes the nature of the threats to be met, compared to those typical of wars between States, rendering them extremely asymmetrical and, as will be seen, difficult to overcome with the traditional Western defence systems, which are unrivalled.


The nature of the new terrorist threats:
International, asymmetrical and in dynamic transformation

The distinctive character of the terrorist threats can be identified, not only in the prioritized and evident political motives (for example influencing the geo-political equilibrium in the Arab world), but in the objective of provoking impacts which go beyond material damage to persons or resources. The acts connected to these threats, in fact, through the generation of anxiety and uncertainty, tend to induce an impaired functioning of mechanisms and the flow of smooth progress in the personal, social, economic and political spheres of the modern systems, now always more globalized and complex. This element is the one which most distinguishes the terrorist threats from those of the traditional wars.
Cutting into the normal and ordinary functioning of these mechanisms and appearing in apparently casual and unforeseeable ways, these threats spread uncertainty in a capillary fashion throughout the system, in this way, maximizing their efficacy. Furthermore, they often provoke emotional reactions among the public involved, thanks also to exaggerated media coverage, which can determine an over-estimation of certain risks, rather than the under-estimation of others and, in consequence, “requests” for countermeasures which are not always the best. This danger is particularly present and threatening in the Western democratic regimes where politics might have incentives to comply with such requests. As we shall see, the application of economic analysis to these problems can, through the use of the logical instruments developed by it and the abstraction which often distinguishes it, favour the adoption of the most rational and sufficiently “detached” perspective.
Among the numerous changing ways which characterize terrorism today, your attention should be directed to its ever-increasing international nature. A terrorist threat assumes international connotation when it is able to involve two or more countries, different in terms of nationality of authors and victims, of communities which suffer the impact, of the place where an attack is carried out and where it is organized and supported, etc, etc., If we think only of its ingrained and systematic tendency to spread, it becomes intuitive to understand that in this era of globalization, its diffusion is always more international. The implications can be very interesting, as we shall see.
The organizational order which seems to have been adopted by international terrorism is that typical of a network (literal meaning of the term “Al Qaida” ) with:
- a “brain centre” which takes care of policy and coordination, but perhaps it is no longer operative as it once was;
- many operative modules made up of peripheral cells, which often originate spontaneously and which act autonomously.
The policies and direction of the “cells” and their coordination often comes through so-called “soft” mechanisms (i.e. based on intangible factors), often, even tacit, which can be effective also when security measures are tightened and impede the deployment of “hard” equipment. The monitored cyclical nature of the intensity of the terrorist phenomena is interpreted in this way; i.e. that a planned attack, notwithstanding, the increased countermeasures that it induces, generates a chain reaction, followed by other attacks which are often not programmed in an explicitly coordinated way, but induced through an implicit coordination.
The “network” structure allows the organization to be agile, flexible and to strike in different ways, and always in a restricted and localized area, in order to render as “private” as possible the incentive to reaction. At the same time, through this type of organization, all the material assets (such as weapons, training centres, logistic support, etc.) are put at the disposal of the entire network, but in an increasing measure, the non-material assets, (such as information, ‘know-how’) and the relative fixed costs are absorbed, thus obtaining economy of scale, scope and training. Unfortunately, as we shall see in the following, the same cannot be said for the threatened international community.
Unlike the logical brain, which reasons rationally, always in a political (and perhaps economic) way, the cultural and motivational glue which keeps the ‘followers’ together, is always less socio-political and always more religious and fanatical (to start from 1979, the year of the attack on the USA embassy in Teheran). The qualifying factor of such a phenomenon is the widening diffusion of the Islamic religious fundamentalism. A founding element of this doctrine is the “Jihad”, the holy war, which foresees the total physical elimination of the “infidels” (the unfaithful), also by means of the diffusion of the suicidal techniques (the Kamikaze).
The implications are numerous and quite remarkable.
The aim to eliminate the “unfaithful” can provoke a great number of victims due to accident, above all, among the common people and no longer in the category of the political decision-makers.
This has been possible mostly through the diffused use of the Kamikaze technique, which permits the adoption of operative attack conditions and the reaching of targets which, once, were unthinkable (for instance, the Twin towers ).
If the basis of consensus of the organizations is always more composed of integralists, terrorism tends to legitimise itself, by manifesting, through slaughters of the “unfaithful”, its role as the instrument to build Islamic States in the Arab World.
Proselytism is much easier and economical and, what is more, it is often self-nourishing.
The effect on supplying incentives to encourage the ‘followers’ to carry-out actions is very interesting and consists in a notable reduction of “personnel costs” for the organization, as it is sufficient to instigate a struggle on a religious basis to make the economic incentive appear unimportant.
The possibility of deterring the attackers by threats and retaliations, in the case of failed or successful attacks, is reduced to zero for the authors (e.g. kamikaze), as well as for their “sponsors”. The efficacy of “soft” instruments and policies (economic aid, social support…) diminishes.
The survival of the organization, over the long term, is assured by its capacity to resist and be carried ahead by its ideological component, even if the fundamental structure should collapse.
The essential aspect of this structure, to be underlined, is the capacity it has, today, of striking with innumerable and unforeseeable combinations of the following elements:
- place and nation (The US State Department has calculated that Al Qaida is present in 60 states);
- targets;
- instruments and modes of attack;
- time of attack.
In light of this, it is not realistic to imagine that the superior resources and instruments, available to the West today, can be efficiently deployed against imminent terrorist attacks, notwithstanding that they are quite simple from the logistic and technological point of view. In such a perspective, the power ratios are completely overturned and the terrorist actions are defined as markedly “asymmetrical”, but in the sense that the Institutions have great disadvantages in combating them.
There is, however, a change underway with regard to the types of actions and interventions principally adopted: today, less “perfect” kidnappings and plane hijackings are used, but there are always more bomb attacks. The former are more difficult and costly due to the complexity of the technology involved, together with the logistics and coordination needed, but also for the quality of the competence to be employed, which is not so readily available within the peripheral cells of the “network”. The latter, on the contrary are considered superior for the easy and economical advantages; simple technology and logistics, less traceability (the possibility for the terrorist to disguise himself among his victims, and manages to increase the impact in terms of victims, and is capable of mingling easily with the ‘indistinct’ sphere of the public and its everyday life, increasing the diffusion of anxiety and uncertainty.
However, it is not only a major “internal” coherence with the new organizational and motivational order which explains these current changes.
Terrorism changes, adapting itself to the “external” context that has to be faced, or rather, to the policies which are adopted to fight terrorism. To cite some examples:- the strengthening of security measures or planned actions in retaliation to the 11th September attack; the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq; investments and re-organization of the “Homeland Security” in the USA, etc. In this respect, terrorism is flexible and reactive in changing targets and modality of action, in reaction to the changing conditions of cost-benefit correlated to the options of its own decision-making framework; behaviour which economists would define as “rational” in the sense that it goes to maximize its own expected advantages or profits. The changeable character of terrorism emphasizes the problem of the asymmetries of information and, obviously, of its strategic advantage towards the institutions.
The first to have adopted a framework borrowed from the neoclassic economic theory was Landes (1978) to analyse the impact of measures which made airports safer, (introduction of metal detector), at the beginning of the 70’s: he had registered a sharp decrease in plane hijackings in the triennium 1973 – 1976. However, the effect which Landes did not emphasize was the resulting substitution of certain types of attacks and targets which these sort of innovative and specific measures must, obviously, provoke. The real picture, then, is not a decrease in the overall volume of terrorism, but simply a transformation in terrorist tactics.
The evidence of this phenomenon, from an empirical point of view, and its theoretical representation must be attributed to a study by Enders and Sandler (1993), which pointed out the changing character of terrorism. They set the decision- making situation of the terrorists in a neo-classic model analogous to that of the choice of the consumer in precarious market conditions. The terrorists have at their disposal, within a binding frame of pre-fixed resources, an array of options characterized by a numerous variety of possible combinations, above all, of different operative modalities, interventions and targets. The two scholars underline the “substitution” factor, foreseeing that the different combinations can, more or less, generate the same benefits (e.g. create political instability, obtain media coverage, induce uncertainty in the economic area….) on their expected advantages or profits.
They also stress how such profits can be negatively influenced by the perception of cost associated to a choice which derives from the summation of the volume of the single activity for their unit price (which, in turn, depends on the value of time and necessary resources, on the expected risk etc.). The various activities can have intrinsically different cost conditions (as illustrated above), but the decisive factor in the determination and relative perception of this element, on the part of the terrorists, are the policies and countermeasures put into action.

Such policies can affect the relative advantages associated with each of the terrorists’ choices and could modify their decisions, just as soon as these choices become “more expensive” with respect to others. This is so, especially for highly “specific” counter-measures within strictly limited areas of use, to impede only some actions or protect only well-identified targets, and which, instead of deterring terrorism, simply provoke a change in its tactics and objectives.
Enders and Sandler have also carried out an empirical analysis to prove their thesis, putting emphasis, for example, on the fact that the introduction of metal detectors in airports has reduced airplane hijacking, but has increased the number of other type of attacks; or how the increased protection of the USA embassies has produced an increase of attacks on American citizens away from home.
Thus, clear indications of “policy” emerge, suggesting interventions which, if at first, they must “guide” and “accompany” terrorism towards attacks of minor impact, this will decrease the overall level of attacks, or striking at the source of available total resources, or through an equivalent intervention of “balanced” impact on various targets. This last option, however. in a scenario like the present one of exponential growth of the options at the disposal of the terrorists, could be inapplicable or totally inefficient.
As will be seen in the following paragraphs, in a context of international terrorism, the element of “substitution” in terrorists’ decisions becomes interesting also from another viewpoint – the choice of a target country – thus, opening space and perspectives for the analysis and choice of optimal policies against terrorism and for the new emerging necessities of international cooperation.


Optimal policies against international terrorism:
possible indications from the Science of Economy

As we have seen, international terrorism seeks to affirm its capacity to strike, at will, an ample and heterogeneous group of Nations which, consequently, share a common threat.
Against this threat, the Nations can avail themselves of policies and countermeasures which can be classified (see Cindy Williams, 2003) as national or international, according to the territory of impact. The first, (e.g. Homeland Security in the U.S.A.) can have a preventive/deterrent character (e.g. border control, law enforcement,..), defensive/protective (e.g. protection of potential specific targets,..)or be of immediate response to emergencies (instruments and procedures to limit damage to persons or goods,..).
The second can foresee pre-active measures, mostly of a military nature, (e-g. the destruction or “sterilization” of terrorist resources, infiltration and intelligence, prohibition of “supporter” States, various types of reprisal,…) or non-military measures (e.g. economic aid, political and diplomatic pressure, sharing of know- how and other resources,…) of a structural character and of longer duration.
Without considering the evaluation of the opportunity of these last measures, (see for example, David Gold, 2003 and 2005) which do not seem to have the preference of the present orientations, at least, in terms of employed resources(2), there is a debate underway in the United States on what type of countermeasures are more effective and efficient(3). In this article, however, I would like to address this question from a different perspective, or rather, that of the application of the economic theory to the main problems connected with international terrorism.
A certain vein of thought elaborated by a group of scholars (Sandler and others) is quite interesting, today more than ever before. It is the application of logical instruments characteristic of economic science; for instance, the Theory of Games. As the authors have pointed out very well, the Games Theory, together with many other instruments, (e.g. economy of asymmetrical information, the theory of market failure,…),can be a very useful instrument to the analysis of typical situations of international terrorism.
For example:
- it manages to pick-up the strategic inter-dependence among the various subjects, where the pay-off of each one is influenced by the decisions of the others and, therefore each one must foresee such decisions;
- it describes the behaviour of the subjects as rational and frames it in a ‘climate of uncertainty’;
- it can take account of asymmetrical situations also from the information point of view;
- it can represent situations of negotiation where threats and promises are made;
- it can represent dynamic situations which keep account of the learning capacity of the subjects.
An interesting type of analyzed games is that which frames and describes the interactions of several players, or rather, the various states which share the same terrorist threat and must decide which type of intervention must be done in order to maximize the expected advantage or profit. The terrorists, instead, are considered - simplifying the analysis, but remaining faithful to their flexibility - as passive subjects ready to adapt their decisions according to how and where such interventions make it more profitable for them to act.
The focalization of the analysis in this restricted area becomes particularly significant because it allows the emergence of implications and distortions of an unpleasant circumstance; the difficulty in gaining international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism. On the other side, terrorist movements cooperate among each other, most effectively and efficiently, as has already been shown, due to a long term perspective of the necessity to fight common enemies which are, on paper, much more powerful (e.g. Israel, USA and the UK); of this cooperation, there are many examples:- European movements from the 70’s-80’s, as well as, the Palestinian and jihad movements. This kind of cooperation, on the contrary, does not happen between the States which have to fight terrorism, due to many factors:
- security is a founding and principal constitutional element of a State, which, therefore, is always reluctant to submit policies and decisions in this matter to other States;
- the intrinsically limited duration of government majorities in the western democracies, in political contexts with very heterogeneous orientations in foreign politics, (this can impede the formation of that climate of trust among states, which is necessary to make and respect agreements of collaboration);
- the diversity of priorities of geopolitics and threats that must be combated;
- the discordance in the perceived importance of the various types of risk;
- the presence of economic interests in countries close to the terrorism.
A key element of the analysis is constituted by the external economy generated by the pre-chosen policies of the players and which affect their pay-off in different ways, according to their classification. In a globalized world, where also terrorism is globalized and where, as we have seen, it can be very flexible in its capacity to strike, the intensity and the strength of such external economy can be enormously magnified and this, in turn, magnifies the lack of efficiency in the international coordination of counter measures to terrorism.
Let us consider, in a general way, two classifications of countermeasures: pro-active actions directed to hit and eliminate the terrorists and their resources (for example, those listed previously under international countermeasures) and more defensive and reactive (described previously as national countermeasures). The former, striking at the “source” and aiming to impede the accomplishment of the attacks, notwithstanding that their intensity would probably provoke terrorist retaliations and escalation (although we assume that the benefits are higher than the costs), they would generate a widespread positive impact, enjoyed by every state and usually correspondent to “pure” international public benefits(4).The latter classification of actions, on the contrary, protect only specific targets from some types of attack, the success probability of which, to a certain extent, diminishes, and tends to be re-directed towards other targets and, above all, towards States which are less protected and thus generating, in these last, ‘public’ costs. But the effects induced can be even worse in some situations. In particular, in a world where terrorism can strike almost anywhere, these ‘domestic’ measures can be ineffective, in the sense that the attacks will be redirected towards citizens abroad who come from the State which has adopted such countermeasures. Similar cases materialize where the increased security for a specific target (e.g. an airport, an aqueduct,….) can be immediately compromised if the security of comparative targets (e.g. airports in other countries, other inter-connecting hydro-infrastructures shared among different countries) is not sufficient or of equal adequacy(5).
Let us examine, step by step, various classifications of games which, starting from the single analysis of the individual classifications of measures, to then proceed to a crossed comparison of them, highlighting the structural inefficiencies, at times, paradoxical, deriving from the lack of international coordination.
Sandler and Arce (2003) analyse a scenario in which two States, or blocks (e.g. EU and USA), share the same threat of terrorist attack, can both choose whether to put into action preventive policies against the threat or not intervene. The possible combinations, obviously, are four. The pay-off structure is symmetrical between the two players, as one supposes that both blocks have the same exposure to the risk of attack and “technology” of action, and we must keep in mind the public benefits associated with preventive actions, (previously described) which are shared in full and equal measure by both players, regardless of who carries out the action which, instead, sustains the costs. If both take actions, the benefits double for each, which sustains also the costs of the action.
The game that comes out, given the hypothesis that the two subjects make their decisions autonomously and independently, is a “prisoner’s dilemma” where both prefer not to take action, notwithstanding, that if both had acted, the situation would have been more advantageous for both.
This solution, however, corresponds to a Nash equilibrium, in which neither of the two sides are disposed, unilaterally, to change orientation and from where it would be possible to turn away only in the case of a credible agreement. Only a scenario in which pay-offs are asymmetrical, in the sense that the net benefits of a country (e.g. USA) are much higher with respect to the benefits of the other, following an action by one of the two, results in an equilibrium where the Country with the higher pay-off takes action, while the other does not, but benefits from the action of the first, (inducing a phenomenon of “free-riding”). This situation could be probably in a world where the USA are the final target of the highest percentage of the aggression and it is indicative of what happened after the 11th of September, which lead to the USA intervention in Afghanistan. The problem to evaluate is whether a solution of this kind is sustainable and the best over a long term period.
The previous structures, in the case of non-intervention, hypothesized a pay-off equal to zero. In a situation of dire emergency, where the western world is potentially under threat of a very damaging attack, the correlated pay-offs to the reciprocal non-action can be negative for both players and if they reach a level inferior to the pay-off, which happens when one subject acts and the other does not, also here, there would be a unilateral action.
Sandler and Lapan in 1988, and then Sandler and Siquera in 2002, on the contrary, consider a scenario in which two Countries must decide whether not to act or take defensive measures similar to those already mentioned, which generate external economy on the other. Such costs are as high as the capacity of terrorism to strike globally. Also here, pay-offs are symmetrical. The equilibrium of Nash shows us a result which is opposite to the previous one, where both players take action, notwithstanding that this provokes a worse situation with respect to the non-action. In other words an over-supply of such protective measures occurs, which is as high as the number of the Countries involved in this “race” and it is not said that it will result in a higher overall security, if, for instance, the terrorists are not vulnerable to the deterrent effect. Paradoxically, only if the citizens abroad, who come from the State which enforces such measures, can be easily hit and/or if these cases are isolated and, therefore, do not constitute distracting effects and, only if these attacks can be foreseen, will the ‘race’ be stopped.
The combination of better coordination in the sharing of information, and, at the same time, leaving the autonomy of carrying out the actions, to the individual countries (a very common policy today), can exacerbate the distortions of the transfer of the threats from one country to another, caused by defensive actions. Such information sharing, in fact, can make known the relative preferences of the terrorists towards individual countries and, consequently, better evaluation of the marginal effectiveness of defensive measures can be made, stimulating the carrying-out of opportune behaviour. Since all types of responses, both defensive and pro-active, are inter-related, they have to be coordinated.
Sandler and Arce (2005) consider an ample variety of games in which, finally, the players have at their disposal, contemporaneously, the choice between non-action, pro-active measures, defensive measures and even, in some cases, a mixture of the last two. The dominant strategy results in being, in most cases, the defensive one brought ahead bilaterally, with results which are not socially optimal, that is, for the community of the State involved in the decision. Only the introduction of asymmetrical pay-offs leads to a dominant strategy which sees a country, (USA) adopts pro-active measures and the other, (EU) remains inactive, if the benefits for the solitary pro-active actions are superior to the solitary defensive actions, a probable case, judging from the American citizens who are attacked or can be attacked abroad. In case a mixed option is possible, where the two types of action are associated, then that would be preferred, but a mix which is not explicit. The results obtained, however, remain collectively not efficient. The dominance of defensive actions over pro-active actions is confirmed by empirical observations.
A series of paradoxical indications emerge from the Games theory:
- the tendency to act in the case of policies which generate negative external economy at an international level, while conversely, not to act in the case of measures which have a positive external economy, inducing also the others to do the same;
- only terrorist actions, concentrating their energies on a single State, can favour solutions with altogether better results and to the advantage of the community against terrorism in which the pro-active actions predominate, to which are associated more important public benefits, but also the phenomena of ‘free-riding’;
- in the opposite case, the States are not able to pursue such results alone, due to an inability to coordinate their efforts.
One last contribution to mention is that of Manuel Trajtemberg (2005) in which the author underlines how terrorism, unlike traditional threats (e.g. the two World Wars) often tends to circumscribe the material and real impact of its attacks on localized targets and not damage the integral ‘whole’ of a country. From this point of view and using similar schemes as those used by Arce et al. the “goods of defence and security”, for public right, par excellence, and therefore supplied from the State to the entire nation, can assume “private” connotations. In other words, there is an incentive of some private subjects to raise barriers, at their own costs, in order to protect only targets in which they have a personal interest, but with non-optimal effects with regard to the “diffusion” of its benefits and, above all, with regard to the efficiency and effectiveness of the action.
It derives from a formal model that such non-optimisation could be avoided only through a substantial and massive increase in the efficacy of actions of a markedly “public” nature; that it, which has a “diffused” and “systemic” impact. This means aiming at the prevention of terrorist acts which, resulting in a decrease of the foreseen probability that such actions happen, would avert “private” interventions, together with the relative inefficiencies and duplication of expenses.
If we go back to international terrorism and somehow extend the concept of “public” to “international” and of “private” to “national” a very simple indication could come to light: to avert the diffusion of defensive and protective actions on single targets, perhaps it would be better to improve the effectiveness of the pro-active interventions and not limiting this improvement to the military and technology sphere, but above all, to logic and politics.
It follows then, that all of this is a compelling indication to find and strengthen alternative solutions for international cooperation against terrorism. Especially, as we have learned that terrorists cooperate extremely well among themselves and know how to exploit the lack of coordination in their adversaries; always searching to strike at the “weakest link” in the chain and in this way, undermining the strong. Against the asymmetric threats in the globalisation era, it is unthinkable to be able to defeat international terrorism with policies realized and elaborated within the restricted national environment.
It is necessary, therefore:
- to try to anticipate the effects of ‘transfer’ of the threats and then, put into act compensations and countermeasures of various kinds;
- to find strongly innovative alternative solutions to increase the efficiency and efficacy of the pro-active measures;
- to create the conditions so that new pro-active policies can be developed and put into act at an international level, also reinforcing the cooperation of countries already involved, but are facing uncertainty (e.g. Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia…), elaborating and finding ‘specific’ solutions which can be effective ‘on the field’.
In the future, the illustrated applications can be further strengthened to better understand two dimensions within the analysis: the strategic and dynamic inter-action between counterparts and the asymmetrical character of the threats, with all its facets. Furthermore, interesting developments can be carried ahead by the application of the economic, social and behavioural sciences (as is recognized in the study, “Combating Terrorism. Research Priorities in Social, Behavioural and Economic Sciences”, NSTC, and, above all, by the developments deriving from their combination. Firstly, I think of the developments of the economy of information, “External Economy Network”…) or of “behavioural economics” (e.g. Khaneman, Tversky, Shiller,..) in such fields as the management of post-attack crisis.


The role of technology

A relevant role to increase the effectiveness of the actions against terrorism, both pro-active and defensive, and to reduce the likelihood that the threats will be carried out, can be attributed to technological instruments able to sustain these policies mainly to resolve uncertainties in the information to be confronted. In this sense, research and development in the field of electronics for defence and security, can play a decisive role in improving the instruments for gathering, elaborating, analysing and transmitting information.

In such a perspective, the models which seem to be more adequate are:
- the Network Centric Warfare, this is, the connection and inter-operability, by means of advanced electronic systems, with military bases of different natures, (e.g. ground, air, water) and different army corps using the system to increase efficiency and effectiveness (particularly with regards to human losses);
- the Homeland Security, that is the whole of the interconnected complex system, able to forestall, block and contain external threats of a prevalently asymmetrical nature, against the population, the territory or the resources of a country.
In an asymmetrical scenario, in fact, it is necessary to count on the efficiency of intelligence and on the correlated functions offered by electronics and by the ITC support to improve the readiness of action and reaction, their effectiveness and flexibility and to restore the efficacy of the traditional systems.
Research is working hard on the activity of gathering information, particularly on the development of “sensors”.
These are interface mechanisms between a real and virtual world which, by simulating the five human senses, succeed in the first place, to substitute the real for the virtual in dangerous situations and then “digitalize” the object of the activity and then submit it to further processes of automated elaboration. The move in this direction could fill the historical gap caused by the “asymmetrical path” of the ITC development.
This sector, in its history, has concentrated too little on the gathering of the same data and on the interface with the real world, to dedicate itself in a serious way, to the strengthening of the pure quantitative capacity of elaboration, without often succeeding to fully exploit it.
Regarding this last phase, (information elaboration) the path of research is directed towards the improvement of the ‘intelligence’, with the development of the appropriate software and algorithms (e.g. very sophisticated research motors), to obtain a better orientation in a world where information and information-flow grows very rapidly and the time gap between action and reaction narrows.
The results consist in the widening of the borders and the potential of the intelligence activity and in the notable improvement of the intervention capabilities, in terms of both speed and errors.
Let us think, for example, of the applications in the tracing of enemy instruments of action (weapons, toxic substances,…) not to mention the interception of all types of communications, (from TLC network communications to person-to-person conversations).
A joint and synergetic development on the above mentioned fronts, could give the intelligence very precious instruments to intervene and prevent terrorist acts, also through the possibility, in this case, more likely, to bring to the fore the traditional military apparatus and use them efficiently.
But the technological development in an imperfect and asymmetrical world, has to be controlled and, therefore needs:
- to guide the development of applications in resolving problems of a well-defined informative type and to satisfy specific needs resulting from intelligence activity;
- to continuously up-date technological research, trying to foresee from the initial phases of research and development, the terrorists’ capacity of adaptability and reactivity which, as we have seen, cannot be under-estimated in circumventing technological innovations (e.g. after the introduction of the metal detector, plastic guns were utilized).


The implications for the Industrial Policy

In the industrial world, the most significant implication which derives from the increasing need of security and from the processes primed by it, is not limited to the restricted areas of the military sectors but it effects the entire economic system of the country.
The passage to an economy more oriented towards the immaterial and intangible dimension, also in the security and defence sectors, and the discontinuity which is transforming it, in fact, is creating a renewed and more intense significance for the phenomenon of “duality” of the interested sectors. In virtue of this, civil and military applications use paradigms and technological language which are always more similar, if not identical, multiplying the classifications, the quantity and the intensity of spill-over and potential synergies between the military and the civil world.
In this perspective, civil applications could make a noticeable “leap” forward insomuch as it could benefit technological developments germinated in military environments, which, as is known, having to face and resolve “extreme” scenarios, are much more complex and sophisticated.
The advantages for the economic system could be very important. It is sufficient to think of what internet has been for all of for us, and what could be the future revolution, using the innovations (e.g. sensors), which are being developed in electronics and the ICT for security and defence in other sectors which, at the national level, are in strong crisis. For example:
- civil ITC
- transportation
- automotive
- logistic
- mobility
- Infrastructure and complex networks management, also for their security
- medical
- biotechnologies
However, this is not all. The higher integration between civil and military compartments could have a healthy impact also in the industrial structure and the competitive dynamics of the above sectors, through:
- the entrance of new players on the scene, more agile and flexible in making innovations (e.g. start-up technologies, …);
- the fall of barriers and fences between civil and military which can increase the actual and potential competition among a higher number of players, previously focussed only on civil/military sectors and who could now compete;
- better exchange, not only of know-how but also of language and managerial models, between civil and military, public and private sectors.
In other words, the development of electronics, spurred by the urgency to solve the security problem, could furnish, with an adequate direction of industrial policy, a strong support to re-launch sectors in crisis and resolve some structural problems of the country (e.g. mobility and management of infrastructures,..) fully exploiting all the possible relapses and the sharing of resources. One could think of a real organic project of the re-launching of certain key sectors of the Country, with benefits largely diffused for all the national system, permitting the reactivation of managerial capacities and, already available, technical and scientific know-how.


Conclusions

If it is true that we need to increase and improve the international cooperation against the terrorism, we have seen in these problems, how different capabilities and responsibilities must be coordinated: Institutions and Politics, University and the Intellectual World, Science and Technology, Industry, Business and Management. To be ready to face the challenge of security and the moment, which we hope is imminent, in which we must coordinate to cooperate globally, with the other Nations, against the terrorism, perhaps it would be opportune, for our Country, to prepare itself adequately, starting from now to:
- introduce and institutionalize venues where all the energy present in our Country can discuss the challenges and priorities imposed by the new scenario, with all the various implications which derive from them and, furthermore, to launch a National Plan of innovative security policies;
- to include the security factor, also for its important technological and industrial policy implications, in the programmatic report relative to the Lisbon Agenda, which every European country, including Italy, must prepare shortly.


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