The Lebanese elections of May, 2005, have re-confirmed Hizbollah (The Party of God) as one of the major political forces of the Country. In fact, Hizbollah has gained an important internal consensus which, perhaps, no-one in the West would have thought possible, particularly, after the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Syria, in fact, had been accused of supporting Hizbollah on more than one occasion.
Since its official appearance on the scene in 1985, Hizbollah has undergone a transformation which has changed the organization from a resistance group to a real political party, capable of winning popular support in the complicated Lebanese political scenario. Moreover, Hizbollah has adapted itself to the internal and regional situations without ever abandoning its initial objective of fighting Israel.
The Movement, which originated during the civil war years, came to prominence because of its resistance operations against foreign forces in Lebanon. At the beginning, also its propaganda activities were centred on military confrontation with Israel.
The many Jihad campaigns carried out by “the martyrs” (shahid) against the “invading and occupying enemy”, allowed Hizbollah to slowly acquire ever increasing consensus, not only within the Lebanese territory, but also within neighbouring countries, such as Palestine, Syria and Iran, which, if not directly involved were worried about the expansionist policy adopted by Israel. Hizbollah began to be recognized internationally and opposed by the West for its military activities; the Movement’s image grew in direct proportion with the number of ‘resistance’ activities which its militants achieved. Without these operations, the Party would never have been able to maintain its presence in the Country.
It is thought, quite erroneously, that the survival of Hizbollah was pertinent only in function of its fight against Israel. This opinion, in fact, was held by certain founding members of the Party, who, at first, instituted the movement only as a means to resist their Israeli enemy.


The integration into the lebanese political system

One of the determining factors for Hizbollah’s transformation from a guerrilla movement into a political party was the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990. Notwithstanding the application of the Taef agreements which permitted the restoration of peace through the institutionalization of the coexistence of different religions and with reference to this last, the division of political power was distributed accordingly, (the office of the President of the Republic was entrusted to Maronite Christian, that of the Prime Minister to Sunnite Moslem and lastly, that of the President of Parliament to a Shiite Moslem), the political, economic and social reconstruction of the country still had a long way to go.
With the evolution of international relations at the end of the 1980’s, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the defeat of Iran and the failure to export the Islamic revolution to neighbouring countries, Hizbollah was encouraged to focus on national priorities and in favour of these, to reconsider its strategies and alliances. Furthermore, the choice of Hizbollah to cooperate as a political member for the unity and safety of Lebanon resulted in unifying all the sectors of the Lebanese society in the action of resistance. However, the renewed strategy towards a full integration into the system had to be realized through a start of talks with the other Lebanese political powers.
Many efforts were yet to be made, both at a cultural and practical level before Hizbollah could embark upon its political activities with the parliamentary elections of 1992. It started with establishing contacts with the other Lebanese political powers and, in time, managed to present itself as a political power able to guarantee well-being and stability to the country. It was also time for a mass-media campaign through which its new programmes could be publicized. The talks with the various labour unions, the public speeches, as well as, the election campaign then underway, all served to reveal the long-term targets and the political vision of Hizbollah, one of the few parties which presented a political programme for the 1992 elections.
The party combined practical actions and concrete resistance to foreign occupation with propositions of political solutions to the problems of the Lebanese society. The Hizbollah party put forward, then as today, the abrogation of the existing political-institutional sectarianism, the defence of political liberty and freedom of information, the development of a social policy, and the necessity to find a remedy for the social-economic disparities between the different Lebanese regions. Apart from military operations, Hizbollah has successfully used numerous ‘levers’ for the ‘machine of consent’, building an “enterprise” which is fully dedicated to the creation of social institutions which bring moral and material help to the population.
Hizbollah has dedicated itself to Health, Education and Information, and through various foundations, financially providing for the families of the “martyrs”, the war-invalids and civilians under Israeli occupation. First among these foundations is the al-Shahid, created in 1982, with the objective of ensuring financial aid, through a type of pension, for the education of children and support to families of the “martyrs” and victims of Israeli bombardments.
Regarding health problems, in a country where social security is practically non-existent, al-Shahid distributes, among other supplies, economic aid to many hospitals in the south of Lebanon and the Bekaa region. It is for this reason that hospitals such as Al-Rasul Al-Azam has one of the best medical teams in the country with a good Analyses and Radiology Centre or the Sheykh Ragheb Hospital, extension of the Islam Institute of Medicine, which gives free care to the families of the “martyrs” and offers treatment, at very low cost, to the civil population (an x-ray which would cost 22 euro in an American hospital, costs only 5 to 6 euro in the two above mentioned hospitals).
Keeping in mind the importance of preparing a social basis for the Islamic resistance, the al-Shahid Foundation has created and controls a cultural institution entrusted to spread the culture of martyrdom.
The al-Jarih Foundation, instead, is engaged in the social reintegration of injured veterans. Jihad al-Bina, founded in 1985, is active, mainly, in the reconstruction of the thousand houses destroyed or damaged by Israeli bombardments, but it has, on several occasions, been engaged in the construction of schools, hospitals and religious centres. This foundation was also committed to the provision of drinking water for the southern outskirts of Beirut, for the Bekaa region and for numerous villages in Southern Lebanon; also building artesian wells and pumping stations for agricultural irrigation and, in those areas where they were insufficient, it has built numerous power generating stations.
The improvements and support given to the agricultural sector by the Hizbollah foundations have been instrumental in:- the creation of regional distributors where seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and other agricultural materials are sold at reduced prices; the construction of two veterinary centres at Nabatiyye (South Lebanon) and Sohmour (west of Bekaa); the planning of irrigation canals; agricultural training to cope with the conversion into alternative and traditional crops, of the hemp and poppy cultivation, which was forbidden by the State of Lebanon in 1992.
In the field of education, with the cooperation of the Lebanese Pedagogical Council, the Al-Mahdi schools network - twelve spread throughout the Lebanese territory - is engaged in teaching programmes in Arab, English and French, together with the basic religious teaching, to the almost five thousand pupils who receive books, uniforms and the necessary school materials gratis. Under the banner of a more “just and solid” society, Hizbollah has undertaken, through the Al-Amdad association, the support of families in need, the old and the handicapped.
The victory and the major impact on the masses, regarding the achievements of the Party, was seen at the end of 2000, with the withdrawal, even if not entire, of the Israeli Army from Lebanon, (the Shebaa zone is still occupied by Israel).
Obviously, after the withdrawal of the Israeli troops, the popularity of Hizbollah climbed even higher and it was able to present itself on the national scene as an organization which is not only military, but as a Party with the social, political and cultural welfare of the nation at heart.

In a sense, Hizbollah has been able to construct and organize a state within the State, covering the needs and shortcomings of the Lebanese institutions, above all, in the south of Lebanon.
After all, the existence of the Party depended more than anything else on its efficiency, apart from the financial aid from Iran and the zakat (the ritual alms giving, one of the pillars of Islam). The identity of purpose within the party and its popular favour, have been, in the past, the reason for the constant increase of consensus towards the movement and are still the base of the growing influence that the party could yet acquire, with time.
Any type of pressure on HIzbollah by the United States or Israel, especially in light of the last elections, could do nothing more than automatically strengthen the Party, particularly, in view of the fact that Israel has not yet completely left Lebanon.
It cannot be denied that Hizbollah, not only with practical actions, but also by means of clever ideological manoeuvres, has been able to gain popular consent: moving and exploiting the needs of a state and a population which are exhausted from a civil war and which, today, must still face a rather critical situation.


Hizbollah and the mass media

Seldom has a guerrilla movement enjoyed, from its very beginning, such an interest from the mass media. Surely this is due to the fact that Hizbollah itself has used, from the start, the very same mediatic instrument. It has often filmed the training of its militants, and has even filmed its soldiers during action, in order to show to sympathizers, the courage of its men.
This mediatic strategy has been a decisive factor for the credibility of the “Party of God”. The video films were then sent to international press agencies and shown on western television networks; demonstrating to the world public opinion and, in particular, to the Israelis, the efficiency of the guerrilla soldier in South Lebanon.
The western media’s interest for Lebanon started to diminish with the end of the civil war, but this was soon remedied by the creation of the Al Manar (The Lighthouse) television channel, in 1989. It became a satellite channel in 2000 and was renamed the “Television of Resistance and Liberation”. In the programming of this TV channel, priority is given to news and talk shows centred on the Arab–Israeli conflict and, in particular, to the “resistance” operations in Lebanon and Palestine.
This type of broadcast and the selected programming line, which, in fact, led to the shut down on the 12th of July 2004 of the channel transmitting from France, has influenced the Arab and Moslem public opinion and has succeeded in promoting the model of resistance embodied in Hizbollah.
By proposing a different reading of the facts through broadcasting the military operations of the Moslem guerrilla, Al Manar contributed, before the withdrawal in 2000, to the exacerbation of debates within the Israeli State as to whether or not it was opportune to maintain the presence of troops in Lebanon.
The images broadcast by Al Manar, which had never been shown on the Israeli television, became the source of information on the developments inside the “security zone”, especially for the relatives of the soldiers engaged there. Two news broadcasts, one in English, the other in French, were transmitted daily, in order to reach the largest possible audience.
It must also be remembered that Hizbollah has been able to adapt to the new technologies in this field; creating an internet site through the Lebanese Communication Group of Al Manar, keeping abreast with the daily international news on the economy, culture and politics etc., The articles available in the Arab and English languages are principally concerned with Arab-Islamic affairs, but details on Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine are regularly forecast.



The Hizbollah language: Islam

Among the social activities in which it has been engaged, Hizbollah has promoted religious teaching in both the primary and secondary schools. It has also provided for the creation of religious schools to guarantee a “good and right” training of its theologians.
The four theological schools (Hawza Almiyya) founded by the Party are distributed through the Lebanese territory and they are committed to preparing a theologian network capable of spreading the divine message. Furthermore, Hizbollah, has managed to gain control of numerous mosques In the southern part of Lebanon, which are administered by Party dependent committees.
However much Islam is an important religious element, it always been relegated solely to a role of inspirational source.
The main difference between Hizbollah and other Islam movements is their acceptance of the impossibility of building an Islamic State in Lebanon, given the multi-religious character of the country and, therefore, it has adapted its political programme accordingly.
It is similar to what happened to the Palestinian Movement, Hamas, which preferred to put the emphasis on the national struggle, rather than on the religious ideology, and contrary to what has happened to other religious movements, the political objective of Hizbollah is not the Islamic State.
The realization of such a project, according to Hizbollah representatives, would lead to the edification of a regime without legitimacy and, therefore, could risk a return to civil war. The above consideration has not, however, stopped Hizbollah from participating in the political life of the country, using religion as a source of inspiration to “fight injustice” and using the religious language to justify its military operations and the “martyrdom” of its fighters. Besides, the very name of the Party, composed of two words, Hizb (Party) and Allah (God), are there to underline the importance of both components, the political and the religious.
It was Hizbollah which made a myth out of the figure of the martyr laden with explosives. The mixture of religion, patriotism and the readiness to meet personal sacrifice proved to be the only possible way to oppose the foreign occupation. Even the sheik Fadlallah, one of the founding members of Hizbollah affirmed: “if we had not had our martyrs, we would not have succeeded in winning”.
Since Islam forbids suicide, Hizbollah had to find a religious expedient to justify the sacrifice of life and legitimize voluntary death in the cause of the resistance, also called “defensive jihad”. This was done through a series of religious edicts (fatawa – sing. Fatwa), defining this sacrifice of life not as “suicide”, but as “martyrdom”.
The Shiite theologian Naim Qassem, a founding member, Vice Chairman and Deputy of the Party, declared: “It is a religious duty of every Moslem to take part in the holy war and to sacrifice the maximum for it. We are convinced that the moment of death for any person is in the hands of God. The only thing the individual can do is choose the way he dies. Those who are familiar with Islam understand that whoever makes this choice does not die before his time. From this point of view, we consider martyrdom as a choice for the Moslem himself to establish the way, but not the moment of dying, which is predetermined”.
It must also be remembered that Hizbollah managed to keep the martyrdom gestures under control, rendering it an instrument be used in a targeted and parsimonious way, in order to obtain maximum resonance with the minimum sacrifice. Other arms were used to carry out its strategy just as soon as it came into possession of them: elaborated bombs with remote control; Katiusha rockets; a good intelligence service, (thanks to Syria); the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers and secret service agents. Hizbollah was too small an organization and too committed to guaranteeing the survival of its fighters, to be able to resort too frequently to martyrdom.
The Party functionaries have often shown disapproval and preoccupation at the too frequent use of this tactic by the radical Palestinian movements, stressing that martyrdom operations must be used with prudence and circumspection because human life is too precious.
Hizbollah has always taken pride in the fact that its operations were perpetrated only against enemy military targets, so as to reduce civilian victims to a minimum. In the same vein, Fadlallah himself, one of the most radical Lebanese Shiites, was one of the first to condemn the 11th September attack, stating that the killing of thousands of civilians is, in no way, justifiable or legitimate for any religion.
To win more importance and credibility within the complex Lebanese situation, Hizbollah has skilfully used the religious language without offending other religions; to this effect, Nasrallah, General Secretary of the Party, has always denounced the danger of a “civilization clash”.
As has often been declared, their war was not and is not a war of religion. Hizbollah considers Israel “the enemy” only because it is an occupying force (the same consideration, however, was not given to Syria before its withdrawal), and the Lebanese civilians were exhorted to support the resistance and to this end, Koran verses were purposely mentioned, in which Allah addresses not only “Moslems”, but the “oppressed” in general.


The future of Hizbollah

In over twenty years of existence, Hizbollah has been witness and actor of numerous transformations on the Lebanese scene, both national and international. These evolutions have had an important impact on the Movement, which has become one of the principle political parties and the major force of resistance to Israeli occupation in Lebanon today.
From its beginning, the priority of Hizbollah has always been liberation from Israeli occupation. The Party has always adapted and reconsidered its alliances and political policies, both internally and externally, in accordance with this goal, transforming the motivation of its militants into the national target of the political party that Hizbollah has become today.
Notwithstanding that Hizbollah is on the American list of terrorist organizations, (since 2002, it no longer appears on the European list), immediately after the attack on the Twin Towers in September, 2001, the United States informed the “Party of God” that they would be willing to open a new chapter in their relations if this last would adhere to certain conditions.
The first was the dissolution of its army, the Islamic Resistance and the renouncement of any claim to the Sheeba area; in exchange, Washington would ensure financial and material aid to the numerous foundations and charity institutions of Hizbollah. The second condition was the request for complete disengagement on all Hizbollah fronts involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the cessation of any intervention in favour of the Palestinians.
With the third condition, the United States asked for the Party’s collaboration in the field of security in the war against Al Qaida.
The answer from Hizbollah was a total refusal of all three conditions. First, complete Israeli withdrawal from Sheeba was imperative for the security and national sovereignty of Lebanon; second, the solidarity with the Palestinian people was a principle on which they would never negotiate; and third, the war on terrorism undertaken against Al Qaeda was a conflict to which this organization was opposed; initially financed by the same Americans, and therefore a family affair which had nothing to do with Hizbollah.
Over the years, Hizbollah has developed a network of relations with several Arab and non-Arab states (with the exception of Israel and the United States) and with different regional and international organizations, reinforcing, above all, its ties with Syria and Iran. For the very reason of these continual international and regional changes, it is not easy to foresee, with any certainty, the future of Hizbollah. Secretary-General Nasrallah himself has never defined the long-term vision of his party. To the often asked question about Hizbollah’s future in the event that the Israelis leave the Sheeba zone and definitively terminate occupation of Lebanon, Nasrallah, like Naim Qassem, have never given a clear answer. The question is avoided by saying that “the options are numerous, anything could happen. To announce such a plan would simply mean exposing oneself to the eyes of the enemy”.
Also the Israelis, according to these latter, would always have opted for the strategy of keeping all options open until the last moment, in this way achieving the highest benefit from the actions eventually taken.
Let us try then, to supply some possible conjectures on developments which could eventually occur.
The only certainty demonstrated by Hizbollah is its capacity to modify and transform itself according to the situation: always, however, preserving its tradition. Hizbollah’s capacity and the political weight it has acquired, makes it obvious that it would never be an actor easy to eliminate from the Lebanese scene. Capable of politically adapting itself to any challenge; coalescing with other Lebanese forces as needed; not disdaining to use religion, as often before, for its ends and interests, in a society in which, unfortunately and often, religion is the main cause and impetus towards mobilization, also for political ends.
Today, Hizbollah controls, in an imperceptible way and in every respect, the southern part of Lebanon and not only by means of the Parliament seats gained in the last elections. The yellow flags with the name of the party, designed to delineate the shape of a Kalashnikov, wave in the villages and at intersections. The militants are able to transform themselves, at the right moment, into peasants, employees and traders.
The power held institutionally by Hizbollah today, is much stronger in light of the event of the 30th of August last, with the enquiry into the murder of the former Premier Hariri.
Four former-executives of the security services, high-ranking representatives of the pro-Syrian establishment, were arrested and charged with this murder by the Lebanese magistracy. The atmosphere in the country, due to the fact that the government majority is defined as “anti-Syrian”(notwithstanding the presence of Hizbollah) and in light of the numerous attacks over these last months, can only be described as very critical.
Owing to this dangerous situation (a new series of attacks is quite probable), many anti-Syrian political and media exponents have presently found refuge in Paris: among these, the son of the former-Premier Hariri and the Druse leader, Walid Jumblatt. Among the powers of this “anti-Syrian” majority, Nasrallah, therefore, is the only leader of the majority remaining in Beirut who does not fear attack.

The reason for the existence of the armed wing of the Party, the Islamic Resistance, the parallel force of the Lebanese army, is the continued Israeli occupation of the Sheeba area. Should it become necessary, due to external pressure and only after a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, Hizbollah would certainly be in a position to dismantle its army without losing control of the situation.
The Islamic Resistance of the Hizbollah has always declared to be ‘in harmony and not in contrast’ with the regular Lebanese forces. The united intentions and vision of the Party could not be undermined by the dissolution of its armed wing. But while Israel is present on Lebanese territory, no external pressure would meet with the favour of the people for the elimination of the Hizbollah army. The “Party of God” is held in considerable esteem within the country. Even Syria, during the entire occupation and, in particular, at the beginning when relations were not so good, paid great attention not to enter into contrast with this force, offering when and where possible, its support.
So far, in fact, Hizbollah has always kept strictly to its own field of action; resistance to occupation. It has never entered into minimum conflict with the Lebanese Armed Forces, leaving to this latter, all the institutional tasks of internal security.
As for Syria, allied in the struggle against Israel for interests in the Golan region, notwithstanding having been, at the same time, an “occupying” force, its withdrawal from the Lebanese territory could have benefited the Party.
Given the forced withdrawal of the Syrian troops, under pressure from the western powers, and given that the cooperation between this State and Hizbollah will remain the same albeit weakened - due to the overall external pressures regarding the Israeli neighbour- the Lebanese resistance can no longer be accused of surviving thanks to Syrian support.
On the contrary, the cooperation could improve in an informal manner: Syria, no longer being on the territory, could finance and support to a greater extent, those within that territory who share and work for the same objectives.
Taking into consideration the Syrian-Palestinian front, relations with the “Party of God” could weaken, both because of the difficult moment that Syria is experiencing in its relations with the U.S.A., and because of the new political course that Palestine seems to have taken after the death of Arafat and the election of the new President, Abu Mazen.
Consequently the resistance and interests of Hizbollah could concentrate, more and more, on the new governments of Iran and Iraq. Therefore, we should, perhaps, take into account the “new Shiite triangle”, which could be created between Hizbollah, Iran (with whom there have always been closely connected) and the Iraqi Shiites, who have an ever increasing role in the Iraqi government and who are requesting with ever increasing frequency, independence for the provinces where they have a majority in the new Federal Iraq.
The Shiite resistance against the Americans in Iraq could represent a national imperative for Hizbollah, like the Palestinian resistance towards the common enemy: Israel. In the eyes of Hizbollah, the U.S. war in Iraq represents a return to colonialism.
The traditional hostility of the Party towards Saddam Hussein for the repression of the Shiites under his dictatorship, the war against Iran and the invasion of Kuwait, which gave to Americans the pretext to install a military basis in the Gulf area, did not impede Hizbollah from launching, before the attack, a reconciliatory initiative among all the Iraqi powers.
The objective was to deprive the United States of the pretext of attacking, by manipulating all the Iraq divergences to their own advantage. Notwithstanding their announcing the illegitimacy of the war to Iraq and the subsequent “occupation”, Hizbollah was careful not to openly oppose the participation of the Shiite parties in the Council of the Interim Government, created under the auspices of the Americans. The Party strategy, as seen many times in the past, has always been to create new and different coalitions with different subjects, according to the circumstances.
Finally, in considering the international developments, we cannot but cite the new course adopted by the Israeli politics. First, with the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and then, with the attempt to normalize relations with the other Arab and Islamic countries of the region.
On the 1st of September last, the former capital of Turkey, Istanbul, was the scene of the first handshake between Pakistan and Israel. Even though it has not been a official acknowledgement of the State of Israel, this beginning of talks with Pakistan has allowed the Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister, Shalom, to underline the importance of this first step, which could lead to, according to the Minister, the opening of relations with Moslem nations.
Meanwhile, the Pakistani President, Musharraf, (urged by the necessity to strengthen his country’s image with the West, after the discovery that the four terrorists of the London attack were Pakistani or, at least, trained in Pakistan) declared that these first ‘indirect’ talks would have been supported by Saudi Arabia and Palestinian Authorities; these last reacting officially by attacking the opening of the talks together with Hamas, Jamaat-al-islamiyya (the major Islamic Party of Pakistan) and numerous other Arab countries.
In such an international climate, given the particular historic moment, a turning point also in the relations between Israel and Iran cannot be excluded.
Even though it is not a real and proper recognition of the Israeli State, the beginning of talks could lead Iran to enjoy major esteem from the Western states. A sort of “do ut des” for which the Iranian state, if Israel closes an eye, could go ahead with its recently started nuclear programme, provided that peaceful use of the programme could be guaranteed. Reciprocally, Iran could tighten its belt on the Lebanese front by reducing its weapons and financial contributions to Hizbollah.
However, whatever international developments are considered, it cannot be forgotten that the power gained by the “Party of God” within Lebanon, allows it to survive without external assistance.
Only a total change of programme or a division, not foreseeable at this moment, within the Hizbollah Party, could bring about great or small revolutions able to provoke dangerous changes.
If, for example, due to the huge power gained by Hizbollah, the idea of creating a totally Islamic state, at the present time not considered, should take root in the minds of the Party’s theologians, Lebanon could find itself, once again, in the middle of a civil war, in a world where often the “oppressed” and the “oppressors” easily exchange roles.