Low-cost weapons. Inventiveness. High mobility. Ability to adapt. Tunnels and bunkers. And a great number of rockets.
From the Middle-East to Asia, guerrilla formations have shaped their forces to keep up with better organized armies.
Choices often dictated by the operative necessity and lack of resources. In these pages, we shall examine some crises where the protagonists have implemented clear examples of asymmetric war: Libya, the conflict between the Hezbollah and Israel, in the Gaza Strip and the developments of the confrontation in the Afghan-Pakistan arena. Each one characterized by a weapon of “preference”.
The armed jeeps – the rockets and the booby-traps. Rudimental systems which can, however, create problems and losses to conventional armies.


The Libya campaign

At the beginning of the popular uprising against the Gheddafi regime, the opposers probably did not think they would have to use weapons. But the demonstrations in Cyrenaica overwhelmed the weak resistance of the Armed Forces, allowing those demonstrators who had taken to the streets, to take possession of war equipment.In Benghazi, the population took possession of several depots and barracks having access to a few dozen old tanks and armoured vehicles, a considerable quantity of ammunition, a good number of anti-aircraft guns, rocket launchers, RPGs and light trucks. Within a few days a mass of volunteers, joined by a small nucleus of soldiers who had passed to the opposition, constituted the central force of a variegated deployment.

It was calculated that there were more or less a thousand “professionals”, with a small number of officers, present at Benghazi. Then, a few hundred volunteers, with a lot of courage, but scarce military training. A modest presence compared to the government forces. According to the Institute of Strategic Studies of London, the following was the consistency – on paper, we must emphasize – of the pro-Gheddafi troops.

- 50 thousand regulars (but there are doubts)
- Several thousand irregulars, gathered in the popular committees.- Circa 2000 tanks (old T 72, T 62 e T 55)- Circa 2000 armoured vehicles (Btr, Bmp 1, M113)
- Self-propelled Italian Palmaris
- Groups of mercenaries from the Sudan, Chad, Niger, Sahara, Algeria, Belarus and Serbia. It is difficult to calculate the number. Maybe a reality that, at times, has been overdone. The regime engaged mercenary soldiers, but they did not have the impact and the proportions which are reported.

The aviation – also this antiquated – was neutralized after the intervention of NATO and the imposition of the no-fly zone. The same fate ensued for the missile umbrella constituted by Sam 2 and Sam 5. Mobile and portable systems remained in the hands of the loyalists.
In terms of the ground operations, the conflicts have had three key zones. Cyrenaica in the east, the city of Misurata, and the west, also called “the mountain”. In the eastern regions, the fighting had – at least until May 2011- two phases. The first, from the middle of March to the beginning of April. The second in late spring.


The first phase

Extremely chaotic, was marked by the continual change of hands between different places. Ajdabya, Brega, Ras Lanuf have been the scenes of combat, conducted essentially with the use – massive – of pick-ups and jeeps armed with anti-aircraft machine guns and rocket launchers of the Grad type. The rebels had only these, the government forces had mixed them with the armoured vehicles in the hope of making them less detectable to the allied fighter planes. And to a certain extent, they succeeded. Also because they were vehicles very much like those of their adversaries and not identifiable as military.

The “applications” of the insurgents were interesting. Without heavy artillery and long-range rocket launchers (above 20 kilometers) the rebels organized workshops which produced a panoply of vehicles:

- pick ups equipped with anti-aircraft machine guns;
- small trucks with rudimental rocket launchers: often, four tubes activated by the battery of the vehicle. A copy of an Egyptian system;
- vehicles on which they had applied rocket launchers taken from fighter helicopters;
- jeeps with small ramps to launch explosive devices found in the depots;
- vehicles seized from government troops, like the Grads with medium range.

The rebels met serious difficulties due to the lack of cadres, scarce training – at least until May – the absolute inability to conduct coordinated actions, non-existent communications apparatus, and no logistics train.
Moreover, the equipment found at Benghazi was of scarce quality. Spare parts were lacking, the vehicles were scarcely efficient and personnel were inadequate. Based on a deliberate choice, Gheddafi left only secondary equipment in Cyrenaic.
To the favour of the rebels, instead, the NATO protection and the access to the Egyptian border through which an uninterrupted flow of supplies continued. Light weapons, ammunition, radio apparatus – non-existent at the beginning – and equipment and vehicles to replace those that were lost.
In Cyrenaic, and as we shall see, in the rest of the Country also, the conflict retraced the one of the 80’s in the Chad Desert. Protagonists were the armed jeeps, the large all-terrain vehicles and pick-ups, used as an armed cavalry to travel the few roads available (in particular on the coast or in the Southern direction). In the East, the government forces, better trained and perhaps well assisted by foreign advisors, held for months using weapons as old as the Katyusha. Their range reaches up to 40 kilometer, the few available to the rebels – in the first phase – reaches 20 kilometers.
For weeks in Misurata, the population and insurgents suffered an asphyxiating siege, conducted with continual bombing and the use of snipers. The Gheddafians had deployed nuclei of 4 to 5 chosen marksmen positioned on the highest buildings, which were replenished every so often. They were, in fact, autonomous groups. For days the tactics functioned. The only way the rebels could get new supplies was by sea and, by their successful holding of the Port, they were able to receive food and military aid. There were few arms available to the insurgents. Kalashnikovs, some Rpg and Molotov cocktails.
In the West, sectors inhabited by the Berbers, were hit hard by the loyalists, but thanks to the conformation of the land, with the villages on very high positions and scarce means of access, the rebels impeded many of these localities from being captured by the adversaries. The losses of the population, forced to flee to Tunisia were, however, very heavy.


The second phase

With the intensification of the NATO raids and a more continuous flow of supplies (accompanied by Egyptian, Italian, English and French advisors from Qatar) the ground operations caused the registration, in May, of a slow, but continual change.In the East, the rebels had intensified training and their units avoided the daring incursions which had cost victims and setbacks in the first days of the revolt. In Benghazi, the revolutionaries thought, first and foremost, to consolidate positions by erecting defences, posts and blockade points, non-existent until then.

In the meantime, they made the sending of aid to Misurata more intense and organized, with the use of tugs, small cargo and fishing boats. A pipeline which, together with precision air attacks by the alliance, made it possible for the insurgents to pass to the offensive. Certainly, they had at their side the presence of advisors and, in particular, contractors engaged by allied government.
It was, in fact, impossible that within a few weeks the “random shooters” of Misurata could have become experienced soldiers. Photos and videos have shown techniques of urban combat. The rebels had started by moving from house to house through the open holes of the walls. In some buildings they had opened small slits from where they could fire without being hit. The snipers’ hideouts were eliminated with precise fire or with tricks, like the one of starting a fire at the base of a building. Smoke and fire forced the snipers to abandon their positions.
To halt the advance of the tanks, ditches were made with the use of tractors. As an alternative Tirs filled with earth and debris were placed in position. On various occasions the loyalists were forced to follow obliged routes, exposing themselves to the sorties of guerrillas armed with Rgps. The armed jeeps arrived by means of the Port (with machine gunners and guns without recoil) and they were modified in workshops – equipping them with protection. The pick-ups became mini-armoured vehicles, able to resist gunfire.
If, in the first phase the fire of the armed jeeps was imprecise, in the second phase, the rebels had learned to use them in teams of 2 or 3. The first proceeded in reverse (because the gunner can only pull towards the back) engaging the target for several minutes. Then they left the place to the second and so forth. At times, they proceeded in couples (or in 4, side by side) to increase the volume of fire. Often in these actions, the insurgents accompanied the manoeuvre with a full launch of Rpgs and other anti-tank systems.
In this regard, Qatar arranged the arrival of numerous Milan launchers.
At Misurata and in the West, the fighters showed, once again, a certain inventiveness. Some small trucks appeared on which were mounted the gun turret of an amoured vehicle: it could not rotate and to reload needed a few minutes. And again, the rebels used the old anti-tank Saggers to make a fire barrage. Instead of employing the wire-guided system, they fired them, making them take off from crude ramps. It is difficult to estimate the effects. The military analysts were rather skeptical. But the impression is that the fire of the insurgents continued – even though imprecise – and the air attacks forced the loyalist to abandon the positions.
On the “mountain” to the West, the Berbers used, more or less, the same tactics – clued in by some form of coordination – and were able to snatch some important military equipment from the enemy.
By dominating the high places, the rebels impeded the loyalists from launching a counter-offensive of wide magnitude. And conquering a border post with Tunisia guaranteed the rebels an important place behind the lines. Also in the West, Qatar, one of the few Arab Countries that openly declared its support, sent mortars, varied equipment, bullets and radio equipment.
Limiting ourselves to the examination of the first three months of conflict, certain points can be fixed:

- without the intervention of NATO, the revolt would have been nipped in the bud in a resulting bloodbath;
- the allied aviation coverage constructed an effective umbrella and the raids neutralized most of the more important weapons systems;
- the rebels, even in the confusion and with greatly reduced equipment, resisted and in certain areas succeeded in prising positions from the enemy. Remarkable inventiveness shown by the insurgents in the attempt to improve their equipment;
- A conflict which has absorbed resources and diplomatic efforts has been fought with modest and simple means (obviously, we are not considering the air component);
- Using light vehicles, rocket launchers and machine guns, it was easier for the contenders to find spare parts and supplies. The arms market – also the second-hand one – was able to satisfy the demand.

In conclusion, the Libya campaign has shown that in certain war theatres, conflicts can be fought on two levels. The first – and we refer to the NATO intervention in all its forms – highly technological. The second, with outdated equipment and rather simple tactics.

The rockets

Israel has two war fronts – active or semi-active. The first is that in the North, which opposes the Lebanese Hezbollah. To divide the two sides, today, there is an ample UN contingent, in which also a part is made up of Italian soldiers. The second front concerns the Gaza Strip with Hamas and the salaphite groups. In both the war theatres, in the face of the overwhelming power of the Israeli Army, the militants have used, and use, rockets of different ranges. They cannot alter the military equilibrium, but they have a high political impact because they can strike the civil population. And therefore, this has very serious internal effects.In the summer of 2006, after the kidnapping of three Israeli soldiers by the Hezbollah, The Jerusalem Army launched an offensive based, essentially, on air power and on limited ground interventions. A campaign which demonstrated evident limitations and aroused bitter criticism in the Israeli establishment.

Against well organized guerrilla formations – and the Hezbollah certainly corresponds to this description – only air power is not enough. On the other hand, the Lebanese Shiite Movement, widely supported in Iran and Syria, has demonstrated that the up-to-date version of the Katyusha can condition regional events and provoke international consequences. The enlargement of the UN contingent is connected precisely to the threat of the rockets.

The Hezbollah had prepared for conflict for almost six years. It was not its intention to use the weapons in the confrontation of 2006 and was taken by surprise by the Israeli response. But it reacted with rapidity and adapted to the situation.
The militiamen created three lines. The first composed of short range rockets (122 millimeters) deployed to the South of the River Litani and managed by the Nasser Brigade. The Hezbollah had hidden the rockets in dozens of villages close to the frontier with Israel. As well as fixed locations – hidden in garages, yards, farms – an effective mobile system was created. This is the sequence:

1) A team reaches a launching point and places the ramp (a metal structure which is easily transportable by any vehicle). Therefore, dispersible;
2) A second team brings a rocket and disperses;
3) Finally, the “launchers” enter the scene, who fire the rocket or programme the launch with a timer.


Israeli sources disclose that in this way, the Hezbollah units reduced to a minimum the possibility of being individuated and attacked by the aviation. Some of the hiding places were concealed in thickets; others were well camouflaged in “trenches” protected by coverage.
The guerrillas then organized a second line, north of the Litani, with rockets of medium and long range fixed on vehicles of various kinds. It has been calculated that since 2006, Syria and Iran have supplied the militias with no less than 13 thousand rockets in order to guarantee a barrage of fire lasting for weeks: according to some estimates, the Hezbollah fired almost 3,800 missiles, of which 901centered inhabited areas of Israel.
Another piece of information tells how the Shiites, notwithstanding the air raids, were able to keep shooting until the last day, without touching the reserves too much; the precision of these rockets is relative, but this does not impede creating a pressure on the population and the adversary government. Even a few rockets can serve the “cause”. In the sense that it permits the Hezbollah to say: “You have not been successful in blocking our response”
To protect the two lines from an eventual ground offensive, the pro-Iranian movement created a defence apparatus which was just as sophisticated, with tunnels equipped also with television-cameras, an escape exit and shooting positions. In 2006, there were no fewer than 600 bunker-deposits. Each unit knew the whereabouts of three shelters only, so as to protect the network in case of capture.
Inside the tunnels firing group were positioned and were equipped with anti-tank rockets of every kind: from Rpgs to the new Hornets, from the Tow to Chinese weapons. On some occasions the Israeli divisions were met with “swarms of rockets”. Out of the 400 tanks and armoured vehicles employed by Israel, almost 100 were damaged. And some were irrecoverable. The Hezbollah employed the anti-tank systems also in urban combat, provoking serious losses: a Tow fired at the interior of a house can cause very grave damage.
As an enquiry commission showed, the guerrillas were advantaged also by the indecision of the Israeli Command and by the delay in the mobilization of sufficient forces on the part of Jerusalem. The Government wanted to avoid finishing in the umpteenth “Lebanese quagmire” and relied, above all, on the aviation. When, at the end, it ordered an intervention of the mobile brigades, it was too late. And also at this juncture – always according to the enquiry – a bad preparation was revealed.
The Hezbollah strategy followed a constant evolution based on what was done after 1985, when Israel maintained the control of a security zone in South Lebanon, entrusting it to small army units and to the Lebanese allies of the ALS. In those years, the Shiite Command had indicated 13 key principles.


Let us look at them.
1) Avoid the strongest, attack the weak. Attack and retreat.
2) The protection of our fighters is more important than the damage made to the enemy.
3) Attack only when success us certain.
4) Surprise is essential.
5) Do not be dragged into an open battle, slip away like smoke before the enemy uses its advantage
6) To reach the goal requires patience, only in this way can the weak points of the adversary be discovered.
7) Remain in movement.
8) Keep the enemy in a constant state of alert.
9) The path to the great victory passes through thousands of small victories.
10) Maintain high the morale of your men, deny the superiority of the enemy.
11) The media has many weapons which can hit like bullets. Use them in battle.
12) The population is a treasure, cultivate it.
13) Create damage to the enemy and stop before you renounce to moderation.

Some of these “cornerstones” seem obvious or just simple slogans. But on a tactical level, they functioned. On the strategic level – in 2006 – they caused certain problems. Or better, the Hezbollah, perhaps too sure of itself, underestimated what the reaction of Israel could be after the kidnapping of its three soldiers. Anyway, the Movement does not seem to have abandoned this line of defence and attack.Revelations that emerged during the first six months of 2011 furnished a new “photograph” of the Lebanese situation.
1) Israel identified 550 new bunkers, 300 observation points and another 100 cites connected to military activities.
2) Hezbollah is in possession of over 40 thousand rockets. Among these: Chinese M600 (400 km range), Scud D (700 km.), Zalzal (200 km.), Fajr (75 km).
3) In the case of war, Hezbollah can launch a daily average of 600 rockets.
4) With the exception of the Scud, these weapons can be fired within a time span inferior to 10 minutes.

In the case of a new conflict, the Lebanese movement will, therefore, follow this operative profile. And it cannot do otherwise, given the gap which divided it from the Israeli apparatus. But those who have studied the dossier are equally convinced that there can be new surprises. Both on the side of Hezbollah and of Israel.


The case of Hamas

The Lebanese crisis of 2006 had a great impact on the military choices of Hamas, the Palestinian fundamentalist faction which has its “heart” in the Gaza Strip, at the Southern frontier of Israel. And the conflict which the Palestinians opposed the Israeli (December 2008 – January 2009) repeated the use of rockets by the weaker component. Hamas, however, is not the Hezbollah and the territory of operation is limited and isolated. There is no dense vegetation, or rivers or high ground which can offer natural cover.
It was inevitable that the Palestinians resorted to rockets and booby traps. The first, principally, - as in Lebanon – they had more of a political value than a military one. And has, in any event, represented a challenge to the deterrence of Israel.
The use of these rockets goes back to the second intifada: Hamas began with the first rudimentary Kassams and has continued until today. Shots which in this time period caused contained material damage and around 220 victims, apart from the psychological stress for the populations which have become targets and hostages. Israel has responded with conventional means – aviation, artillery, drones – and secret activities. This latter to neutralize the chain of supplies and provisions.
Hamas, in the 2008 war, substantially failed in part of its objectives: it was not able to slow down the advance of the ground units; its fighters turned out to be below expectations; they failed to create that deterrence which would have induced Israel to a major prudence (which, instead, came about in Lebanon); they suffered serious although not irreparable losses. In contrast, the enemy offensive, did not neutralize the threat of the “missiles”, which continued to be present in the Strip and to grow in number.

Hamas worked with success on four levels:
1) Local production of Kassam rockets with a range of 6 to 12 km.
2) Increase in the quality of the “pieces”.
3) Importation of missiles of Iranian production with a vaster range (like the Fajr).
4) Use of mortars against the troops and the settlements close to the Strip.

All this was obtained at relatively low costs. What follows is a table – approximate – of the prices of their weapons. Grad rocket costs about a thousand dollars; a Kassam only one hundred; a mortar bullet 500-700 (there’s a tax to pay to the smugglers). Only recently, Israel has introduced an anti-Katyusha system (Iron Dom), which has given good results, even though the costs for the development and use are rather high. On the basis of information from Israeli sources, Hamas employed, on the whole, rockets with a range not superior to 20 kilometers. Then, towards the end of December, it passed to the use of the WeiShei-1E, a Chinese rocket produced in two versions: the first able to hit a target at 10-12 kilometers, the second up to 40 km. To increase the effects, balls of iron were added to the explosive (from 18 to28 kg). Despite suffering a defeat, Hamas – thanks also to the use of the missiles –can reclaim some successes. Like the Hezbollah was able to threaten the Israeli communities with the Kassams and this danger still remains. The organization has not been annihilated. On the contrary, it has put part of its force back on its feet by obtaining new military supplies from Iran. The Movement also showed how it was able to adapt and “change course in mid-stream”. Moreover, Israel had entered easily into Gaza, it did not meet the feared resistance – there was talk about a circle of fire bristling with traps – however, it was decided, in the end, to retreat.Certainly, the objective was not to re-occupy the Strip, but the Jewish State preferred a medium-term operation to avoid being caught in a situation which could become hazardous for its men and without obtaining the desired advantages. However, a continued presence in hostile territory can be fraught with attacks, kidnapping of soldiers, incidents in which the population, above all, has to pay.There is no political advantage – internal or external – it is not possible to completely neutralize a movement like Hamas, which is not only a military reality, but enjoys a very large social consensus.

The supplies

It is not sporadic aid, but a line of provisions which has a dimension that exceeds the regional borders. The Lebanese movement receives supplies directly along three main direction lines. To circumvent controls, the containers are sent in intermediate stopovers and then transferred to a second freighter. The arms are concealed behind batches of powered milk and other legitimate products. Large cargo airplanes transport the missiles always in Syria or in Lebanon itself. Various shipments have been individuated during the last two years. And, finally, the ground route. The arms reach Syria and therefore, the Lebanese shelters. In Syrian territory, there are numerous depots where the Hezbollah stocked their reserve of rockets. Furthermore, a plant – still in Syria – to produce a special version of the Grads.The supply chain that serves Hamas with the shipments that follow the African route is more articulated: Sudan, Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula and last, Gaza. A complex network composed of officers of the Qods Army, Sudanese elements and smugglers connected to the Bedouin clans. At times, on the Egyptian territory, there are contact with Islamic cells, in particular, those present in the Sinai. The revolts in North Africa, the chaos which unsettled the security apparatuses in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia, and the fewer inspections have extended these activities

The Afghan-Pakistan war theatre

Afghanistan e Pakistan form a single theatre. It is impossible to divide them. One influences the other. The insurgent forces and the terrorists move along the two sides of the frontier. There exist ideological connections, bonds of complicity, operative exchanges, recruiting in both directions. Conventional forces move against this threat. In Afghanistan, the allied contingent – of which also Italy is a part – in Pakistan, the local army and, to a lesser extent, the United States with special forces and armed drones. Although they have thousands of followers, the militants only rarely accept direct firing confrontations. And this is usually against the most exposed positions in remote areas. Their preferred weapons represent a trident, known in slang as IED (improvised explosive devices); the suicide attackers; the infiltration accompanied by kamikaze actions. They have been fighting in this way for more than 10 years and only, at times, introduce light variations, like that of the snipers. These are low cost “systems”, but they influence the war scenario. American forces sustain that from 2007 until today, 57-60% of the losses are attributable to the IED. A percentage which, during 2010-2011, has risen further. At the beginning, the insurgents used old mines, but when the supply finished they constructed explosive devices with fertilizer to which they added “bullets” of various kinds: iron marbles, nails, screws and fragments of metal. The bombs can be activated from a distance, but recourse to counter measures by the allies led the rebels to increase the power of the charges with pressure.From the single explosive device they advanced to the so-called “ring”. A series of charges disseminated along a road or around a building. They were detonated together or with the “bait” technique: a first blast which strikes the patrol and the others which hit the rescuers. Imitating a technique already adopted by the Qaedists in Iraq, the Taliban organized “house explosives” intended to cause losses among the foot patrols. The building was booby-trapped, together with the surrounding area. Fertilizer is indispensable for the preparation of the devices and is imported in huge quantities – and with the contraband – from nearby Pakistan. The bombs are studied to damage newly designed protected vehicles. Charges which range from 20 to 200 kilos. In certain regions the perforated explosive devices have appeared: “creatures” of the Iranian Pasdaran sold to the Taliban. The allies have spent astronomical sums to counter the threat. The United States have an interforce department which conducts research and solicits the private markets to find remedies. Studies which have cost no less than 20 billion dollars. Protected vehicles have arrived in the war zone, which have limited the damage and have made the missions in hostile territories safer. Vehicles like the Oshkosh M-ATV, the “Buffalo”, the “Cougar”, the Navistar MaxxPro, the Cayman, the Italian “Lynx”, and the German “Dingo” have enlarged the shield and favoured the fight against the IED.Furthermore, the employment of electronic systems – with significant costs – has grown. Spy-aircraft, drones, aerostatic balloons with sensors and viewers, systematic mapping of the routes followed by the ISAF units, intelligence work to discover the networks of installers. A repetition of the tactic which gave results in Iraq. The Pentagon recognizes that progress has been made, but that it is, obviously, impossible to eliminate the problem. To give a parameter: in January 2011, 1344 bomb attacks were registered, “only 465 were counted in the entire year of 2005. In keeping accounts of the actions, the American also revealed an increase of bombs against foot units. In April 2009, there were 5, in April 2010, the number rose to 210, in the same month of 2011, 376 were registered. Weapons which, at times, do not kill, but provoke mutilations extended to the lower limbs and pelvis. The Pentagon speaks of an increase of 11% of the maimed. Injuries which change the life of a soldier, provoke physical and psychological consequences, and influence the costs of assistance.Together with the booby-traps, the insurgents proceeded, in the 2010-2011 period, with the operations entrusted to the kamikaze. With two modus operandi. The first, the classic one of the terrorist who blows himself up in the middle of a crowd or near a sensitive objective. The second, instead, has military characteristics. The kamikaze strike in formation: a first team activates the explosives near the guard post of a barracks, or smashes into the carriage doors of a vehicle full of explosives and gas cylinders. It is the testudo tactic. It opens a breach to favour the entrance for a firing group which infiltrates an installation or a base and tries to resist as long as possible. The operation can finish with the flight of a part of the assailants or with suicide. Compared to the “conventional” actions, these last have a great propaganda impact and arouse strong feelings of insecurity. It is equally clear that to organize them a work of accurate intelligence is necessary and, often the assailants need internal complicity. But the first seven months of 2001 showed that the Taliban do not lack either kamikaze or persons disposed to help them.

Conclusion

In the scenarios examined, we have photographed only a part of the arsenals employed.It is deliberately a partial picture. But it is clear that the “small” can put in crisis the “great”. The apparatuses and the technology of the armies are impressive. They see the impossible, they reach the enemy when it is least expected, they offer the military a multiplicity of resources. But sometimes, these arms are too advanced. So much so that the Pentagon is looking for an attack aircraft which is less expensive than the present jet. Something that closes the gap between the drones – known by now as the sky snipers – and the traditional aircrafts.On the opposite front, the terrorists and guerrillas spend very little and have learned how it is possible to survive in the face of superior apparatuses. There is almost a race for rockets and explosive devices. The IED are the perfect representation of “economic” means which can have serious repercussions on choices and strategies. The soldiers die and in the public opinion – as in the parliaments – the doubts over the usefulness of these expeditions are reinforced. After every attack, the question is the same:”Is it worth dying for Kabul or Herat?” A question which can be repeated in Lebanon – where the IED have reappeared – and in all those zones where the “great” fights against the “small”.And the affirmative answer to those questions, with each passing month, becomes ever weaker. All this is very clear to the Taliban and the Qaedist ideologists. And they insist. Because it is an asymmetric war of friction where no-one can win, but where the NATO can lose. The same holds true for the Hezbollah with its rockets. It could be scaled down, risk paying a high political price, but it is difficult to erase it. Without forgetting the time factor – which is always on the side of the enemies of democracy. If a western army goes to war, already the day after “how long before the finish” is being discussed. The adversary has only to be patient and wait.