The protean reality of the Islamic matrix of terrorism has called attention to the western security apparatuses, particularly after the alarm following the discovery of the parcel bombs sent from Yemen. Strong preoccupation has been aroused over the phenomenon of the “foreign” volunteers, better still; let us say “western” volunteers, within the galaxy of terror headed by Al Qaeda, without necessarily being structures which answer directly to the main branch. Furthermore, the kidnapping of persons for self-financing –with ransoms in the millions – makes even these individual small groups very strong, thus liberating them from the more hazardous collaboration with drug trafficking. The precise analysis of Guido Olimpio leads to the conclusion that cooperation between Governments and security apparatuses is vital to the prevention of the attacks, as has already been experimented.

The security alarm which was activated almost on a global scale in the October-November period was connected to three distinct subversive realities.
The first – the chronic one – embodied by the Pakistani tribal area used as platform for attacks. A region where the presence of volunteers-turned militants from the Western Countries has developed, with the help of regional extremist movements, into a dual weapon. They can strike on-site or are designated to conduct long-range operations, often in their own home Countries. The phenomenon of the “foreigners” – and this constitutes further sources of preoccupation – has spread to other war zones. In particular, Yemen and Somalia.
The second reality, much nearer to our borders, revolves around Al Qaeda, in the Maghreb land (AQIM). A group which, although weakened, has found reviving resources through the kidnapping of tourists and humanitarian workers. A faction which through historical ties with sympathizers on the Old Continent is considered to be an ugly customer for the Security Services. Also the threat represented by AQIM has a double significance: regional – with an epicenter between Algeria and Sahel, international – with the branches in the European States (France mainly, but also Italy, Spain and Scandinavian Countries).
The third danger came with the parcel bombs on cargo planes to the United States, actions claimed by Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, Yemenite/Saudi factions of the main branch. The attack failed, but after what happened at Christmas, has revived the subject of attacks against civil aviation.
In this article, however, we shall try to explain the developments along the first two fronts.

The flow

From the biennium 2006-2007, starting from the United States and from almost all the European Countries (plus Australia), the march of the extremists towards the jihadist conflict areas began. If Iraq remained – even though with considerable reduced numbers over the course of time – the meta for aspiring Arab, Pakistani, Somali and Yemenite mujahedin attracted a growing number of volunteers.
The analysts agree in saying that it is not always possible to draw an exact profile of the “Jihad travellers”. Without doubt, there are common characteristics. They are converts or young Westerners of Asiatic/Middle-east/Turkish origin. The majority has very little familiarity with military practice and they rely on training once the desired region has been reached. A smaller number – especially in the United States and Great Britain – are inclined towards a preventive training: use of Softair weapons, the martial arts, simulation fighting in the forests. Summary experience which, if done together with companions, plays and important role in increasing the cohesion and “to know each other”. In other words esprit de corps.


The phenomenon of the volunteers has three essential characteristics.

1) The militant nuclei mix, combine and separate. In other words, there is a certain fragmentation connected with spontaneity and the opportunity of the moment.
2) There can be various leaders and lieutenants, the militants fall under areas of changeable influences. Much depends on the contingency, on the territory where they are located and on the necessities of the faction to which they associated. And for this reason there can be a spilling over of men from one group to another.
3) They are sometimes included in temporary rapid networks, which perhaps revolve around one mission or a specific training. As it emerges from several investigations, the extremists, in order to reach the tribal area, follow a route which has been established over time. Usually, the first stage is Turkey, then across into Iraq (at times in a clandestine way – or almost) and from here to Baluchistan. Other routes take them to Saudi Arabia or Egypt. There are even those who attempt the Gulf route, via the junction of Dubai, but with extreme caution as they fear being intercepted by the Security Services. These movements would be impossible without the assistance of the ‘facilitators’ – individuals already active in the 90’s when the sympathizers of Al Qaeda wanted to go to Afghanistan. We can distinguish three categories.
The first is the traditional one – the man who supplies documents. They are expendable pawns who, often, have no true connection with the subversive organizations.
The second is more interesting because it includes people who are able to finance the journey, and give useful “tips” on how to act. In certain situations, they can also furnish “clean” and sophisticated apparatus of communication. The American Security Services have reported the increase of this second “type” in North Europe, and to a lesser extent, within the United States. They are valuable pawns for the network, with solid ties with formations operating in the tribal zone.
The third is that of real “guides” who welcome the militants on their arrival and assist them in the first months. A function that cannot be neglected: the investigations and confessions of those arrested have always demonstrated that the cases of “rejection” are not just a few. The young persons meet difficulties – feel isolated in a new reality. And, at this point, decides to abandon the situation. Or, it is the group that decides to abandon them, considering they are not hardened enough or fearing they are spies.

The “colonies”

From the observation of the flows and from the reports gathered during these recent years, it is possible to furnish some numbers on the presence of the Western volunteers in the various war theatres.
The German colony in Pakistan – also in light of the October alarm – is shown to be very active. According to the authorities, starting from the middle of the 90’s, more than 200 persons established themselves – for varying periods – in the tribal area of Pakistan (Fata). Evaluations referring to more recent periods estimate 70, the extremists who have followed special training and 40 of those have actively participated in the Afghan conflict. The French have observed between 30 and 50, divided between the tribal area and Yemen. A few dozen British and half a dozen Austrians.
If we look at Somalia, the composition is even more varied. A Danish report lists: 25-30 Americans, 40 Australians, 100 British, and 80 Scandinavians. Among the latter – according to Government sources in Stockholm – circa 30 Swedish. The data emerging from two other studies is not less important. In the first (February 2010) it claims that out of 21 serious conspiracies in the post “11th September” a significant role of 37 “foreigners” emerged, hidden in the Fata . Another dossier: out of 43 cases of “home-grown” terrorism in the United States, almost a dozen militants had been abroad for indoctrination and training.
In this context talk has returned concerning certain Islamic centers in the region of Hamburg, including the mosque attended by Mohammed Atta, leader of the “11th September” commando. Even though it is still summary information, one can understand how the old roots that formed the basis of the plot against American have not been completely extirpated. Rumours have brought back into the foreground the figure of Said Bahaji, who appeared in the “11th September” preparation.
It seems that this terrorist, together with German accomplices, recruited a good number of youngsters, who were then sent to Pakistan. Compared to other nationalities, the Germans were able to count on a well-oiled assistance network. The volunteers created their own group – the “German Taliban” – and this made them more closely knit, but they also have close relations with the Islamist Uzbek, one of the transmission belts of the neo-terrorism. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (MIU) and the Union of the Islamic Jihad (UJI) received the “foreigners” giving them a roof, guaranteeing military training (how to use firearms, RPG), and instructing them on the technique of suicide attacks. All this done, notwithstanding that the two factions – allies of central Al Qaeda and of the Pakistan Taliban – have been, for some time, under attack by the American pilotless airplanes. In August, after months of denials, the MIU admitted the death of the mythical figure of Tahir Yuldashev, the guiding leader of the movement. His place was taken by Abu Usman Adil. Another aspect: the Uzbek continued in their activities although having to defend with their teeth – and with weapons – their enclaves in the tribal area. There have been some real battles with certain clans. The locals do not appreciate some of the conduct of the Uzbek.
Under the watchful eyes of the two factions, the Germans have grown on the ideological and military level. Even if, at times, the relations between them and the factions have been complicated. In a certain phase, a nucleus of Germans decided to separate from the UJI to fight alongside the Taliban, who allowed them more autonomy. This is why the presence of the more sensitive and attentive “facilitator” can contribute to tighten the ranks.
Certain Germans have been used as suicide attackers against the NATO Forces; others have participated in sacrificial missions, i.e. assaults very similar to the kamikaze actions, “Shahid” and then celebrated with the traditional video diffused also in Germany. A propagandistic effort accompanied by other clips – traceable on the Internet – where volunteers address possible recruits in German. In May 2010, the memories of Eric Breininger were diffused on the Net, a young man killed in a clash with the Pakistani, and protagonist in the video. Linked to the Saar cell – a group that planned attacks against US bases in Germany in 2007 – Eric recounts his story, including the difficult relations with the Uzbek hosts, and spoke in ecstatic terms of the “pearls” the youths designated to be the kamikaze.
The volunteers – and not only the German ones – found a formidable support in two key individuals. The first is Qari Saifullah Akhtar, leader of the Harkat ul Jihad Al Islami, a movement created in Punjab in the 80’s. The second is Ilyas Kashmiri, leader of the 313 Brigade, conjunction link between Qaedists, Indian separatists and Pakistan equipment. Both leaders have transformed their own groups into terror agencies. They act in the region, but have in mind ambitious objectives from Europe to the United States.
Kashmiri, in a rare interview, explained with extreme frankness who he is: “do not consider me as the usual talkative ideologist” – this was the synthesis – “because I am a military leader”. The head of the 313 Brigade demonstrated his ability in the plan that brought a Lashkar firing group to attack the large hotels of Mumbai. According to the Indians, Kashmiri coordinated a part of the preparations.
The man is feared not only for his audacity, but because he is considered among the few able to assemble nuclei of men from different origins for an ad hoc mission: i.e. putting together Europeans, locals and real Qaedists. Then, according to the necessity, chooses to whom he can entrust the final action. The Americans are sure that Kashmiri has his trusted contacts in Europe: it is not only hypothesis, but information confirmed by telephonic interception. Their lives are quiet and undisturbed; they have resources and are actively ready at any moment. The information gathered from interrogations of arrested persons confirms these facts – starting from David Headley, the Pakistan-American involved in both a plan of attack in Denmark and the Mumbai operation.
If we observe the modus operandi of the Commando that acted in India, it is evident how well informed they are on the target buildings, the roads to follow, the tactics of arriving from the sea without being seen. Credit belongs to the reconnaissance conducted by “scouts”, including Headley. An operation carried out with video, inspections and studies via Google Earth: communications between the assailants and their referent were meticulously cared for. Another aspect to underline is the tactics preferred by Kashmiri and related groups like the Lashkar and Taiba. The Mujahedin are ready to sacrifice themselves and they are prepared for this during their training. However, the kamikaze action is truly the final act. The real objective is the taking of hostages to prolong the emergency and exploit the siege for propagandistic purposes.
In this context, the terrorists move and imitate gestures and behaviour of Special Forces. After the massacre of Mumbai, it emerged that the commando had followed a special preparation course to enable them to resist for hours. They had ammunition, communication apparatus to follow the news and the supply of food. Rumours from German sources claimed that the possible terrorist plan in Europe, which was spoken about so much, provided for just this – the taking of hostages in hotels or public buildings. In exchange, they would have demanded the liberation of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, the brain of the “September 11th”, and of other prisoners held at Guantanamo. This is why it is indispensable for the 313 Brigade and other formations to have Westerners among their ranks, better still, if they have “clean” passports and speak the language of the target Country of attack.
Being the first to leave, the extremists of the Asiatic area are in advantage with regard to their Yemenite and Somali “colleagues”. But also in these two regions – as we have seen – the presence of “whites” is on the rise. In Yemen, at least four American have been arrested, an Australian has been held and several Frenchmen have been expelled. They are not all full-time terrorists; however, they gravitate in the area of violent fundamentalism. They came to Sana under the pretext of attending study courses – from languages to religion – and then to establish contacts with individuals very close to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The “white” presence has grown thanks also to the proselytism of the imam Anwar Al Awlaki. Of Yemenite origin, born in New Mexico, he cut out a space for himself in the Jihadist propaganda through Internet and the YouTube. Perhaps, with too much approximation, he is considered one of the ideologists of the Islamic Movement.
He is rather more a reference point for the volunteers and for those who have remained in the West. The failed attack on the North-West jet airline has, however, demonstrated that a disciple of the imam – the Nigerian, Faruk Adbulmutallab – was loaned to the parent organization for the attack. Having French and British members available, it is probable that the Qaedists will use them.
In nearby Somalia, the militants from the West are divided between active roles on the war front – some wear the explosive belt – and those of the propaganda. A good example is Omar Hammani, a convert from Alabama, transformed into a species of Jihadist “rock star” on the Web.
Finally, a rather clear aspect has emerged in the United States. The Somali Shabab Movement (but also the Indian Lashkar and the Lebanese Hezbollah) is able to count on external support. Persons, living a long time in America, full-fledged citizens and part-time guerrillas, whose only mission is to send money, equipment and – when it is possible – weapons to their accomplices. They are unable – or do not feel like – leaving for the front and, therefore, they compensate with supplies.

Iraq

In this analysis, we have deliberately left out Iraq, insofar as in this area the volunteers come mainly from the Arab Countries. Therefore, we shall limit ourselves to a rapid note on the flow, which has had alternating phases. Very high until 2007, then reduced, due to the better controls at the frontiers and the repeated raids launched in the States of origin (Morocco and Algeria). At its highest point, the flow was almost 5,000 volunteers, at its lowest, a few hundred. According to an Algerian analyst (February 2009) 20% came from Algeria, 18% from Syria, 17% from Yemen, 15% from the Sudan, 13% from Egypt and 12% from Saudi Arabia. Other studies have, on the contrary, indicated the Libyans, Moroccans and the Saudi as the most important components. At June 2010, official American and Iraqi sources confirmed a substantial decrease. But after the summer, with the resumption of the attacks in grand style on the part of the Qaedists, it is probable that their number has, once again, increased.

The danger

If, in the 90’s, Europe and the Middle East followed with preoccupation the “return of the veterans of Afghanistan – understood as the Mujahedin who had gone to fight together with the Afghans against the Russians – today, the “return of the whites” is feared.
Obviously, there is no comparison between the first and the second subversive migration – then, they were in the thousands – but this must not lead us to reduce the impact of strongly indoctrinated young people who acquire, after their stay in critical areas, also a technical competence. A training which, up to now, appeared insufficient – and we must be glad – however, there is the risk of rapid development. An important annotation: the volunteers, apart from knowing how to use machine guns and grenades, study how to make bombs with domestic products. This allows the overcoming of logistic difficulties and grants more autonomy to the elements sent to the West.

AQIM – the desert front
According to the American and French Services, apart from the three “classical” hotbeds – Afpak, Yemen and Somalia - a potential source of threat is represented from Al Qaeda in the land of the Maghreb (AQIM). An evaluation which is also shared by the European Security apparatuses although in different degrees. Moreover, the faction is certainly not a new entity, given that it has operates under different names in Algeria and the Old Continent. First, as the Armed Islamic Group (Gia), therefore, as a Salaphite Group for preaching and combat.
The Italian Police, the Intelligence and the Judiciary may claim a certain experience on the Algerian dossier, in virtue of numerous investigations conducted a long time before the September 11th 2001. Arrests, convictions and documentation have allowed the development of an optimum background. Thus, AQIM is the return of an old adversary. And from certain aspects somewhat weakened compared to the 90’s, but which tends to raise the challenge again – especially against France and the Sahel Region – intensifying relations with a nebula that hides brigandage, desert marauders and every kind of smuggling. On this reticulum, halfway between terrorism and criminality, today the extremists have pinned their principal activity: kidnapping. With the kidnapping of tourists, technicians and European travellers, AQIM have accumulated a real fortune. Not less than 28 million Euros realized from the ransoms.
In a documents presented to the UNO from the Councillor for the fight against terrorism of the Algerian Presidency, Kamel Rezag Bara, some of the amounts paid by the Countries, victims of the kidnappings are listed below:
- Spain: 8 million Euros for three hostages;
- Italy: 3,6 million Euros for two hostages (the Cicala spouses);
- Australia: 2,5 million Euros for two hostages;
- Canada: 2 million for two hostages;
- Switzerland and Germany: 2 million Euros for three hostages.
A patrimony which has in part been used to finance their operations, or for real investments of an economic nature. Legitimate: like the purchase of real-estate and commercial activities in the African Countries. Illegal: with the development of smuggling.

The military situation

Al Qaeda in the land of the Maghreb was born “officially” the 11th September 2006, when Ayman Al Zawahiri blessed the fusion announced by the leader Abdelmalek Droukdel, also known as Abu Musab Abd al Wadoud. The occasion was evidently dictated by the difficulties of the Salaphite Group for the preaching and combat. With a new name, Droukdel tries to launch a new product. It is a marketing operation to increase the downward quotations of the group and present it as a reference point for the militants of North Africa and of the Sahel area. Not all of the “colonels” like the change. Conflicts are created, some abandon the fight, and others try to assume their own autonomous line. The birth of AQIM is accompanied also by a new modus operandi, through the use of kamikaze and car-bombs in large number. The faction tries, with scarce resources, to carry out guerrilla actions – like the attacks on convoys – with acts of pure terrorism. Imitating other Qaedist factions, the Algerians target the two classical enemies. The one close by, i.e. Algeria, in all its representations and institutions. The distant one, the Countries that support the government. The first target is relatively easy to reach, the second is more problematic: and AQIM, notwithstanding many threats, strike the foreigners whom they find on their territories. What is lacking – in a very evident way - is any action outside of the regional ambit, notwithstanding the continual threats. A “lacuna” which is not said cannot be filled very soon.
In 2007, there is the massacre of four French tourists in Mauritania, accompanied by attacks against objectives which are little protected in Algeria. Then, in February 2008, they widen their range once again, striking the Israeli Embassy in Mauritania; in the summer of 2009 the French representation is attacked – always in the Mauritanian capital – and they kill an American.
This last action is attributed to a legendary figure among the rebels. That of Mokhtar Belkmoktar, known as “Marlboro” due to his ties with smuggling and notorious for not being captured. In fact, he is named “the unseizable”. He is in command of a kataeb (phalanx) of 100-150 men. The incursions in the African Countries are looked on with suspicion by Al Wadoud, who tries to contain them, giving more space and power to Hamid Essoufi, alias Abu Zeid, deputy of Yahya Djouadi, commander of the Kataeb Bin Zaayd, who had competence in the South. We cite these figures because the divisions and conflicts – fed by personalism or jealousies – affect the activities of the organization as in the delicate dossier of the kidnappings.
Starting from the summer of 2008, Abu Zeid tries to increase his influence in the region ranging between Mali, Niger and Mauritania with a series of military initiatives and kidnappings (a Britain and a Frenchman are brutally killed). The Emir tries in this way to cash in and in the meantime wants to establish his authority.
According to the analysts of the region, the AQIM attacks are, anyway, decreasing. The repeated clashes with troops of the African Countries – assisted by the French and the Americans – reduces maneuvering space. It should be underlined that the various columns are forced to operate near their shelters. Also the power of the bombs used in the attacked is decreased.
A study made by the Texan Research Institute “Stratfor” confirms the tendency of decreased attacks also during 2010: in the first six months of that year, 31 attacks are recorded compared to the 72 of 2009. Following a strong interdiction on the Algerian territory, AQIM was forced to retreat in the traditional “fiefdoms” to the East of Algiers and in the so-called triangle of death, constituted by the localities of Bouira, Boumerdes, Tizi Ouzou.
In synthesis, observers consider that the military capacity in the classical zones has diminished, as has their strength to conduct spectacular initiatives. The Qaeda mark has not translated into a guerrilla expansion and not even into a growth of the number of recruits. Also significant is the reduced use of car-bombs and kamikaze. This tactic has not been appreciated by many leaders, while the pressure of the Law Enforcement has become more effective.
Badly limited in the north, the militants sought to do better in the south, taking hostages and carrying out clandestine trafficking typical of that region. As we have outlined before, it was a tactical development – and partly strategic – which led to the feud between Abu Zeid and Belmoktar. In this regard, French sources sustain that the latter, determined to protect his kingdom, offered his aid to the central Al Qaeda ahead of his leaders. A headlong rush thwarted by the entrance on the scene of Abu Zeid who, to demonstrate that he was even more ferocious and determined, assumed the responsibility of killing hostages in coordination with the Qaedist leaders in Pakistan. First it was the turn of the Englishman, Edwin Dyer (May 2009) and then the Frenchman, Michel Germaneau (July 2010), murdered in response to a Franco-Mauritanian raid. In this second case, information from France affirmed that Germaneau was in the hands of a “column” tied to Belmoktar, but would have followed orders from Abu Zeid. In a recently published book, however, it is stated that the hostage died of a heart attack. Again, Abu Zeid coordinated an ambush which cost the lives of Malian officers. Deaths which the African State tried to avenge, targeting, however, militants of Belmoktar, who were chased and hunted for days.

The network

Notwithstanding such an unstable situation, the AQIM extremists were able to continue the hostage operations, with the capture, in September, of five French technicians, a Togolese and a Malagasy in Niger. A spectacular operation, with the militants able to surmount the security measures surrounding the nuclear installation of the Areva and to carry off the employees. An internal enquiry ascertained that the measures of security that protected the nuclear installation were not adequate. On the 10th October, the terrorists, according to information diffused by Al Jazeera, had delivered their conditions for the release of the prisoners: abolition of the Law on the veil, liberation of certain prisoners and 7 million Euros. A master stroke attributed to Abu Zeid – always more taken up with his role of world Jihadist and inspired by what Abu Musab Al Zarkawi had achieved in Iraq.
For the specialists of Sahel, there are several advantage points on the side of AQIM.
- Logistics: it uses resistant 4x4 vehicles; it relies on local guides who know the desert to perfection; it has created fuel deposits in the desert entering the Gps coordinates; it has great mobility. Once they have captured hostages, they transfer them for thousands of kilometers, normally to the massive mountain range of the Timetrine (north of Mali).
- Alliances: the Algerian Islamists have developed close relations with the tribal clans through favours and marriages of convenience (polygamy helps). In fact, Belmoktar and Abu Zeid have married local women. The number of Africans in the ranks of AQIM increases (almost 400 between Mauritanians and Malians). More complicated are relations with the Tuareg, even though some have been hired as scouts and jeep drivers.
- Labourers: some kidnappings have been conducted by locals – in the case of those that happened in Mauritania – who then turn them over to the terrorists. This allows Abu Zeid to avoid useless risks to his men.
- Interest: the dossier of the hostages – as in Iraq or in Lebanon of the 80’s – favoured the initiative of the mediators. Persons in Niger and Mali specialized in negotiating. They are a help, but it is obvious that they have their economic payback. The role of Burkina Faso is significant: hosts special French units, but is considered a business hub of little transparency.
- Tradition: Belmoktar, even though in difficulty, possesses an historical network of complicity. He is a master of trafficking (cigarettes, human beings, drugs). A network which, in the past, has assured him of a certain political and military autonomy. Abu Zeid has forged ahead and constructed his own.
- Weakness: Only now Niger, Mauritania and Mali have begun to fight the terrorists in a more effective way, but the apparatuses are insufficient to monitor such a vast area.

The ideology

It is stated in a note of the French Secret Services of 22nd September that an anti-French sentiment has developed in the region and not only because of the old colonial past. In the 007 analysis the terrorists cling to three points: the attacks of the local armies supported by Paris; the French military presence in Afghanistan and the disputed law over the veil. It is interesting to note how the militants align themselves with the propaganda of the central Al Qaeda. Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri have intervened several times exhorting the militants to strike France. And the story of the veil is one of the faults cited in the messages.
It is worth mentioning as a direct testimony, the declarations of a French hostage, Pierre Camatte, who fell into the hands of the terrorists in the winter of 2010. The man recounted that Abu Zeid, expressing himself through an interpreter, spoke little of Osama or colonialism, but insisted very much on the “laws against the Moslems”.
AQIM – or a part of the Movement – have sought to obtain new religious investitures. In September, the Jordan, Mukhabarat stopped Mohammed Al Maqdisi, preacher and spiritual father of Al Zarkawi. It seems that the imam had had contacts with the Algerian extremists who urged a fatwa that would authorize the armed fight in response to the contrary opinion of other doctors of the law. Al Maqdisi has great influence in the Qaedist arena, even though he is exposed to the pressures of the Authorities of Amman and this, at times, leads him to correct his religious verdicts.
The great agitation within AQIM – judged by observers – betrays the desire to grow, however, by drawing attention and making often uncoordinated publicity. Furthermore, the conflicting opposition of the lieutenants does not allow a compact presentation.

The countermeasures

Although AQIM is not a monolithic block, the same can be said of the forces that try stand in its way. The fight against the extremists has two poles: the first – taken for granted – is the Algerian one, the second is France. Two Countries that contend for the management of the containment activities in a parallel way and often competitively. Algiers claims the right of leadership and does not appreciate the intrusion of the West. It desires and asks for consistent military help, but does not tolerate that it is the “foreigners” who will “place their boots in the desert”. Paris wants to issue the guidelines and obtain the coverage for the coups of the Special Forces deployed in Africa. France, at the end of September, had available around 80 members of the corps d’elite (Cos) based in Niger and three areas of reconnaissance. With the support of the Intelligence, the French participated in a raid (22nd July) launched by the Mauritanians in Mali. An incursion which, according to one version – led to a ruthless response from the terrorists: they killed the hostage, Germaneau.
The disposition of Paris left space also to the United States which, in the course of these years, has established an aid programme – 500 million dollars, distributed over 5 years – tied to the security in favour of the Countries of the region. The Special Forces, for example, have been employed in the training of the Mali units and it is probable that they have supplied information gathered from satellite spies. A presence which, nevertheless, must be the least visible possible, precisely for the reason of not raising sensitivities and should give a low profile impression.
Evidence of the divisions that slow the anti-AQIM response emerged after the summer with two separate summits. Algeria has promoted the creation of a Commando where information can be exchanged at Tamanrasset involving Mauritania, Niger and Mali. A praiseworthy initiative which, however, awaits concrete development in the field. In October, at Bamako, a summit took place with representatives of the G8, Ciad, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and Morocco. Algeria absent – it did not appreciate the inclusion of the Moroccans, regional adversaries and the western intervention is judged as a serious interference. If we wanted a paradox, we could say that AQIM and Algeria agree on one subject, at least: the French must keep out of the region.
To these disputes the particularity of the theatre is added. The Government is worried, they want to act, but at the same time, they intend to proceed with great caution. The war against the extremists intertwines with the traditional problems of the conflict arena, where rebel group, marauders and tribal bands are constantly present. Algeria is clearly contrary to the payment of ransoms, while the Mali does not exclude them “for humanitarian reasons”.
There is then, the grey area of traffickers. In particular, those connected to drugs. In Mali airplanes loaded with ‘coca’ continue to arrive, which is taken charge of by the African gangs. The ‘goods’ then continue on to North Africa. A land route that is protected in some cases by the Qaedists, who take a sort of “revolutionary tax”. According to certain analysts the terrorist-narcotics connection is extensive, other claim that it is reduced, or, at least, similar to other types of smuggling. Basically, if Belmoktar is called “Marlboro”, it must say something.
In this ambit, a small dialogue on the Tuareg must be opened – the Lords of the desert. Some have joined AQIM – it is rumoured that one of them has become “emir” – many have animated a historic rebellion, still others are employed in the fight against the Islamists. This is the case of Ibrahim Ag ­Bahanga, a figure of ambiguous profile. On the 14th October, leading a group of Tuareg insurgents, he attacked a convoy carrying cocaine to the North. Subsequently, he offered to collaborate with the authorities in the hunt for terrorists. The Government’s reaction was somewhat cold, doubting the real intention of Bahanga. A sign of how the diffidence concerning protagonists and projects is very widespread.

Conclusion

The tendency of terrorist groups to recruit western elements encompasses, without doubt, multiple challenges for the Security Services. It is a reality which is not easily predicable, thus difficult to counter. The terrorist can act as a cell and as “loan wolves”. The interaction with formations of the Pakistan or Somali area makes them leave what could be a confined environment. How many times a militant would have liked to go into action, but did not know how to do it. Now he has accomplices who can help in a concrete way in launching an attack. Neither is it easy to keep an eye on the supply chain. Once the volunteer reaches his “front”, there is a good risk of losing him. Without wanting to be prophets of doom, it should be said, however, that the danger of an attack led by western volunteers is extremely concrete. Let us look again at the past. The 11th of September was prepared by elements who lived, in part, in the West and then went to Afghanistan to be trained.
However, the pendulum of the aspiring Mujahedin towards Pakistan or Yemen represents a favourable occasion to infiltrate the organizations. The sieving is not so rigorous and the desire to attract the “whites” opens spaces for infiltration. Even the professional terrorists are aware that they often leave the new arrival in limbo and, at times, keep them at a distance, in the fear that they are unreliable. If, in these months, so much data on plans in the making has emerged, it means that the Intelligence is far from “blind”. If an effective collaboration exists with the authorities of the risk Countries, the results increase. The ‘tip-off’ of the Saudis on the parcel bombs conspiracy is one of the clearest examples.
The threat that comes from the desert has also a double face. AQIM has set its sights on punishing the West and, in particular, France. It has the will, the determination and even enjoys the blessing of the traditional summits of Al Qaeda. Nevertheless, if we leave aside the hostage question, it has not been able to follow up its proclamations. Credit of the security apparatuses monitoring in Europe – the coordination seems to function – and also due to a probable weakness of the faction. This line should be followed, finding, however, major collaboration with the Sahel States. The criminal-terror contamination could be used to gather major information. If it is an advantage for AQIM to have relations with the marauders, it could also be an advantage for the Intelligence to catch some bandits and turn them into “moles” (spies).
Fortunately, the cases of kidnapping are few; however, when colossal sums are poured into the pockets of the kidnappers, one is exposed to future risks. With all that money, unfortunately, much harm can be done.
Is it a return to the future?