They sell-off false designer labels in New York, hunt protected animals in Assam and steal cars in Canada and Malaysia. They traffic drugs in North Africa and Afghanistan, recycle money and swindle the Health System in Midwest America. They take hostages in Baghdad and sell arms in South East Asia. They smuggle gold and petroleum in the Persian Gulf and manage small commercial empires.
An incredible economic activity under the sign of globalization with a very precise objective: to feed terrorism and the guerrilla movements.
The era of robberies as a means of self-financing is prehistoric, even if there are those – like the Algerian extremists in Europe and the Iraqi mujahedin – who continue to resort to them.
Today, to conspire requires money, even if the cost of attacks continues to fall. The assessment of the various Intelligence Services on attack expenses is a good starting point to analyse the terror budget.
In 1993, a small jihadist cell paid out a few thousand dollars to hit the Twin Towers, in New York. The highest figure was around $400 to rent a small van to fill with homemade explosives. Their imitators, the Mohammed Atta terrorist group, in September, 2001, had to pay out much more, estimated at more than 500 thousand dollars (other estimates say double), but he took care to return several hundreds of thousands to their “cashier” in Dubai.
A little earlier, in the Bay of Aden, local Qaedists hit the United States’ war ship, “Cole”. Budget: 10 thousand euro. A year later, the massacre of tourists at Bali: 45 thousand euro. In 2003, it is Istanbul’s turn, with the explosion at the British Consulate: 35 thousand euro.
For the Madrid massacre, 13 to 17 thousand euro were “sufficient”, however, the extremists had a small fortune in drugs. Almost a million euro. And to buy the explosives, they made recourse to swapping: pure Moroccan hashish in exchange for the explosive materials. The London attackers, July, 2005, covered everything with 7 to 10 thousand euro. A more accurate analysis established that the criminals did not pay out more than one thousand euro for video cassettes (used for the testaments of kamikaze), DVDs, CDroms and memory cards intended for computers. A modest budget – if it had succeeded – also for the infamous, as much as hypothetical conspiracy of the summer, 2006, against the air passengers. Ten thousand euro, designed for buying tickets and indispensable “technical” material to prepare and perfect devices with liquid explosive.
It is necessary to remember that these are empirical assessments, which give, however, the idea of what is, today, the phenomenon of the financing of terrorism. The extremists are frugal, they have no great necessities, the logistics are reduced to the bone. Another thing is the gold pipeline which feeds the movements. More solid channels are needed here – perhaps, the intervention of finance institutes which support integralist leanings. Prior to September 11th, 2001, the transparent component – or rather, the use of banks and Islamist charity associations – were certainly more substantial. Controls were non-existent and it was easy to let help to a radical movement pass for social assistance. The creation of black lists by the UNO, followed by a greater severity from the Western States, forced the armed groups to find new sources, and their financers to be more cautious.
A cautiousness dictated also by political motivations. One thing is to support a project – which even contains expansionist objectives like the wahabism – another is to find oneself involved in subversive plans which foresee a heavy blood tribute. To this, one adds an indisputable fact in the Islamic world. It is, above all, the Moslems who die. A fratricidal holy war which, in the long run, loses the sympathy of public opinion and transforms the armed groups into assassin sects.


Jihadists

Organizations like the Salaphite Group for the preaching and fighting in Algeria or the Moroccan “brothers”, had to re-invent their finances. Judicial enquiries in various European countries have brought to light collusion between narco-traffickers and extremists.
A sacrilegious alliance favoured by the takfir doctrine, which inspires a great part of the Islamists active in the West. According to this ideology, it is possible to criminally conspire – and thereby go against the religious precepts – as long as it is in the name of a cause.
A large part of the drug arrives from the north of Morocco through a tried and tested network. The Spanish enclave of Ceuta and Mellila, just like the Iberian ports, has assumed the role of the logistic junction. The hashish is then distributed to small pushers and a part of the takings is used for the expenses of the cell. The tie with the narcotics underworld, beyond producing money, guarantees to the formations a point of connection for recruitment. Tens of elements, contiguous to the criminal environment, have been converted to Jihadism: both through the classic indoctrination by forced stages, and with prison contact.
Very often terrorists and drug peddlers are detained in the same prison sector with imam(s), improvised or genuine, who assume the task of directing the neo-initiate on the way of the Jihad. Once released from prison, the ties originated in the prison cell are utilized in subversion. It is certainly no coincidence that in most Western Countries, the authorities have issued a warning on the birth of the so-called “prison fronts”.
In France and Belgium, elements close to the Gspc – today, transformed into the Qaeda of Maghreb – have found an important source of income in robbery, fraud and the forging of documents. With a well-planned assault and a security van, they got away with one million euro.
Furthermore, the Islamists clone credit cards, empty bank mat machines, and establish commercial activities with falsified products. As an example: an Algerian gang in France managed to accumulate 90 thousand euro a month by robbing the automatic teller machines of banks. The system was the classic one used by the East European crime world. In Italy, they dedicate themselves to the traffic of residence permits and documents. Parallel to this, legal activities are developed – in general, retail selling and small enterprises, which assign a quota of the earnings to the fight in Algeria.
Once again, one must not think in terms of great sums. Today, two to three thousand dollars sent to North Africa is more than sufficient. And to transfer the money, when they do not utilize banks and specialized institutes, they use couriers. In the southern part of Algeria and, in particular, in a wild area towards Niger and Chad, a phalanx of ex-Gspc has dedicated itself to banditry. An extraordinary seizure of a caravan of European tourists yielded – a few years ago – tens of millions of euro. A fortune for those regions. The same group imposed a “revolutionary” tariff on the new slave markets and on every kind of smuggling. Vehicles loaded with immigrants directed north, trucks full of goods and means of supplies. The drivers – with their organizations – are forced to make a contribution: buying, in this way, safety and security.
Canada, Norway, Germany and certain eastern countries, such as Malaysia, have discovered how the stolen car racket can help the extremists. According to the Canadian Police, 20 to 30 thousand luxury cars are stolen every year and, almost always sent abroad. An undefined number are handled by criminals who have relations with extremist organizations. The same thing has been discovered by the Malaysian authorities, alarmed by the 12% increase in car thefts.
It is suspected that the receivers of these cars are the men of Jemaa Islamya, a group that is responsible for serious attacks. Nearer to us – in central Europe – the traffic has favoured that nebula inspired by the Al Zarkawi. As always, North Africa and the Middle East are the markets of cars stolen in Paris or Milan.
The vehicles can be filled with explosives, guns, drugs and documents. These become exchange money and even bombs on four wheels. It might sound strange, but analyses of the wrecks of some exploded cars in the streets of Iraq were discovered to come from abroad.

The street hawkers seem more innocuous – and, perhaps, they really are – they sell T-shirts, musical CD ROMs, and toys, in any city of any country. But it has been proved that the sale of false designer labels as T-shirts for tourists is a minor source of money. It is the type of offence which the Japanese extremists used to finance themselves in the 70’s: buying purses and handbags from Italy and selling them abroad. Years have passed and the “sector” has been re-launched by Egyptian Islamists, by the Palestinians of the People’s Front for the Liberation of Palestine and by the Colombians of the FARC. In general, they open shops in tax-free locations, which are open to any type of commerce and with very low control levels.
Dubai in the Emirates, Ciudad of the East in Paraguay and small towns perched on the borders of South American countries, are their preferred
areas. The organizations, equal to the large groups, finance small dealers and chains of shops, obtaining in exchange a part of the takings. And business goes well. The Kurds of the ex-PKK – who have their network in North Europe – demonstrate this, together with the Lebanese Hezbollah and the enterprising Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka.
The Colombian FARC have no scruples and don’t even bother to hide themselves. A guerrilla warfare which survives, thanks to kidnappings, drugs and extortion. An American Court has just closed an enquiry into a giant food industry, which has paid out 1.7 million dollars to the FARC, in order to avoid damage to their plantations.
To crush illegal activities is not an easy task. In many cases the financial backers operate in small localities, out of the way and, therefore, difficult for the Security Services to observe. The environment of the backers is very favourable to fraud. It was the case of ‘Mr. H’, accused of having swindled the American Health System out of 26 million euro. A substantial slice of the proceeds finished in Pakistan, another in the pockets of groups of the Caucasus. A mixture of criminality and radicalism.
A world marked by violent deaths, ambushes and intrigues: five Russians who had come into collision with the racket were eliminated by a bullet in the head and were thrown onto a Californian rubbish dump. They make money quickly and act like Chicago gangsters of the 1930’s. Another network – discovered in California – fed the Chechen separatists, by dealing in goods ranging from stolen cars (to the value of 5 million dollars) to powdered milk and second-hand clothes. The humanitarian aid collections served as a cover, while the contact point of the operation was a Chechen ‘padrino’ colluding with the rebels.
The ‘nebula’ that reports to Dawood Ibrahim is not part of the Cosa Nostra, but it acts like a real mafia. Son of an ex-policeman of Mumbay (Bombay), Dawood Ibrahim is accused by the Indian authorities of economically helping radical factions between India and Pakistan.
At the beginning of August it was rumoured that he had been arrested, together with two close co-operators, but there is no official confirmation. Ibrahim is the classic link-man who puts together the crime traffic and terrorism. In fact, according to the New Delhi police, he had a role in a long series of attacks, among which was the attack on the Indian Stock Exchange.
The organization manages societies in Pakistan, India and, obviously, in the United Arab Emirates. We could call them double-use. On the one side, there is an apparatus that respects the Law, on the other, a clandestine one. They move dollars through the banks or much more easily through the hawala, the system based on trust and personal relations. You present yourself to a mediator in London, who stands guarantee for you to his correspondent in Lahore (Pakistan): it will be this latter who will pay out the money to the person indicated. With a minuscule piece of paper, one can transfer a fortune. With the same facility, the men of the ‘padrino’ move through the classic financial markets. They are front men, innocent as angels. With one telephone call, they open accounts, fill them with money, launder it and leave again.


The Iraqi model

The ethnic fragmentation; a structured and extended warfare and an intermittent control by the central power, has transformed Iraq not only into a terrorism laboratory, but also into a ‘training ground’ where different financing techniques can be experimented. We can say that the territory is a combination of everything: from trafficking to extortion. It is done by the Qaedists, the Sunnite rebels, the Nationalists and the Shiites. According to possibilities, they set up little potentates to procure resources and, at the same time, keep and eye on the population. The phenomenon is followed by the USA Services because of the real danger that the resources collected in Baghdad could favour other areas, starting from Europe.
The chain of production that sends volunteers towards Iraq could be activated in the opposite direction. And it would be an error to consider only the Sunnite Jihadists. Also the radical wings of the Shiite component have organized their finances and the case of an Iran-USA confrontation, they are ready to move.
The followers of Moqtada Sadr, the ambitious leader of the Mahdi Army, have created the so-called ‘special groups’. It is they who control an enterprise which includes the sale of stolen cars, arms trafficking, kidnapping and extortion. Always more frequently, they swoop down on the quarters inhabited by Sunnites and force the families to flee. Then they rent the houses, furniture and everything that can be serviceable, at discount prices.
Obviously, their clients a re Shiites. Other formations concern themselves with the service stations. The Mahdi has its own: it sells at prices established by the commanders and cuts out the Sunnites. The involvement in the black market of arms is causing new alarm. The supporters of Moqtada, with the help of the Iranians, are among the ‘diffusers’ of special perforated bombs. Tested by Hezbollah in Lebanon, they have appeared in Iraq and subsequently in Afghanistan.
Again, it is the Mahdists who have introduced explosive devices that are triggered by infra-red rays. Experience teaches us that this kind of knowledge travels fast. In the sense that, adapted, it is employed in new conflict areas.
The opportunities of making money have had repercussions on the solidness of the Mahdist Army. Different sources maintain that numerous ‘colonels’ have started up on their own, openly challenging Moqtada Al Sadr.
On the other side of the barricade – the Sunnite one – business is flourishing. Pentagon estimations oscillate from 75 to 200 million dollars per annum. Crackling dollar bills used by the rebels to carry on the guerrilla warfare and attacks. But what are the “sectors” of development?
First and foremost, petroleum. The rebels plunder the installations and resell the black gold, making tens of millions of dollars. The figure oscillates between 25 and 100 million dollars. The coffers have been filled then – as far as it has been possible – with the kidnapping of foreigners. Now that the westerners are on their guard, the rebel bands turn their attention to Iraqi prey. Obviously, they have to be content with inferior sums. A hostage can be worth a few thousand dollars, but in certain cases, ransoms of 30 to 50 thousand dollars have been paid.
As many other criminals, terrorists always invent something new. The latest tragic speciality is that of the blackmail for corpses. Armed men recover the bodies of people assassinated and abandoned in the streets. If they are able to trace identity, a blackmail message is left with the family: with 10 to 30 thousand dollars, you can have the hope of receiving the body.
The presence of thousands of armaments in the hands of simple citizens, increased by the looting of military deposits after the fall of Saddam, has made the gun and revolver market flourish. The firearm that is sold the most – needless to say – is the Kalashnikov, in all its versions. The rebels sell it for a price which various between 150 and 210 dollars.
If you want a Russian machine gun, the price rises to 1000 dollars. A semi-automatic pistol like the Glock is worth 1800 dollars. And when you have a gun in your hand, it is easy to be transformed into a plunderer.
The Police retain that the environments of guerrilla warfare are involved in a couple of mega-robberies – value of the take – two million dollars. They are also strongly involved in narco-traffic. Obviously opium, arriving from the Iranian borders, but also cocaine. A recent seizure led to the confiscation of the entire load. If the rebels had been able to sell it, the proceeds would have been over 10 million dollars. Whatever money is collected on the ‘road’ is nothing compared to the river of money arriving from the Persian Gulf countries.
Iraqi security sources sustain that the Sunnite Jihadist networks receive circa 25 million dollars each year. To guarantee them are the Saudi and Kuwaiti financers who intend, in this way, to counterbalance the excessive power of the Shiites and, at the same time, manifest concrete solidarity with the Salaphite currents.
This tendency is closely monitored by the Western Governments because many streams reach factions able to act beyond the Iraqi borders: in the countries nearby, (Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon), where attacks of Qaedist inspiration have already been verified – or in Europe itself. And within this framework, another reality is taking place: that of the Saudi volunteers. They are the most requested by the radical groups because they arrive not only with a great desire for martyrdom, but also with very full wallets. Before sacrificing themselves, they pour all their possessions into the hands of their inspirers. The presence of the Saudi Mujahedin has been noted in Lebanon in the ranks of the mysterious Fattah Al Islam, the organization which challenged the Government in the name of Osama, and in Yemen, where they have had a role in the reconstruction of the local branch of Al Qaeda.
The Iraqi model has taken hold also in Egypt, a country blooded in recent years from attacks against tourists. Poorer than their companions of Falluja, the local extremists have entered into business with the Bedouin tribes. Accustomed to moving along rarely travelled routes, very able in moving anything through the borders, the sons of the desert are ideal partners for resolving logistic problems. The Bedouins deal in stolen vehicles and any type of arms and explosives. These last arrive from Sudan or they are realized by recovering old mines of the Second World War.

The Eastern Front

In the Afghan-Pakistan sanctuary, the remains of the so-called ‘Central Al Qaeda’ – that of Bin Laden, to be clear – operate, when it is possible, with the Taliban. A military collaboration which, nevertheless, does not always mean an economic pact. A letter revealing this was sent by Ayman Al Zawahiri, the presumed Qaedist ideologist, to a contact of his in Iraq. In the document, intercepted by the Americans, the right arm of Osama refers to financial difficulties. “The lines have been cut, we need new funds… We should be grateful if you could send us, at least, 100 thousand dollars”, Al Zawahiri writes. The letter is interesting for two reasons: 1) it confirms a flow of money from Iraq to Afghanistan – a movement accompanied also by an exchange of information and men;
2) to keep the Al Qaeda going does not need great capital; that the organization has temporary problems of cash is confirmed by the nomination of a new operative head. The Egyptian, Abu Al Yazid. He was chosen for his managerial capacity demonstrated in the course of the last ten years. More than warrior, he is a super-accountant, possessing good contacts in the Gulf States. According to the investigation into the 11th September, he had the task of financing the Mohammed Atta command, in the United States – and the money not used by the terrorists would have come back to him, as a regular bank transfer – a thriftiness that has always been a rule among the followers of Osama.
The Taliban, instead, do not seem to have problems. After having opposed the traffic of drugs, they decided to exploit it to feed the rebellion. A business that touches on 3.1 billion dollars a year.
The rebels offer protection to the cultivators and to convoys directed to the West. But there is more. The Taliban coffers are kept full by a network of solidarity constituted by rich Baluchi traders who operate in both the Spartan frontier zones and in the scintillating skyscrapers of Hong Kong and Dubai. It is they who call meetings which are transformed into generous collections in favour of the insurgents. Others invest money through phantom societies in the petroleum monarchies, and in Karachi and Shanghai. Indian sources indicate, in the Noorzai and Achakzai clans, the economic border of the Mullah Omar. A repetition of what happened in the autumn of 2001. The Taliban transfer to Dubai a shipment of gold to the value of 10 million dollars, entrusting it to the care of a businessman known as ‘Gold Finger’, who is the owner of many enterprises with interests in the Asiatic region. Respectable enough not to be arrested – notwithstanding two international investigations – sufficiently unscrupulous to make pacts with the devil. And it is thanks to individuals like this that Taliban exponents have been able to conduct promotional tours in the Arabic capitals of petroleum. Visits aimed at raising funds.
Not satisfied, the Taliban has found new resources in kidnapping. Cases which have involved our countrymen, French and South Korean citizens.
Taking hostages is a modus operandi which brings many advantages to the rebels: a) they cash in considerable sums, quantifiable in tens of thousands of euro; b) they have a propaganda and media kickback; c) they force the enemy governments into compromises and compliance; d) they create divisions within the anti-terrorism coalition; e) in a season which is marked by heavy defeats for the movement, it permits them to present the kidnapping as military successes.


The Hezbollah realm

To avoid misunderstanding, we should clarify immediately that the Hezbollah is a resistance movement that also uses the weapon of terrorism. Its history, past and recent, is measured in kidnappings, lasting for years, kamikaze actions, terrorist plans from Lebanon as far as South America (especially Argentina). In fact, the Lebanese ‘Party of God’ is able to sustain the impact of a conflict with the eternal Israeli enemy: a peculiarity which makes the Hezbollah, together with the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a guerrilla warfare that conducts itself like an army. But, in the meantime, maintains a clandestine structure – with strong ties with Iran – which can be activated to carry out special missions with global projects. The area, therefore, is not limited to Lebanon: if necessary, Hezbollah has men available from North America to Thailand.
All of which would not be possible without a formidable economic apparatus. For the very reason that it is a movement, with a large social adhesion in the Shiite community, the top echelons of the Party have taken care to have direct and indirect sources of financing. The Israelis, who are interested observers, hold that the Hezbollah budget could be around 250 million dollars per year. A conservative evaluation. The help from Iran certainly contributes to the balance sheet. Cheques that vary from 10 to 270 million dollars – a fluctuation which is tied to the regional crises and to the moves of the ayatollah. Starting from this solid platform, the cashiers of the movement have worked very hard to increase the treasure. The heart is, The Association for the Assistance to the Islamic Resistance, the ASRI.
The functionaries follow the financial aspects, gather the religious offerings (often conspicuous), coordinate the humanitarian and social assistance activities, and cover the expenses destined to the guerrillas and the families of the martyrs. The TV ‘Al Manar’ – the satellite station which has become the symbol and a propaganda model in the whole of the Middle East – is funded by the Hezbollah. The ASRI can count on three distinct ‘departments’. The first is that of the Beit Al Amal Bank, another Hezbollah creation. It is their accountants who collect the money given by the world Shiite communities (Bahrein, Western Africa, the USA and Canada) and make it yield.
To the great international campaigns are added those smaller ones, but not for this, less interesting.
Hundreds and hundreds of little boxes distributed throughout shops, mosques and villages, where anyone, on the basis of their possibilities, can give their offering.
A step lower down, we find the Al Bina Jihad (in aid of reconstruction). Instead of soldiers, we find draftsmen, architects, military engineers, engineers and an army of workers.
They construct houses for the poor, reconstructing those destroyed in the conflict and guaranteeing loans without interest. Behind the civil work hides the military one. In the 2006 conflict, Hezbollah detected an incredible network of bunkers, dug in South Lebanon: tunnels from which the militants had launched lethal attacks. They had been made by the Al Bina workers, perhaps with Iranian and North Korean consultancy.
Close to the needs of the guerrillas is, instead, the Foundation of the Martyrs. They take care of the families of the fallen, provide for the children to study, and make further collections.
Compared to other organizations, Hezbollah has relied much on Internet. There are sites where forms, purposely designed for donations, appear. The major part of the economic efforts is transparent and legitimate. The Hezbollah is really very generous with the weak, as long as they are on their side. But since there is never sufficient money, the movement must activate other sources. And, therefore, its representatives, scattered over at least three continents, enter the field: like small ants, they put aside every single dollar for the utilization of the cause. They dream up ideas; they invent and scheme.
In the United States, proof of cigarette trafficking has emerged, falsified powdered milk and medicines (including Viagra). The Latin American triangle, Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil constitutes the backbone of tax-free commerce. They sell, literally, everything. Perfumes, musical and electronic products, toys, precious stones and little snap-open umbrellas.
A part is authentic, but the major part is comprised of well-made copies.
For almost ten years, the emissaries of the Party of God have opened companies from Panama to Uruguay, taking care to choose locations where control is scarce and there is a market tradition. The other alternative, apart from walking on one’s own feet, is of a strategic character.
In the case of emergency, the local Hezbollah representative can ‘finance the project’. If dollars are needed to set up a cell, it is not necessary to mobilize the Beirut Command group. Therefore, no trace or proof of collusion remains. Because the movement, notwithstanding its history, does everything to distant itself from any label of terrorism.


The tigers of the Sea

In the extremism panorama, an important role which has lasted through time has been won by the Tamil Tigers, committed to a bloody separatist conflict in Sri Lanka. Like Hezbollah and, in some measure, to a wider extent, the rebels have created an armoured defence, composed of a navy (with patrol boats and underwater commandos) well-trained ground divisions, a mini-aviation (with planes and helicopters) and a nucleus of militants – men and women – ready to undertake kamikaze missions.
Just a few months ago, the Tigers succeeded in conducting two air-raids against important Chingalese installations, including one of the principle airports. An absolutely tactical novelty made possible by an experimented logistics chain. The separatists fill their arsenals with the respectable activity of a sturdy mercantile fleet. It concerns freighters which operate on the normal routes transporting legal and not so legal goods. But hidden beneath the declared cargo can be armaments. The Tiger aeroplanes - according to one version – arrived dismantled, aboard a merchant ship.
The ships are of primary importance in the financing network. When they are not ‘working’ for the Tamil, they are used for import/export along the Asiatic routes.
The maritime ‘department’ merges with a larger economic front which guarantees the Tigers a good balance sheet. In the past, it reached 25 billion dollars a year. Today, A figure of circa 300 million collected with the imposition of revolutionary taxes, donations and commercial enterprises.
Similar to Hezbollah, the Tamil Tigers have their men of trust located in key countries. In Cambodia – to buy war equipment; in the United States – for fund raising and electronic material; in Canada and Northern Europe – to manage shops.

This is the general picture of the relation between economy and terrorism. A photograph of a reality in continual evolution, with flexible organizations, adaptable to the situations, cunning enough to insinuate themselves into any kind of market. But the experts warn that a new frontier is about to open. Daunting. The transaction and transfer of money through cell phones. A convenient system for any citizen, but a formidable ally to those who are lying in ambush in the shadows.
There is a fact that should be food for thought. The enormous collection of information on subversion, the adoption of new instruments and certainly a major knowledge of the phenomenon, have not allowed – six years after the 11th of September, the preparation of great trials against the financers of terrorism. Many judicial cases have been opened, but have remained unfinished.
A puzzle in which, almost always, the last piece is missing: the piece that permits proving in court that Mister X guaranteed funds to group X to carry out a massacre.
An investigation by GICO of the Guardia di Finanza (military corp dealing with customs, excise and tax crimes), threw a ray of light on the relations between the collection of money and the actions of the extremists in Algeria. An important breach, but limited in content. But then, today terrorism – in particular, of the Qaedist inspiration – is broken up, with the operation that is born on the premises: entrusted to an already existing structure or to so-called spontaneous cells. Therefore, it is useless – except in rare cases – to cover large logistic expenses.
The response of the forces of law and order - and we do not speak specifically of Italy, must then be calibrated – on more than one level.
The first level concerns the eventual flows of money in favour of associations that act as a cover for fundamentalist environments. It is a long-term mission because those who criminally conspire do not furnish reference points and always have a ready excuse: e.g. the money constitutes a social aid. With the passage of time, this pipeline has been progressively closed or, however, well camouflaged.
The second level strikes the bad teachers and the ‘facilitators’, or rather those who, at both ideological and operative levels, sow the seeds to produce a fanatical group. Since they are more in contact with who is close to the action, it could be less difficult to identify the economic tie.
They must show themselves and cannot hide behind convenient alibis, like a gesture of charity or the necessity of giving the religious offering.
The third level concerns the single cell. It is true that it is widely independent, but it uses technology and, therefore, leaves traces. The time will come – the investigations in Europe maintain – that the terrorist will make a false move: an e-mail, a telephone call, the memory of a computer. Three ‘spies’ that can say very much on both the terrorist’s operative relations and on eventual economic sources alternative to those of his legitimate work.
To this response, which we can define as tactical, is added a strategic one: that it be imposed, not only on the security apparatus, but also on the political one, to make all efforts to crush severely any form of illegal commercial activity. To linger over the repression of narco-traffic is reductive. The post 11th September experience indicates that it is necessary to look more closely at phenomena which are illegal, but which are often not associated with terrorism. Therefore, the trade of immigrants, the falsification of brand name products, the exploitation of natural resources, the management of small widely diffused entrepreneurial activities constitute the thousand rivulets which can guarantee the independence and a network of complicity – direct and indirect –