Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al Balawi Photo by http://media.washtimes.com/   The evolution of the Islamic terrorism has stretched over a long period until now it has reached sophisticated forms of communication that are now, principally, the prerogatives of Al Qaeda, the organization which has known how to best exploit the Media, especially that of the electronics: from the television to the Internet. In a particular way, terrorism, whatever its matrix, has understood and interpreted correctly the principle that the message is in the act itself, in the fear it generates, carried by increasingly rapid and intrusive means of communication. However, if the language simplification of the terrorist structure facilitates proselytism, the terminological generalization of those who fight it generates confusion. Hence, the necessity of unambiguous words to better combat the war of terror on the mediatic front.

Islam and Islamism


The phenomenon of terrorism of the Islamic matrix thrust itself on the attention of world public opinion in the 70’s. From the first attack, in 1993, on the World Trade Center in New York, going on to the most blatant and dramatic attack of September 11^th 2001, this form of terrorism polarized by a strong religious component has set itself as interlocutor of the entire international community.
The term “Islamism” was coined in the 18th Century in France and referred to Islam. The oldest trace is found in the Oxford English Dictionary of 1747. Starting from the definition Islam that the Treccani on-line vocabulary gives us, we read: “Islàm (ìslam is incorrect) masculine noun [from the Arabic ‘Islam’, “abandon, deliver (oneself to the divine will)”] – the great monotheistic religion founded by Mohammed and collectively, the Moslem world (almost always written with a capital M): the diffusion of Islam; wars between Christianity and Islam. While, under the definition Islamism, we read: “The religion founded in Arabia by Mohammed, in which elements drawn from Arab paganism, Christianity and Judaism converge, as well as personal ideas and rules of Mohammed himself: based on the belief in the unity of God (Allah) and Mohammed as the prophet. In the Koran is encoded also the political, social and cultural system closely connected to this religion”.
The second meaning of the term Islamism particularly interests us: […]“also, the political, social and cultural system closely connected to this religion”. Although not comprehensive, these two entries are, however, helpful in introducing a fundamental concept: i.e. that there is a very strong difference between Islam and Islamism and to consider them identical, as often happens in everyday language, is a serious error. Islamism, in fact, is also defined “political Islam” and represents a group of political doctrines which aim at the institution of a State which has Islam as its religion, and incorporating its guiding principles as regulators of the economic, political, juridical and social spheres.
As far as the movements and the political parties are concerned, one tends to distinguish between Islamic parties (which promote Islam as a religion) and Islamic political parties (which promote Islam as a political party). Their positions are very different and go from the theocratic hardliners, which led the Iranian revolution (Party of the Islamic Republic), to the much more secular and democratic parties which originated in the West, like the Party for Justice and Development, in Turkey.
A separate mention is deserved for the brotherhood of the Moslem Brothers, which follows in the wake of strict traditionalism: founded in Egypt, in 1928, it has, over the years, increased its influence, especially starting from the 80’s, extending its presence to all the Islamic Countries, with the objective of the reconquest for Islam of all the territories which, in the past, were Arab States.
Islamism has different forms and space in a wide range of strategies and tactics, therefore, it cannot be perceived and defined as a single movement. It is, however, fundamental, to distinguish between “Islamism” and “Islamic terrorism”, precisely in order to avoid that simplification which we spoke of earlier: that is, in uniting all Moslems under the umbrella of Islamist terrorism and ignoring the complexity of the phenomenon, we stigmatize the greater part of Moslems, who have nothing to do with the terror, guaranteeing, in this way, the success of terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda.


Islamic fundamentalism and the terrorism of Islamic matrix

To clarify the concept of “Islamic terrorism”, we must first note that this definition is used for acts of terrorism committed by extremists who define themselves as “Moslems”. Since the 70’s, episodes of Islamic terrorism have occurred in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, South-East Asia and the United States. One of the most recognized and active of these terrorist movements – from a militant point of view – is Al Qaeda, founded by Osama bin Laden with the objective of ending the American military presence in the Middle-East and in the Arab peninsula; to overthrow the Arab regimes considered to be corrupt and not sufficiently religious; to put an end to the American support to Israel and to return East Timor and Kashmir to Moslem rule.
Although the definition “Islamic terrorism” has, at times, been considered counter-productive and excessively politicized, its use is now very widespread. Many Moslems, obviously, dispute the definition, since, according to them, it is in opposition to Islam – a peaceful religious. Professor Bernard Lewis observes that “Islam, as a religion, is not particularly in favour of terrorism, or even, tolerant towards it; it has had an essential political character from its foundation until our times. […] In the traditional Islam – and, therefore, also in the fundamentalism of Islamic source – God is the only source of sovereignty. God is the head of the State. The State is a divine State. The army is the army of God. Treasure is the treasure of God, and the enemy is, naturally, the enemy of God”.
This vision is contested by scholars like Jamal Nassar and Karim H. Karim, who maintain that, being more than a billion followers of the Islamic religion, the phenomenon would be better considered as “Islamist terrorism”, because it describes political ideologies rooted in the interpretations of Islam: otherwise, describing it as “Islamic” terrorism, runs the risk of confirming “a prejudicial perspective towards the whole Islamic world”, falling again into the simplification from which we are trying to escape.
Another scholar, Karen Armstrong, sustains that the use of the term “terrorism” is counterproductive, insofar as it fuels the conviction of those in the West who believe that such atrocities are caused by Islam, and, at the same time, reinforces the point of view of how many, in the Moslem world, perceive the West as an implacable enemy. Armstrong considers that the terrorists cannot, in any way, represent the traditional Islam and, for this reason, suggests the use of other terms to define the phenomenon, such as “wahhabita terrorism” or Qutbianita terrorism”.
With regard to the motivations at the root of terrorism of Islamic matrix, the former analyst of the CIA Michael Scheuer, who participated in the hunt that the CIA conducted against Osama bin Laden, claims that terroristic attacks, in particular by the Al Qaeda in America, are not motivated by a religious or culturally inspired hatred, but by the conviction that the foreign policy of the United States has oppressed, killed and damaged the Moslems in the Middle East. Which is summarized in the phrase: “They hate us for what we do, not for what we are”.
Professor Robert Pape, expert in the study of terrorism and, in particular, in suicide attacks, sustains that the terrorists utilize suicides – a particularly effective instrument of terrorist attack – are not guided by Islamism, but by “a clear strategic objective: to force the modern democracies to withdraw their military forces from the territory that the terrorists see as their homeland”.
Martin Kramer, on the contrary, expert in Arabic and Islam studies, contests the position of Pape, sustaining that the suicide attacks do not respond solely to a strategic logic, but also to an interpretation of Islam from which is drawn a moral logic. For example, Hezbollah started suicide attacks after a complex re-elaboration of the martyr concept. “The only way to put a brake on the suicide terrorism”, Kramer maintains, “is to undermine its moral logic, encouraging Moslems to see its incompatibility with their own values”.
The Islamic terrorism, according to critics of Islam, is tied to the practice of war divinely sanctioned against the apostates. The expert, Scott Atran, presently Director of research in anthropology at the Centre de Recherche Scientifique, has studied suicide terrorism for a long time, and he underlines that we cannot speak of a single root of terrorism: normally, in fact, it is not the religion that is the driving force, but the dynamics of the group, formed by family and friends, on which is based the growing wave of action that leads to martyrdom. With regard to the profile of the aspiring kamikaze, the forensic psychiatrist and former official of external services, Marc Sageman, made an intensive study of biographical data on 172 al jihad participants, and he concludes that the “social networks” and the “close ties of family and friends” inspire the young Moslems to join al jihad and to kill, much more than behavioural disturbances, poverty, trauma, madness or ignorance.
Lawrence Wright, an American Pulitzer Prize writer concerned with terrorism, describes the characteristic of ‘displacement’, as a phenomenon that the aspiring kamikaze have in common: the majority of those who join al jihad, in fact, do so in a Country different from the one in which they have grown up. An opposite profile to that of the “local” Afghani terrorists: in a study conducted by the Afghan pathologist, Dr. Usef Yadgari, of 110 suicide attacks, it emerged, in fact, that 80% of the cases of kamikaze examined had some form of physical or mental disability. It is not coincidence, in fact, that the Afghani shahid do not appear on the commemorative posters or leave posthumous video messages as martyrs.


Brief remarks on the Jihad

Jihad (gihad ÌåÇÏ) is an Arabic word which means “exercise the maximum force” or “fight”. The word implies a wide spectrum of meanings, from the interior spiritual struggle, to obtain a perfect faith, to the holy war. It is to be understood as masculine, therefore the jihad.
During the period of the Koranic revelation, when Mohammed was at the Mecca, the jihad referred, essentially, to non-violent and personal struggle, therefore, to that inner struggle necessary for the comprehension of the divine mysteries. Subsequent to the transfer from the Mecca to Medina in 622, and to the foundation of an Islamic State, the Koran (22:39) began to incorporate the word ‘qital’ (battle or state of war), and two of the last verses revealed on this subject (9:5, 29) suggest, according to classical scholars like Ibn Kathir, a continuous war of conquest against the enemy non-believers. Among the followers of the liberal movements inside Islam, the context of these verses is that of a specific “ongoing war”, and not a series of binding precepts for the faithful.
These “liberal” Moslems tend to promote an understanding that rejects the identification of the jihad with the armed struggle, choosing, instead, to stress principles of non-violence. This is, however, a scarcely diffused interpretation and is markedly in the minority within the Islamic world. The Moslems often refer to two meanings of jihad – although the chain of traditions that can lead back to the words of Mohammed is classified as “weak”, these meanings are: “great jihad (interior)”, the effort for self-amendment, combating the passionate drives of the ego; “small jihad (exterior)” a military effort, i.e. a legal war.
Today, the word jihad is, however, used in many circles as if it had an exclusively military dimension. Although this is the most common interpretation of jihad, it should be emphasized, however, how this expression is not used strictly in this sense in the Koran.


Al Qaeda, the birth of the network

Al Qaeda (in Arabic ÇáÞÇÚÏÉ, means “the base”). The origins of Al
Qaeda as inspirer network of terrorism throughout the world and trainer of its operators can be traced back to the Soviet wars in Afghanistan (December 1978 – February 1989).
Five distinct phases can be identified in the development of the Al Qaeda: the start at the end of the 80’s; the “desert” period between 1990-1996; its “golden period” between 1996-200; the period of the network between 2001-2005 and a period of fragmentation from 2005 until today.
After the attacks of September 11th 2001, it is thought that the leadership of Al Qaeda became geographically isolated and that it left the conducting of the terrorist actions to local group leaders utilizing the name of Al Qaeda. This is the real origin of the Qaedist network: i.e. a galaxy of independent organizations working in isolated conditions with respect to the “network”, although sharing the objectives and resources. This system means that although one “cell” may be put out of action, the security of the others is not undermined, since there is no hierarchical tie between the cells, giving the organization a “network” structure and not a pyramidal one.
Al Qaeda has been classified as a terrorist organization by the Security Council of the United Nations, by the NATO, by the European Commission of the European Union and by numerous governments and government agencies.
Osama bin Laden explained the origin of the name in a recorded interview given to the journalist of Al Jazeera Taysir Aluni in October of 2001: "The name 'Al Qaeda' was established a long time ago by mere chance. The late Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri established the training camps for our mujahedin against Russia's terrorism. We used to call the training camp Al Qaeda. The name stayed".
According to another definition ascribable to a statement given by the former British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook – who resigned in protest against the aggression policy of Tony Blair against Iraq – to the British daily, The Guardian” on the 8th of July 2005, Al Qaeda is the Arabic translation of database: “As far as I know, Al Qaeda was originally the name of a database of the US Government, with the names of thousands of Mujahidin enrolled by the CIA to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan”.
Everything comes from the militant Mujahidin in Afghanistan. After leaving College in 1979, Bin Laden went to Pakistan and joined Abdullah Azzam – a Palestinian Islamic scholar and member of the Moslem Brotherhood – to take part in the Soviet war in Afghanistan. During the Operation Cyclone, from 1979 to 1989, the United States supplied financial help and arms to the Mujahidin and to the leaders, through the Pakistan Secret Service, Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). Bin Laden, at the time, was able to meet and cultivate relations with Hamid Gul, a three-star general of the Pakistan Army and head of the ISI Agency. Although the United States had supplied the money and the arms, the paramilitary formation of the militant groups was entirely carried out by the Pakistan Armed Forces and the ISI.
In 1984, in Pakistan at Peshawar, Osama bin Laden and Azzam founded the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), which channeled money, arms and fighters from all over the Arab world towards Afghanistan. Through al-Khidamat, the bin Laden family financed, with its own fortune, the activity of the fighters for the jihad. Bin Laden established training camps inside Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – in Pakistan – and used them to train volunteer fighters against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
It was in this period that Bin Laden began to wear the camouflage jackets and brandish the Russian made assault rifle, thus creating that icon of the fighter guide which accompanied him for the entire duration of his leadership and which made him a paradigm of inspiration for his followers.
In 1988, bin Laden decided to separate from the Maktab al-Khidamat movement. In fact, while Azzam acted as supporter of the Afghani fighters, bin Laden aspired to a more militant role. One of the principal points which led to the split and to the consequent creation of Al Qaeda was the insistence of Azzam that the Arab fighters be integrated into the Afghani fighting groups, instead of forming a separate fighting force.
In a meeting in which the Sheikh participated, in August 1988, the formal creation of Al Qaeda was decided: “Fundamentally, an organized Islamic faction, whose objective is to elevate the word of God, to win his victorious religion”. And also a list of requisites was drawn up in order to be a member of the organization: ability to listen, good manners, obedience, and the oath (bayat) to follow their superiors.
According to Wright, the real name of the group was not utilized in public declarations, because its existence was still kept a strict secret. According to the author, Al Qaeda was formed in August 1988, during the meeting between expert chiefs of the Egyptian jihad, Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden. In this meeting it was decided to combine the money of bin Laden with the organizational experience of the Islamic jihad and to embrace the jihadist cause elsewhere, after the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan.
Subsequent to the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in February 1989, Osama bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia in 1990, as a hero of the jihad who, with his Arab legion “had brought down the superpower” of the Soviet Union.
The Sheikh was forced to leave Saudi Arabia the day after the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein and the consequent friction with King Fahd for using the US troops to defend his borders. Bin Laden fled to Sudan in 1992, thanks to an agreement mediated by Ali Mohamed.
Bin Laden remained in Sudan until 1996, then, under the pressure of the local government and the governments of Egypt, the Sudan and the United States – after having lost Saudi citizenship and had been repudiated by his family – he was practically forced to re-enter Afghanistan, where he landed at Jalalabad with a charter flight. Cementing relations with the Mullah Mohammed Omar, leader of the Taliban, he began to collect funds from donors of the period of the jihad against the Soviets and from the Pakistan Secret Service (ISI).
From there on, Afghanistan is considered by some analysts to have been the principal base of the Sheikh, even if, according to other experts, Pakistan had always covered the presence of Osama bin Laden on its territory – thanks to its ISI Service infiltrated by the Taliban.
Recent events, in fact, with the killing of bin Laden in Pakistan, would confirm that the Sheikh, even if not as a fixed base in Pakistan, at least, he used to spend some of his time on the territory of Islamabad.


The political communication and violence

A political message is a communication of political content between two or more persons. The communication is of political content when it occurs between a person who is the bearer of an interest and someone else who has the possibility of intervening, directly or indirectly and in a more or less effective way, in that specific interest, whether in favour or contrary to the interest itself. The interest (therefore, the communication) to be of a political nature, must normally concern a multitude of persons and a public benefit, tangible or intangible.
The means through which such messages are sent are many. From the old posters and leaflets used by movements claiming responsibility for attacks etc., to the article in the national daily newspaper X or Y, going on to street demonstrations and other means of legitimate, non-violent protest.
Violence, even if it is seen as extrema ratio, may, in fact, be used as a vehicle for a political message. Obviously, for this to happen, the violence must not be pursued as an end in itself, but must be included within a wider design with, for example, a claim of responsibility, and must be prepared by groups that have a political strategy. A “political violence” – if these two words can be juxtaposed - is something abhorrent in itself and should always be condemned and never justified, but who commits a similar act represents the sender of a message that is addressed to a political recipient which, in general, is the political class and leadership of a Country. Obviously, it does not matter whether the act is actually accomplished or not, one thinks of Eta, which often gave prior warning of having put a bomb in a given place. What does matter is the mediatic echo that such an action generates … the attack that kills 200 persons reaches the minds (and, above all, the “stomach”, in other words, the fear) of many more people than those personally involved, together with their families.
One thinks of the New York attack, the bombs of London and Madrid: practically, the whole planet (at least the part connected to the media) came to know about these events; many governments reacted by raising security measures, the UNO met, the Security and Information Services all over the world were activated or intensified their activities, and so on.


The mediatic strategy of Al Qaeda

The mediatic strategy of Al Qaeda is designed to fulfill various functions and for this reason is channeled through various media: declarations via fax, post on the Internet, audio recordings, video production, publication of articles and interviews. Each mediatic product is addressed to a specific target, as well as to the wide base constituted by the population. The “calendar” of the declarations, generally, corresponds to the principal international events and is aimed at making propaganda and raising tension, in order to demonstrate that also the network or a leader of the organization is alive and well, and to increase the supporters or launch attacks.
To sensitize the masses with regard to their cause, to earn the support of sympathizers or to generate fear, the terrorists need publicity. When Peter Bergen, analyst of terrorism for the CNN and author of Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of bin Laden, made the first television interview of bin Laden in 1997, he discovered that within his Afghani base bin Laden had a well thought out mediatic strategy; so much so that the Sheikh required first to know the questions and then replied only to those he considered opportune for the interview.
Ayman al Zawahiri, historical number two of Al Qaeda and – as we learned – successor of bin Laden in the leadership of the movement, has always considered the manifold benefits in the utilization of the International Media to call attention to their cause. Therefore, when Al Qaeda declared war on the United States in 1998, it did it publicly, holding an official press conference in Afghanistan. Zawahiri was also certain that the successfully televised images of the attack would spread widespread fear among the people, encouraging, at the same time, “martyrs to come forward and take part in the suicide missions in the name of the Islamist cause”.
Following the loss of its safe haven in Afghanistan, due to the pressure, immediately after the 11^th September, of the International anti-terrorism operations, the Al Qaeda Network was forcibly “broken up” into smaller and more elusive factions (micro-players). The Network, once back to a state of perennial hiding, experienced a drastic decrease in its capacity to communicate. Consequently, the Network began more frequently to gravitate towards the new technologies, such as Internet and satellite communications. The mass media became a central component in the strategic operations of Al Qaeda in the post September 11^th period: a more virtual and widespread organization which Peter Bergen nicknamed “Al-Qaeda 2.0”.
The efforts of Al Qaeda to interact with the Media often reflect those of the specialized public relation companies. Audio declarations, video press releases and news streaming are created at its own in-house production company known as As-Sahab and released through various channels, including its publicity affiliate, the Global Islamic Media Front. The latter is also responsible for the Voice of the Caliphate, an on-line television newscast, which made its debut in the month of September 2005.
Studying the mediatic connections of the jihadist groups can help us to understand the relationship between Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups, and the priorities that emerge from the study of this network can give us indications on the operative modalities of the Qaedist galaxy.
These connections, visible to all, are part of the so-called “open sources”: analyzing them, one certainly cannot understand what the jihadists think and say among themselves, but monitoring forums and other virtual meeting places can serve to analyze what their supporters think.
If it is true that one cannot establish that there is a direct connection between their actions and their mediatic output, it is just as true that a detailed analysis of the mediatic priorities can give us some clues as to their future actions.
What is of interest, for the purpose of profiling of the media network, are the operators that produce and place material on the Net – with this is intended the affiliated armed groups – and the means through which this material is published, utilizing a Media Production and Distribution Entity, that is, an entity responsible for making such material public (but which, not infrequently, also produces it). These entities form the “mediatic network” which spreads the Qaedist ideology. An out and out distinction between these entities cannot be made. However, they can retrace the major Media Production and Distribution Entities (MPDEs) which create the connective tissue between the various terrorist realities: Fajr, Global Islamic Media Front e Sahab. One could think that such links are only virtual, nevertheless, the constant contact between the various groups and the MPDEs suggest also real and effective contacts, as those required to carry materials – for example, a film clip – from the group which has made it to the representative of the MPDEs which will publish it.
The system is laborious and the more complex it is, the more risks there are. It would be natural to ask why not just produce the material and publish it oneself. First of all, it should be considered that the MPDEs with their activity maximize the synergies and the efforts of the groups that contribute to the media, without losing anything, which could happen if each one provided for himself; and above all, the MPDEs create an implicit link which is a guarantee of the authenticity of the material – like a “genuineness” conferred on the news, simply because it is issued by a known and reliable MPDE. In this way, the network becomes “guaranteed” and it is very difficult to circulate false or misleading material introduced by hostile or emulative agents who try to contaminate the information system.
The media flow that comes out of this network is only in a minimal part directly attributable to Al Qaeda, and this confirms the character of the network, of the galaxy, of the movement which does not have, therefore, a real hierarchy with direct ties of subordination, while recognizing in the Sheikh an ideological point of reference which even survives his death.


The propaganda

The messages of Al Qaeda, addressed to the populations throughout the Middle East, Europe, Asia and the United States, are designed to “elicit psychological reactions and to communicate complex political messages to a global public”. Al Qaeda addresses requests, threats and warnings towards its political and ideological enemies, among which are the governments of the United States, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Certain messages, instead, have been designed to go beyond those who are already followers, and are aimed to influence the average Moslem-Arab citizen; this represents the largest segment of the Middle East society, which is often reluctant to support the violent attacks of terrorism. Al Qaeda also makes direct appeals to those who share the ideology of a global jihad, in the hope of collecting financial support, acquiring new recruits and future martyrs.
Other messages are supplementary and are directed to the cells, to already existing individual International operators, or to dormant cells, and contain instructions, updates and the most recent developments of the Net. "Masking their true intentions with propaganda, rhetoric, and a sophisticated use of the mass media and the Internet, this enemy exploits regional tensions and popular grievances" (General John P. Abizaid).
To implement this “resistance”, the central theme of the arguments in support of its work are a certain number of heated Arab and Moslem questions and some “convenient” conflicts which the organization has strategically manipulated to advance its cause.
A basic point in many of its messages is represented by the attempt to transform the actions and policies of the West into a total war against Islam. Often, drawing on historical and religious images of the days of the Crusades, Al Qaeda points to Arab nationalists, insisting on the fact that “the United States, in collaboration with its puppet States in the region and Israel, wage war against Islam. In particular, through their policies in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, their support of the sanctions against Iraq and their military presence in the Gulf Region” (declaration made before the war in Iraq). Furthermore, the viewpoint of the “war against Islam” allows the Al Qaeda leadership to constantly make their actions appear as defensive and necessary from a religious point of view.
One of the more lasting and convincing arguments in its rhetoric against the United States revolves around the incessant Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A situation that creates resentment, which has a strong emotional influence on the Arab-Moslem collective imagination. Large segments of the Moslem population believe that the United States are in agreement with Israel and support, therefore, what Moslems perceive as the continued occupation of Palestine. Terrorist organizations, a strong popular base like Hamas and Hezbollah, and radical Moslem leaders like the Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have publicly asked for the destruction of Israel. Zawahiri has always considered the Palestinian cause as a catalyst to obtain the universal support of the Arab world for jihad against the United States. This theme represents a meeting point for all Arabs, also non-believers. Consequently, many of the Al Qaeda statements often underline and insist on the theory of an American-Zionist conspiracy.
The principal scope of terrorism is that of “drawing attention and creating fear”. The public declarations released by bin Laden and al Zawahiri often contained threats of attacks pending details and warnings for the target populations. Abu Musab al Zarqawi, leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, killed in June 2006, became infamous for the release of horrifying videos and images of decapitations of hostages and mutilated bodies. Among the first unfortunate victims of this series of assassinations was Nick Berg, the young American of Jewish origin who was beheaded by five individuals, on the 7^th of May 2004, among whom, perhaps, was Zarqawi himself. The mediatic reverberation caused by the release of the video of this barbarous execution was felt strongly all over the world, not only in the Western world, but it clearly achieved the intended purpose of the Al Qaeda group in Iraq (AQI): the group headed by the Jordanian thus imposed itself as the “antenna” of Al Qaeda in Iraq, earning for itself rank and respectability “in the field”, to put it in simple terms. A public communication of this kind had, at least, two intentions: one, for “internal use”, that is, addressed to those at the summit of the Qaedist network, to ask, or better, to claim investiture; another towards the rest of the world, from governments to populations, to fuel and spread terror.
With the same intention, to maximize the effect, attackers frequently chose to make attacks in areas of high density of Media presence and, particularly, with the possibility of visibility.
To prove that they were still alive, bin Laden, Zawahiri and Zaeqawi frequently produced messages and communiqués following military operations which boasted to have captured them. This, of course, for the purpose of demonstrating that they were still alive and in control of their networks. These statements, in general, reached destination with a delay of weeks or even months.
Al Qaeda often releases statements through the communication channels before launching terrorist attacks. These messages are considered encoded communications addressed directly to the operative and dormant cells scattered around the globe. Even though it is difficult to decipher from the various communications the specific details before an attack, the former Director of the CIA, James Woolsey, maintains that bin Laden rarely released public statements without a reason and that, usually, the release of his communications indicated that “something was being programmed”.

The virtual community: terrorism through the cyberspace

The transfer of the major part of their communication operations to the Media and to Internet has allowed Al Qaeda to function in a safe and not easily detectable environment. The tracing and location of terrorists through the Internet has demonstrated to be always more difficult for the International authorities, which must grapple with a tangle of restrictive and contradictory laws. Normally, the terrorist hack the servers of Network to send untraceable messages, instruction manuals and various other materials. When the terrorists are identified and the server is closed, they hack into another. The principal instrument they use is the forum, or rather, a site in which a series of subjects are treated and are then accompanied by interventions introduced by the users. In this case, the users are armed groups which participate in effective actions and attacks and are able to maintain a level of privacy which allows them to remain untraceable on the territory, but without going unrecognized, if they wish, and frequently utilizing also a logo. Certain forums are so often visited and considered reliable, they assume, almost, an official standing.
Al Qaeda developed its physical existence from a single terrorist group to a movement sustained by many organizations, to become a real galaxy. Franchise affiliations have spread the global jihad beyond the delimiting borders of the Middle East towards the south-east of Asia, Europe, and the territories of the former Soviet Union.
In March of 2005, David F. Ronfeldt, an expert scholar of political science at the RAND Corporation, discussed how Al Qaeda has used the information age to repeat, at a global level, the patterns of the ancient tribal schemes. “The jihadists are using Internet and the Web to inspire the creation of a global virtual tribe of the Islamic radicals, an on-line umma, with segments of affinity all over the world”.
Another means of communication used is that of the sites of the social networking, becoming increasingly popular throughout the Middle East. These sites – allowing the free access between groups of like interests – lend themselves precisely to the game of the fundamentalists.
Internet has also increased the capacity and the number of recruits for Al Qaeda and its affiliates, solidifying relations between the active militants and the financial sponsors. Abu Musab Al Zarqawi himself, formed Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) from the rebel movement and, subsequently, with his own computer, used the means of the Network to align it to the leadership of Al Qaeda. Internet was the medium which allowed Al Zarqawi to ask bin Laden for the recognition of the organization and the granting of a “leadership position” as head of Al Qaeda in Iraq.
Gabriel Weimann, Senior Researcher at the United States Institute of Peace, and Professor of communications at the University of Haifa (Israel) has studied the growing presence of terrorism on the Internet over the last few years. In his book, “Terror on the Internet”, he states that the cyberspace has opened a global arena for the conflict. “The Internet has expanded the terrorists’ theatre of operation, allowing them full control over their communications through the use of the developed world's cyberspace infrastructure".Bomb attacks, carried out successfully by various affiliate cells of the Al Qaeda have been made in Qatar, Egypt and in Europe. These attacks, which were programmed almost exclusively through Internet, have led the Intelligence experts to conclude that the global movement of the jihad has extended to “groups and ad hoc cells” becoming a “web directed phenomenon”.
The terrorists use Internet as an instrument for up to 80% of their pre-attack information, including diagrams of nuclear plants, railway line maps, water pipelines, and air flight timetables, using sources which are legally available and accessible to the public. The example is worth mentioned of the finding in Iraq, in August 2005, of prints regarding places in Rome, taken from the famous Google Earth site.
Al Qaeda have instituted a remote training network through an open university for the Jihad, loading its servers with training videos, manuals and other strategic material, CD ROMs with explanations of weapons, hand to hand fighting techniques, and the manufacture of bombs and assault tactics. Not only this, but very recently, also on-line newspapers have been diffused, unloadable in the common PDF format and written in the English language, which praise Ad Qaeda and aim at proselytizing in America and all other Countries where English is spoken.
Among the most recent, appearing in July 2010, is the “Inspire” – created by the imam Anwar al-Awlaki, born in the United States, educated in Yemen and presently wanted by the CIA – which represents an actual magazine of “Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula” (AQAP), addressed to American Moslems, and aims at radicalizing the Moslems in the United States and activating the myriad of terrorists which – according to the Jihadist rib – are already inside the Country.


In the virtual to survive the reality

Following the attacks successfully carried out on the 11th September 2001, the organization began to disaggregate and concentrate on smaller and more local conflicts. The central leadership withdrew to the zone controlled by the Taliban, in Afghanistan on the border with Pakistan, and the movement divided up, splitting into different realities, among which the most important are Al Qaeda in Iraq, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula and other affiliated movements which pre-existed, like the Taliban.
While bin Laden was alive, the movement was still fed by the images of the Sheikh, whose mediatic leadership has never waned, but the effective control that Osama had on the operations in the last years is significantly reduced, giving more space to local leadership and groups which manage the “trade mark” of Al Qaeda as an authentic “franchising of terror” in different areas of the globe.
This mediatic dimension of bin Laden has given rise to talk of “holographic terrorism”. In fact, in this innovative dimension, the figure of the Sheikh has been dematerialized, exactly like a hologram and has remained unchanged over the years. For his followers, bin Laden never aged, was never ill and never suffered from kidney trouble, and was vigorous and effective to the end. And for his followers, he continues to be so. A few weeks after the death of bin Laden, al Zawahiri appeared in a video in which he declared that “the Sheikh is dead, but the jihad continues”. In this transmutation of his figure, from human to icon, bin Laden has left an image and paradigm to follow and venerate by anyone wishing to follow his “mission”. It does not matter whether it is he who gives this or that order to carry out an attack in Europe, rather than in America or Africa, those who are inspired by him act independently, inspired by his “stainless” image: for this reason, we speak of “cells of a network”. Osama bin Laden has, thus, been able to transcend the boundaries which were imposed by the hunt opened for him after September 2001: although in hiding, he continued to influence and inspire groups and individuals who acted in his name, even when there had never been an actual contact between them and the senior leadership of Al Qaeda. The power of the mediatic network and their knowing how to use it is this: to be able to feed, regularly, into the mediatic circuit, information, communiqués, declarations and videos, without directly addressing them to a specific user, but allowing the mediatic flywheel to “spread the message”, the significance of which depends on the ears that acknowledge it.
To defeat this winning and stainless image, the Americans have started to try to undermine it, disseminating a video in which the Sheikh is seen aged, with a posture of a tired man, comparing it with his old TV videos: that charismatic mythicised figure who – although physically deceased – is far from being forgotten.
The Americans, over time, have understood that this “war of terror” must also be fought on the mediatic front: one cannot “bomb” or “assault” icons. The icons must be fought on the same level on which they were born, on the mediatic one.

Conclusion

The birth of the so-called “asymmetric wars” in the last decade, where regular armies confront an enemy which is not perfectly identifiable by another uniform, has led to the awareness that now, much more than in the past, the wars are fought on different fronts – like the mediatic one. Since ancient times, the psychological war has always been one of the weapons in the quivers of the generals. Nevertheless, it was a weapon which had a limited scope and its employment was seen as collateral to the “typical” war operations. Now, on the contrary, since war was openly declared on international terrorism, the psychological side of the conflict has, at times, grown predominant, driven and exasperated by that faction that had a military disadvantage, in the strict sense and which, for this, focused on an “innovative” strategy. The use of the Media by the jihadist galaxy is precisely the paradigm of this new mediatic war, which is fought more in the mind and in the cyberspace than on the ground, in the battlefield.
Notwithstanding the presumed – and much vaunted by the West – cultural backwardness of this enemy, the Islamic extremists have proved to be true masters in the utilization, for their use and consumption, of the Media, arriving mainly to make use of those Westerners who – contrary to what happens in the “non-Western” world –profoundly permeate our society. They have brought the front line into our living rooms, thanks to the television and the computer. Communications was a successful instrument for the radical militants, and to embrace the mass media and the new technologies was a catalyst to reach their objectives.
The lesson that can be drawn from these observations is that the war on International terrorism must be fought also, and above all, on the mediatic front. The Western Governments must, therefore, dedicate instruments and resources – not directly and purely “military” – to activate that circuit that leads to the involvement of public opinion, principally, of that part of the globe which watches us with suspicion, for the purpose of drying up the reservoir from which these extremists can still draw recruits. Otherwise, if we are not able to involve the Moslem world with policies of greater dialogue, we shall be forced to see, even in the coming decades, the birth of new generations of terrorists.




The author advises

Holy War, Inc. Inside the Secret World of bin Laden Author: Peter L. Bergen Editor: The New York Times, 2002