Photo by www.medicinalive.com/   Explosions of the megalopolis, demographic upheavals, massive migrations, with consequent impoverishment of areas today considered “rich” and enrichment of areas today considered poor. This is the projection of the world situation to 2050, with dynamics which will have an impact on the economic growth and on the capacity to generate wealth, to support even a semblance of welfare. The demographic tsunami will produce extremely strong imbalances and tensions between continents with opposite demographic trends, with the risk of a rapid decline of Europe, strong social tensions and massive migrations from Africa and Latin America. The demographic changes, therefore, put us before radical political and social choices and Gianluca Ansalone analyzes some possible solutions.

Around forty years ago, the German biologist-anthropologist, Paul Ehrlich warned the scientific community on the approach of what he defined “the demographic bomb”. The scientist foresaw, shortly afterwards, a decided increase in the world population, which would not, however, be matched with an increase of available food, prophesying famine in the story of humanity. This event should have come true between the middle of the 70’s and 80’s.
Fortunately, and thanks to advanced technology and the so-called “green revolution” in agriculture, this scenario proved to be somewhat more than rash.
Nevertheless, although with less alarming tone and with a much higher technological availability, today, the world is on the eve of a demographic transformation without precedent, which will have profound consequences on the global geopolitical and geo-economic scenario.
Demography, defined as a statistic study of the population and its possible projections in time, is not, obviously, an exact science. And yet, its interaction with other disciplines, such as economy, strategy or security is able to furnish significant pointers on the future model of the social relations within the States and strategic relations between the States.
As it is for all the other disciplines , also demography is subject of an open scientific debate, which is sometimes radical: some analysts see in the consistency and demographic composition an essential asset for strategic superiority; others, in the wake of the English economist and demographer, Malthus, place a physiological limit to the growth of the population, given the relative scarcity of resources; others again, consider that through the advancements of science and technology, one can imagine a world which is always more populated, but nevertheless, adequately livable.
What is undeniable is that during the course of the centuries, the demography has always been a determining factor for the ascent or decline of Empires; a factor which is unavoidable in the long term, just as the economy is in the medium term, and the military power in the short term.
The cultural approach to such dynamics has changed over the course of time. The analysis of Thomas Malthus (1798) on the relation between population and resources started from the assumption that the increase of the population presents an exponential trend, while food resources can increase only in a linear way. It would, therefore, have reached a peak – defined the “catastrophe of Malthus” – in which the lack of food would have created poverty and wars.
Also the catastrophic previsions of the Club of Rome, in the 70’s, on the depletion of the energy and natural resources, goes back to the Malthusian logic.
Compared to the Malthus epoch, the problem today presents further difficulties of analysis, but also more instruments of intervention. In particular, two aspects should be contemplated: the first returns to the essential role of technology, which has made possible the diffusion of agricultural means on a large scale. It has contributed to reduce the infantile mortality rate, increasing contextually the hopes of life and has guaranteed, above all, in the last decade, the reduction of hunger in the world. In the same way, with respect to the previsions of the Club of Rome, the “oil” resources will cease to be employed, not so much because the supply will be depleted, but because a new technology that tied to hydrogen will probably become of wide and immediate utilization.
The second aspect is tied to the numbers and statistical projections, which show a worrying scenario.
According to the UNO data, the overall population of the planet will pass from 6.51 billion (2005) to 7.67 in 2020, and to 9.19 billion by 2050. However, the growth will continue to be profoundly unbalanced and will concentrate prevalently in Asia and Africa. In absolute values, it will pass, in the first case, from 3.95 billion inhabitants to 4.6 billion by 2020, with an increase of 16.7%, in the main, concentrated in India, and where the overall population of Japan will tend notably to contract, that of China will stabilize. In relative terms, instead, the growth of the population of sub-Saharan Africa will be even more alarming and could touch 38%, passing from 922 million to 1.27 billion in the same period.
On the contrary, the industrialized countries will experience a generalized phenomenon of population decrease and progressive aging, with an increase of the average age. Europe will constantly lose population from here to 2020, passing from 731 million to 722 million.
The demographic weight of the West compared to the world total will decrease by 25%, moving prominence and economic important towards the emerging Countries, which present more significant rates of population growth (and therefore, an employment capacity of young labour force).
To sustain acceptable rhythms of economic growth, the industrialized Countries will need to receive foreign labour force, that is, from the regions where the demographic boom is more pronounced. These regions are typically the poor areas, Moslem in majority (in the case of Europe) and that of Latin America (in the case of North America). Finally, for the first time in the history of humanity, in 2010 more than 50% of the world population lives in great urban centers instead of in the country. In 1950, this quota was 30%; while it will rise to 70% by 2050. The majority of these megalopolis are found in Countries with a low average income and where the health conditions are still precarious.
This momentous displacement of demographic weights has direct socio-economic consequences. The Industrial Revolution of the 19th Century, rendered the Europeans not only more numerous, but also richer. Europe, the United States and Canada produced together 32% of the world GDP at the beginning of the 19th Century. By 1950, this slice was considerably increased to 68% of the world production; but the reduction, which has been ongoing since the end of the last Century, is progressing with a rapidity without precedent; in 2003, the economic clout of the three regions had already dropped to 47%; by 2050, it should touch just 30%, a lower quota than that registered in 1812.
Within the middle of our Century, the major concentration of the so-called “middle class”, always the driving force of development, production and consumer, will live in those, which today, are considered emerging Countries, according to the assessment of the World Bank, by 2030, the number belonging to the middle class in those regions will be equal to 1.2 billion people (+200% compared to 2005).
In 2050, circa 30% of Canadians, Americans and Europeans will be more than 60 years old, a percentage which rises to 40% in Countries like Japan and South Korea. They will have, therefore, always larger portions of retired population and an always more reduced labour force. The case of South Korea is emblematic in this sense: even though the total population is foreseen to contract by about 9 percentage points within 2050 (from 48.3 million to 44 million), the population of working age will drop by 36% (from 33 million to 21 million) and the number of over-sixty year olds will increase by 150% (from 7.3 million to 18 million people). Europe will lose circa 24% of its labour force (about 120 million people) within the same date.
These dynamics will have, as is very evident, a profound impact on the economic growth and on the capacity to generate wealth, on the weight of the public debt – swollen by the health and social security expenses – and finally, on the capacity to promote technological innovation and invest in security and defence.
Against this, the vast area of the planet, today defined as “emerging” will experience phenomena of the opposite kind, characterized by the same intensity and rapidity. Over 70% of the growth of the world population from now until 2050 will concern just 24 Countries, all classified by the World Bank as “low-income”, that is an income per head estimated in 3,500 dollars. This prospect will concern, above all, the Arab world – Moslem, where many Countries of fragile economies will experience a demographic boom without precedent. In 1950, the overall population of Egypt, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey amounted to 242 million inhabitants. In 2009, the total had already risen to 886 million and will grow even further, by an additional 475 million.
The demographic evolution is an element susceptible to break down and re-build the entire paradigm of the International relations. During the Cold War, the strategic analysts dividing the planet into a “First World” of democratic, industrialized Countries, a “Second World” into socialist and communist Countries with prevalent industrialization and a “Third World” of developing Countries, with prevalently agricultural and mining economies. A photograph more faithful to reality, if filtered through the lens of the demographic change, today, would adversely affirm a First World of industrialized economies in a phase of rapid aging, localized in North America, Europe and on the Pacific ridge (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, in particular); a Second World of economies in rapid growth and with a sustainable mix of population, in terms of labour force and of average age (Brazil, Iran, Mexico, Thailand and Turkey); a Third World of Countries in very rapid demographic growth, but with poor and unstructured economies and often with weak central governments (Pakistan, Nigeria and Cambodia).
The demographic tsunami will produce macroscopic phenomena from the economic and social profile and from the point of view of international relations: further risk of a rapid decline of Europe and phenomena of strong social tension; massive emigration from Africa and Latin America.
It is easy to imagine, in this new configuration, how the linchpin of any paradigm of development whatsoever, will be exactly the Second World, not only for its consumer capacity of products coming from the First World, but also for the centrality in terms of security and international cooperation.
First and foremost there derives a statement of fact: the world system out of Bretton Woods and from the end of the 2nd W.W. can no longer be valid. The traditional mechanisms of governance which the world has known to date, no longer reflect the geopolitical, economic and demographic reality of the planet.
This is true, above all, for the G-8 which, not by chance, is already consolidating in the most suitable and coherent formula of G-20. But this must be true also per the principal military and security institutions at an international level. Let us take the case of the NATO, pending a new, crucial strategic revision. It is composed almost entirely by Countries the populations of which are aging and are inexorably decreasing. This does not represent only a limit in terms of operative employment, as we shall see; but also in terms of political and strategic credibility. Today, Afghanistan, the principal theatre of operative commitment for the Atlantic Alliance, has 28 million inhabitants. Within 2025, it will have 45 million and within 2050, 75 million. The equation is, therefore, elementary: if the overall strategy of the NATO takes account of the demographic evolution of the Country, it can count on an effective action of institution – building and civil reconstruction, which improves the lives of a very large number of new-born; vice versa, the international coalition committed today, in the difficult Afghan scenario, it will find itself having to reckon with an extremely young population grown up in malcontent.
The implications of the demographic trends on the security scenario are numerous. What must be underlined is that the transformation in course, unlike the baby-boom of the 50’s, is not transitory no occasional, but it is a structural evolution in the system. For example, the average age must be taken into consideration. Up to the beginning of the 20th Century, it was impossible to find a Country in the world with a median age above thirty. In 1950, this threshold moved to thirty-six. Today, 8 of the 16 West European Nations have a median age of forty; within 2050, 6 of them will reach fifty years. There are already 18 Countries in the world with a total population structurally in contraction; by 2050, the number of Countries will be 44 and the majority of them will be located in Europe.
From the point of view of socio-economic implications, such process will have three principal effects:
- a permanent contraction of the volumes of production and of the GDP, the growth rhythms of which cannot be sustained in the face of a constant diminution of the total population and the available labour force;
- with the middle aging of the population one observes a greater social stagnation, with a reluctant propensity to innovation and flexibility;
- older societies are naturally less inclined to change. This attitude will also influence the internal political scenes and on the attitude of the leadership. Phenomena like immigration and the multiplication of places and expressions of different faiths will be metabolized with greater intolerance and difficulty, if not, even rejection.
The consequences on the geopolitical and security scenarios can be synthesized as follows:
- the architectures of security which have operated in the International scenario since the end of the 2nd W.W. need to seriously rethink their mission and configuration. One refers to the Euro Community – Atlantic and to the role of the NATO, unsustainable in a context of scarce resources and a generalized aging of the population. It is necessary, therefore, to involve more dynamic partners in those administrative centers, who share objectives and values.
- in the weakest areas of the planet or in the presence of fragile States, the demographic pressure could represent the last element of destabilization or of collapse, with serious regional and global consequences. Certain of these Countries, in fact, are today, already in possession of nuclear arms (North Korea and Pakistan). In response to the threat of a growing social chaos, certain Countries could be tempted to turn drastically towards forms of more authoritative governments.
- in the course of the last two decades, we have seen the increase of conflicts of ethnic matrix in the developing Countries, relating also to a demographic divide between the different ethnic groups. Looking at the future prospects, 90% of the demographic boom will be concentrated, from now until 2050, precisely in those areas of the planet (Southern Asia, sub-Sahara Africa and the Arab world) in which the ethnic tensions – the religious ones already very high. One refers, for example, to the Mediterranean Basin and to the Israeli conflict – Palestinians. The demography will contribute to deeply change the geopolitics of the relations between the two peoples. The population growth for Israel was more intense between 1950 and 2005, while it will be clearly favourable to the Palestinians between 2005 and 2050; the proportion of the young population is extraordinarily higher among the Palestinians (46% of the total) than for Israel (28%); the over-population is, by now, an unsustainable phenomenon in the Palestinian territories, where density could reach a good 1,705 inhabitants per square kilometer, in 2050.
- in the industrialized world, the 20’s of the present century will be the so-called “turning point”, the moment in which the labour force will stop growing everywhere, in numerical terms (with the exception of the United States) wit serious economic consequences. The ratio between workers and pensioners will be definitively inverted, with consequences on the Public Accounts and Budgets of the States. In the developing world, in the meantime, the highest entry of young people, ever registered, into the work market will be seen. China will experience a delicate moment, since its last generation (the most consistent numerically) born in the 60’s, will begin to retire, with unpredictable effects on the coffers of the State.
- the reduction of the number of young people will make certain phenomena less socially acceptable, such as the employment of soldiers in war areas or for missions in high risk areas. Also, in the Countries in which the sense of patriotism is more distinct, the death of a young person will be experienced with greater preoccupation. It is this that the political scientist, Edward Luttwak defined “post-heroic war” or “to zero deaths”.
- the success of the liberal democracies in the last half century is, for the most part, due to their “soft power”, that is, to the capacity that has demonstrated to know how to affirm a dynamic and prosperous society. In the face of the change of the demographic paradigm and socio-economic stagnation of the West, the models of authoritarianism could become more attractive to the new generations and the Western politics, as a consequence, considered as a mere defence of privileges.
The demographic changes place us before radical political and social choices. In the near future, we will have to cope with rates of fertility near maximum, at the substitution level accepting demographic structures based on the model of the column, rather than that of the pyramid of age. On the whole, it is comfortable information, since some of us will live longer and the world population can stabilize itself. But the welfare systems will suffer the effects in a way beyond remedy, if for nothing else but for the fact that the pyramid model has always been their reference: in economies based on contributions and incomes, every generation must be more numerous than the previous one.
There exist, at least, four directing guidelines along which it is necessary to imagine interventions to contain relapses of this demographic evolution; they go from the National ambits to the management of the strategic international relations.
An adequate welfare and demographic policy seems to be the first, necessary and most important answer to stabilize the future of the market economies. Incentivize the birthrate and allow women to have a more active social and economic role – perfectly compatible with the maternity – are the preconditions for any model of social sustainability. An adequate management of the migratory phenomenon represents the second essential condition social cohesion and growth.
From the economic viewpoint, the access to the labour market for the young is a primary requisite for demographic sustainability, as are the definition of incentivizing mechanisms for longer active and professional lives.
From the political – diplomatic viewpoint, the community of the liberal democracies is called on to involve, more and more intensely, Countries with younger populations, with whom they can share values and objectives. The reinforcement of policies of cooperation and aid to development would, likewise, be considered a priority, to prevent a constant migratory hemorrhage from the regions subjected to stronger demographic pressures.
For the politician decision-makers and the military summits, instead, it will be fundamental to prepare themselves to manage a more generalized aversion to external military operations, given that the lives of the younger people will become an even more social and economic asset. The forces, instruments and the operations must, therefore, be modelled on the basis of such elements, through an even more massive use of military technology and a strengthening of the options relative to soft power and preventive diplomacy, in such a way that the war really becomes the very last option.