Photo by http://1.bp.blogspot.com/   From car-bombs to mass killings. The Mexican drug traffickers tend to act as an authentic counter-power, according to the alarm launched by President Calderon, while the FBI states that the drug cartels are more dangerous than the Al Qaeda. The bands, the tactics, the weapons, the territorial divisions, the objectives of the armed groups give the picture of the Mexican situation which, according to Guido Olimpio, carries a high risk of evolution with unprecedented alliances. In fact, in the criminal world, “never say never”. The Intelligence Services draw possible lines of development, above all, in light of the new military tactics of the cartels, whose economic ambitions could go beyond the traditional US market. The globalization and the economic crisis are two points in favour of crime. The narcos move rapidly, have fresh money and can invest and search for alliances. The Mexican Government observes, with attention, the systems employed by Italy in the fight against the mafias: confiscation and seizure of assets and joint action between the Investigative Police and the Intelligence, but it needs help and support from the International Community. And preferably, suggesting means other than the purely military ones.

With the car bomb that exploded at Ciudad Juarez, on the 15th July, and the threat of other attacks, Mexico has taken a further step in narco-terrorism, opening scenarios which closely resemble Colombia in the 80’s. For some experts the approach is premature and the incursions of the traffickers have only become more violent. On the contrary, some, comparing the present situation with that of the 90’s, claim that the picture is not as bleak.
The coming months will tell whether the chain of episodes – and actions – will turn in its trend, but certainly, the fight against the criminal organizations has entered a very acute phase, with a progressive militarization of the conflict. And not because of the intervention, in an anti-crime function, of the 50 thousand men of the Mexican Army – with not exactly successful results. Terror or not, it is beyond dispute that the narcos are often better armed than the soldiers, using guerrilla tactics, they have mobility, a high rate of fire and tend to establish a “real” control of the territory. And not only in an “economic” sense, with the exploitation of the area for the sale or passage of the drugs. The cartels aim to dominate a specific geographical area and to protect it with all the means at their disposal. Exactly how can a movement of insurgents do this? We cite two unsuspected sources. The Mexican President, Felipe Calderon has declared that the gangs seek to go beyond the drug trafficking racket and intend to establish their own power. The second appeared at the beginning of August, on the official site of the FBI and reads: “the cartels are more dangerous than Al Qaeda”.
In this period, the Director of Intelligence, Guillermo Valdes, revealed that since 2006, the victims of the clashes amount to 28 thousand, with 23% of this number in Ciudad Juarez alone. A higher figure than this has been furnished and confirms what is suspected by independent observers. In the same period, the law enforcements have seized 84 thousand firearms and 411 million dollars in cash, fruits of illegal activities. Starting from 2006, 963 gunfights between the law enforcements and bandits have been recorded. To have a parameter of comparison, we offer further data: in the month of July 2010 alone, there were 1,234 homicides. In distant Iraq – at June – there were 535 dead and it was considered one of the worst months.

The territory

Convergent evaluations of the DEA (United States Anti-drug Agency) of the FBI and the equivalent Mexican authorities believe that the battle is more bitter where territory control is in discussion. And they cite how, up to the summer of 2010, the clashes in Lower California decreased. There continue to be crimes, ambushes and disappearances, but at the border with California, the Sinaloa Cartel of Joaquim “El Chapo”, Guzman scored points in favour. The capture of Teodoro Simental, named El Teo, facilitated the encirclement maneuver of the ‘godfather’.
The picture is different in the State of Sonora. Guzman and his accomplice, Ismael Zambada, have intensified the operations against the Beltran Leyva and the Enrique Parra brothers, also known by the name of “Los Numeros”.
The fighting is particularly violent – with similar characteristics to those seen in Iraq – in the Saric and Caborca region, a few dozen miles from the frontier with Arizona. The Sinaloa militia had to work really hard to eliminate pockets of resistance held by a local bandit, supported by circa 300 men loyal to the Leyva. A deadly duel for both the drug traffic and the illegal immigrants directed to the United States. The tactic-strategic picture in this zone is ruthless: the law enforcement has suffered or witnessed the actions of the criminals, who are able to control the few paths of communication by taking possession of numerous ranches, transforming them into stations for the contraband. Those who lived there were forced to leave. In certain occasions – gunfights of the 1st and 30th July – the attitude of the Authorities seemed very weak and there were the dark shadows of the usual accusations of connivance.
The States of Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas and Coahuila are the other key points of this incredible front. Always according to the Mexican evaluations, the reason is that the groups are contending the route, with massacres and ambushes. The formations see, on the one side, Sinaloa supported by the Michoacana Family, by the Valencia brothers and by the so-called “civilian arm” of the Gulf Cartel. On the opposite barricade, the Los Zetas – broken away from the Gulf – the Leyva (but afflicted by internal divisions) and the Cartel of Juarez of the Carrillo Fuentes.
In May, a summit was held at Torreon, which sanctioned the split-up of the Los Zetas – headed by Heriberto Lazcano and Miguel Trevino Morales – from the Gulf Cartel, accompanied by an understanding for the direct supply of cocaine by the Colombians. The rebel Zetas, well-armed and better trained compared to the other groups, offered in exchange, the corridor which from Tamaulipas leads to Texas and smuggling routes in the Yucatan, Tabasco, Michoacán and Guerrero: lines of illegal traffic attacked by rivals who recognized – in the summer of 2010 – the leadership of Osiel Guilen, Eduardo Costilla Sanchez nominated “El Coss” and Ezequiel Cardenas, alias “Tony Tormenta”.
The Los Zetas, while suffering losses, conquered positions in Nuevo Leon where the Police is infiltrated by the gangs or, as it is said in slang “cartelized”, that is, taking sides with one group or another.
A suspect and an accusation – that of the bonds of secrecy – which reach the maximum summits of the State. In these first months of 2010, those of the Gulf Cartel have accused the Government of favouring the Sinaloa Cartel. A help which, on the basis of a scenario, should favour a sort of non-belligerent pact. But, at the end of July, the Government replied with the killing, in a gunfight, of Macho Coronel, ‘number three’ of Sinaloa and great manager of the amphetamine market. A hit which could – according to certain interpretations – spark off dissent in a rather compact reality like that guided by “El Chapo” Guzman. During the Coronel operations, the arm seized his computer: stored in the memory of the pc – it is said – are proofs of ties with the political world. Moreover, for a long time, Nacho lived in the Guadalajara zone in villas similar to palaces. The only precaution taken to avoid being noticed was that of moving with a reduced escort. Somewhat inadequate for a super-criminal at the top of the wanted list.
The game of the alliances is, however, susceptible to surprise. The victory of a group or, sometimes, a simple insult can change the order at local levels. On the 26th July 2010, for example, the massacre of six people found inside a vehicle announced the birth of the Cartel of the Sierra (Guerrero). As for others, the killers claimed that the slain were “thieves and rapists”. It is impossible to verify these versions. In some places the cartels, besides committing crimes, have imposed their own order with the sole objective of trafficking without annoyances. In the State of Michoacán, the Family, which claims to be inspired by the sacred scriptures, presents itself as champion of the citizens. But its assassins, forced by the bosses to read the Bible, mutilate and behead their fellow creatures.
Furthermore, the ambitions of small bosses, often backed by men who stop at nothing, have the strength to alter the consolidated “status quo”. And, finally, without forgetting the freedom of movement that the young gangs have earned, transformed into cannon fodder of the narcos. Gangs such as the “Aztecas” (with the Barrio Aztecas in North America) and the “Los Artistas Asesinos” settle their scores in parallel campaigns in the Mexican cities – and, at time, American cities – or in the prisons, which continue to be in the hands of the criminals. Many homicides are committed not by orders of the ‘godfathers’, but following the decisions of young hotheads. A crime does not always have a precise reason. And this represents the measure of the Mexican drift.

Impunity

President Felipe Calderon designated the fight against crime as the central point of his administration and decided to use the Army. The results were contained and temporary. More reliable than the Police – however, not in all regions – the soldiers have faced the narcos in the open field. But the fundamental problem remains that of administering justice, to prepare trials and to reach certain and reliable sentences. Let us examine the period of December 2006 to September 2009: 226,667 persons were arrested for crimes connected to drugs. Well, only a quarter were incriminated and barely 15% of these cases came to a verdict. Let us look “inside” Ciudad Juarez, the dead city. In 2009, there were 2,600 crimes, but the Police prepared scarcely 93 cases. For the others, no real investigation. In Lower California 33,000 arrested, of which 24,000 were released. At Sinaloa, one of the bloodiest zones, 9,700 arrested and 5,606 liberated. In the Tamaulipas region, 3,600 captured, 2,083 at large.
The data relative to the affiliation of the suspects who finished in prison is also interesting. In the period of December 2006 to the 16th July 2010, 38% of those arrested belonged to the Gulf Cartel, 32% to the Michoacana Family, 31.7% to Sinaloa and 4% to the smallest cartel of Sinaloa.
Some releases came about through lack of proof or for the difficulty in preparing the trials – situations which have benefited both the labourers and persons of a certain importance. The local press cited the case of Osvaldo Munoz El Gonzo. The Police maintained that he was connected to 40 homicides: one year later he had not been incriminated and was released. The ‘fate’ of Juan Pablo Castello was no different, “approaching” 28 assassinations, he enjoys his freedom.


Arms and tactics

Imitating what has already happened in Colombia, the narcos have launched a clamorous challenge to the Authorities by using car bombs. On the 15th July 2010, a vehicle exploded in a street of Ciudad Juarez: there were 4 victims. An action attributed to the “La Linea” bandits, armed branch of the Juarez Cartel. The tactics they used were incredible. The narcos kidnapped a man, seriously wounding him and dressed him in a police uniform. Some minutes later the man was abandoned on the side of the road. The criminals, with an anonymous telephone call, notified a nearby police station. When help and police rushed to the scene, the narcos activated the explosive hidden in the vehicle. Afterwards, the bomb disposal experts found that the bomb was composed of civil explosives robbed in a mine and from a mobile phone. Subsequent appraisals established that the device was identical to that used in 1994 in an attack in the Federal District, an attack claimed – according to the Authorities – by Procup, an extreme left movement.
The use of the car bomb could signal the desire of the narcos to increase the impact of the operations against the forces of law and order. The vehicles – in just the same way as happened in the Middle East, but also in Europe – can become explosive rams to devastate fixed stations or to strike military convoys. Furthermore, they spread terror throughout the population, since it is clear that they are not “selective” arms. A deflagration in an inhabited zone would risk disastrous consequences. And this is what happened in Colombia in the 80’s.
The presumed motive for the attack is also significant. The narco-terrorists wanted to punish the Police accused of supporting the rivals of the Sinaloa. And with the intention to increase the effect of an unprecedented attack, the criminals have turned to the United States Authorities in order that they investigate the connection between Sinaloa and the Police. As already mentioned, the attack was organized by the “La Linea” structure, which acts on the orders of the Carrillo Fuentes Family at the summit of the Juarez Cartel. The Americans do not exclude the possibility that this latter formation wants to drag the United States into the conflict. It should be remembered that in March a band connected to the “Linea”, the Aztecas, killed three employees of the United States Consulate of Ciudad Juarez – a diplomatic seat which had become a real target: in fact, it was closed for a number of days after the car bomb explosion.
The appearance of the car traps was preceded by the indiscriminate use of grenades. In 2009 alone, there were 72 attacks with hand-grenades and since 2007, 5,800 have been seized. 90% of them date back to the civil conflicts fought in Central America and, therefore, are more than 20 years old. Under the Reagan and Bush Senior Administrations, the United States supplied an impressive amount of stock to friendly Countries. In particular, to the “popolare” M67: in Salvador alone, in the period 1980-93, they received a good 266 thousand grenades. Today, they may be bought on the black market for prices oscillating between 100 and 150 dollars. In an effort to get them out of criminal hands, the Authorities have offered as much as 200 dollars for each grenade handed in.
The hand grenades are part of, together with the Kalashnikov, the standard equipment of the militias under the command of the cartels. The grenades are thrown against police vehicles and in attacks on barracks or in gunfights between bands. The arms traffickers in Guatemala furnish them with the 40 millimeter grenades and, always of Central American origin, the numerous RPG, fired against armoured vehicles. Regarding firearms – as was illustrated in a preceding article in Gnosis – the United States remains the primary source. An approximate calculation estimates 20 thousand illegal firearms smuggled to Mexico from the United States each year. A market of 20 million dollars, with affordable prices considering the availability of narcos cash: a Kalashnikov costs around 1,200 dollars, a brand new pistol about 1,000 dollars. In the numerous confiscations conducted by the Army, there are many American AR15(s) and the feared Barretts – powerful rifles which are able to perforate armoured vehicles. Another particular which gives the idea of these clashes is the passion of the narcos for the rotating drum magazine of 27 cartridges for their assault rifles. Sometimes they are installed in couples. The shooters – not very precise – do not want to run the risk of remaining without bullets. And, in fact, the Army has seized hundreds of rotating drum magazines.
The workshops of the cartels have worked swiftly to protect their vehicles. Many are armoured by professional workshops, others modified by mechanics hired ad hoc. In the rear of the pick up cabin and Suv, armoured “shells” have been created in which are positioned chosen marksmen. Barretts and machine guns are frequently installed. There are many requests for vehicles with slide-back roofs to facilitate the use of the arms.
During the last two years, especially in the frontier states, the criminals have begun to move in very large convoys. Dozens of vehicles, full of heavily armed killers, who attack the places held by rival clans and, at times, engage in shoot-outs with the Army. Three episodes which happened between May and July showed exactly what the narcos are capable of. In May, a group of Los Zetas launched an attack using a homemade armoured lorry. The driver’s cabin was protected, as were the sides and wheels – a vehicle similar to those used in Iraq and by the Sri Lanka troops: According to the images diffused on the Internet, the vehicle did not pass its baptism of fire. The “monster” was first damaged and then set on fire. On the blackened body of the vehicle was left a relative narco message deriding the constructors of the “beast”.
The scenario verified at the end of July in the zone of Saric and Tubutama near the Arizona border was quite different. On two occasions, armed convoys of Sinaloa, supported by allied groups, infiltrated a territory held by El Gilo del Cid, an ally of the Leyva, head of a formation of circa 300 men. Although besieged and with reduced provisions, El Gilo proved to be a formidable opponent. Well informed on enemy movements, he deployed his militias on small hills on the sides of the State Highway and, therefore, by surprise, he was able to block the long Sinaloa convoy: barricaded by vehicles at the head and tail of the convoy, the maneuvers of the enemy were impeded. At this point, El Gilo’s men opened fire and annihilated their rivals. The official balance of victims was 20, but rumours say that the dead were more than double. At the end of July, Sinaloa took their revenge, moving their men with greater caution and avoiding the roads guarded by the sentries of the local boss. The fate of El Gilo is uncertain: he may have been killed.
Other examples of how the narcos resort to mobile columns was seen at Ciudad Valles, on the 30th July. A formation of eight vehicles – Suv and cross-country vehicles – entered the city around 18:00 hours. They launched a police hunt: they killed seven police, including some others inside a small office. Having completed the massacre, the caravan of death – perhaps tied to the Los Zetas – moved on without losses.
Starting from the end of 2009, the criminal bands have launched the campaign of the blocks. With simultaneous actions, small nuclei take possession of buses and lorries with which they create barriers along the main arteries. The blitz serve as diversions, as a display of force, or to impede the flow of reinforcements in zones where the narcos are about to strike. The strategy of blocks was used, in the past, by the Iraqi quaedists, but also, in 2006, by the “Primero comando de la capital”, one of the most infamous gangs of Rio del Janeiro.
US Intelligence information –as yet, unconfirmed by precise data – does not exclude that the crossover to narco-terror coincides with contacts between the cartels and elements who have served in armed or guerrilla formations. There are suspicions about former soldiers of the Special Serbian Forces – their presence in South America is a solid fact – Americans, Russians and also Middle Orientals. The Los Zetas – this is an element ascertained by investigations - avail themselves of the veterans of the Guatemalan Civil War, the feared kaybiles. The Mexican Authorities affirm that the “juvenile nursery” of the Los Zetas is, in fact, Guatemala. But recently, the killers have begun to recruit further afield, also in the Los Angeles region. Obviously, they cannot be defined as war professionals, but they have the double advantage of having the United States nationality and to be in a hurry to “grow”. For this, they are not afraid to be employed as killers.
A repetition of what happened in the Laredo area of Texas, where the young killers are a well rooted reality. They sleep in America; kill in Mexico and return home to sleep. Analyses of certain fights have enabled the assessment of modus operandi, arms and techniques of the narcos:

a) many wear the same type of shoes: a way of making themselves recognized during the observation phase;
b) signals of identification: letters or X on the windows of the cars, coloured stripes tied on the arm. Situations already seen in conflicts (Thailand, The Philippines) where rival forces are in contrast, but belong to the same entity;
c) use of bullet proof bodices and ample ammunition pouches for a large number of magazines. At times, they are marked with the letters of the cartel to which they belong (Gdf, Family, Zetas). They often wear camouflage or dark uniforms, robbed from the police or purchased;
d) many unexploded bullets and half full magazines have been found: this points to bad ammunition, bad functioning of the arms and scarce training;
e) large waste of ammunition, almost to saturate a target. This explains the recourse to the drum cartridge magazines;
f) prolonged gun battles: in certain situations, the bandits resort to hit and run exchanges, but if the circumstances require, they can remain in the field for extended periods;
g) the assault rifles, at times, have “homemade” wooden butts: perhaps the arms were smuggles without butts, to better hide them, or maybe because they had been damaged;
h) constant presence of radio apparatuses for contact between the firing groups;
i) type of weapons: Ak 47, M4, M16, assault rifles equipped with 40 mm grenade launchers, G3, Barretts, sniper rifles, M1911 pistols and Beretta 92, few revolvers (they are not useful in prolonged gun fights)


Communications

Another sector where the bosses seek external help is that of communications. Several organizations have bought technology and have hired technicians to create a radio network able to maintain contacts also those of long distance. In this way, the bosses have a very precise control over the large shipments of cocaine, marijuana and amphetamines.
To liken the behaviour of the bandits to that of the subversive formations, there is the systematic campaign to silence or condition the Press. The narcos, through trusted persons, feed their communication. The first platform is that of the Internet: messages, communiqués and videos – to claim attacks or announce initiatives – are diffused on the blogs, sites and YouTube. Therefore, there is the more rustic communication of the posters and banners, hung from bridges – at times, together with corpses – on the walls of places that have been attacked, or gigantic leaflets left beside the bodies of victims. But alongside of this is the intimidation of reporters: in 2010 alone, a dozen people have been killed. In July, a commander of the Sinaloa cartel seized four journalists to force a TV station to broadcast a proclamation.
The attempt to condition the freedom of the Press represents a very serious fact and strong political implications. And, unfortunately, it is not only the traffickers who threaten courageous journalists, but also, in some cities, exponents in uniform. Perhaps, because they are in collusion with the criminals or because they do not appreciate certain excesses of the fight against the narco-traffic being made public. The emergency, at times, pushes the Army and the Police to evident violations.
For the future, the analysts expect new initiatives by the gangs in the communications sector. With arms they silence who they wish, with the mass media they impose their own “truth” and, even make propaganda – no different from that set up by the quaedists in the Middle East.
In the middle of the spring campaign, the kidnapping of a pre-eminent person took place. On the 15th March, Diego Fernadez de Cevallos disappeared – a prestigious politician, already candidate for the presidency and former President of the Senate. The personage had no escort – a necessity in Mexico for those who are rich – however, he had had a microchip implanted beneath the skin. In case of his disappearance, he would have been able to signal his whereabouts. A system which various societies offer at affordable prices. But his well-informed kidnappers removed the “bug” and started negotiations with a clever communications strategy. A ransom request was received by the family – of figures oscillating between 30 and 50 million dollars – accompanied by a photograph of Don Diego blindfolded. There was also a written text which excited the interest of the investigators: in certain passages of the letter, the author had used terms of revolutionary groups of a Marxist matrix. This indicated a political kidnapping, or collusion between the kidnappers and extremists, a well-known phenomenon also in other countries.
Before the killing of Nacho Coronel, rumours went about that de Cevallos had finished in the hands of the narcos, who wanted to exchange him for a boss kept in secret detention by the Police. It was not so, but the hypothesis circulated in certain environments, represented a confirmation of the fear of terrorist action on the part of the cartels.


The contagion

The necessity of carving out new markets, the direct supplying of cocaine, the recruitment of new “soldiers” for the bands and the enormous financial availability push the cartels to enlarge their area of influence. And the consequences are serious. It is enough to look at the Salvador-Honduras-Guatemala triangle where different organizations – with Sinaloa and Los Zetas in the lead – have formidable points of support. A dramatic parameter which permits measuring the violence is the rate of homicides with respect to the population. Let us look at it in synthesis: Mexico has 14 homicides for each 100 thousand residents. In the triangle, it is four times as many. In Salvador alone, an increase of killings was registered at 37%, with a rate of 71 crimes each 100 thousand inhabitants. Not all the episodes are ascribable to the narcos phenomenon, but a good part is related. In a direct way (affiliates to the cartels) or indirect (the different gangs that ill-treat the immigrants going to the North and collaborate with the Mexicans).
As pointed out previously, there is the arms chain, which appears inexhaustible. On these dealings – United States sources claim – other alliances have been created with the cartels that open their “offices” in the neighbouring States, from Panama to Guatemala. Between 275 and 300 tons of cocaine go from Guatemala to the United States each year. A good seven provinces that compose this troubled Country are threatened and the impunity of criminals, at times embarrassing, does not bode well.
The coasts of Guatemala and those of Mexico remain the preferred landing place of the famous semi-submarines of the coca. Boats that skim the surface of the water at speeds of six-eight knots, constructed in fiber, able to transport 10 to 12 tons of powder from Colombia (or Ecuador). After the boom of 2008-2009, the phenomenon underwent a decrease: at least, this is the evaluation of the US Coast Guards. There are various reasons. The interdiction controls have increased, with the recourse to long-range air patrolling – the only efficient method. And also the Intelligence activities have grown at the departure points, with the Colombians, Americans and Ecuadorians very much committed in this type of mission.
A technical pause, tied to the development of new transport means is not precluded. In fact, at the end of June, the Ecuador Police and the DEA found, in a cove, the first real submarine of the narcos. Thirty meters long, powered by two motors (one diesel and the other electric) equipped with periscope and sophisticated technology and on the eve of its launch. According to technical experts, it would have been able to navigate at, at least, six meters below the surface. Close by, there was an encampment able to accommodate around 50 people, probably the workers in charge of the construction. It is possible that this type of unit is used for round- trips. A significant change from the semi-subs which are sunk after the cocaine has been unloaded.
The Colombian Navy suspect that the construction of the boats are, in part, ascribable to elements of the Farc, the Marxist guerrillas extensively involved in the smuggling of cocaine.
In the organized crime classification, the Mexicans have jumped from the 7th to 5th place, a promotion tied to the progressive expansion of their activities. There are not only drugs in their empire, but piracy of DVDs, clandestine Chinese and Haitians, oil, economic activities tied to the world of tourism and of large business. The Mexicans have increased contacts with sister crime organizations. In the United States, they have reinforced bonds with local and regional groups. Some, which are totally North American –the city gangs – and others of Latin extraction, like the M (Mexican mafia) and the Maras of Central America. In Europe, relations with the mafias of the East continue to be reported, in particular, Russian and Serbian. And in the foreign policy of the cartels, a place is reserved also for contacts with the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta. The investigation of 2008 revealed very clearly, how the narcos of the Gulf had created a triangle with Italian criminals active both in the United States and along the Peninsula for the sale of cocaine. The analysts remain cautious on the ability of the cartels to enlarge their range of action. The numbers – consistency, money, men – indicate a further enlargement. Even if, as often happens, it will be deciphered only when it is in an advanced phase. However, the fratricide war could constitute an obstacle.


Conclusion

The Mexican narco-war continues to be seen as an almost taken for granted phenomenon and, however, tied to the Central American regional theatre. But with their growing military capacity and the flashes of terrorism, the cartels are now being observed through different lenses. If this trend really gets underway, it is inevitable that the narcos will try to improve means and techniques. To do this, they will have to go further afield to specialist and professionals. In the last year, American conservative environments have also hypothesized pacts between traffickers and Islamic movements, from Hezbollah to Al Qaeda, with the objective of infiltrating elements through the US borders. In reality, there have been contacts, but tied only to the traffic of drugs. The Hezbollah in the Caribbean area, presumably affiliated to “Al Qaeda in the Maghreb” have trafficked in the sub-Saharan. In any event, the Mexicans were not involved, but rather, they were their South American competitors.
In the world of crime, however, “never say never”. And therefore, for the Intelligence Services, it is important to monitor closely the lines of development. Especially if the car bomb becomes an habitual weapon for the cartels and if economic ambitions go beyond the traditional US market.
Globalization and the economic crisis are two points in favour of crime. The narcos move rapidly, they have fresh money and they can invest and seek alliances. A recent analysis of the Wall Street Journal underlined how the great crime networks have helped the Euro raking banknotes of 200 and 500.
This is by way of saying that, without wanting necessarily to internationalize a phenomenon that has distant origins, the International Community must help Mexico – suggesting, in the meanwhile, methods other than the purely military ones. The Mexican look attentively at the systems employed by Italy in the fight against the mafia: confiscation and seizure of assets, combined actions of Intelligence and Investigative Police. In the period 2009-2010, Mexico asked for advice and advice was given. It is clear, however, that the Authorities must open up to a greater extent and invest more in the fight against collusion. The opening of liaison offices – providing that we have a real exchange – is a small, albeit significant contribution. Mexico, furthermore, must commit itself to gain the confidence of the citizens. And, therefore, Justice must be made to function: it is useless to carry out raids, if the criminals do not face a trial. Connected to this point is the behaviour of who must make the law respected: ambiguity and abetment cannot be tolerated. The Mexican Authorities could, for example, dedicate greater resources in the investigations on the “feminicide” of Ciudad Juarez, where dozens of women have been murdered by killers who have remain unknown. Crimes where drugs are very little involved, but which weigh on a social fabric that is always more skeptical as to what the State can do.
We have cited this case only to recall how the Mexican crisis presents different aspects, where it does not always count who has the most powerful rifle. Resources are needed to compete with those of the criminals. The Intelligence is needed to understand where the enemy steals consensus: President Calderon himself has admitted that his Government “does not know how to solve the war against the narcos”. The Intelligence is needed to understand if and when a criminal reality assumes subversive aspects, dangerous both for the area where it operates and for other countries. The cartels can limit the battle to their territory, but it would be no surprise if they wanted to make their huge treasure yield even more by investing in Europe. Mexico, after all, is not that far away.