The evolution of relations between Europe and Russia can be better understood in the context of a triangle that involves also, with full rights, the United States. One must start, in fact, from an observation of fact: of the 27 Member Countries of the EU, a good 21 are, at the same time, members of the NATO, which creates a direct security connection with Washington even if one wanted to take into consideration only the “Eurasiatic” side of the triangle. Furthermore, it is evident that Russia itself looks at the European questions in strict connection with the American policies, from the anti-missile system to the great energy infrastructure. Finally, it is no longer possible (if ever it was) to isolate the “old continent” from what happens beyond its borders: one thinks of the impact of the economic crisis on the world redistribution of power, of the Iranian nuclear programme, of the tie between the Afghan mission and the evolution of the entire Central Asia. All this forces us to evaluate the relations with Russia from a fully triangular point of view.

The structural dilemmas of the Europe-Russia relations

It is an objective fact that between Europe and the Federation of Russia, relations of interdependence have grown, in recent years. After the first post-Soviet phase – coinciding with the Boris Eltsin period – in which the axis, by far the most prevalent, was that between Moscow and Washington, the years of Vladimir Putin have witnessed a much greater activism on an international level and the determination to get back into the European games. This new attitude has been very well synthesized by certain analysts as a Russian choice of a revisionist type on the old continent, whereas Moscow, instead, would be very much more favourable to the status quo on the global level (1) (recognizing the limits of its own influence). If it were so, we would be facing a direct challenge, above all, for the Europeans, although with it, it presents considerable opportunities.
The well known fundamental dilemma is that a truly common European position has still not emerged. The interdependence is perceived as a constraint at high risk by the newest Members of the central-eastern Countries, and, instead, as a geopolitical reality - to exploit to the best - by Countries like Germany and Italy. It cannot be denied that the realization of great infrastructural systems like the “North Stream (in the Baltic) and “South Stream” (in the Black Sea) tend to consolidate relations of energy interdependence, with vast economic effects and, in the final analysis, of security.
The EU, as such, obviously tends to reason from the viewpoint of its Neighbourhood Policy, that is, through the typical instrument of the Partnership Agreements, but is not able to apply this logic, in full, in a vital sector such as energy. In its turn, the absence of a strong intra-European coordination confers upon Russia an extraordinary negotiating leverage to utilize, starting from the “fait accompli” of the agreements established, in particular, by Gazprom.
The role of Russia as crucial energy supplier – but also as an economic actor that has a certain penetration in Europe – has, indeed, intensified one of asymmetries of the transatlantic relationship: some European Countries have developed such close ties of interdependence with Moscow as to consider the Russian Federation as a protagonist of the “Eurasian” macro-region; on the contrary, the United States sees in the Russia of Putin and Medvedev a possible partner – albeit rather problematic – only in particular sectors of action. Essentially – for Washington, the collaboration is much more selective – no matter who sits in the Oval Office and whatever the tone was of the last discussion of President Medvedev or Prime Minister Putin.
Given these fundamental considerations, it is undoubted that the armed clashes between Russia and Georgia in the summer of 2008 left a mark, despite the European efforts to rapidly overcome the most critical phase without ever interrupting contact: the Russian Federation had used military force against a sovereign Country, without any international sanction. Moscow has systematically compared its intervention in Georgia to that of the NATO Kosovo-Serbia, describing both as interference for the protection of the minorities, which it considered seriously threatened. The principle objective of this parallel for Russia seems to be, apart from justifying their own action, obviously, that of pushing the West (read NATO) to make a sort of historical mea culpa. To accept this equivalence would mean, in practice, to restart from a new balance, less advantageous for the West. Furthermore, that a certain revisionism is making a breach also between the Europeans who are more traditionally “Atlanticists”, seems undeniable, if one thinks that even Javier Solana – former Secretary General of the NATO, as well as first High Representative for the Foreign Policy and Security of the EU – has recently declared that some possibilities of better relations with Russia were not seized and this was the fault of the West (2) .
Essentially, the Russian recourse to force against Georgia – even apart from the Georgian co-responsibility, which the EU expressly recognized - transformed one of the “frozen conflicts” into an open military clash, and this could not but have a massive impact on the European perception of the relations with Moscow. In fact, the enormous risk for the Europeans is that of the possibility of having to “militarize”, to some extent, the entire system of the Neighbourhood Policy, while it is clear that the comparative advantage of the Union lies in the economic prosperity and in the capacity of attraction of its liberal-democratic model.
The worst worries of the summer of 2008 seem to be dispelled, in the hope that Moscow really considers the Georgian intervention as an exception or an accident on the road from which they can learn a lesson in prudence. And one can say that the medium term effect of that crisis has been, substantially, to crystallize the pre-existing positions, rather than radically change them: Russia remains strongly “sovereignistic” in its vision of the questions of security of its own borders, the United States look with diffidence at the Russian foreign policy, but are disposed to collaborate pragmatically, and finally, among the Europeans, all the nuances in terms of perception of the risks and of the opportunities persist.
The situation is considerably complicated by the fact that the entire post 1989 history interpretation (or post 1991) is not shared, at all, in Europe: a common “narrative” is lacking, and therefore, a diplomatic, economic and security structure, which everyone wishes to consider stable and satisfactory (3) . Or, at least, this is the image that, often, one wants to convey to Moscow, given that a vicious circle has been created whereby the protests of the post 1991 balances seem to strengthen the internal popularity of the Russian Government. We shall return to this internal dimension in the conclusive section; in the meantime, it must be underlined how the Eastern enlargement of the European Union has incorporated, so to speak, also all the different perceptions of the rift that we call “1989”. The Baltic Countries and, at least, certain members of the former Warsaw Pact do not share the rather “relaxed” vision of the security questions along a vast zone of contact with the Russian Federation which, instead, prevails between the old members of the EU. On its part, the leadership of the Putin-Medvedev era has, indeed, a “European vocation”, but certainly not in terms of passive acceptance of the modus operandi typical of the EU, but rather in terms of participation as a great power in the creation of new rules in the old “enlarged” continent.
A confirmation that the problem of the rules of the game is still unresolved comes from the persistent difficulty in signing the now notorious “Energy Charter” prepared by the EU, but also in reaching the objective of having Russia enter the World Organization of Commerce (WTO). These limitations are very serious from a European point of view, because it is in this very system of agreements and regulated exchanges that the EU enjoys a higher International profile and, consequently, greater influence. In the absence of a full Russian inclusion in the governance framework preferred by Europe, Brussels has, in the meantime, completed the range of “neighbour” Countries covered by formalized policies, with the launching of the “Eastern Partnership” in May, 2009. With this package of rather flexible proposals of cooperation – for now, all to be tested on a practical level – the intertwining between the areas of direct Russian interests and the external projection of the EU has become quite clear (4) .
It is no accident, in a situation that remains fairly fluid along the Euro-Russian borders (also because of the official line of the NATO, which remains that of the “open door”, notwithstanding the freezing of the Ukrainian and Georgian candidacies), that for some months now, the insistence with which the Russian Government has requested to re-discuss the overall picture of the Pan-European balances, has increased.
At the end of November, the Russian Government published the first draft of a text for a new “Treaty of European Security” (5) , which renders more concrete the extremely vague proposals already put forward before the Georgian war of 2008, and subsequently resumed in a series of interventions, above all, by the President Medvedev. Essentially, the document aims to raise a crucial problem: the lack of co-decision (a pessimist would say “of a Russian power of veto”) on possible situations of crisis in the Pan-European area (defined in the widest possible way, as in the first years of the 90’s: that is, from Vancouver to Vladivostok). The proposed agreement expressly wishes to incorporate all the existing organizations, i.e. naturally the NATO, but also the same OSCE, which today, is the only Pan-European security organization. It is known, however, that the OSCE was divest of almost all its “hard” security dimension, and that NATO has, in fact, adopted a specie of political self-legitimization – although not fully legal - in occasion of the operations in Kosovo and Serbia of 1999. It is precisely this last passage that constitutes the bone of contention for the Russians.
On such a background, the proposal seems to want to repeat, in essence, the principles of the Paris Charter, which in 1990, opened the path to the creation of the OSCE (transforming, in 1995, the old CSCE inherited from the 70’s), but this time, from a position of greater contractual strength for Russia. A new Treaty could, in fact, “photograph” the present geopolitical situation, sanctioning, in this way, also a direct Russian military presence in the Georgian enclaves (Abkazia and Southern Ossezia) together with the failure to resolve the other “frozen conflict” in Moldova (with the presence of Russian forces in the separatist region of Transnistria).
Even clearer is the attempt to block any further enlargement both of the NATO and of the EU, given that Moscow would, without fail, add to the agenda, as a discussion of “principle”, any possibilities of new accession, sustaining that this would alter the continental geopolitical picture; for Russia, it would be a kind of right of vote (if not even of veto) of the fundamental decisions of the two historic organizations from which it is excluded.
On the other side, it is not easy for the Western Countries to completely ignore the hypothesis of re-discussing the general principles of the Pan-European security. Very probably, we are, therefore, at the beginnings of a discussion that will tend, however, not to be completely interrupted; the French President, Sarkozy, was the first to openly express a generic interest for the possibility, though without taking any substantial commitment. But it is clear right now that the fundamental problem is: up to what point can be accepted a Russian right of formal interference in the decisions of a real alliance of the classical type like the NATO. In reality, those who observe that NATO is transformed into a strange hybrid are not wrong: it has actually carried out certain functions that go far beyond those typical of a purely defensive alliance, as is, without doubt, the case of the Afghan mission, despite its roots in Art. 5. of the North Atlantic Treaty. On the other hand, looking just beyond the official statements, Russia objects to the expansion of the functions of NATO, not certainly to protect international rights, and neither to delimit the role of the old alliance to the European Continent. It has more specific scopes: block further enlargements and limit the political and military weight of any possible American guided coalition centered on the NATO.
The proposal of a new Pan-European Treaty forces, therefore, the Europeans to show their cards, i.e. in the first place, their own vision of the trans-Atlantic relationship in a moment when, frankly, such vision is rather blurred or, at least, uncertain. And, not by coincidence, in the decisive months for the updated drafting of the Concept of Security to be formalized at the end of 2010.
The hypothesis of a Treaty, however, highlights also another fundamental problem, this time, between the Russian and EU vision: whereas Moscow insists on the principle of non-interference, based on the traditional concept of sovereignty, the EU adopts a “mixed” conception of security, which also involves a systematic interference in domestic affairs (at least with respect to possible violations of fundamental rights). That is, while the Russian proposal aims at a re-edition of the old collective security (with great emphasis on the territorial questions), the majority of the Europeans is decidedly more interested to develop a coordination of the policies of security in sectors like anti-terrorism, or the fight against piracy and organized crime. And, inevitably, such an activity of coordination presupposes a high degree of reciprocal trust, with abundant exchange of information and close links between judicial authorities and the police.
The extent to which a more massive employment of military force is planned in Europe, it is done, however, in reference to peace keeping and stabilization missions, but in this case the tendency is to look towards the United States as a crucial partner – if not necessarily – in every occasion. As is known, the American Forces, in reality, supply a truly common “operative system” for the major international operations: from logistics to communications, as well as, the doctrines of the employment of the forces – which does not always mean perfect coordination or absence of friction, as Afghanistan demonstrates every day, but certainly it implies a rooted habit of cooperation.
If all this is held in consideration, NATO, however, remains the best choice with respect to a series of ad hoc agreements for each single mission. Without denying its limitations and defects: principally, the financing system and the decisional mechanisms, beyond the mandate subordinated to a further legitimacy – that of UNO – when the alliance acts “out of area”.
In conclusion, the Russian proposal of a new Treaty remains useful as a possible frame work of general reference, but then, it is hard to see how it is preferable to the already tested OSCE:
In extreme synthesis, the Russian initiative appears, today, to be a shrewd move in tactical terms (also because it was at low cost for whoever launched it), but with little probability of success.


The America factor: the Obama Administration and the (re)opened dossier

The Obama Administration has launched a policy based on the concept of a “reset” dei rapporti con Mosca: una sorta di apertura di credito intesa, in primo luogo, a rimarginare le ferite alla fiducia reciproca inferte dalla crisi georgiana dell’estate 2008. of relations with Moscow: a kind of credit agreement, primarily, to close the wounds inflicted on the reciprocal trust by the Georgian crisis of the summer, 2008.
The first concrete steps in this direction have been configured as a possible exchange: the suspension of the anti-missile defence project in the Czech Republic and Poland, in exchange for a more active Russian collaboration on the Iranian nuclear dossier. The existence of such a direct proposal of exchange was, understandably, denied at the official level (principally by Washington), but it is, however, an important test of the real wish of Moscow to identify and pursue shared interests.
Perhaps, it is still too soon to draw conclusions, but meanwhile, Washington has had a partial afterthought in the management of the anti-missile programme, sending, in autumn, the Vice-President Biden to reassure the Czech and Polish Governments with the promise to involve them, however, in a more reduced system of anti-missile defence.
These contrasting pressures on the Obama Administration reflect, in practice, a structural limitation to the efforts of a “reset”:the improvement of relations with Moscow cannot be realized at the expense of the ties with old and new alliances in Europe, something which would naturally risk weakening the American position on the Continent.
Also, coinciding with the missile issue, a debate on the allied guarantees has been re-opened – i.e. in the first place, American – embodied in the Art. 5. Of the North Atlantic Treaty: a debate occasioned also by the revision of the Strategic Concept, as noted. Some of the hearings held at the American Senate, in recent months, with the former Secretary of State, Mrs. Albright (who presently presides over the Commission of experts for a first reconnaissance of a new document) show that the principal preoccupations in the American Congress are focused, precisely, on the fundamental guarantee of territorial integrity as the old “cuore” of the covenant relationship (6) . This, above all, in light of the sensitivity towards the Central-Eastern European Members: an attitude that recalls the first phase of the post cold-war enlargement, with the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, when the discussion was mainly on the Art. 5, rather than on a generic global role of NATO. In short, it is clear that the events of summer, 2008, and in general, the new Russian assertiveness, have again moved the axis of political attention of Washington onto fundamental questions of security in Europe. But it must be recognized that there is, on the one hand, certain incoherence between this drive towards a greater American activism on the Continent, and on the other, the phase of reduction of international commitments that the Obama Administration is pursuing in many strategic theatres.
As was well synthesized by Ivan Krastev (who has thoroughly studied the Russian leadership), Washington and Moscow probably do not have common dreams and objectives (i.e. they do not share a vision of the world), but they have certain important preoccupations in common, starting from the role of China and of the penetration of radical Islamism (7) . The objective of the non-proliferation of arms of mass destruction could most likely be added in which, not by accident, some progress is being registered with the conclusion of a bilateral Treaty on the strategic nuclear arms which substitutes the “START”. Obviously, to this is indirectly linked also the American effort to actively involve Moscow in putting the Iranian nuclear programme under control and, with different methods, the North Korean one.
This, perhaps, might not be an unshakeable base for a partnership without limitations – which is confirmed by the above mentioned hypothesis of a “selective” relationship on individual issues – but, at least, it allows keeping eventual mishaps along the path and controversial questions under control.


Options and limitations: European choices, Russian realities and world trends

The Russian political system determines, to a large extent, the way in which the International projections of the Country take shape. This political system still remains a long way from the liberal democracy and the European models, continuing to suffer from “identity” problems, as well as of concrete interests that only in part coincide with European ones. Indeed, it is fed by a kind nationalist frustration which continues to allow the ruling élite to manage the populist consensus.
It is not necessary to believe in a direct and automatic correlation between the internal regime and foreign policy, to see many shadows in the way in which the Russian leadership manages international affairs.
There seems to be a constant temptation – although not a definitive and unambiguous choice – to play the role of “revisionist” power, which is unloaded, above all, as previously mentioned, onto Europe.
It is true that an internal dialectic exists; even though within rather narrow confines: a dynamic, nevertheless, has been created between positions in different parts represented by President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin. These two probably address different sectors of the public opinion, but at the moment, not in an antagonistic way, but rather parallel (8) . They are, in every way, the unopposed leaders, and yet their interaction produces a foreign policy with certain oscillations: times, oriented towards relations of interdependence and modernization, at other times, unbalanced between opposition to a kind of Western “encirclement” and a very traditional nationalism.
In light of this situation within the Russian Federation, a possible line of action for the Europeans – which may, in part, prescind from strong intra-EU cohesion – lies in utilizing, in the best way, the level of already existing economic inter-dependence. A symptomatic case is the delicate relations with the Ukraine as a still indispensable infrastructural junction: the Ukraine problem – with the persistent political instability of the Country and, above all, its double linguistic-cultural identity – could damage the same Russian interests. The almost periodical blackmail weapon of the blocking of the Russian supplies is, in the long-term, self-damaging. Particularly, in light of the technological development in progress in the natural gas sector – which has made the exploitation of large new reserves economically advantageous – it is more in the common interests to stabilize the relations between Russian suppliers and European clients. Today, the gas of Russian provenance is, nevertheless, a logical choice for many European Countries, but the conditions must be acceptable.
The agreement reached last November for a system of ‘early warning’ relative to the supplies will probably go in this pragmatic direction.
In the final analysis, in the interaction between internal dynamics, energy resources and foreign policy much will depend on the economic stability of the Russian Federation, on which new doubts have arisen following the global recession of 2008-2009. As long as the growth remains at the levels of “emerging Countries” and there are realistic prospects of modernization, the Russian political system seems to hold without great tremors. But the diversification of the productive apparatus – and with it, the strengthening of an ample middle class – is not indefinitely deferrable, if only for the fact that, otherwise, it will finish by depending too much on the international prices of energy products. It is exactly this need, at medium term, that President Medvedev has openly recognized in certain of his recent public interventions, which, in fact, has received much attention in the Western media (9) :Medvedev made explicit reference to the direct connection between modernization of the social-economic fabric of the Country and integration in the international system – which implies, without a doubt, accepting the many constraints, leaving the pure logic of the “sovereign democracy” on which Vladimir Putin has often insisted. It is evident how a similar overall choice would have repercussion on the degree of pragmatism of the foreign policy and security. But patience is needed, and the outcome is not a foregone conclusion, at all.
In the meantime, the Europeans – and the EU as such, must nevertheless work together with Russia on many complicated dossiers, seeking not to lose the occasion offered by Obama with the “reset” phase. The ‘moment of truth’ is coming: the United States will ask Moscow to become a more active part in the policies towards Iran – with increasing insistence – and, perhaps, in the management of certain problems in Central Asia, given the serious risk of “contagious effects” between the Afghan question and chronic instability of the former Soviet Republics.
The cultivation of inter-dependence with Russia (and some of the Caucus and Central Asian Countries) is certainly a very important European objective. It must be made maintaining a firm anchorage to the United States, for political-cultural, as well as economic and security reasons. It is not, in fact, in the interests of Europe to close itself in a kind of “Euro-Asiatic block” which would cut the EU and its members out of the most dynamic areas of the world economy, i.e. the Pacific axis that closely connects, for now, North America and Asia.
Tactical choices and style are important, as is shown by the opportunity successfully taken with the Obama presidency and the rise of Medvedev. But probably, the central quesito should be posed at a “macro” level: in fact, it regards the general global trends between status quo, growth of weight and ambitions of the greater emerging powers, and relative decline of certain traditional powers. Based on various criteria, Russia simply does not possess those essential characteristics (demography, entrepreneurial climate, attitude of the political authorities towards the economy, optimism towards the future in the society, in a wider sense) which, instead, identify the emerging powers. This means that the foundations of any shared Euro-Russian project could be fragile.
the future in the society, in a wider sense) which, instead, identify the emerging powers. This means that the foundations of any shared Euro-Russian project could be fragile.
On the other hand, the first year of the Obama Administration has not given us the image of a confident superpower in phase of “expansion”, but if anything, that of a great Country that knows it must – with difficulty – renew itself within, while scaling down certain costly commitments abroad (10) . Certainly, it is always a “central” power in the international system, as much for the Europeans as for Russia, but not an absolute point of reference on all regional dossiers.
Seen in these extremely synthetic terms, the situation that Europe faces in assessing the Euro-Russian-Atlantic triangle (or, if you wish, the great space that goes from Vancouver to Vladivostok) concerns, above all, the management of a double decline relative to: the Russian one, despite the temporary recovery of influence due, almost exclusively, to the prices of the energy raw materials; and the European decline, by the market shares to the weight in the organizations for the world governance. If this analysis is correct, then the principal challenge that Europe and Russia really share is that of adaptation and renewal: in this sense, it is well to remember that Europe is, nevertheless, much better equipped than the Russian counterpart, and any negotiation of partnership must take this into account.