Unpredictable Conflict

The signs of a conflict have been clear for years, if anything, the observers have tried to conceal that which, since the “revolution of the roses”, could be read in the work of the new Georgian leadership. The election of 2004, of Mikheil Saakashvili to the Presidency realized the absolute will of the Georgian people to free themselves from the control of Russia (3) and get closer to the West and, at the same time, to develop the political-nationalistic centralization. If the severance from Russian control cannot be held to be but a legitimate aspiration, the nationalistic centralization is, on the contrary, an aspiration which has never before been so hazardous for a territory characterized by three autonomous entities: Abkhazia, Agiaria and Southern Ossetia; as well as by the Armenian and Azeri minorities – without autonomy – but in any case, very important.
It should be remembered that such policy was already strongly developed under the Presidency of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, between 1991 and 1993, which refused to adhere to the CSI (the Community of Independent States) and develop a micro-imperial policy against Russia and ethnic minorities.
Russia intervened in that policy, in an indirect way, supporting the claims of independence and liberty of the Ossetes and Abkhaz, touching off a conflict that provoked thousands of deaths and refugees. From the declaration of the Georgian cease fire, Abkhaz and Ossetes were divided by a multi-national contingent wanted by the CSI, with a Russian prevalence (4) .
The freezing of the events has allowed the creation of a sham stability, which Tbilisi has tried to strengthen by conceding a greater autonomy to the region of the Agiarian Republic, situated on the border with Turkey, and populated by Georgians of the Islamic faith, thereby, remote controlling, as it were, the situation of the Javakheti Province (5) . The province has an Armenian majority which, until now, has not claimed nationalistic autonomy due to the economic conditions and to the pressure which the Armenian State itself conducts in defence against the possibility of being forced into another conflict like that in which it is involved in the High Karabakh (6) . In the same conditions, but for strongly economic reasons, the Community of the Azeri, situated mostly in the region of Kvemo Kartli, is giving signs of growing criticality, which is still being diplomatically repressed, awaiting eventual developments (7) .
For our further comprehension of the situation, we should remember that also the diplomacy of President Shevarnadze leads Georgia always closer to the West and, in particular, to the structure of NATO, with the purpose of finding that umbrella of defence from possible Russian retaliations to maintain hegemonic control of the Caucasian area. This was realized with the strong approach to Turkey for the development of routes of energy transit with outlets to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea: joint action which saw, both the creation of the oil pipeline from Baku to Supsa, on the Black Sea – which broke the Russian monopoly of the Caspian petroleum – and the concomitant public declaration of Georgia of the security treaty of the CSI, with the clear intention of approaching always nearer to the NATO structure (8) .
The scenario changed rapidly with the events of the “11th September, 2001”, which led the American strategy to operate on an asymmetric front and to undertake operations of self-defence by breaking tacit agreements which, until then, had been recognized with the new Russia of President Putin. Among these steps was the sending of the contingent of “instructors” to Georgia in 2002, for the anti-terrorism operation “Train and Equip” to serve for the training and preparation of the Georgian Forces for the integrated struggle against international terrorism of a religious matrix. This move clearly went against the strategic doctrine which saw Russia responsible for the function of support and defence of the ex-USSR, now CSI (9) . The new strategic interest of the United States developed with its support to the so-called “revolution of the roses” which led Mikheil Saakashvili to the Presidency and which, like a domino effect, led to the change in Ukraine, Moldavia and Kyrgyzstan, consolidating the US penetration into the Caucasus to a much greater extent than it could have been with the support of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The new Georgia, strong with the nearness of the United States, began a policy of territorial recapture based on persuasion, in a peaceful way, successfully bringing the region of Agiaria under the control of Tbilisi, forcing the President, Levan Abashidze, to take refuge in Russia. The same thing was attempted with Ossetia, but the result was a brief, but intense conflict, which only the firm American intervention was able to bring to a standstill (10) . Subsequent to this difficult and dangerous moment, the American scholar King wrote:
The United States should now give help to the new executive powers of Georgia in such a way that they can act creatively on the fundamental questions relative to the sovereignty, the control of the territory and to an institutional plan. The Central Government should accept the multi-ethnic and multi-religious reality of the Nation. It must also accept that a decade is needed for the construction of the State in the secessionist regions and permit the local government to acquire full powers. If these efforts are successful, Georgia could certainly become that positive example for East Europe for which observers, for a long time, have hoped (11) .
This did not stop the policy of re-acquisition of territories by Georgia, which succeeded in the military recapture of the Valley of Kodori in Abkhazia, in the Summer of 2006 (12) , and the creation of an autonomous administration of Ossetia of the South, of the territories controlled by Tbilisi, with the leader, Dmitry Sanakoev (13) .
The Georgian action has led to an always stronger request, on the part of the most influential politicians of Abkhazia and Ossetia of the South, for an annexation of the territory in the Russian Republic, an action that has always been refused by Moscow which, nevertheless, by granting passports and bestowing pensions and salaries, virtually treats the territories like its provinces. This, however, does not alter the fact that such territories belong, geographically and legally to the Georgian Republic and, furthermore, that the ethnic claims of the Abkhaz and Ossetes are in conflict with the mass flight made by the ethnic Georgian inhabitants, which has allowed the ethnic hegemony and all the separatist claims. A twin-like event can be found in the Kosovo dispute, where the ethnic Albanians claim, in an arbitrary way, an ethnic hegemony on a territory which, in reality, is of the same type, already mentioned, for the mass flight of the Serbian populations and is absolutely indefensible, from an historical viewpoint, for the fact that the Kosovan region was, historically, the cradle of the birth of the Serb-Orthodox religion; a fact that jars with the historic claims by an ethnic group of Islamic faith.
An analogous context, which has only been worsened over time, notwithstanding the action of containment carried ahead by the Americans with regard to the Georgian Government. This, however, without ceasing that path of military collaboration which, after the Train and Equip project, was followed by the programmes: Foreign Team Financing, International Military Education & Training and Joint Contact Team Programme. Military collaboration which has seen Georgia particularly committed, sending contingents also to Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq (14) .
If it is obvious that Georgia has become the bridgehead of the American penetration, by the same token, it is clear that this action renders the entire area of the Caucasus unstable and, even more, was destabilized with the policy that President Bush carried out in advancing the recognition of the independence of the Serb region of Kosovo; an action which restored strength to the claims of the secessionist and independence supporters of the regions of Abkhazia, Ossetia and Karabakh, causing the Caucasian region to be in a state of a constant risk of conflict (15) . It must not be forgotten, however, that this destabilizing push is not only the fault of the actions of the United States, but also to the development policy of NATO, which envisaged Georgia and the Ukraine included in the Membership Action Plan, the first step for the entrance as member of the Alliance. In this context, the ‘brake’ action which was applied by such Countries as Italy, Germany, Spain and France was able to lower the level of a clash with Russia.
The spirit of the activity of blocking the possible entrance of Georgia and the Ukraine into NATO is well highlighted in the comment of Anatol Lieven:
the pressures of the Bush Administration at the NATO Summit of Bucharest, for a proposal of a project of adhesion to the NATO of Georgia and the Ukraine were blocked, which is a good thing ……. It is difficult to see what conceivable rational calculation could support the extension of the role of members of the NATO to two new Nations, one of which, Georgia, involved in a civil war without solution, and the other, the Ukraine, having a population which, in large majority, opposes belonging to the NATO. And this is defined «expanding democracy»? (16) .
The American defeat at the Bucharest Summit on the ‘expanding democracy’ front was mitigated by the acceptance of the plan of missile displacement in Poland and the Czech Republic. A fact that Russia had placed at the height of the problems of contrast with the United States and NATO and that, together with the recognition of Kosovo, the real presuppositions of the outbreak of conflict in Ossetia must be considered. It should be remembered that to this purpose the Russian Ambassador, Dmitry Rogozin, had the occasion of declaring, at the NATO, in March:
the eventual entrance of Georgia into NATO would have been the cause of the secession of the regions of Ossetia and Abkhazia.
And, in effect, without delay, the day after the recognition of the unilateral declaration of independence of the Serb region of Kosovo, the Abkhazia and Ossetia Parliaments launched a following appeal addressed to:
the Secretary General of the United Nations, the President of the Russian Federation, the Federal Council of the Assembly of the Russian Federation, the State Duma of the Russian Federation, the Heads of State and the Parliaments of the Community of the Independent States and the Member Countries of the European Union, in which was asked, the recognition of the full independence on the basis of the principles of self-determination of the people, of the existence of legal bases for the creation and development of a sovereign State and of the impossibility of being part of the Georgian State (17) .
They obtained no results from the UNO and the European Countries, but received the condemnation of the European Council, the European Union, NATO, OSCE and the United States, while Russia did not intervene, but intensified the relations of collaboration with the two regions and their populations. This provoked a rapid political military escalation, which saw the Georgian and Russian Forces face each other, first, at a distance and then, directly, with an ever increasing numerical presence on the territory.


The five-day war

Notwithstanding the clashes and military manoeuvres of the month of July, the conflict had an unexpected impact on the international opinion at the Peking Olympics; in fact, on the very night between the 7th and 8th August, the Georgian Forces bombed the capital of Ossetia, Tskhinvali. This action was justified by the Georgian President by their necessity of confronting the entrance of the Russian armoured column into Ossetia. This declaration is confirmed by a Western source which released the following despatch:
At approximately 1:30 a.m. columns of tanks of the Armoured 58° began to enter Georgia by the Roki tunnel, which separates North and South Ossetia. In appearance, if not in fact, the Russians had foreseen the moves of Georgia (18) .
The superior force of the Russian intervention crushed the frail Georgian resistance and, in a few days, the Moscow troops occupied not only all of the Ossetic territory, but also part of the Georgian neighbouring territory, pushing forward up to the City of Gori (cutting communications between East and West), the Port of Poti on the Black Sea and further localities of considerable strategic importance for the control of the circulation. When the road to the capital was free, on the 12th August, the President on duty of the European Union, the French President Sarkozy, was successful in bringing about a cease fire agreement, composed of 6 points:
1) the abandoning of force by all parts involved;
2) immediate cessation of hostilities;
3) free access for humanitarian aid;
4) withdrawal of the Georgian Forces in the positions previous to the conflict;
5) withdrawal of the Russian Forces to the positions previous to the conflict, but maintaining the peace-keeping bases;
6) the start of an international debate to guarantee security and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (19) .
The acceptance of the agreement did not lead to the respecting of all points, but the Russian troops stopped the offensive and implemented the cease-fire. The positions taken by the Russians were not abandoned and the troops of Abkhazia completely conquered the Valley of Kodori. As in all conflicts, uncontrolled numbers of dead and wounded are released. In five days the figures declared were: Russia, 64 dead; Georgia, 215 dead and Ossetia 1,492 dead (20) .
The closing of the conflict in the military field did not extinguish activities in the political arena; in fact, on the 25th August, the Chambers of the Russian Parliament approved the Law of recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, ratification signed on 26th August by President Medvedev. Following the signing, the President declared:
the Government of Tbilisi has taken another road ……. Saakashvili has chosen genocide to pursue his own political ends. In this way, he has extinguished with his own hand all hopes for a peaceful coexistence of Ossetes, Abkaz and Georgians in one single State. ..…..This difficult choice is the only possibility of saving human lives (21) .
At the recognition, isolated, Moscow delivered a long diatribe on who had begun the brief, but bloody conflict. The various reconstruction by international observers coincide with the fact that, certainly, the Georgians started the conflict, but at the same time, it is evident that the previous actions of the Russian were, undoubtedly, the preparation of a neat trap into which President Saakashvili clumsily fell; it results, furthermore, important how the Georgian Army, notwithstanding the American training and the army’s total renewal allowed itself to be found completely unprepared. These considerations are underlined not only by expert Russian analysts, but also by the United States Blank:
notwithstanding numerous declarations by Russia, that Georgia was actively preparing for war and insisted with the provocations, in this particular drama, Georgia took the role of the bull and not the bullfighter. Even though Georgia clearly made declarations that were provocative, notwithstanding advice from the West to avoid responding to the Russian provocations, the Russian reasons of wanting to react to the ethnic cleansing and to the attempt of genocide, were mendacious and tendentious. The most evident proof leads to the thought that the invasion by Georgia and the Russian counter-attack were carefully planned provocations by Silovoki in Moscow and by their confederates in South Ossetia (22) .
It should not be forgotten, however, that the way of diffusing the news on the conflict was, to say the least, rather particular; many sources supplied, simplistically, the representation of the aggression of the great dictatorial Russia against the little democratic Georgia. Versions which, with regard to the western populations, permitted the exploitation of the strong diffidence towards what had been seen, for decades, as the ‘great evil’: the ex-USSR. In reality, it must be remembered that Georgia had, inexplicably, tried to resolve, with force, its internal ethnic problems. Perhaps believing to be able to manoeuvre under an imaginary United States cover, which would have held back the Russian reactions. This, unfortunately, did not happen, but, on the contrary, it underlined the risk of a new contrast between the new Russian power (military energy) and the West.


New Cold War?

The Georgian defeat awakened with a jolt the American policy towards the Caucasus. A policy which had dozed off on the conviction of an easy penetration.
The military force, politics and energy that Russia had put into these events demonstrated that their once hegemonic will had not been lost with the return to the “Santa Madre Russia”. If with the fall of the monolithic Soviet Block, the West and, in particular, the USA and the NATO thought to radically change the geopolitical situation with a strong penetration, now all the strategy has to be reviewed in function of a preponderant return of the Russian power (23) . In this way of seeing things, it can be held that the brief Russian-Georgian conflict has modified the evaluations made, until now, on the relations between the West and the new Russian position; and it is for this reason that some analysts have read the happening in this way:
The biggest crisis to date, in the relations between Russia and the West: certain observers have even come to consider that the Georgian War of 2008, could be the most significant challenge to European security since the end of the Cold War (24) .
Another important interpretation is the Russian politics, from the middle of the 90’s on.
The reawakened Russian power interpreted the Western action towards the former Eastern area as a real and proper political-military expansion for the purpose of filling the space left by the USSR in the geopolitical theatre, to the entire advantage of the United States and NATO. Moscow politics have replied to this situation, claiming, in particular:
the right to defend the national minorities, particularly the Russian speaking people, in all “near” foreign territories;
the right to maintain control of the stability within the area of the CSI, with the creation of a belt of good neighbours on the Russian borders also with the presence of the Moscow troops;
the maintaining of a special role of guarantor within the policies of the CSI (25) .
In the first period after the fall of the Soviet hegemony, Russia was not able to obstruct a certain propagation of the European Union, the United States and NATO, because their internal crisis impeded the carrying out of a foreign policy able to counter arguments such as: the Europeanism policy (the EU), the global defence under an equal political control (the NATO) or help, without limitations, of a Nation like the United States. But, with the coming to power of President Putin, the internal system understood how to exploit the great energy potentials, enabling Russia to forcibly re-enter the international theatre and permitting a resounding internal recovery, which allowed them to revive and reorganize the extremely costly military system.
Acquiring, once again, the economic and military power, the Russia of Putin understood how to represent themselves in the great international reunion – with a new weight and a new voice – restoring faith also to historical allies, who no longer had references and cover (26) .
With the arrival of the new President, Medvedev, chosen by Putin, Russia has continued in the policy of backing energy, becoming among the first exporting Nations and has placed itself in a monopoly position with regard to certain European States in the supplying of gas. All this has meant that the Russian State, with the Georgian conflict, returns its troops to intervene outside national borders for the first time since 1991.
This demonstration of force, therefore, shows the affirmation of a renewed force of the Russian State, ready to retake, also with arms, that hegemonic position so long abandoned; it should not be forgotten, however, that the subtle politics resumed by Moscow, had launched clear signals of this will, when in 2006, when Professor Degoev of the Muscovite University of Mgimo, wrote:
The West must recognize that Russia has and will always have certain vital interests in the Western Caucasus (Zakavkaz è, for Russia Trans-Caucasian), for which they demand not a verbal recognition, but a correct observance ……. The best way to educate the Western States to really respect the vital interests of Russia would be an open policy, clear and coherent of the Kremlin in the Caucasus. And it is not necessary to justify such policy in an artificial and cunning manner. In reality, it is sufficient to openly declare that at the base of such policy lies the supreme value of any State Body, which means to say the defence of its same existence from internal and external threats. There are, furthermore, historical, geographical and other kinds of circumstances which do not allow Russia to be indifferent to what happens in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Russia. In any event, the United States and Europe will understand what is being spoken of. And they themselves know well that it is not for the purpose of strengthening the vital capacity of Russia that they intend to take over the Southern Caucasus. It is necessary, consequently, that the West foresees, in some way, a reaction by Moscow ……. In principle, both Russia and the West have the same objective in the Southern Caucasus, in other words, the pursuit of peace, stability and well-being ……. Nevertheless, there is a paradox if, in the Caucasus, Russia will have as Southern neighbours, the European Union and NATO, then, in this region, there will never be the hoped-for tranquillity (27) .
These words make it clear how, already in 2006, the Russian policy was claiming the right to domination over the bordering Nations, not only for a presence of areas of strong ethnic Russian, but for a clear resumption of the capacity of wanting to claim the control of a territory considered vital for Moscow.
From the Western point of view, this vision could clearly be opposed, but the intervention in Georgia puts the whole Caucasian problem under a different light, which imposes new strategies and the need to find a line of effective and valid action with the new Kremlin policies.
It is important to abandon, immediately, the spectre of a new “Cold War” and those who resurrect this event from history perform only rhetorical exercises and skirt the real problem: Russia no longer has an exportable ideology and an economic system comparable to that of the old USSR; there still exist many restraints on liberty, in a particular way, at a journalistic and mediatic level, in general; the capitalist system is moving parallel with the political system of government and, therefore, the interests become global. Contemporaneously, we must remember that the problem of freedom of expression and criticism of the government in Georgia is exactly the same as in Russia, and it is for this reason that many of the illiberal facts that the Georgian Government carried out with respect to the minorities did not actually reach the international media. On the contrary, what did reach the media was news skilfully transmitted for the purpose of diverting the reasons of the conflict which had been smouldering for a long time (28) .
The comment of extreme lucidity and balance that the Ambassador, Sergio Romano made on the Russian-Georgian conflict becomes very important.
President George W. Bush declared that it was necessary to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. He wanted to say that Abkhazia and Osettia of the South do not have the right to separate themselves from Tbilisi and proclaim their independence. But when the Serb Government asked for respect of its own territorial integrity and maintained that the independence of Kosovo was a violation of international law, the reply was that the people have the right to decide their own destiny. It was right to deplore the outbreak of hostilities, but would not it have been right to remember that the exodus of the Ossetes of the South, after the Georgian attack, recalls that of the Albanians of Kosovo when Slobodan Milosevic tried to ethnically ‘cleanse’ the region? The United States and the Atlantic Council have accused Russia of having made “disproportionate” use of force. But the conservative American, Patrick Buchanan, recalled in a recent article that NATO bombed Serbia for 78 days in the Spring of 1999, and that Israel, after a Hezbollah incursion in Israeli territory, bombed Lebanon for35 days, in the Summer of 2006 (29) .
The problem of the contradictions arising when considering the moves of the Russian foreign policy, on the part of the Western media and also some European chancelleries, carry a series of unknowns in relation to the new possible energy and defence alliances, principally, due to a lack of a correct and common policy of the European Union.
We should remember, for this purpose, the Ukraine problem which, for some time, is in a tug-of-war with Russia for the energy supplies and on the possible entrance into the Atlantic Alliance.
For Russia, the Ukrainian problem could also become a defence intervention of the Russian speaking community of the south-west Ukraine, an event which, after the Georgian facts, can no longer be considered as only a “remote and improbable hypothesis” (30) . .


Conclusions

The hypothesis of an isolation of Russia following the Georgian conflict and of the attitude in merit of the distribution of the energy sources is completely unrealistic for a concept of integrated policies of defence and distribution of the primary sources, both for the European Union and for the United States. These considerations should lead to a serious reflection on the relations and strategies towards that East which the West had seen as a land of conquest, considering Russia as a no-problem. And this, in particular, on projects like: the missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, which is no longer opportune to see as exclusive collaboration of defence, but must be reconsidered in an integrated system of defence where the Russian State becomes and integral part and, eventually, also an active part. Evaluating the problem of religious terrorism, to which Moscow did not remain immune, and that for this reason effective collaboration for, not only internal security, but also global security, could be seen in a positive way.
These evaluations are, however, still uncertain considering also the declarations which the then Secretary of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, released in an interview in September (31) , where he bitterly criticized the fact that the European Union had, essentially, endorsed the permanent presence of 7,600 Russian soldiers in the territories of South Ossetia and in Abkhazia, considering it an affront to the objective of returning to the us quo ante.
In an evaluation of possible future scenarios, it becomes important to underline that a potential opening to the East of the NATO, could be seen by Russia as a direct action against its security, and that a lack of political agreement between the European Union and Moscow for the management of the energy and of the primary sources could cause a serious risk to many European Countries.
For these very reasons, in the positive climate of confidence arising from the moves of the new United States President, and considering the international crisis, which has effected many of the so-called emerging Countries, the results of the future G8 become crucial. Its subsequent openings and developments could smooth out misunderstandings and re-launch a new common policy between Russia, the United States, the European Union and NATO – no longer seen as only a military force , but as a new political instrument of dialogue. An instrument able to utilize an integrated military force for the purpose of guaranteeing that security where, unfortunately, the UNO has, until today, failed to do, due to the ultraconservative policy on which, for years, the project of renewal of the structure created at the end of the 2nd World War has been stalled.