The Olympics of Peking of August, 2008 was an event of “nation branding” (1) , of the creation of the brand of a Country of planetary proportions. At an economic level, despite the traditional stalemate in the macro-economic indexes which follow every Olympics (2) , in August, China maintained itself in position of commercial surplus (28.7 billion dollars), with a slight fall in production (1.8%), accompanied, however, by a reduction in the inflation of prices (2%) and by a significant growth in exportation, which has guaranteed an introduction of new cash flow into the Chinese economy (3) . This growth of the Chinese economy, according to the analyst community, should proceed (maintaining itself on an average of +9%), even if there are factors of criticality which, subsequent, and connected in some way to the Olympics, could determine a fall in consumption: the increase of retail prices, the fall of real estate prices, a contraction of credits to the consumer will all be elements which could reduce the rate of growth of the Chinese economy for all of 2008 (4) . With regard to the relation between import and export, notwithstanding the increase, compared to the first half of 2007, of the exportations (+21.8%), this represents the lowest element of the 5.8%, with respect to that of the previous year. On the contrary, the Chinese importations have increased (+30.6%), with respect to the previous year. This combination generated lower commercial assets of 11.8%, with respect to the previous year (5) .The main causes of the contraction of the surplus are to be found in the reduction of the Chinese exports to the United States (first Peking foreign market), and an increase of the yuan in relation to the United States dollar, and to the fall in steel exportation. The 2008 Olympics allowed China the fusion between different, but all equally important, geo-political factors: a new image of Chinese power, the affirmation of Peking, visible and symbolic as a leader Country at global level; the structure of the political message, which the executives of the Chinese Communist Party wanted to launch to the international community and, lastly, the fusion between soft power and the geo-economic project of Peking. The first comparison that comes to mind is that of post-war Japan, in which national pride – mythology of the Samurai – entrepreneurial culture and fusion between Imperial tradition and the Western culture (6) . But Japan had undergone an extremely rapid westernization in the presence of a ruling class still strongly impregnated with the traditional culture, while China had had the experience of a communist revolution and the successive attempts of autarkic economic launching (The Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1960) and the successive Seven mile Assembly of 1962, where Liu Shaoqi stated that the consequent economic disaster was “30% natural causes and 70% the fault of man”. It was to take over the Party that Mao Zedong gave the go-ahead to the “Great Cultural and Proletarian Revolution”, at the beginning of 1966, which represented the systematic destruction of the Chinese elite (7) . Therefore, the model of Chinese ‘nation branding’ cannot reconnect itself, in fact, to the tradition and continuity of the ruling classes, even though metamorphosed in the One Party. Today, the Chinese global ‘politics of the image’ tend to annul the perception of the “yellow peril”, which represents an element of regionalization in Asia and of closure of the economic spaces that would be ruinous for the leaders in Peking (8) . At a symbolic level, the first element of Chinese soft power is culture. The tradition of the “Intermediary Empire” is still a significantly influential intermediator (9) . It concerns “products” of the popular culture, which enter the global commercial system. Cinema, books, television products, art objects, books that reach an average value for exportation of approximately four billion yuan per year, and the Confucius Institutes are by now diffused in 50 Countries (10) . Within the soft power framework of Peking, there is also the image of political stability and welfare of the Chinese population, which make the consideration of medium-long term foreign investment plans in the Country possible. But the relation between stable growth and the external image of China, between hard power and soft power, can be thrown into crisis by certain long-term trends which can deform both the economic system and the external image of Peking: the aging of the population, which de-structures the welfare (11) , the increase of the economic divide between city and rural urban (12) – already a theme of the Cultural Revolution – the general intolerance towards political and administrator corruption (13) , the environmental crisis (14) , the alarming increase of unemployment, both in the cities and in the rural urban (15) . All this could favour the tendencies – already present in the Chinese political culture, both in certain sectors of the PCC and in the rural and urban masses – to project these tensions into a model of “post-modern nationalism” directed, in the first place, towards Japan and the United States (16) . The recently terminated 2008 Olympics event was a key element in modifying this internal perception of the criticisms of the Chinese System and transforming, in the Olympics’ spirit, the Chinese nationalism into an ideology of “harmony among Nations”, and the traditional Maoist polemics of the PCC against the “hegemony” in the geopolitical field. In fact, immediately after the Olympics, surveys revealed that over 80% of the Chinese population had a positive perception both of their own Country and its economic progress and, among the 24 Nations examined, China is first in both the categories “perceived economy + image” (17) . The Olympics “showed”, therefore, a harmonious image of China both on the domestic scene and abroad. The Chinese Olympics established, above all, both for the internal public opinion and for the rest of the world, the central theme which the leaders of the CCP wanted to spread with the Games of Peking: the rise of China to the rank of a global superpower. This represents the best possible yield on the investment of 43 billion dollars paid out for the preparation of the games. But, for the CCP executives, the purpose of the Peking Olympics was not that, as some journalists have superficially commented, of “making business and boosting tourism”, but rather that of building a contemporary Chinese identity, following the Maoist phase and that of the “Four Modernizations” of Deng Xiaoping. With this event the Chinese have learned to “beat the West on its own ground” (18) . Therefore, the element of future criticality, from the point of view of political communication of the CCP elite will be to stimulate a new Chinese identity, where the “three harmonies” theorized by Hu Jintao (19) are mixed with the new pride of the Chinese economic patriotism which, through the growth of the GDP - used as an instrument of global strategy – should construct the position of leadership of Peking at a global level. With regard to the rest of the world, the harmony of this identity is fundamental to the continuity of the growth and for overcoming the backwardness of the Chinese social and economic traditions, exacerbated by the long crisis which dates from the “Great Leap Forward” to the “Cultural Revolution”. The Olympic preparations were ideal for the leaders of the CCP in the alignment of a transformation, without precedent, of the Chinese society and economy. The nexus between the preparations of the Games and Confucianism allowed the acceptance of unpopular measures in the economy; it reinforced the prestige of the Party and has stimulated an inter-classist sentiment of national pride. Today, after the termination of the Games, the CCP could find itself having to recognize a limited social dissent, up to now hidden by the preparations of the Great Event: the increase of production costs, the inevitable assimilation of the Chinese economy with the global one (and its values) and the ecological crisis could resurface. This situation could be managed by the CCP in the same way that the entrance of the “capitalists” into the Party was managed: with a slowness marked by moments of decision-making tendencies (20) . And the Tibetan question? If, on the one side, it marred the image of China in those days, it has also reinforced, in the Chinese population, the identifying narration of the Han ethnic group and the sentiment of unity and dignity of the Homeland (21) . The CCP leaders perceived, from the support of the Chinese people for Tibet, in the days of the Olympics, the necessity of an “iron fist in a velvet glove” response against the demonstrations in Lhasa, which were understood as a “threat to the Chinese national sovereignty” by nearby neighbouring powers (India) and distant powers (the United States) (22) . In essence, a threat to the “Peaceful rise” of the Republic of the Chinese People, propagandistic, but real axis of the CCP in these years, which will last until the economic growth weakens the structural criticality of the Chinese society and economy, to then transform itself into a Peking hegemony in Asia – which, according to Chinese strategists, could equal or even surpass that which has characterized the United States, from the end of the Second World War until today (23) .