GNOSIS 1/2008
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Internet and Al Qaeda two ‘networks’ for Islam |
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Guido OLIMPIO |
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It is difficult to understand, in the absence of direct contact, and meetings which are susceptible to monitoring and tapping, the capacity of the Al Qaeda penetration into the Islamic world, and the capillarity of its propaganda.Within the space of a few years, the qaedists have passed from amateur video from a cave to a chain of messages.
With the historic leaders hidden, the operations entrusted to regional factions and spontaneous cells, the old Qaedist guard has maintained presence and control, thanks to Internet. A control room with two levers. The first, stronger, governs the ideology. The second, not always in working order, activates the operative phase. A mechanism which, through the Internet, has communicated the idea of perpetual activity. This has been served by the messages of Osama Bin Laden and of a long line-up of spokesmen, alternating in being the mouthpiece for the propaganda. A rather well articulated mediatic explosion which has pushed some researchers to say that without the web the Al Qaeda phenomenon would have been perceived in a different way. Certainly, we would have seen it as a distant reality and less threatening. Using Internet, the chiefs have been able to open an ideological umbrella, even without having direct contact with what the teachers have put into practice. Bin Laden, Al Zawahiri and Al Libi, Azzam the American, Abu Al Yazid and an array of minor ideologies – considerably cited on the web – have assumed the role of inspirers. In this way, from Asia to North Africa, groups grown with characteristics tied to the respective theatres have tried to assume a trans-national physiognomy. Some have been successful on the territory: it is the case of Al Qaeda in the Maghreb Countries, which from Algeria it spread to Mauritania, Mali and Tunisia. Surprise attacks consolidated by a strong activity of proselytism on the web. Other factions have limited themselves to actions of propaganda, taking care to underline the bond with the main branch. Once again, it has been Internet to guarantee them cover and to create a common virtual space. A scenario of defensive asymmetric war, with the Moslems pledged to respond to the presumed aggression of the West. The Islamist ideologies have repeated this concept and have been successful in convincing sectors of the Moslem public opinion. Fortunately, the mass revolt that Osama dreamed of has not come about, but it is a fact that there are many who although not willing to take up arms, consider themselves victims of an attack. Any regional crisis – Palestine, Chechnya, Sudan, to make some examples – have become the ideological motivator employed by the Qaedists. In their narration, the responsibility is only on one side. And, therefore, whatever form of reaction with regard to the West is legitimate. For the inspirers it remains sufficient to find the justification and perhaps, a suitable religious verse by the Prophet: “He who sees something wrong must correct it with his own hand, if he cannot, then with the word and if he still cannot then with his heart”. It is the ’soft powder’ exercise, as the Israeli, Reuven Paz notes – one among the best researchers on terrorism. The ability to reach goals by drawing and persuading other to adopt them. With a spreading effect. It began as a limited phenomenon, to then expand progressively with the deliberate intention of increasing the number of “spectators”. The Qaedists have passed from amateur videos from a cave, in 2001, to a chain of messages. Also the channels of information have changed. In 2001, it was mainly the TV satellites to acknowledge the material, today, it is the Qaedist sites. “As Sahab”, the label that manages the films and sound recordings of the most well-known exponents, distributed, in 2007 alone, almost one hundred. Al Qaeda opened its first site – Al Neda – in the 90’s, registering it in Texas and in Singapore. More than ten years after, they are counted in the thousands – between six and seven thousand – and continue to increase in volume and quality. Professor Gabriel Weimann, teacher of the Science of communications at the Haifa University (Israel), has calculated that 900 Jihadist sites are opened every year. On the basis of his study, in 1998, out of 30 subversive groups on the list of the American State Department, only 15 had a site. In 2000, practically all had a site, therefore, tens of factions from the Middle-East to the Philippines. Obviously, many sites have a limited duration. They appear, disappear, transfer or are re-elaborated. Elasticity made possible by the great flexibility of the Net. However, the Qaedists are not always precise. They speak of Iran when, perhaps, there is a more pressing event in another zone of contention. They also lose “big events”: an election, the choice of a president. It is difficult to explain the reason. They could be technical or tied to a need for security. But one is prone to think that the terrorists want only “to make noise”, knowing that their sermons will, however, have prominence in the international arena. The Jihad by word, in addition to the armed Jihad, responds to an intention of the same Osama and a close circle of accomplices. In a letter, seized by the Americans in Afghanistan and prior to the 11th of September, Bin Laden explains to the Chief of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, that the battle would be waged ninety percent on the field of propaganda. Analyses which have found Osama’s advisor, the Egyptian, Ayman Al Zawahiri, in agreement. In a book which has become famous among the Jihadists – “Knights under the Banner of the Prophet” – the doctor writes: We must transmit our message to the peoples of the nations and break the mediatic siege imposed on the Jihad movement. This is an independent battle which we must wage along side the military one”. The Qaedists imitated what was done at the end of the 70’s by the Ayatollah, Ruhollah Khomeini, an obscurantist, but innovator in propaganda. Forced into exile in France, the Iranian imam recorded inflamed speeches on tapes which were then played to the Iranians. Long distance rallies which represented a spur for the infant revolution that led to the expulsion of the Shah in 1979. Experiences made by rebels and terrorists. In the middle of the 90’s, the Palestine movement, Hamas was among the first to use videotapes. Its suicide attackers appear smiling before mission, and record their political testaments. A practice which becomes a tendency. At that time – after the Palestinians – the Islamic militants in Bosnia, Algeria, Chechnya and Kashmir followed and documented their operations. Truculent images, with ambushes and the slashed throats of enemy soldiers, filmed to sustain the cause. The tapes are consigned to some survivors of the conflict who smuggle them into Europe, where they are shown in order to recruit young initiates. Today, the same pictures, more edited, with sub-titles and interventions by the chiefs, find their ideal theatre on the Internet. With unprecedented success. In analyzing this continually growing phenomenon, the anti-terrorism experts have identified certain guide lines. To begin with, the theatre. The extremists live in countries where free speech is limited and the press often gagged. The Internet becomes a refuge, a source of alternative information and a platform where the Qaedists can express themselves without fear. Furthermore, the sympathizer establishes, like the potential terrorist, contacts with persons who live outside the confines and who share the same opinions and ideals. Internet favours, therefore, the diffusion of a trans-national idea tied to the preaching of Osama. The external projection is formidable. The Islamist sites have become a primary source for the traditional mass medias which are not able to “pull out the plug” and relaunch the messages. The result is doubly advantageous for the Qaedist, who circumvent possible censoring and achieve that their propaganda is propagated with the help of the West. This leads to the subsequent step. If they do not launch attacks, the terrorists still strike fear with the threats, and the vehicle is the Internet. The pc monitor can be “blank”, in the sense that it is represented only by words. Or otherwise it is filled with gruesome scenes of old attacks or bloody actions. The beheading of a hostage is the perfect, as much as distressing interpretation of this logic. Abu Musab Al Zarkawi in Iraq was the most faithful perpetrator, but he was preceded by other Qaedists – the slaughtering in Karachi, in 2002, of the Wall Street journalist, Daniel Pearl. According to a reconstruction, the murder and mutilation was filmed twice because the first “didn’t come out well”. And, subsequently, the photographs of the hostage with a pistol pointed at his temple were circulated. Having lost many bases following the allied offensive on Kabul, the Osama faithful invented the global Koranic school, where virtual indoctrination is carried out. It is, once again, the Internet that gives the irreplaceable support. One of the executives of the Global Islamic Media Front, a signature often seen on Qaedist documents, explained how it works. “Since the operation against the USS Cole, (a USA military ship attacked by a kamikaze in Yemen, November, 2000, ed. note) and of the glorious events of Manhattan, hundreds of Moslems from all over the world, have united at the Global Jihad University, where they study every type of activity, rule …… It is a non-centralized university, without geographical borders, present in any location and open to any believer. The University has its own presidency, whose role is to urge, guide, indoctrinate and encourage the conscience of the mujaheddin. The presidency is under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden”. But the real springboard that projected the mediatic campaign to sidereal heights was the Iraqi conflict. Rebels and terrorist revealed themselves to be as capable in this field as with weapons. The videos of the attacks, the classifications of the “best explosions”, the heroic deeds of the snipers filled the Internet, invading spaces like Youtube or Liveleak. The sophistication of the product surprised everyone and gave the basic teaching, to the point that today; all and every faction must have a site, logo and music to accompany their actions. Otherwise, they risk not being taken seriously. Compared to the material offered by the Al Qaeda old guard, the Iraqi terrorists are more concrete. The words are only the frame and not the substance, the leading theme in the Iraqi videos is the military action. The great space conceded by the newspapers and television – both Western and Arabic – to the mujaheddin missions has done the rest. When they film the explosion of a bomb during the passage of a convey in a remote Sunnite village, the Military are aware that that image will, not only bring support, but will also instil restlessness and anxiety. And furthermore, without even paying penny. The terrorists do not have to pay for space in the palimpsest of a radio or television broadcasting station, their “promotional” film clip is transmitted anyway, and free of charge. The proliferation of messages has given rise to a debate between how many hold that there exists a connection with the successive attacks, and those who prefer to consider them mere indications, with very ample limits, on what is needed to be hit and where. Let us start from the numbers. In 2005, “as Sahab”, the Qaedist production house, diffused 15 videos; in 2006, it went up to 58; in 2007, it rose to over 90. Added to the films with the logo are hundreds of others made by affiliated formations. Among the most expert, the Algerians, “Al Qaeda in the land of the Maghreb”, signalled a series of terrorist operations raising the volume of the propaganda on Internet. But no less expert are the Somali Shebab movement; the mujaheddin of the Iraqi “Islamic State”; the Afghan-Pakistani Taliban. Considering Osama as an immortal symbol, they associate themselves with a global design even if they are employed in a local conflict. They offer themselves as a gift to the mother house and Al Qaeda responds by giving its anticipative or posthumous approval. When Internet did not exist and one had to resort to a fax, days could pass before the presumed link emerged. Now, the interaction is rapid. In the same way that the claiming of responsibility for an action needs great caution: also its reliability needs the same. The presence of a video does not represent the acid test, but rather signals the will of a group or a leader to intervene. Let us look at an example. On the night of the 19th March, an audio attributed to Osama was launched on the web. A fragment of five minutes in which Bin Laden attacks the Pope, Europe and promises a severe punishment for the satanic cartoons. The following day on the Islamist forums, the news is interpreted as a sign of an imminent attack in the heart of Europe. Also the Vatican reacts – to deny the accusations – and the Security apparatus, to say that the monitor is not to be under-estimated. Great space on the sites, on the TV and radio news. The operation functioned and in the eyes of the Qaedists, the audio had represented a precautionary claim of responsibility for a possible attack. Whether it occurs immediately from a precise order, or is planned in an autonomous manner.  photo Ansa The mediatic incursions provoke a permanent discussion, which are developed mainly in the blogs. Once again, the idea is that of a lot of talk in general terms, with the Algerian group or the Iraqi one, whoever assumes the task. According to the Research Center, Intelcenter, from 1988 to 2007, scarcely 62 attacks can be attributed to the “real” Al Qaeda. These are calculations that have no scientific value and can be contested. However, they represent a parameter to keep in mind in understanding how – fortunately – verbal volleys do not always correspond to real intentions. The Qaedists, on the contrary, claim responsibility for everything – from the blackout which disrupted New York to the summer fires – and tries to slip into whatever crisis invests the Moslem community. Michael Scheuer, ex-chief of the unit that sought to capture Bin Laden, has observed, nevertheless, that a certain adherence between threats and attacks exist. A good 23 of the countries cited, in 2001, by Osama have been victims of attacks: within the borders (Spain, Great Britain, and Pakistan, to give 3 examples) and elsewhere, like Italy at Nassiriya.But, once again, the report derives from an ideological submissiveness of who performed the attack, and not from an official channel, issued in a direct manner. It is obvious that the ambiguity of the picture leaves the door open to contrasting evaluations and favours speculations. Let us take the massacre of Madrid, the 11th March, 2004. The terrorists could have taken the idea from a document of 42 pages, entitled “Jihad, Iraq, hopes and dangers” which recommended attacks against the Spanish “strength” with the elections close at hand. The text, published on the Islamist site “Global Islam media front” in December, 2003, seemed to be edited by the so-called “Media Committee for the Mujaheddin victory in Iraq”, also defined Service Centre of the Mujaheddin. A signature which recalls to mind the office created by Osama followers to co-ordinate the flow of Islamic volunteers in Afghanistan. Two Norwegian researchers, Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, found the document. According to them, the author of the text could have been Yusuf Al Ayiri, exponent of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and among the most convinced supporters of the use of the Internet. Until he was killed in 2003, the Islamist had produced a large number of practical articles destined to those who wanted to adhere to the Jihad. A document proposes a theory of the ‘dominoes’ to apply against the forces that participated, in 2003, in the multi-national coalition in Iraq. The objective is to strike one country after another to provoke crisis in public opinion, and progressively isolate the United States. In particularly, the author, showing a good knowledge of the Western political dynamics, examines Poland, Great Britain and Spain. It was just this last Country to be at the centre – and continues to be – of the target of the Qaedist propaganda, which invites it to liberate the Arab Andalusia. Is the text proof of the connection? In political terms, the answer is in the affirmative: something different if we examine the “military” implications, in that the criminals enjoyed an ample autonomy. Instead, the case of the bombs in London of summer, 2005, is different. The group acted in complete solitude, but some of its members had operative contact with Qaedist exponents in Pakistan. And the Al Qaeda station was able to manage, even if with small delay, the mediatic phase. On the 31st August, the Al Jazeera transmitted a video in two parts: in the first the presumed chief of the cell, Mohammed Siddique Khan, appeared: in the second, ideologist, Ayman Al Zawahiri, affirms: “The blessed raid of London is a slap in the face for the arrogant crusaders. We have repeated it many times and now we are warning again. To all those who take part in the aggressions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine, we shall respond in the same way”. On the 6th July, one year later, on the anniversary of the massacre, a video is diffused with Shehzad Tanweer, another kamikaze, who pronounces a phrase which is recurrent in the extremist vocabulary: “We love death in the same manner as you love life”. In the clip, Al Zawahiri makes another appearance and sustains that the two militants have attended an Al Qaeda training camp. Compared to what happened in Spain, the British case appears more homogenous to the Al Qaeda. But, in both the situations – as often happens for this type of terrorism – there remain ample zones of shadow that years of investigation have not been able to throw light upon. The virtual base Internet has been transformed into a huge virtual base, into an academy of terror. A fundamental and useful instrument for civil life has been bent to satisfy the needs of criminals. It would be an error to attribute to the web the “blame” of what has happened: equal to other technological innovations, it has good and bad applications. Having said this, it is undeniable that the terrorists have been able to exploit all of the possible advantages, substituting with the telematic Net certain important logistic structures and indispensable functions to keep the movement alive. A mere sympathizer of the cause can connect to one of the thousands of Islamist sites and become part of the community. It is the first step towards enrolment. Frequenting the site, one meets the Jihadist reality, and gathers the motivations and objectives. It is almost a notice of recruitment, where the initiate can understand if he has the necessary requisites. And to attract him/her, they show – always on the Internet – the bloody images of conflict, texts of indoctrination, technological opinions, the war scenarios traced out by the leaders. And there is not only Osama’s face to make testimonial, but also those minor although extremely influential inspirers. An open act of proselytism, almost under the eyes of everyone. The harsher sites are often protected by a key word, but for who has the desire to enter the Jihad, it is not arduous. This allows those who cannot go the Afghan sanctuary or many who live in countries where the security controls are very severe – like certain States of the Middle-East – to stand at the virtual window and observe what happens. A Press inquiry, published in February, 2008, by the Scottish newspaper, “The Edinburgh Journal” discovered how radical elements had utilized the “Face book” space, to gather British university students who wanted to follow the precepts of Jihadist Chiefs, such as Abu Qatada and Abu Hamza Al Misri. An article explained how the “holy war” should be an individual duty for all Moslems. The use of martyrdom was legitimized; it underlined that “no permission (from the parents) is required to adhere to the Jihad”. The potential followers are literally bombarded with slogans, doctrine and invitation to action and to martyrdom: virtual messages directed mainly towards those who do not have the possibility of arriving where the fighting is. However, it would be superficial and dangerous to consider someone a terrorist because he spends hours at the computer to consult the Qaedist web. With Internet one enters in a first circle, very external, where one is known only by pseudonyms or names of war. It takes time before the future militant can enter the second, composed of those who are part of a diffused network. And it is not said that one is successful. With Internet one approaches a way of thinking, to see the confrontation with the West, to consider adhesion to the Jihad – and not necessarily to Al Qaeda – as the only answer to world and personal problems. It is a common goal. To construct it, the propagandists have certain cards at their disposal, which are often convincing. 1. The model – Famous terrorists, like Al Zarkawi or the Saudi Arabian, Al Moqrin, and anonymous fighters are presented as a model to follow, and added to this, biographies of the fallen, speeches, actions are needed. When they lose a leader, the secular organizations or insurrectional parties tend to hide the killing, while the Qaedists are proud to announce the fall of the mujahed. 2.The sacrifice – the exaltation of the martyr, the theology of death, contribute to construct a social assent that pushes the individual to want to enter the organization. For them, the Internet recreates the ambient which has sustained, for example, the tactics of the kamikaze in the Palestinian and in other limited Iraqi sectors. To sacrifice one’s life becomes the common practice that brings honour, respect and consideration. A community sense strengthened by a wise use of images and words: Paradise, the green of the mountains, the purity of the water, the courage of the lion. 3. Suffering – The propagandists recount the suffering of the Moslems in the world. The deaths of the intifada (Palestinian revolts against Israel in1987), the victims of Chechnya, the civilians killed in Iraq, representing an ever-open wound. To revenge “their” deaths, the sympathizers can decide to pass to action. 4. The conspiracy – All of what is happening is the fruit of a conspiracy hatched by the United States, Israel, the “new crusaders”, the Hebrews and the ex-colonials. The idea is always that of a defensive Jihad, which permits the most bloody tactics. If a kamikaze causes the death of other Moslems – an event repeated hundreds of times in Iraq and Algeria – these victims are presented as the “unknowing martyrs”. 5.The Jihad – The fight has a religious dimension: it is blessed by Allah. A sympathizer can redeem himself by carrying out a superior and “noble” act connected to the cause. And who inspires the militants has a thousand roads to indicate: Iraq is the principal destination, but there are also Algeria, Somalia, and Pakistan. The training A good number of the sites contain information of a strictly military nature and have the ambition – often excessive – to wish to substitute it for a real training camp. So as to not fall into easy generalization one must recognize that the practical applications of what is learned on the web are not automatic. It is not enough to read a manual or an arms review “on line” and think of being ready for combat. It is true, however, that the offer is wide. Let us see, in synthesis, the benchmarks. 1) Use of firearms and characteristics of same. 2) Techniques of warfare: from the preparation of an ambush to the creation of shelters. 3) How one lives in an enemy country: great emphasis is laid on techniques of counter-shadowing and measures to avoid being intercepted. 4) Instructions for the preparation of explosive traps: with the use of vehicles, motorbikes, pressure cookers, gas cylinders. At the base there could be military materials (this applies to war theatres like Iraq, Palestine) or civil materials (for use in Europe). 5) Techniques for the elimination of a target. 6) Security of communications: coded programmes have been created, in different versions, to protect the exchange of e-mail. 7) Information programmes: some militant, based in Scandinavia, have realized a guide, in 2006, to conduct research on the Net, to treat the photos with the computer, to diffuse, in the most rapid way, news regarding the rebels. 8) The reconnaissance: On certain occasions, the terrorists have tried to utilize the programme of satellite images “Google Earth”, to study the zone of ambush. Two examples of this use: the Algerian extremists planned an attack against a bus of foreign technicians at the periphery of Algeria; the members of the Al Kassam di Hamas brigade used the Google Earth photos to launch rockets against Israel. 9) Counter-Intelligence: elaboration of studies on techniques and behaviour of Western secret services. An example on all: the over 150 page document written by a militant Egyptian on the modus operandi of the CIA. Certainly, some of these lessons have more impact if the Qaedist lives in a territory like Iraqi and Afghan, where he can experiment and then pass to the action. The Pentagon has revealed, more than once, how there has been a leakage of information from one theatre to another. An exchange made possible both from the journeys of travelling terrorists and by the diffusion of “didactic material” downloaded from Internet and recorded on CD ROMs. Among the most diffused lessons are those which teach the preparation of explosive devices with material available on the civil market. A base ingredient is fertilizer, but the Qaedists have utilized also other products revealed to be lethal. In London, in July, 2007, they used zaini bombs constructed in the bathroom of their lodgings; not different from the technique followed by a neutralized cell in Germany, 2007. In both cases, however, at least one of the militants had had personal contact with the Al Qaeda bomb-disposal experts in Pakistan. The threat of the home-made bombs is seen with a double lens. The first tends to highlight the danger of a diffused and simple arm which very much reduces the logistic aspect and the risks of being discovered. The second, on the contrary, tends to re-dimension the importance of them. The Swedish researcher, Anne Stenersen has underlined how the instructions are often unrealistic, with concrete suggestions, but extremely rudimentary. The researcher has individuated, at least, ten manuals: six for chemical arms, two biological, one radiological (dirty bombs) and one of a good 480 pages, on the atomic bomb. Her Dutch colleague, Marten Nieuwwenhuizen, has, instead, made tests taking into account the information offered on the Internet. In her judgement, “they hardly ever work”. But experience teaches us that with the help of technology and time, one can fill-in the gaps. The dossiers dedicated to the suicide operations are considered formidable because it is seen that the different factions copy each other although acting at a thousand kilometres distance. The information is traceable on the Internet and, alternatively, on support material constituted by video tapes, short film clips and long lessons on CD ROMs. One very “popular” film, seized by the Israeli secret services, is dedicated to the ‘man bombs’. Apart from the meticulous preparation of the explosive devices, a drill exercise is shown. The bomb experts have placed mannequins inside an old bus and then have detonated the explosives. In the video, the instructor takes great pains to explain which positions are the best to provoke the greatest number of dead. The test could have been made in a Lebanese training camp. A good part of the propaganda and information activities are managed by small teams. Sometimes, no more than two or three elements and particularly clever in the use of the computer. Al Qaeda has a desperate need for expertise in this field, to the point that in one of the last video messages of Abu Al Yazid, considered the new manager of the movement, he made a pressing appeal to informatics experts: the appeal was “Join with us”. In the Iraqi theatre, the local branch, founded by Al Zarkawi, has disseminated numerous “stations” throughout the territory, which collect the films, re-elaborate them and then put them on the Internet. The network in the Pakistani tribal regions is just as large. These stations represent the last phase of a process in three acts. The first is the filming of the attack: it is made with a video camera or a cell phone. The second is the re-elaboration of the product: the clip can be circulated in its original crude form, but usually, it is preferred to submit the original to an editing process. Other scenes are inserted; sub-titles and sound tracks are applied. The foregoing is the phase that has grown the most in recent years, thanks to what technology has offered. For some experts it is obvious that the terrorists attempt to constitute a parallel with what is transmitted by the big TV transmissions and give it an international tone. With ever-greater frequency, the films are accompanied by transcriptions in English, French and German. The third and conclusive act is the launching. The “heavy” videos are divided, downloaded on Usb keys and then launched onto the Internet. It is difficult to trace those responsible. Today, one can purchase, with the equivalent of less than 100 euros, the control of a site in the United States and register it with a false identity under the name of someone who resides in Moscow or in Singapore. If the police try to track down those concerned, in most cases they will arrive at an address and not a person. And also the closure of a site is a relative measure: it has happened that within the arc of 48 hours, a site has been re-opened, supported by another server. The facility with which something can be hidden in the virtual jungle has pushed some Qaedists to devise a form of self-financing. They organize telematic swindles, rob identities and sell information.The band led by a young Moroccan, based in London, known in those circles as “Irhabi 007”, has successfully cashed 3.5 million dollars. Starting from nothing, without any knowledge of the extremist environment, the North African has become one of the most important propagandists of Qaedism. A skill and a prestige recognized also by the Al Zarkawi faction which, for these qualities has sustained his position in the West. “Irhabi 007”, among other things, had contributed to the strategy of the tension, to the detriment of Italy, fed with messages and threats in the summer of 2004. One year later, the militant will be unmasked in an almost accidental way: the police find his telephone number during a raid on presumed terrorists in Sarajevo, in Bosnia. The case of the North African encloses the new form of extremism, made of keyboards, videos and rapid connection. The protagonists defend their virtual trenches, being content to live the Jihadist experience on the web. In some cases, they pass years in front of the computer, fantasizing actions, dreaming of martyrdom, nourishing themselves with everything that the net offers. They can remain in this waiting position for a long time. It has been demonstrated by a Digos (Division of special operations and general investigations) investigation of a militant who had transformed his apartment, near Perugia, into a school of terrorism. Others combine theory with practice. This is the case of the Egyptian, Mohammed, arrested in Milan and connected with the enquiry into the Madrilena cell. He was a magician of the computer, of the links with the cells, he was inspired through Internet, but at the right moment, he could intervene on the field. If the challenge of Qaedism is fragmented in many regional and local fronts, that of the Internet projects a global threat. And here is its strength: difficult to measure. As is the perception. The sorties can be considered” paper bombs” magnified by the media system and by the fear provoked by the phenomenon, which continues to be seen in a non-uniform manner. The experts change, the latitudes alter, the interests weigh and we oscillate between those who see the movement of Osama on the wane and those who hold that it is ready for a big resurgence. If we look at what has happened after September 11th, one is inclined towards the first opinion. Examining the volume of propaganda on the web, one opts for the second. The answer must be calibrated, ignoring censorial tendencies. They are counter-productive and inefficient. Close one blog, immediately another pops up. When the Qaedists cannot use the computer, they resort to the cell phone. The latest novelty announced by Al Qaeda is the perfecting of software and the recourse to cell phones able to receive heavy duty lines. One can intervene by putting sites out of order, denouncing who makes written defence of terrorism. But it is only one step. Better to create sites incognito to misinform the extremists. The Americans and English do it with great success, so do certain countries hit by political violence. To infiltrate a forum – on condition that the connection with the subversion is proved – is equal to having an informer within the cell. This does not mean that one is monitoring a group, but rather analyzing the tendencies. One picks up the moods, intercepts the sensitive themes. It might be a tedious work, frustrating and, sometimes, useless. But is a departure point, even though experience shows that to infiltrate a real cell is almost impossible. It is certainly interesting to exploit the irresistible tendency of the extremists to talk about themselves and others, to sense the next moves. During the anni di piombo (‘years of the bullet – the 70’s), it was necessary to await the strategic resolutions to delineate the future of the Red Brigades. Today, we can have these connections in almost real time. However, it is necessary to maintain the sangfroid in gathering the input which filters out of the haze. It is necessary to digest it, without being tempted to follow-up all the alarms that the terrorists boom out. Because this is exactly their tactic. If the criminals try to increase the alignment of the forces of security – the war of words also serves this – the countermove must be to reduce it. With enterprises expected from the Governments. Removing excuses – not from the terrorists, who will always have one in reserve – but from those areas that observe with curiosity and, sometimes, admiration, the Osamian propaganda on the Internet. The challenge with Al Qaeda is on this territory. Therefore, policies are needed that reduce the distance of the Islamic world. Dialogue and tolerance, at the price of some sacrifice, does not automatically translate into the sell-out of security. Those voices should be helped. Voices, today timorous, which are diffident towards the West, but have little to do with the strategy of butchery. Neutrality, given the North
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