According to Griffel, the 11th of September was the result of “globalization, of different civil wars and political conflicts between Islamists, military governments (such as Syria and Algeria), or monarchists ".the attacks were the terrible consequence of a strategic decision taken by the most radical Islamic movements which, defeated in many Islam countries (1) attempted to globalize the fight with the means that the same globalization offered to them, striking the roots and its branches in the Middle East. They used globalization to surmount the barrier of the State in their Countries, carrying out a strategy of survival and offence at the same time".
I wish to submit certain reflections. The first: we must not forget that globalization for the Islamists is the cause of the new Jihad (2) .The peaceful co-existence with the West, at the end of the 20th Century, was next to impossible for them: the West, by offering financial and logistics assistance to its supporters, had contributed, in a decisive manner, to the defeat of Islamists in Algeria, Tunis, Morocco, Egypt and even in Saudi Arabia. For many Islamists, the West, spreading material corruption by means of globalization and giving military aid and security to the Arab executive groups against the Islamists, had launched a double attack, declaring war on Islam.
The global Jihad was the most appropriate reply to such challenges (3) Abu Bakar Baaysir (leader of the Indonesian Islamiyah Jemaah) declared "The United States, and not Islam, is responsible for the terror which, today, pervades the world. It wants to blame the Moslems for attacks like that of Bali, while we have nothing to do with it".It is the United States and its allies that are interested to demonstrate that Indonesia is swarming with terrorists to obtain consensus to attack Iraq” (4) .
The 17th of October asserted that the Bali explosion was "orchestrated by the ‘infidels’ to declare war on Islam" (5) .
The second reflection: in their campaign, the globalist juhadists use and apply with ease, the modern means of communication, transport and war. Thus, while Middle Eastern and North African States release the telecommunications, the Jihadists exploit the new publicity spaces to increase their contact and make converts. Furthermore, the same technologies are used to apply leverage on the ‘surprise effect’ in an attempt to provoke as much damage to the targets
to be hit. The new telecommunication systems, rapid means of transport and modern, mobile and deadly war weapons are the new elements of the new Islamist activist generation.
To give an idea of the leap in quality, it is worth remembering that in 1979, the tape-recording of messages from Ayatollah Khomeini to his followers in Iran was considered an innovative instrument!
The third consideration: like the trans-national society, also the Jihadist globalists see the world as a single theatre of operation. They have also become more agile and always less tied or dependent on a solid territorial base for the international operations.
If it is the case that countries like Afghanistan, the Sudan, Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan are convenient places to manage operations and personnel, the constant presence in only one country seems much less indispensable now, even with respect to ten years ago.
The fourth observation: the globalist Jihadists have an always more frequent tendency to move their battles outside of the Middle East, North African and Moslem areas, and to nail their enemies down in their own or neutral territory, where the Western presence is already considerable in dimension.
The globalist Jihadists have been able to spread insecurity far and wide, forcing the West to review their own security parameters in terms of the post Cold War, where the war, as a single block, is now ceding its place to minor conflicts of a subversive nature, scattered throughout the world.
For example, in our times, an alarm coming from London, Paris, Berlin, Madrid, Rome or Washington assumes a global dimension, and the customary evaluation of threats by Western countries must necessarily foresee an analysis of the activities of small organizations, the monitoring of subjects in e very part of the world, the monitoring of suspicious financial transactions, as well as, the deployment of hidden technologies and of remote controlled sophisticated apparatus.
Finally, while globalization involuntarily weakens the pressure of the executive management on the territorial State, the globalist Jihadists try to exploit the weakening of the physical and bureaucratic borders between the States, to spread their tentacles and guarantee their own effective trans-frontier presence. The lowering of frontiers, of any type, plays into their hands, even if their final objective is to isolate and separate the Moslem world from the West.
On another level, the globalized Jihad jeopardizes the understanding between Arab executive management and the West. The trans-national dangers have undermined the weaker understanding, even though lasting, between the Arab regimes and the West on certain questions such as, for example, the role played by Islam in politics. It is worth remembering that during the Cold War and even more, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 80’s, the politics of Islam (not Iranian typology), on the whole, was favourable accepted by the United States, as an ally in the anti-communist crusade.
The fact that the Islamists portrayed the Countries of the Warsaw Pact as "Godless" played in favour of, not only the geo-political interests of the United States, but also of the domestic fight of its Arab allies against the national Left adversaries and anti-imperialists. Until they questioned the status quo of the regional order of the Middle East and North African areas, they constituted a legitimate power.

Nevertheless, the globalist Jihadists, exceeding all limits and breaking the implicit pact between the governing Arabs and the United States, have taken away from the former, the best lever of command. Furthermore, they allied themselves with the executive classes and with the West, forcing Washington to review its strict relations with those governing Moslems, whose domestic situation appears critical or, worse still, a fertile terrain for radical Islam.
At a distance, it now clearly appears that the events of the 11th September, 2001, were the most macroscopic signs of a much vaster international terror campaign, which involves many Countries of the region. In Morocco, Tunis, Turkey, in post-Saddam Iraq and in Saudi Arabia, the activists of Al Qaeda began to hit civil targets just as they wished, forcing the State to adopt greater measures of security. Availing themselves of the instruments of the IT revolution, the Al Qaeda network created safe structures of control and command in different Middle Eastern and North African Countries, and have used their own branches present in those countries to strike and carry out acts of terrorism
For example, in Saudi Arabia, they have clearly sought to destabilize the Al-Saud Regime, while in other cases, they target "secondary" objectives (synagogues and residences for foreigners), they have known how to wedge themselves between Moslems and non-Moslems, between governors and the people, as well as, between Moslem States and the West.
A commentator noted that the suicide attacks of Istanbul of November, 2003, were a clear "political message to ‘push home’ the fact that Hebrews and Moslems must not collaborate. [In this way, the wanted to make Turkey and Israel pay for] their solid military alliance, and Turkey for having taking into consideration the hypothesis of sending troops to help Iraq" (6) .
This analysis is strangely in line with the message from bin Laden, himself, who warns: "God says: O believers! Do not consider Hebrews and Christians your friends and protectors: they are friends and protectors of each other only. And whosoever of you look to them [in search of friendship] he is one of them" (7) .
And here we have that at a particularly interesting historical juncture, at the exact moment in which governments of the Middle Eastern and North African States start to take into consideration the possibility of opening out, lowering the many rigid barriers towards people, information, and new benefits, just at the exact moment in which they are ceding a little power to the national forces and globalizers, Regional Governments like Saudi Arabia are
incited by their international allies and by their violent opponents to raise the barriers, protect the State and render even more trenchant, their presence in the society
Consequently, the globalist Jihadists, " perhaps, involuntarily " have forced the Middle Eastern and North African Countries to put the State back onto the road of globalization.
Their objective " to impose a trans-national Moslem presence beyond the borders of the single Nation-States " has rocked the already fragile political situation of the Region, dangerously constricting the regimes to seek a balance between those things which are, in essence, technical requirements for survival and elements of legitimization which are as important as their very identity.
The Saudi motto "either you are with the Country [alias the State] or with terrorism", [alias the trans-national Moslem forces, which emerged following the Riyadh attack of 9th November, 2003] perfectly stigmatizes the question (8) . The Saudi Regime must, on the one side, maintain its own interests in the Moslem world, with regard to which it feels to have certain responsibilities and, at the same time, concentrate on essential imperatives, such as the defence of national security against the direct attack of the trans-national Islamist forces.
Finally, by opposing the Western powers in the Region, which are considered to be the political machine of globalization, the globalist Jihadists have, likewise, targeted the modern Moslem State, itself.
This resistance experienced in first person, with suicide missions and other violent acts carried out in the Moslem Countries, makes them martyrs dedicated to a Moslem cause of much wider significance.
Ably creating the Umma by means of the cyber space, passing over the heads of the regimes and underfoot " under the radar of security of the State " they have been able to assume the comfortable role of bridge-head in the fight for the defence of religious devoutness, in the face of the attacks against Islam, launched by the West.
The Middle Eastern and North African States are, inevitably, at the mercy of the political winds which are brought by globalization.
The unpleasant war against the terror, which is now imposed, in particular, on the Arab governors, contributes to further widening of the already large gap between the pro-Western gentlemen of the State and their society, which is, to a great extent, religious and traditionalist.
Furthermore, by placing their message at the Umma level, the globalist Jihadists are provoking the resurfacing, in the State-Society relations in the Arab World, of tensions analogous to those of the epoch of nationalistic struggle between Arab Nation and Arab State.
The subsequent result was a break between peoples, on the one side, and a split and fragmented weak Arab State system, on the other. In the end, it was the State which won the battle, and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, in the August of 1990, was, probably, the last act of Pan-Arabism as an international political power.
Since then, a region already in itself exposed has been more systematically dominated by external powers. In the 21th Century, we can say that we are experiencing again, in a more accentuated manner, the same alignment between Middle Eastern and North African States, and a trans-national power.
This time, however, the caesura concerns State and globalization, State and radical Pan-Islamism, where the latter is a power which has major resources than Pan-Arabism, even if disposed of in a chaotic manner. This time, the State itself, is in a more vulnerable position: on the one hand, it must face a more serious domestic ‘fiscal crisis’, while on the other, it is attempting to mitigate the intrusion of globalization on its society.

Another factor which is necessary to keep in mind is the geo-politics of Pan-Islamism. Starting from the 50’s up until the 90’s, the rivalry amongst the Arab peoples was, more or less, played out within the confines of Arab territories. On the contrary, today’s fighters of the global Jihad feel free to bring their campaign to every corner of the Moslem world and, therefore, they are able to manipulate the geo-political map of conflict with the West and the Moslem regimes in power, in the ways that most conveniently fit their programme: they exercise pressure where necessary, certain of the fact that, wherever they act, the consequences of their actions will be felt in the entire Middle East.
A classic example was the 11th of September, with its repercussions in the Middle East. The Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, in March, 2003: an invasion of a protagonist Arab State in the area and eastern door to the Arab World constitutes, however, another example of the ways in which already difficult relations can undergo sudden developments.
One must consider that the occupation of Iraq was done with the pretext of disarming and impeding Saddam Hussein to supply lethal weapons of mass destruction to Al Qaeda or other terrorists. It seemed of little importance that there existed no really significant ties between the Iraqi regime and Al Qaeda, and that Iraq was no longer in conditions to develop, even less, to accumulate, arms of mass destruction.
Nevertheless, after the war in Iraq, in 2003, the crisis which extends from Palestine to the Euphrates has become more obvious and the Western presence in the Middle East has notably increased.
The war, declared to be fought for the Iraqis and the civilized world, has further enhanced the Islamist theory of an American conspiracy intended to annihilate the strong Moslem countries to the advantage of Israel.
The war, in fact, finished by playing into the hands of Al Qaeda, favouring the opening of an umpteenth front for the Jihad.
A typical supporter of the idea that the United States is intervening to forcibly modify the geopolitics of the Region is Bin Laden, himself, who analyzes the (imminent) conflict in these words:"We are following with great interest and extreme anxiety, the preparations of the crusades in a war which proposes to occupy an ancient capital of Islam, plunder the riches of the Moslems and install a puppet Government, hangers-on to their Washington and Tel Aviv bosses, just like all the other traitor and puppet Governments of the Arab Countries: This, in preparation for the advent of the Great Israel" (9) .
The fact that the other enemy, the Shiite people, would have gained benefits from the war, constituted another pre-occupation, even though unexpressed by Al Qaeda.
As already mentioned, the war has contributed, once again, to re-design the geo-political map of the Region and during the course of the next decade, it is possible that the relations between the States will begin to conform more to the new power reality of the Region. This tendency is already being seen from the way in which Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco and Qatar are realigning themselves to take advantage of the opportunities offered by a major commitment with the United States.
On the contrary, it is noticeable how Turkey, Egypt, Syria and Iran " the most powerful countries of the Region " are, in one way or another, found on the outskirts of these new alignments and Iran and Syria are being deliberately indicated by the United States as destabilizing entities.
The relations between the United States and these two confining States with Iraq could become more tense, during the course of the next 10 years, if Baghdad should assert itself as a strong State, a trusted friend of the West and one of its principal Arab partners in the areas of the economy and security. However, observing the profound crisis that torments Iraq at the beginning of the 21st Century, this eventuality is, to say the least, aleatory. The situation could easily slip out of control and take rather unexpected turns.
Let us consider, for example, a not too implausible hypothesis: in the 21st Century, to resolve its internal geopolitical problems, Iraq is dismembered, reassuming the aspect of Mesopotamia of the beginning of the 20th Century, divided into three "districts" of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. This alternative was not taken into consideration immediately after the fall of Baghdad, but it is possible to imagine a situation in which the persistent problems of Iraq could render the hypothesis of dismemberment acceptable.
The fragmentation of a key Arab State like Iraq, into two or three small States (Kurd and Arab or Kurd, Sunnite and Shiite, respectively) would have important historical consequences. It would not only determine a shift of the power centres within the Region, and not only re-design the geography of the area, but would also leave the door open to further territorial re-arrangements in the Middle East, in a time when the State is undergoing a strong internal pressure, besides the one of globalization.
The other multi-ethnic and multi-national Countries of the Middle East and West Asia, which are numerous, would not have any choice but to erect defensive barriers around themselves and reinforce their own authority, by means of a further centralization of powers.
The result would be diametrically opposed to the tendencies of globalization and to the pulling down of the frontiers. With the advance of the 21st Century, we can, therefore, find ourselves having to cope with the winds which sweep the Middle East, bringing with them further wars, inter-state conflicts and social violence, instead of seeing that diffusion of democracy radiating from Baghdad, so ardently championed by the Bush Administration, in 2003.
However, the dissolution and conversion of the present territorial States of the Region into smaller entities: into a group of States numerically greater, but qualitatively weaker, would not contribute to consolidate globalization in the Middle East.
A re-dimensioning of this type cannot guarantee the minimum requisites for a capitalist expansion nor for satisfying the immediate needs of the people. The inefficient States, as these dismembered countries would, inevitably, become, would not be able to promote the cause of stability.
Therefore, what happens in Iraq, and the probable destruction of the ‘artificial’ State, will have enormous implications for the Countries of the Region " Arab and non-Arab " and will alter a whole series of relations concerning the identity, culture, security, economy, religion and politics of the Nations, which are composed of a vast gamma of populations. Among other things, the internal dimension of the question cannot be under-estimated: with the fall of Baghdad, the Shiite factor has become a political power which is absolutely able to challenge the Sunnite supremacy in the heart of the Arab World.
What is more, the Shiite factor risks a further reinforcement of Sunnite anti-Shiite sentiments, over an area which extends from Indonesia to North and West Africa.
The Al Qaeda violence will attract other militant Salaphite and Sunnite forces, united in an anti-Shiite fight. The Sunnite and Shiite contrasts will have direct repercussions on relations between Iran and nearby countries of Sunnite faith, very likely causing the deterioration of good relations with powerful States such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey. Likewise, the rise of the Shiites in Iraq will make the relations between the United States and the Arab World more complex, insomuch as the former is considered, rightly or wrongly, the sponsor of the Shiites in the Arab World.
For certain Arab Islamists the violent removal of the Baatist Regime in Iraq is part of the same strategy of dominion which tries to strengthen the Shiite “heretics” and the "Zionist crusaders" of Israel against the Sunnite and Arab majority.
The Middle Eastern and North African States find themselves inevitably drawn in the wake of the operations carried out by Al Qaeda in the Moslem lands. The consequences that for such States will have the capacity of Al Qaeda to exploit the time-space compression characteristic of globalization, and the security measures adopted by the West in answer to the Al Qaeda actions, will determine a high level of uncertainty between States in the Middle East.
This, in turn will generate, in all the Countries of the Region, a state of profound uncertainty concerning a further opening of the political-economic space.
Furthermore, the strategy of Al Qaeda influences the geometry of the Region. When bin Laden declares that the regions which have major right to liberation are Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, the land of the two sacred mosques (Saudi Arabia) and Yemen, (10) , you can be rather sure that it will be in those places where the gun fire of his fighters will be the most furious.
These declarations speak of long and indeterminate conflict, ample in terms of intentions and involved geographic area.
In reality, that which Al Qaeda promises is not unlike the dynamics of the globalization itself. Without an adequate defence, the Middle Eastern and North African States could easily fall victim to the explosive mixture of these two forces.