The characteristic of the Turks as a migrant community, clearly changed with the conquest of Constantinople and the creation of the Empire, in 1543, by Mehemet II, descendent of the Lord of the Othman War, from which the Ottoman Empire takes its name, (in Turkish, Osmanli). Like other empires, also the Ottoman Empire, during its expansion, fused, with more or less success, many populations characterized by different languages, traditions, religions and social mores.
This multi-cultural personality was, inevitably, inherited by the republican Turkey, together with its advantages and unresolved contradictions. While Turkey’s natural geographical vocation of cultural mediator favoured, and today, still favours it as the key actor on the international scene, this aspect has, at the same time, been the cause of much internal tension, which this Republic has experienced since the day of its creation.
The European way of life in Turkey, like part of the western-type structures and infra-structures, co-exist with the traditional rural communities of Anatolia, closely tied to various and different religious and cultural branches, while many minorities have been slowly and successfully assimilated through complex processes of integration, under the aegis of a secular republic.
The secular state identity constructed on a western model was, in fact, the key element adopted by Mustafa Kemal, founder of the Republic, to balance the kaleidoscopic nature of the communities which lived on Turkish soil after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Mustafa Kemal, the 1st President of modern Turkey, founded in October, 1923, led the Country through a massive and demanding programme of reform introducing drastic changes.
The leader did not limit the reform only to the institutional area, but considered it essential to launch new behavioural patterns and social models able to profoundly stimulate the evolutionary processes and change of the various groups within the Turkish society. The typical Ottoman head-dress, known as the fez, was abolished in 1925; in 1926, the Swiss civil code and the Italian criminal code substituted the Islamic Law, while in 1934, every Turk was obliged to adopt a surname (Pope, 1997, 62). The Kemalist reform proceeded rather rapidly, producing gradual changes to the way of life, based on strong nationalism, justified and promoted by the President himself.
It is fundamental for this discussion and for the analysis of the violent movements within Turkey, to underline how the processes, directed towards the creation of the Republic, emerged from a harshly endured and bloody war that left a unfulfilled desire for revenge among many communities and minorities.
From the ethnic mosaic which represented what remained of the Ottoman Empire, a conspicuous number of minority groups were left, in fact, isolated from their own original provenance. For example, this was the situation of the Armenians, who found themselves on Turkish territory at the end of a conflict, and although in another set of circumstances, the same was for the Kurdish tribes, divided among a number of different States in the Middle East. In the religious area, the Kemalist reforms, in all probability, ably developed with the intention of excluding any possible elements of division among the communities present on the territory, defined a secular state where Islam, and any other religion, were deprived of any direct influence on institutional life.
The reform process was certainly not easy, especially, in view of the fact that Islam, in the Ottoman Empire, in quality of religion of the majority and of the State, had constituted the backbone of the ethical-moral and legal system, through the application of the Shar’ia, the Islamic Law.
In this context, the governing class demonstrated its capacity of putting into operation and developing the Kemalist idea, promoting the new Turkish Army to the role of guardian of the institutions and of the vast processes of secularization, developed through the state institutions, in primis, the Ministry of Education.
It is worth repeating how these processes were not always carried out with respect for what we, today, define democratic values and that, often, force was the principal instrument adopted to ensure the prevalence of the secular ideas, (Zurcher, 1997, pgs. 187-190).
The Turkey of today is still the land of meeting and, sometimes, of conflict, between cultures and its kaleidoscopic composition, which we remember as rather lively. However, these very differences and the variety of social-political shadings make Turkey a place of infinite fascination and cultural richness. However, these same nuances are also the basis of the internal tensions which have challenged the Turkish leaders since the beginning of the Republic.
The history of the Turkish Republic and its geographical position, embody essential elements for the analysis of the roots of terrorism in this Country. In this context, the principal reasons at the base of the terrorist movements in Turkey are tied to the religious, ethnic and political tensions, which are utilized and, in different ways, manipulated by the power elite within the various minority groups, and, in a number of cases, exacerbated by the repressive measures taken by the Turkish authorities, in various moments in the history of the Republic.


The Republic of Turkey and the
development of the terrorist movements


The Republican Turkey of 1923 is the product of a hard and bitter fight which united the populations of Central Anatolia under the umbrella of a new national spirit, created and promoted by Mustafa Kemal, later named Atatürk – the father of the Turks. The innovative doctrine introduced by Atatürk aimed at increasing that patriotic spirit of unity which took form from the re-proposed origins common to all Turks: a kind of new mixture where nationalism and the Secular State represented the new driving force.
So it was that, at the head of a new flag, a new nation was proposed to the world. A world amply supported by a new executive class and, rather passively, accepted by the scarcely literate masses. As history has often testified on the occasion of the formation of new States, also the creation of the Secular Republic of Turkey, with the institution of its new borders, left various minorities isolated from their community of origin.
The Kurd population, historically located in East Anatolia, thus became part of a new State which was not necessary in line with the traditions and social-cultural dynamics of its own community.
In such circumstances, then, the Turkish leadership, immediately after the creation of the Republic, introduced laws intended to consolidate the values of a new Nation. Following this path, on the 3rd of March, 1924, the Parliament decreed the abolition of the Islamic Caliphate and closed all Kurdish associations and newspapers (Pope, 1997, 372), clearly showing the already perceived incompatibility between the methods selected to obtain the unity desperately sought by the new leadership, and the ambitions of independence of the principal Kurdish clans.
Living on territory divided between Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey, the Kurd populations were already historically known for their close ties with a number of other clans and for their strong aversion to integration with other community systems. Even the Greek, Senofone, in the 4th Century BC, referred to this mountain population which showed scarce inclination to obey the laws of the king (Kinzer, 2001, 110).

Apart from the ancient history of the Kurdish people, its spirit of self-determination and its national aspirations seem to take a more consistent form with the birth of Turkey.
Other inter-ethnic disputes emerged with the dawn of the new Turkish Republic. In fact, tensions flowed following the massacres suffered by the Armenian populations, creating strong dissension between the new State and the Armenian minorities remaining on the Turkish territory. Similarly, the secular character of the Republic, vastly promoted and, in a certain sense, imposed by the Kemalist idea, began to be disliked by the Islamic religious groups, which aspired to accomplish Islam political rule.
It is, therefore, probably that the abolition of the Islamic Law and the introduction of new civil and criminal codes (Pope, 1997, 372) was not favourably accepted, at least, not by certain religious groups which, it is correct to suppose, still exercised influence on a part of the population. Meanwhile, Turkey certainly needed a new stable identity and the rapid introduction of new rules and regulation was, positively, instrumental in the development of the necessary cohesion to pull the Nation out of the crisis produced by the decadent and ineffective Ottoman leadership.
Thus, already in the 20s, at least, two possible sources of strong political-religious tension can be identified in Turkey: the Kurd question, characterized by the separatist desire, and the Islamic movements, delineated by the firm intention to resist secular reformism and aiming at the re-introduction of the Shar’ia.
For a better comprehension of the context from which the terrorist movements emerge, it is very important to explore the socio-political evolution of the State and its complex fragmentation silently hidden behind the proclaimed unity of the Kemalist movement.
As often happened, between the 19th and 20th centuries, after the creation of a new State, it was possible to observe a new and tenacious governing class which supplanted the old and, sometimes defeated aristocracy.
It was this way for the old Ottoman dignitaries, who were removed and substituted by a new governing class. In this regard, it is probable that a sort of opposition, with religious roots and/or ties with the dominant Kurdish families, contributed to nourish the struggle against the new rulers, since they were denied access to the chambers of power.
In this sense, the first phases of the Turkish Republic were strongly characterized by a clear totalitarian tendency of the Kemalist party which, to launch serious reforms, it was necessary to maintain control of the Country,but did not help to promote a process of reconciliation and integration of the minority groups.
Discontent and social struggle was common during the 30’s and was harshly suppressed on the orders of the highest Turkish leader. However, it was probably fear of a possible formation of new political opposition movements that convinced Atatürk to increase control on the social and cultural life of the Country. Therefore, during the first decade of the life of the new Republic, the authorities put an end to the activities of many cultural associations (Zurcher, 1997, 188).
The fear of the development of possible opposition movements became, to a certain extent, the propelling force of the initiatives of Atatürk and demonstrates certain totalitarian tendencies of this leader. It is evident that such actions were not able to entirely suffocate the opposition, but simply contributed to drive it underground.
During the 30’s and 40’s, the repressive measures taken by this system were particularly harsh, especially towards the religious movements. At the end of the 2nd World War, when the international pressure and internal dynamics accompanied the Country in its first steps towards democracy with the elections of May, 1950, the two principal parties sought to obtain the votes of the Islamic movements. As a consequence, religious classes were reintroduced in the schools and the Faculty of Religious Science was officially instituted in 1949 (Zurcher, 1997, 244).
The alternating economic crises, from this period on, further contributed to augment the social conflicts: from the tensions between the middle class and the impoverished rural masses to, more or less, open confrontation between the adherents of the new secular State, and Islamic religious groups and movements led by clan leaders founded on ethnic bases.
Political tension continued to be a fundamental element during the whole of the 1950’s, until the military coup d’état, on the 27th of May, 1960, which ended the failed regime of Prime Minister Menderes: the event being briefly celebrated by the students and the Turkish intelligentsia (Kinzer, 2001, pgs. 62-63).
This coup d’état, destined to be only one of many in the history of Turkey, took place at the beginning of a troubled decade, where the catalyzing socio-economic changes and the student movements played a key role in the history of the 20th Century. The social changes urged many people to become an active part of the intellectual movements and to reflect upon a daily life conditioned by urbanization processes and a savage industrial growth.
Probably, this context acted as an incubator for the formation of new ideas; ideas which, very often, were later evolved with the fusion of various movements. Some of the emerging political parties, because of their newness and, therefore, still a partial expression of this society in motion, showed a strong tendency to be radical; very probably, as a result of this historic situation and by a certain authoritarian-repressive tendency manifested by the authorities.
Thus, the urban proletariat and the student movements began to acquire a more clear-cut identity, attempting to affirm civil liberty and workers’ rights.
The Turkish national scene and, in some respects, also the international, were dominated by considerable social tensions, principally spurred on by economic crisis, which tended to exacerbate the already existing distance between the dominant class and the working class, reducing, at the same time, the already very thin social stratum occupied by the middle class. The social tension of this period came together with and, to an extent, in close connection with the rise of the movement, led by a strong ideological left wing impetus, to be framed in the context of the polarized logic of the Cold War.
The governing Democratic Party appeared, at this moment, unable to deal with this new social turmoil. The increasing awareness of oppression, emphasized by the role of the army in establishing and choosing the members of the Government, together with the new social conditions, all created a suitable situation for the birth of left wing movements originating from the ashes of the old Turkish communist party, outlawed for a long by the authorities. The sensation that an armed struggle represented the only effective instrument to overcome such an oppressive regime probably led to the formation of extremist groups emerging from the left wing factions of recent creation.

It is interesting to ponder how Turkey, at the end of the 60’s, presented social phenomena similar to those found in Eastern Europe, processes which were totally foreign to many Middle-East countries, where the religious influence and a, relatively, low development index impeded the formation of a class consciousness. This is not to say that Turkey was totally immune to this social ‘wait and see’ policy.
In fact, while a part of the population became supporters of struggles aimed at obtaining social justice, the major part, which was situated in the rural areas, were largely excluded from these processes.
Therefore, it is likely that this historical point was a period where the distance between social groups increased, at the moment in which elements connected to the same group started to take different social paths; where a part began to become aware of a system of rights and another part remained essentially anchored to traditional socials laws, where religion continued to have the key role as social moderator. It was at this time that, out of the manifestations of the urban proletariat discontent, violent groups emerged, which saw in the armed struggle the means to reach their objectives.


Terrorism in Turkey – between politics,
ethnic clashes and religion

Although it is clear that Atatürk was able to propose a new model of government, based on a revolutionary idea, it also appears very evident that this was carried out using a considerable dose of political violence, probably not so rare for those times, but enough to be present in the historic memory of the opponents.
In this way, the actions of Atatürk were directed against Islamic groups, separatist factions and other groups considered in conflict with the interests of the governors. The same methods were adopted by his successors and underscored by the influence and actions of the military apparatus, particularly, during the numerous coup d’états. The different nature and ideological motivations of the various terrorist groups in Turkey underwent an evolution within a context which led to violent attacks which, notwithstanding the differences characterizing their perpetrators, these actions certainly cannot be considered in terms of human losses provoked by the terrorists. In this analysis, the specific conditions under which the most important terrorist groups were created, and the motivations behind the choice which led them to conduct an armed struggle against the State institutions, assume a central importance.
The Turkish terrorist groups are to be differentiated according to their political, ethnic and religious vocation, framed within a specific historical-political context.
The groups which claim political motivations for their actions were identified as driven by revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideas or from the extreme Left, while the groups motivated by religion are linked to ideals tied to an integralist interpretation of Islam.
In order to observe a good overall picture of the terrorist movements, we shall deal with only certain groups. In particular, those which, for their history, organization and modus operandi, can be considered as the most significant for an objective analysis of the roots of this phenomenon. The first terrorist organization emerged more clearly as a product of the class struggle, in 1974.
The almost contemporary formation of a series of militant and subversive organizations would suggest, in this context, the presence of particular conditions favourable to the development of these socio-political processes. As a confirmation of this hypothesis, it is interesting to note how the end of the 60’s and the beginning of the 70’s were dominated by a decisively repressive attitude by the Turkish authorities, towards intellectuals and elements adhering to extreme Left movements of the time. The repression was carried out with particular force and method by the military authorities, which after re-taking power in 1971, did not hesitate to use detention measures regarding those manifesting sympathy for left wing ideas.
With regard to this question, not only elements of the extreme Left were effected by these repressive actions, but also members of Islamic religious brotherhoods who had supported Ncemettin Erbakan politics in the creation of a conservative Islamic Party (Mango, 2004,71). Bulent Ecevit, named Prime Minister, in 1974, put an end to the temporary military control of power. The new leader, probably animated by good intentions towards processes of social reconciliation, conceded an amnesty to revolutionary elements imprisoned by the military leadership, and to those who had fled abroad. At the same time, a small part of the intellectuals from the middle class were successfully absorbed by the emerging political movements.
However, the amnesty was not able to impede a considerable number of its beneficiaries from utilizing their newly acquired freedom to promote the armed struggle. The movement known as the Revolutionary Left (in Turkish, Dev-Sol), subsequently, re-named the Liberation Front of the Turkish People Party (DHKP-C), now emerged in strength (Mango, 2004, 72). In this case, it is rather evident that the good intentions of Ecevit came on the scene when the radicalization process had already reached its point of no return, and they were not, therefore, sufficient to start that really necessary social pacification.
On the contrary, the moment was not propitious and the decision to liberate the political prisoners caught this ‘portion’ of the prison population in an acute moment of rage and desire for revenge. In a similar way, this process involved other political movements in Turkey. The conservative party, known as National Republican Rural Party, proposed by its leader, Colonel Alpaslan Tutkes, as an anti-communist bulwark and internal barrier to the emerging left wing groups.
The corresponding youth party, better known as the “Grey Wolves”, set up genuine paramilitary training camps which gathered supporters, accompanied by a violent campaign reported by the press as emulative of Hitler’s SA (Zurcher, 1997, 244). If, in the case of the FHKP-C, it was the feeling of oppression which motivated the triggering of the armed struggle, for the “Grey Wolves”, it was the perception of danger linked to the left wing movements: this perception was promoted and fuelled by Colonel Alpaslan Turkes, himself. In this connection, it is important to remember how these events occurred within an international scenario dominated by the Cold War, where the two powers in competition did not refrain from actively encouraging groups which could promote ideologies to the detriment of the enemy or its allies.
The Liberation Front of the Turkish People Party (DHKP-C) appeared on the scene as an emanation of the urban guerrilla group known as Dev-Sol (Karmon, 1999) and was from the intellectual revolutionary faction, active between the 60’s and 70’s.
The group originated in 1978, created by Dursun Karatas, and was an offshoot of a larger socialist organization known as Revolutionary Youth. The DHKP-C was of a clear Marxist-Leninist matrix, in addition to a specific aversion to the United States, anti-NATO and anti-Turkish (American Department of State, 2005).
Specifically, the DHKP-C, from its inception, considered the Turkish Government as a fascist power, controlled in an authoritative manner by western imperial forces, particularly by the United States and by the NATO. The group declared their intention to eliminate such western influences through violent means set in a Marxist revolutionary logic (MIPT website, 2006).
The proclaimed political motivation of this movement would suppose a particular aggressiveness against government objectives, with particular emphasis on military installations, but, on the contrary, the statistics show that the majority of the attacks, corresponding to circa 36% of the total number of actions concluded by the DHKP-C, were against commercial activities (MIPT website, 2006). Such facts underline rather clearly the preference for so-called ‘soft targets’ more vulnerable objectives, and also an unmistakable lack of operative capacity which, otherwise, would have led the organization to perpetrate other kinds of attacks, like the attack against the present Turkish Prime Minister.
In 1993, the DHKP-C underwent a schism, which gave birth to two factions: one remaining faithful to the historic leader Dursun Karatas, and the other supporting the emerging figure of Bedri Yagan. At the present, it is supposed that the DHKP-C is still led by Karatas, wanted by various European police, since Bedri Yagan was killed by the Turkish Security Forces. It is important to underline that the DHKP-C has financed its activities, mainly, by means of donations and extortions (American Department of State, 2005).
The DHKP-C is representative, at least, in its general characteristics, of the other terrorist movements tied to extreme left wing ideologies, and its analysis leads us to the identification of a series of factors which characterize the motivational systems typical of the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary terrorists in Turkey. In primis, its foundation was a reaction to an oppressive system which, for years, impeded Turkish intellectuals and workers to publicly manifest their dissension.
Secondly, this movement, at the time of its creation, found ample support also on an international scale and it aligned itself on a strongly polarized world zone, taking sides with one of the two contenders in conflict: the Soviet Union. The third element which appears crucial for the genesis of this group is tied to a clear motivation of a psychological nature and relative to the individual impulse of the single members (Reich, 1988, 25-102).
In the mid-seventies, this same context gave birth to another faction, which appeared for the first time in Ankara, under the name of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), officially founded in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan. Also in this case, like the revolutionary movements of a Marxist-Leninist matrix, after the coup d’état, in 1980, this movement became a violent terrorist movement.
However, the PKK presented itself as a movement motivated by different dynamics from its contemporaries. In fact, notwithstanding it shared socialist revolutionary impulse deriving from the same social base as the DHKP-C, the PKK identifies itself as the driving force for the promotion of Kurd independence.
Therefore, despite the similarities with other militant organization of the extreme Left, the PKK remained totally tied to the idea of self-determination of the Kurds in Turkey. During the movement’s existence, it has principally targeted individual members of the Establishment and government buildings, and in general, opponents of the movement (FAS website, 2006). From its beginning, it has carried out about 100 attacks, causing more than 40 deaths and 250 injured. In this case, like the DHKP-C, the preferred targets are private commercial activities: very probably, because of their vulnerability (MIPT website, 2006).
This group was founded by Abdullah Ocalan, otherwise known by the nickname, Apo, the uncle. Born in 1948, of a Turkish-Kurdish family, Ocalan after having tried, without success, to join the Turkish Air Force, was able to register in the Faculty of Political Science of Ankara, which he subsequently left to take up a post in the Public Administration at Dyiarbakir, where it seems he was particularly inclined to corruption to finance his power ambitions (Mango, 2004, 214). After having been a member of several left wing revolutionary movements, in 1975, he began to plan the creation of his own group.
Concerning this question, it is likely that Ocalan had cautiously considered that the Kurds could be the right target to absorb and adhere to a separatist idea of a Marxist nature. Poverty, a living collective memory of the revolts against the various dominations followed one after another in the history of the Kurdish people, and the use of an armed struggle seemed to be the right element for a leader in search of a group to guide (Kinzer, 2001, 111).
Abdullah Ocalan was immediately identified by the Turkish Security as a threat against the interests of the State and, in 1980, was forced to transfer his headquarters to Syria, where he took advantage of ample support for his paramilitary activity, furnished by President Assad, who conceded to the PKK, arms and training camps on Syrian territory (Kinzer, 2001, 111). He then became an unwelcome guest also for the Syrians and, in 1999, was captured in Kenya by the Turkish authorities. He was, subsequently, condemned to life imprisonment for murder and betrayal (MIPT website, 2006).
Even though its historic leader is, at present, detained in a Turkish prison, the PKK has continued to be responsible for a high number of terrorist attacks. The principle catalysing factors regarding the motivation of this group are many. The impulse that directs the PKK definitively towards the armed struggle is furnished by the reactions of certain parts of the Turkish society to the military coup d’état of 1980.
This factor is absolutely similar, if not identical, to the one resulting from the analysis of other extreme Left groups. Also here, the individual psychological motivation seems evident. The same story of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, and his narcissistic personality (Post, 2001, 85) demonstrates the veracity of how the creation of the PKK would appear to be the outcome of one individual’s need for power, rather than a determinate choice from a firm ideological position.

Finally, the limited freedom of expression imposed on the Kurds from the very beginning of the republican era, might appear as a further factor that could offer credibility to a terrorist movement, and given the oppressive conditions, might render a higher public consensus than would normally be expected towards a violent movement of this type.
To make the terrorist panorama in Turkey even more complex, if possible, in the 80’s, another group announces its existence under the name of Hezbollah (in Arabic, ‘The Party of God’). Although, on the surface, it is ideologically inspired like its Islamic Lebanese namesake, the Turkish Hezbollah originates and develops in the predominantly Kurd region of Dyiarbakir, as a Sunnite movement, unlike the group that is active in South Lebanon, which gathers individuals adherent to the Shiite movement. It is in this way that the Islamic religious connotation adds to the other catalyzing factors of terrorism in Turkey.
The ideological-religious denotations of the Turkish Hezbollah seem to refer to the extreme phalanges of the Khargiti, an Islamic Sect going back to the 7th Century, noted for their austere interpretation of Islam (Õzören website, 2006). There is confirmation that initially, this movement received support and military training from the PKK, even though very soon, this co-operative effort gave way to rivalry.
The Hezbollah movement accused the PKK of being responsible for collaboration with the Armenian leaders, of serving communist ideals and of having assassinated Moslem brothers. This fight lasted for many years, causing the death of hundreds of people, between PKK members and other Kurdish groups (Levitsky, website, 2006).
In this period Hezbollah crossed the borders of the Dyiarbakir region, to expand into other parts of Turkey, where it used mosques and secret locations, to proselytize and increase the number of its militant elements. Certain sources report that this movement does not hesitate to resort to crime in order to obtain financial resources necessary for its activities.
Such actions in themselves, clearly contrasting with every Islamic belief, were justified by Hezbollah on religious grounds. Since, according to the leaders of the movement, the victims were all people noted for their behaviour in contrast with the Islamic faith (Õzören website, 2006). For example, in the space of only six months, in 1999, more than 200 Kurdish businessmen were kidnapped by the Hezbollah movement (Levitsky website, 2006). In addition to this criminal behaviour, Turkish government officials stated that they had evidence which would confirm support offered to Hezbollah by the Iranian authorities, in the form of military training (Migdalovitz 2002, 4). Apart from a, more or less, confirmed hypothesis, it is a fact that this group has continued to terrorize Turkey, carrying out attacks, on many occasions causing deaths among the civilian population.
The Turkish Hezbollah develops in parallel with other terrorist groups of an Islamic matrix and stresses a number of fundamental aspects typical of the origins of terrorism in Turkey. Hezbollah comes to maturation, almost simultaneously with the PKK, in the same geographical area, and after a brief period of alliance, becomes its rival. This element could suggest that the end of the 70’s presented such dynamics as to supply suitable ground for the genesis of subversive movements in East Turkey. The suppressive methods adopted by the Turkish authorities in that period, could have functioned as a catalyst for a concrete oppression or, also, could have served as vital lymph for the birth and development of Hezbollah. International developments and the rise of the first new Islamic militant movements are added as propulsion for groups destined to persist over the long-term period, insomuch as they are continually nourished by new tensions.


Conclusion

In consideration of what has been said of the three cited groups in this brief analysis, we can draw our conclusions regarding the ties between the birth of terrorist groups and the events which have characterize the history of modern Turkey.
In the first place, the style of government adopted in the first decades of the Republic was characterized by a strong will to impose a new institutional system, together with new social models, accompanied by decidedly repressive methods.
Thus, these last could have contributed to the motivation for an opposition front to the constituted authorities, involuntarily functioning as a cohesive factor between many ethnic, religious and cultural minority groups. Considering then, in more recent times, the succession of military coup d’états, the almost contemporary formation of an urban proletariat and a certain lack of response from the State to the requests of this new important social group, such events, inevitably, worked to stimulate the birth of protest movements. This last, in itself
is insufficient to justify the formation of violent groups with subversive aspirations, but it is useful to outline the social platform from which they derive. It is, instead, significant to analyze the reactions of the State with regard to the general discontent, both that coming from the urban proletariat and the more silent dissatisfaction of the more conservative Moslems. The military coup d’états although welcomed by many Turks and considered by the lay sector as a sort of extreme resource against Islamic politics, could also be added as a source of tension and radicalizing elements.
The lack of social reform and the repressive attitude were, undoubtedly, negative stimuli, especially for elements already individually inclined towards anti-social behaviour. Furthermore, the ill chosen operation of the Turkish Army in East Anatolia, against Kurdish extremist groups, probably precipitated the radicalization of a larger number of elements already, in many ways, inclined to support the PKK: just as such military actions could have had a polarizing effect among members of the local Islamic community.
However, it is likely that the leaderships of the groups discussed here, had concrete economic interests in maintaining tensions at a high level. In this case, the violent actions would appear to be further nourished by the profit obtained through the illegal activities of these terrorist groups.
The analysis of the roots of terrorism in Turkey lead us to rather homogeneous conclusions, where groups although characterized by different connotations and vocations, seem to share almost equipollent catalyzing factors and reactions, which are practically identical in the face of possible radicalizing actions although their ideologies diverge considerably. Furthermore, it is important to underline that the suicide actions, normally associated with the Islamic matrix, have been used also by the PKK and the DHKP-C although respectively fed by separatist and Marxist-Leninist ideals.
Therefore, it would seem reasonable to deduce that the deep origins of terrorism in Turkey are shared by groups which are ideologically different one from the other and can be identified within a multi-dimensional context and composed of various temporal strata characterized by different socio-cultural tendencies, normally linked to closely connected social groups
The state of concrete, or only perceived oppression, emerges as one of most vicious and difficult to control causes behind the creation of terrorist movements. Other reasons connected to individual and group psychological dynamics are added to these motives, reconfirming how exclusion from the society of origin can represent a recurring cause, associated with the individual tendency to anti-social behaviour (Reich, 1998, 25-40). In this regard, the individual story of Apo Ocalan, leader of the PKK, constitutes a rather clear example. Finally, and to a different extent, the diffusion of extremist religious ideals aspiring to create theocratic regimes is to be found among the causes of Islamic extremist movements.
In fact, the roots of the terrorist phenomenon in Turkey are but the mirror of a rather troubled modern history, where external influences have been combined with factors of internal tension, leading groups of individuals particularly inclined to this kind of violence, to form dangerous and destabilizing movements Against a scarce sensitivity towards internal dynamics and a certain lack of managerial capacity in social problems by the State, would appear to have substantially contributed to the generation of a favourable climate for the birth of subversive movements
Furthermore, the vast spectrum of terrorist organizations in Turkey is the reflection of the great diversity typical of this Republic. Even though it is undoubtedly difficult for a State to handle such diversity without disposing of adequate resources, it remains crucial, however, to remember that it is just this diversity that constitutes the wealth of other countries, one among all, the United States of America.


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