The unpredictable moves and counter-moves of the reigning diarchy in Cuba, the Castro brothers, Fidel and Raùl, regularly wrongfoot the international observers, experts and “Cubanologists”. But probably not the Cuban people, accustomed (and resigned for half a century!) to the pirouettes, contradictory decisions, about-turns, the announced, but never implemented reforms, and the predicted and immediately forgotten changes by the Lider Maximo before, and now by his “younger brother”.
In any case, many observers ask whether, in recent times, something in Cuba is really happening, above all, after the liberation of 31 political prisons of the group arrested in March 2003, and all to be released within a brief period, according to official declarations.
Can the timid measures introduced by Raùl Castro, to give a little oxygen to the dramatic economic situation of the Country, put a brake on the social discontent, which although restrained by the rigid political control, is palpable in every strata of the population? Could it be the beginning of a new economic system? Are they going towards a “Chinese” model (free market in exchange for the maintaining of iron control of the political system)? Currently, is there rivalry between the two brothers, Fidel, the conservative and Raùl the reformer?
All very lawful and legitimate questions. However, as always in the Cuban questions, it is necessary to try to discern the declarations from the achievements, the declared aims from the hidden finalities, the occasional promises from the maintained commitments, in short, the tactics from the strategy. Furthermore, without counting the immense advantage the Regime has, compared to democratic systems: power to use at will, all the means of information the Country possesses, to form, control and direct public opinion, to which it does not have to be accountable, since it does not have to account to political parties (non-existent) or to opinion movements (forbidden), or to workers’ unions (in practice, there exists only one, which is under strict government observation) and so on.
Let us take an example, the recent release of political prisoners, so celebrated – rightly so – by the international media (but not by the Cuban media, which was literally taken up with the “Reflexiones” of Fidel). First of all, it was not a “liberation”, but an authentic “forced exile”. That is, the prisoners were released from goal and immediately expelled, very secretly, from the Country. Expulsion as a condition of freedom! Certainly, exile is always better than prison, one says. But this is just the point, is it just a tactical move, i.e. of a mere humanitarian decision adopted to limit the growing international protests and obtain the termination of the EU Common Position? Or rather, are we looking at a political gesture, the introduction of new and innovative relationships with the civil society and the peaceful opposition? The first hypothesis seems more plausible to us.
In fact, how can one not reflect on the circumstance that the “liberation” came on the very eve of the Council Meeting of the E.U., which had to decide whether to renew, or not, the Common Position? How can one not think that the Cuban Government is cynically using two dozen, or so, prisoners to obtain the end of the bland European ostracism, and instead, commit itself to some democratic reform in respect of humanitarian rights? In short, the European Union asks for significant gestures to eliminate the Common Position, the bête noire of the Castro Regime, which considers it as an intolerable interference in the domestic affairs of its Country. Havana, however, decides to “sacrifice itself”. Therefore, it liberates a large group of political prisoners to obtain – at the same time – the definitive clearance in Brussels of the Regime; a better predisposition of the States of the Union to invest in the Island; a consolidation of the governmental positions inside and outside of the Country with beneficial pressures on the USA to loosen the embargo; the maintenance of the privileges reserved for the nomenclature and, above all, a saving of time in order to slow down the constant erosion of the Regime. All this is worth throwing a few “mercenaries” out of the Country, but nothing more. Tactics, therefore, not strategy…
But, one says, we must have faith in the Catholic Church, which has played a leading role – an invaluable work of mediation – in the negotiations that led to the liberation of the political prisoners, thus becoming a privileged interlocutor of the Regime. A Government readiness – Cardinal Jaime Ortega sustains – willing to further reforms and openness and which, consequently, will be supported and encouraged, counting on the willingness of Raùl Castro for reform. Fine! But also in this case certain circumstances have to be clarified.
First of all, there was no “mediation”. The table of negotiations was rigorously private and between two: the Regime and the Church. Notably absent was the third interlocutor (a mediation presupposes the existence of two opposing parties), that is, the representatives of the peaceful opposition or, at least, of the civil society. Therefore, we cannot speak of mediation, but a noble and appreciated intervention with an exclusively humanitarian objective to obtain the end of the unjust convictions inflicted on 75 of the “Primavera negra”, guilty only of expressing their views in opposition to the Regime. An undoubted success for the Cuban bishops, who however, should have made themselves heard sooner … But a success that involves a risk which cannot be overlooked. The risk that the Cuban Church is transformed – in the spider’s web skillfully designed by the Castro brothers – into an unaware pillar of support of the Regime, awaiting uncertain openness and improbable democratic reforms. This, after all, is the conviction of most of the internal opposition (including the Catholic component of Oswaldo Payà) and of almost all of the exiled dissidents, who have always looked with much suspicion at the tactical moves of the Regime, whose only objective – the dissidents affirm – is to perpetuate itself. The Cuban Church has, undoubtedly, its own pastoral motivations and its own transcendental visions, but it may have fallen into a trap , i.e. agreeing with the tactical designs of the Regime, without first requiring clarifications on the strategic intentions, making it appear, at the moment, the best pillar of the Cuban communist system. Ultimately, it is necessary to avoid that the liberation of the political prisoners is seen as the end of a new openness rather than just the starting point.
At present, it seems evident that the desperate wish of Raùl Castro is to save the Country from economic bankruptcy, resorting to all possible “tactical” means, including that of the cautious openings in various sectors. In fact, the economic, financial and commercial situation of Cuba is becoming dramatically unsustainable. A Country where nothing is produced, where the public structures (90%) are among the least productive in the world, where the agriculture, once very flourishing, has been put on its knees by a frantic collectivization, which has destroyed the spirit of initiative and the desire to embark on any enterprise (to the point where Cuba is forced to import 85% of the agricultural products it needs, including sugar), where the principal government revenue comes from “bad American Cubans” who send consistent remittances to parents remaining on the Island (unduly taxed in the amount of 20% by the Government), from tourism (prevalently with sexual connotations), from the extraction of nickel (a gift of nature, not of the system…), and from services (in practice, the revenue deriving from the international “cooperation” for the Cubans: 60,000 medical doctors, nurses and teachers, who work abroad and whose wages mostly finish up in the pocket of the treasury). An economy substantially dependent on Venezuela, which supplies Cuba, every day, with 100,000 barrels of oil at bargain prices. Cuba is a strongly subsidized economy, supported by the favourable conditions accorded by friendly Countries (China, Vietnam and Brazil).
Some significant figures will probably be enough to give an idea of the present state of the Cuban economy. Havana has a foreign debt of around 20 billion dollars (which is not honoured, our SACE – the Export Credit Insurance Agency has some related experience on this); the most recent cyclones caused damage amounting to 10 billion dollars; the Balance of Payments records a deficit of 2.5 billion dollars, the commercial one of 10 billion, while foreign exchange reserves amount to just 4 billion dollars. How can such an abyss be bridged? The cash crisis has assumed such proportions that even the current accounts of foreign enterprises operating in the Country have been frozen. Accounts which are unblocked drop by drop, more or less according to political patronage criteria. All this is complicated by the fact that the importation of agricultural products and medicines coming from the United States (the only two exceptions provided for in the US embargos) must be paid in advance and in cash, the American banks not being able to deal, not even indirectly, with the Cuban banks.
Is it all the fault of the American embargo? Only partially. In reality, it is the Cuban model which has not functioned and if it has resisted this long, it is only owing to the concerned support of those Countries which are ideologically similar.
In such a disturbing situation, the Cuban Government is very well aware of the necessity of having to adopt some reforms in the economic system of the Country by gradually introducing the parameters of the capitalist economy (privatization of many activities; meritocracy; fight against waste and of the public unproductiveness; salaries commensurate with results; and partial reintroduction of private property etc…). After all, to save the economy means more chances of maintaining the political regime, principally though, not to fail the charismatic figure of Fidel Castro. In any case, time would be gained. This – according to many observers – is the underlying thinking of Raùl Castro.
But a similar policy would incur a fatal risk. The opening of the market and of the Country could give rise to a wave of uncontrolled liberalism, which could bring down the entire building, with all the power holders who live in it and to write the word ‘end’ to the revolutionary experiment of the last fifty-one years. This, in essence, would be the thought of Fidel, always allergic to any significant reform, a sworn enemy, in his time, of perestroika and glasnost, which in Cuba, in fact, has never taken root due to the wish of the Commander-in-Chief.
Is it, therefore, a contrast between two brothers? Nothing is less sure. In fact, the two have always been complementary and, since the beginning have chosen different roles for the same finality: to maintain power! To Fidel, therefore, the glory and the exasperated media exposure, to Raùl the organization and the discretion. A well studied game of parts that Fidel and Raùl have, with art, managed and continue to manage, confusing and wrong footing the international observers. Playing at two tables and, in a certain way, also interchanging them. The most important thing is always to adopt the best strategy to keep the Revolution alive.
All this complicated by the American policy, uncertain, as never before, with regard to the Cuba question. Should they eliminate the so deprecated embargo, proved to have been useless for the purpose of re-establishing democracy and damaging for the American image in the world? It is, today, a possible option for the Obama Administration. But how would the large Cuban-American community of Florida react, an electoral weight which, in some phases, has been determinant for the President himself? Furthermore, it must be considered that the law on the embargo can be modified or eliminated only by Congress (where the anti-Castro feeling is still very strong) and not by the President, who can, if necessary, intervene only on certain implementation measures. Washington, in such perspective requests significant gestures of democratic openness, but the communist regime cannot go beyond a certain limit without discrediting itself and without risking political suicide. An inextricable knot.
What then are we allowed to predict for Cuba? It is impossible to venture hypotheses. As we have seen, there are too many variables to take into consideration. In reality, numerous scenarios can be proposed and they are all credible. From the most optimistic ones (a gradual and smooth change without social upheavals) to the more dramatic ones (explosions of violence, personal vendettas that have been hatching for half a century), or to the one … originally of a Fidel – diminished in his mental faculties or perhaps, come to his senses – who just a few days ago declared; “the Cuban model no longer works!” What did he mean? Has he suddenly embraced the theories of the partisans favourable to substantial modifications of the “system”, of that system which he has obstinately defended for fifty-one years? Has he suddenly become more reformer than Raùl, who, until now, has been presented as the innovator who cannot go ahead because of his hidebound elder brother?
The two-party game continues, the Cuban people continue to be absent from the decisions that concern them, the economy of the Country continues to be in freefall, the international “useful idiots” continue to crowd the court of Havana.
In short, confusion reigns, but one thing appears to be certain.
The future of Cuba will commence only after the Castro(s) have definitively left the scene, when the Cuban people regain their own lost identity, when the ideological fanaticism that has lasted half a century finally dissolves, when the Cubans can finally take their destiny into their own hands and decide, democratically and without external influence, the path to indicate to the new generations.