I don’t think one can define Utopia an ideal which, when it is translated into concrete political choices, it has led to rhythms of uninterrupted growth: let us think of the U.S. model, where a bi-partisan agreement between democrats and republicans allowed, in the 90’s, a wave of liberalization which guided the growth of the GDP. Certainly, the world crisis has re-awakened fear. And fear leads to protectionism, to the closures of the markets, and to the not wanting to acknowledge the inter-dependence of the economies. The difficult economic trend has created a general diffidence towards the advantages generated by the competitive encounter and towards the market mechanisms; loud voices are raised for new regulations and limits to the actions of the companies; in short, the benefit is being doubted of the entire process of liberalization which, between highs and lows is, however, ongoing.
The experiences of the past show, however, how this wish for closure is not only mistaken, but also dangerous. History teaches us that the policies adopted by the governments to obviate situations of crisis, focused also on the introduction of restrictions and of breaks with the anti-trust regulations, have done nothing but exacerbate and prolong the negative situation: in the United States, at the time of the Great Depression, certain of Roosevelt’s advisors held that the competition was a contributory cause and in 1933, a law was approved for the resumption of national industry, which brought important infringements to the federal anti-trust regulations. The law was declared unconstitutional in May, 1935 and the committee, instituted by Roosevelt, in April of that year, to examine the effects of the reform, concluded that that programme, promoting cartels and monopolies had, in fact, slowed down the recovery. This experience confirms that it is extremely hazardous to fall back on protectionist solutions, intending as such all those which determine situations of privilege for certain operators, sheltering them, therefore, not only from the threat of the foreign competitor, but from anyone who wants to exercise a healthy and effective competitive action.
The strategy of maintaining markets open and competitive – even if it can meet with certain exceptions for particularly delicate sectors – is, therefore the best, the only one able to maintain and equip the Country System for the phase succeeding a crisis.

I consider that the crisis, precisely for its endemic extent, forcefully brought to the attention of the political institutions all over the world that the model of ‘national’ vigilance is not sufficient. It is not by accident that the project of European monitoring, not without some resistance, has already had the go-ahead from the Financial Ministries of the EU. Europe and Italy, in particular, withstood better the shock-wave of the financial crisis: there have been no bank failures; we have not experienced the race to the banks to rescue savings. Our banking system demonstrated a good solidity. Thanks to the patrimonial solidity of our credit companies, the system was able to contain the losses. On the whole, the mechanisms of surveillance, constructed on the fundamental objective of stability, functioned. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to undervalue the many cases of savers who were burnt by mistaken investments: these families have suffered their own small tsunami and I don’t think that the evaluations on the good performance of our financial system can console them.The Anti-Trust has received reports of people who have seen their life savings go up in smoke. An opinion asked of the State Council made clear that we are not competent on the financial products and we had to pass the reports on to the sister Authorities. But what happened should spur the Legislator to individuate capillary systems of control on the quality and transparency of the information that the financial operators must give to the public. I believe that on these aspects there is still much to be done: the financial contracts are rich in information in such detail as to be useless; the financial operators who – as provided for by the Mifid directive make, obligatorily, the ‘profiling’ of the propensity of the savers’ risk – are the same people who then sell the product, thus assuming more than one role in the comedy.

Let’s start with an ascertainment: the heated polemics between the industrial and financial worlds, which have accompanied this period of crisis, confirm the existence of a problem. The Italian Banking System has made many steps ahead, but it must make others and not only with respect to the retail clientele. Above all, in a negative economic phase the banks must evaluate the potentiality of the companies and not only their assets. It is a cultural leap which could be favoured by an increase of the competition in the sector, which we have been able to monitor only from 2006. Since then, I believe we have done our duty to the very maximum: we have concluded two important cognitive investigations which have uncovered certain anomalies: excessive costs to the clientele, share plotting in the financial sector to the point of impeding the competition. We cannot, however, take the place of the Legislator: it is not up to us to cut with a hatchet all the role conflicts that we have highlighted in the investigation. We can act as a chisel, and this we have done, when we have been called to authorize the mergers.
I remember that in the first place, we brought the subject of the ius variandi to public attention, judging it as a mediaeval practice. On this the Legislator was in agreement. But when we intervened against the banks which did not apply the free transferability of loans, we were stopped by the Tar, (Regional Administrative Tribunal) which annulled the fines.
I have a clear conscience: more, we could not have done. Now the ball is in another court. I hope it is placed in the right position.

As soon as the jurisdiction in matters of incorrect commercial practices was obtained, we instituted a call-center, with a green number put at the disposition of consumers and their associations. We went onto the field immediately; we have made the protection of the consumer a fundamental mission for the activity of the Authority. The response of the citizens has been positive: from the end of 2007 until today, we have received almost twenty thousand calls, to demonstrate that the call-center meets real needs. Not all these telephone calls concern cases which fall under our jurisdiction, but we have referred the reports to institutions which can intervene. Apart from the call-center, our action has moved along two lines: prevention and repression. Right from the beginning of my term of office, I have maintained – attracting also some criticism – that with the productive world, it was necessary to come face to face with the situation because the sanction is a defeat, first and foremost, for the Authority. For this reason we have used the instrument of moral suasion to convince the companies to adopt more transparent behaviour with regard to the consumers. When, nevertheless, the damage towards the users is already verified, we can do nothing else but punish, in the hope that the companies learn the lesson.

The class-action does not overlap activities of the Antitrust; if anything, it represents a complementary instrument to better protect the consumers. It is a civil law weapon which aims to recognize the collective damage and to facilitate recourse to justice on the part of the consumers who have been damaged. In parliamentary discussion, I had hoped for a greater role for the Antitrust, imagining that we could perform a sort of preventive filter action. Unfortunately, this proposal did not pass. Now that the class-action has, finally, become law, it is essential that an intelligent use is made of it. I consider that it is necessary to operate this lever in the case of really serious damage caused by irresponsible behavior by companies. I would not like someone to fall into the temptation of overdoing the recourse to the class-action because it would be the best way to shelve it.

. More than once I have advised of the danger of the diffusion of many small Iri (Institutes for Industrial Reconstruction). Municipal capitalism is not compatible with the principles of competition, not because the societies are the property of the Municipalities, but because those same Municipalities are, at the same time, proprietors and controllers of the management of the services. A conflict of obligations which results in higher prices for the consumer and in poorer quality services. Fortunately, after years of false starts, a reform of the local public services has, finally, become law, which although conceding a period of transition – necessary to avoid chaos in the public services - has fixed certain fundamental principles: the management of the public services must be put up for tender and the societies which present themselves must be, in the majority, private. This model breaks that tie which, up to now, has existed between Municipalities (which will have the responsibility, first and foremost, political, of controlling the work of the society which has won the contract) and the former municipalized societies become private (which must operate to the best, on penalty of the risk of being expelled from the market).

The deterrent of the sanctions exists, even though it is necessary to distinguish between the sanctioning regime, provided for the violations of regulations for the protection of the competition, and that in force against the incorrect commercial practices. In the first case, the instruments in force are adequate: the law give us the possibility to sanction with fines up to 10% of turnover, even if it does not allow us to attack the assets of the associate societies when the agreements are decided at the level of association of category. On the whole, nevertheless, we can graduate the sanction, bearing in mind all the elements. For the incorrect commercial practices, instead, the fine can reach a maximum of 500 thousand euro, which constitutes an enormity for a medium-small company and a trifle for a large company when serious incorrect commercial practices are actuated, which damage a multitude of consumers. As far as the possibility of directly striking the assets of the administrators, I don’t think that an innovation of the kind could give greater deterrence to the sanctioning system, but certainly, it would render even more complicated the preliminary investigations which should ascertain personal responsibility. Moreover, the shareholders have all the weapons to punish an administrator who violates the law. If they do not use them, it is because, evidently, the culture of the competition and of the commercial correctness is not a part of company ethical baggage.