GNOSIS 3/2008
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Al Qaeda twenty years after ... and came the hour of dissent |
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Guido OLIMPIO |
In August of 1988, Osama Bin Laden and a handful of followers laid the foundation of Al Qaeda. Twenty years later, the name still holds, even though the “factory of death” that it created is beset with problems, internal dissent and difficulty in maintaining the uniqueness of the “terrorist product”. For the Caliph to have attained these twenty years is already a success. Very few subversive organizations have been able to do it, without failing in their ideals and practice of same. But it is precisely because of the time factor in its evolvement that inevitably, voices of dissent are raised in opposition to the Leader. And, in fact, forms of dissent are spreading within the ranks of the Jihadists. They are expressions limited to a few intellectuals with reduced consequences in the field, but sufficient to disturb the spiritual guides of the movement. Osama and his fighting companion, Ayman Al Zawahiri, have had to react and tighten up the reins, which they would not have done if insidious dissension had not been spotted. This Al Qaeda crisis could be due to the tendency of the leaders to cover all possible crises, to intervene in every conflict that involves Moslems (and the United States), to try to fan the flames of every hotbed, without, however, having the right lever to determine the mechanisms. But the rift can be transformed into something much deeper, since it is not only an ideological question that is sowing discord – a rift which the West tries to enlarge with counter-information manoeuvres – but it is the strategies and, consequently, the terrorist tactics themselves, which are causing dangerous divisions within the movement. And the most evident rifts have emerged in two important outposts for Al Qaeda: Iraq and Algeria. In these two Countries the Islamic intimidatory massacre tactics have not only alienated certain intellectuals of the Jihad, but by indiscriminate killing the extremists have found themselves against the very individuals whom they thought to transform into followers. If the pendulum is no longer on the side of Al Qaeda on the Iraqi territory, it is also because of the butchery carried out among defenceless civilians. The heirs of Al Zakawi wanted to create a Shiite-Sunnite civil war, but instead, they exasperated the relations within the Sunnite camp. Those who were, for a certain period, allied and accomplices of Al Qaeda have taken up arms against the followers of Osama, forcing them on the defensive. A more intelligent strategy – who knows why they did not adopted it before – has led the Pentagon and the Bagdad Government to make a pact with the Sunnite Tribes, has created an interaction between population and authorities and has exploited the errors of the terrorists. The Clans were compensated not only with money (a lot), but also recognizing a role which is, perhaps, irreplaceable. The following months will show whether the pact – temporary and fragile, made up of self-interests and not of the sharing of objectives – can be changed into something long lasting. In this extremely uncertain phase, the same Qaedist evolution appears turbulent and lends itself to many varying judgements, to the point that the experts are arguing on the status of the organization. On the one side, there are those who see it in a waning phase, by now without a real hierarchical structure; on the other side, there are those who maintain that, notwithstanding the evident problems, it is always a dangerous enemy able to repeat an 11th September, at any moment. Opposite positions, favoured by the particular nature of the movement created by Osama. As the expert, Steve Simon, observes, the study of Al Qaeda “is more art than science”. And, therefore, leaves much room for personal interpretation, once released from the facts, numbers and reality. In the following pages, we shall look at what has happened during the last two years within the terrorist galaxy, comparing the judgement of the analysts, trying to weigh – as far as possible – the real force of the phenomenon that has changed the life of the West and the Moslem world. The challenge of Doctor Fadl The most clamorous example of revolt within the Al Qaeda is embodied in the figure of Sayed Imam Al Sharif, better known as Doctor Fadl. True spiritual guide and politician of the Egyptian Jihad, author of fundamental texts for the extremists, venerated as a scholar, he was with Osama in the days of the foundation of Al Qaeda. His stand – contained in the “Document for the correct guidance of the Jihad activities” – exploded like a bomb. A document accompanied by a series of press participations, sent via fax from the Egyptian prison of Tora, where Fadl is serving life-imprisonment. He questions the decisions of Osama, the killing of civilians, the attacks against Arab States which oppress Moslems. For the ideology, the 11th September was a catastrophe, representing a betrayal towards the Talibans (who were opposed to it) and even towards the enemy. Purist, deeply religious, Fadl sustains that the 19 Kamikaze entered the United States with a visa and, therefore, were obliged to respect the law of the adversary. Words of condemnation also, for those factions financed by kidnappings and illegal activities. An even more important aspect, the dissenter advanced doubts about the legitimacy of the top Qaedists, sustaining their inadequacy in the area of religious knowledge. In his eyes, they are ignoramuses who have exploited the anger of the Moslems. An attacked tied to both ideological and personal questions. Fadl, who performed the role of mentor to Ayman Al Zawahiri has accused him of having removed and changed a text, which was then diffused among the Qaedists. A manipulation of the thoughts of Fadl to justify the subsequent actions of Al Qaeda. An affront that the ideologist has never forgiven: in one of the declarations issued from prison, he defines Al Zawahiri as “a charlatan”, underlining how the present ‘second in command’ of Al Qaeda betrayed – under torture – his companions. There is, in the background, however, a deeper diatribe that has placed “the party of the jurisprudence” (Fadl) in opposition to “the party of action” (Al Zawahiri). The first, although holding radical positions, advised prudence in the steps to be undertaken: the Islamic movement passed to the offensive when it was still weak and unprepared. What is more, the Egyptian ideologist invited people to use caution in taking literally what was published on the Islamic sites – today, a great source of inspiration for the militants – and denounced the “jurisprudence of the justification”. A reference to those who seemed to adapt the Sharia (the Islamic Law – editor’s note) to their objectives and find a “legal” basis only after the action has been carried out. The particular situation in which Doctor Fald lives was used by the other doctor, Ayman Al Zawahiri, and in reply to the criticisms produced and diffused a 200 page book on the Internet. The hook on which he hangs his defence is rather obvious: Fadl and the others were forced to “repent” and, therefore, had acted in agreement with the Egyptian Authorities. An observation that is not, all together, unfounded since it is rather strange – as the same Al Zawahiri sarcastically noted – that an extremist can issue a fax from a maximum security prison like the Tora. The furious and prolonged reaction with messages on the Internet constitutes the proof that the blow of Fadl has left its mark. Libyan and Saudi manoeuvres The tempest in Egypt had a parallel phenomenon in Libya. Thanks to the mediation of Noman Benotman, and ex-member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, one of the many Qaedist veins, the Ghedaffi Regime opened negotiations with the Islamic executives in prison. Benotman – personally known –also he was in Afghanistan in the years of the Al Qaeda growth. In 2000, he participated in a summit with Osama to whom he confides; “Just one more operation and then I stop”. An allusion to the 11th September. Benotman progressively moves away from the movement and does not hide his displeasure over the consequences of the attack on America, and definitively breaks with the ex-companions. A position expressed with a letter to Al Zawahiri. The negotiations conducted by the mediator bother the initiatives of Al Qaeda which, between 2006 and 2008, tries to put its stamp on the formations that are in action in North Africa. A manoeuvre dedicated by the adhesion of the Salaphite Group for the preaching and the Algerian fighting to the “main branch”: a shift in internationalist positions blessed by the change of name to “Al Qaeda in the land of the Maghreb”. An evolution marked by the use of kamikaze, by attacks against foreign targets, by recourse to the Internet for the propaganda, and by the attempt to influence and control the militants of nearby Countries. The undertaking of Benotman has importance because it fits into a larger design which sees many Arab Countries using not only the stick to oppose the Islamists. Algeria, Libya and Saudi Arabia unite the repression to offers of reinstatement for those who renounce violence. A difficult path, with alternate results, which, nevertheless, had the merit of breaking from the logic of the clash and offer an alternative. It is in this framework that certain important Saudi sheiks emerged from the shadow of Al Qaeda to denounce no longer acceptable actions. The most resounding case is that of Salman Al Awda. Once a great supporter of Bin Laden, reference point for terrorists, finished in prison in Saudi Arabia and then released, he severely criticized his “godson”. In an interview given to the Mbc TV, he pronounced a few phrases which have become famous: "“Dear Brother Osama, how much blood must be spilled? How many innocent … must be killed in the name of Al Qaeda”. . Therefore, he made people remember that Bin Laden "… is a simple man, without religious credentials, but one who has a personality that attracts”.. Al Awda, to underline his position, specified that in the past he had expressed criticism regarding Al Qaeda, avoiding, however, to attack Osama directly. On the same wave length is another famous Afghanistan war veteran, the Algerian, Abdullah Anas, who is, today, resident in Great Britain. The breaking point for the Mujahed was represented by the bombs of Madrid and London; “Criminal acts, contrary to the Islamic Law”..
The Impact The stands taken by the dissidents – told and re-told, minutely examined to the last syllable, and commented upon – have been viewed as a decisive watershed by those who see a black future for the Al Qaeda. But those who have re-dimensioned them are not lacking. For Michael Scheuer, former head of the Alec Station, the CIA unit that coordinated the hunt for Osama, the declarations are important, but do not touch the fundamental bases of Qaedism and have very little impact on the ‘man in the street’. On the contrary, in the eyes of many young people, fascinated by the violent fundamentalism, the dissidents appear as defeatists, who accept to submit to the adversary. In the daily newspaper, Al Hayat, Murad Al Sishani, adds certain points: 1) the ideological row between reformists and purists is not that new. They have been fighting since the 80’s, mixing personal ambitions and basic questions; 2) the message of protest does not seem to be acknowledged by a large audience: rather, it is “read” only by a category of intellectuals; 3) the recruitment area for the top people for Al Qaeda has moved from Egypt to Saudi Arabia and, more recently, in Algeria. The movement is fragmented and de-centralized. Perhaps, Qaedism is in decline, but on the opposite side, Salaphitism is gathering consensus, an ultra-radical interpretation of Islam. The party of the wary, however, recognizes that the declaration of Fadl or Al Awda is invalidated by one important aspect: both statements arrived after the subjects had experienced prison. Therefore: what is genuine? Is it the fruit of a bargain with those who are keepers of their destiny? Legitimate doubts which glare in the eyes of any militant. And, in fact, this was the argument that was reiterated time and again by Al Zawahiri in his on-line polemics. The Sageman theory The comparison of the greater systems of the Jihad has been reproduced, in the Western field, on the present consistency of Al Qaeda. The former-CIA agent and psychiatrist, Marc Sageman, author of the book “Leaderless Jihad” and, today, consultant of the New York Police, theorizes that the movement has passed from an organization structured and guided by the Qaedist hierarchy to an informal multitude of local groups that tend to emulate their predecessors. They are friends and neighbours that ‘radicalize’ together; they grow up together and finish with acting together. It is the theory of the “youth gangs”: that of the spontaneous cells. A subject which we have seen examined in another number of Gnosis. For the scholar, the major danger is always in Europe, inasmuch as it is easier for these realities to form, given the particular social situation of the Moslem Communities. In the analyses, the Mujaheddin profile is changed. With regard to the “chosen troops” responsible for the 11th September, the new recruits are much younger, with little education and low – if any – religious preparation. They are born, live and become extremists in Europe, and are then fascinated by a slogan, which Sageman synthesizes in “Jihad is beautiful”. An evolution characterized by four steps: 1) moral rage with regard to how the Moslems in the world are treated; 2) consider this rage as part of the war on Islam; 3) fusion of these sentiments with the everyday problems which any young person can have in any Country; 4) mobilization or creation within a social network: friends, parents etc. Under fire of criticism, Sageman has changed certain positions; hurrying to sustain that he did not want to underestimate the importance of Osama and the “old guard”. However, he insists in his theory. In his opinion, the radars of anti-terrorism must be pointed on those who Al Zarkawi called the “lion cubs”. Sageman’s book is interwoven with certain United States Intelligence evaluations – also these reviewed and corrected – which started to speak of the victory over Al Qaeda. The Director himself, prudent and moderate, does not hide his satisfaction for results obtained on various fronts. Not only is Al Qaeda in retreat in Iraq, but is losing the “battle of ideas”, a clear reference to the internal disapproval and to the negative reactions provoked by the massacres. Robert Grenier, a former high executive of the CIA and expert in the terrorist reality, added “The worst enemy of Al Qaeda is Al Qaeda itself”. Meaning that the Osamian movement could destroy itself, torn apart by the internal feuds and by the counter-productive choices. It was then the turn of the Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, who, in front of the Fox TV cameras, declared: “Today, Hezbollah is the A-team of terror … Al Qaeda is a B-series team, in comparison”. The answer Inevitably, this delicately painted picture has given rise to heated polemics. With bitter attacks, the analysts maintain that the approach of Sageman is superficial and naïve. Heading this line of thought is Bruce Hoffman, Professor at Georgetown University and an authority in studies on terrorism, being dedicated to this research well before the 11th September. He comments “The study of Sagemen has no scientific basis – it is only his affirmation – and too many times we have celebrated the funeral of the Osama factions”. ““Al Qaeda is very similar to a shark”, he writes, “which is forced to keep moving – it is not important how or at what speed – otherwise it dies. Al Qaeda must constantly adapt and adjust itself to the efforts of the enemies to block its plans and, at the same time, it must identify new targets. The capacity of survival is directly tied to its determination and to the enlargement of its own ideology”. Hoffman, in support of his own argumentations, cites the National Intelligence Estimate of 2007, and other published documents up to the summer of 2008, of the United States’ security apparatuses and research institutes. Dossiers of decidedly strong colours. Let us look at them in synthesis. *The greatest threat to the national security remains, with the central leadership that continues to plan conspiracies of high impact and pushes Sunnite extremist communities to emulate its efforts and sustain its abilities. * It is an agile and flexible organization with a command chain that functions from the top to the bottom and vice versa. The operative abilities remain intact. * It has created a well protected sanctuary for its executives in the Pakistani tribal area (Fata), finding protection in the coalition of the local Taliban, today, led by Meithullah Mesud. In this cradle of terror, the Qaedists assume the function of “multiplier of strength”, that is, providing for military assistance and indoctrination. * It has lost important management members over the years, but has demonstrated to know how to replace them, showing, once again, great spirit of adaptation and initiative. * The network has intensified efforts to recruit citizens with European passport. In March, an attack was verified, conducted by a German of Turkish origin. One of the many young people who have left for Afghanistan and Pakistan. * Certain formations of Jihadist inspiration, like the Pakistani Taliban or the Uzbek Islamic Movement, have assumed the role of transmission belt of terror. They receive, enrol, ideologically and militarily prepare recruits coming from both the Middle East and Europe. Double-use militants. They can go on mission in the Afghan war theatre or they can be sent back to the Countries of origin, to organize attacks. Investigations in Spain and Germany have confirmed the presence of ‘radio-controlled’ cells, even though the hierarchical relations with the tribal area are not completely clear. * The importance of the Fata is testified by a change in the movements of the recruits. Today, according to the American, the preferred destination of the Jihadist volunteers is the Afghan-Pakistan sector. To the point that numerous militants decided to leave Iraq to be united with their “brothers” who operate to the East. Movements dictated both by the part played in this area and by the objective difficulty of the Qaedist on Iraqi territory. * Osama and Al Zawahiri have dedicated various propaganda interventions at the Palestinian junction and to Israeli, leaving the Iraqi front to take second place. A shift interpreted as the attempt to recuperate terrain, playing a card that is always dear to the Moslems and moving away from a quadrant – Iraq – where the Qaedists are clearly on the defensive. The question is whether Al Qaeda will relaunch its actions striking Israel? * The Peking Olympics and the American Presidential elections: two historic events that coincide with the twentieth year of Al Qaeda. For terrorists a double opportunity. In China, where they could acted in the name of Islamic minority of the Uighuri (a separatist component that has found support in the omnipresent region of the Afghani-Pakistani confines, under the Islamic Movement flag of East Turkistan). There have been some attacks with victims, but it concerned acts that were more demonstrative than strategic. In the United States, instead, the choice of a President is a classic occasion which could stimulate the Qaedists to act in a much more dramatic way. Even more so today, considering the profound difference on the fight against terrorism theme between the two candidates. In addition to the United States conclusions, Bruce Hoffman has cited the reports of the British Security Services. Particularly one prepared by the MI5 that speaks of at least 2000 Al Qaeda elements active in the United Kingdom. After the London and Glasgow attacks, the signals put out by the official declarations were that the terrorists could strike again and at any time. However, on the characteristics of potential attackers, the interpretations are less clear with respect to Hoffman’s opinion. Re-examining the nature of the cell responsible for the underground attacks (2005), the discussion still continues on what the real link was between the kamikaze and the main branch. It started from the self-constructed and semi-spontaneous cell, and then attention was concentrated on the trip to Pakistan by the cell leader, Mohammed Siddique Khan, as proof of an operative contact. In reality, as Professor Samuel Rascoff of the New York University notes, the episode lends itself to a double reading. Without the mission to Pakistan, perhaps the July, 2005 attack would not have happened. But it would not have happened anyway if the terrorists had not found radicalism in the privacy of their own homes, in Great Britain. If we look at the bombs of Madrid (March, 2003), we come to the same conclusions. The sentences of guilt were handed down to a group of “local” extremists who had conceived the massacre in Spain. The death of the perpetrators has certainly impeded major clarity and the flight of suspects, very close to Al Qaedism, has not allowed the emergence of the much sort after link. But going back in time and observing the beginning of the first cells in Spain, the ties which are not exclusively ideological can be spotted. The third way Between these two alignments of opinion, a third way has crept in, open to authorized personnel, investigators and experts. Convinced that in facing terrorism a clear-cut and pragmatic approach is necessary, equal to that shown by the Qaedists, for the Indian, B. Rahman, both Sageman and Hoffman are right. A growing number of Moslems, wounded and blinded by what they see, set out on the path of the Jihad without identifying themselves in Al Qaeda. The scholar cites the massacre of Madrid and expands on what has happened in Pakistan in recent months. The many suicide attacks have been conducted by the “worshippers” of Osama, without having received any orders from the movement. According to Rahman, those who fall into this category have only tactical capacity and their objectives show it. Instead, it is the main branch that has the force for a strategic strike like the 11th September. And the Indian expert shares the alarm of Hoffman: the expansion of individual terrorism and the spontaneous cells must not induce us to think that the central Al Qaeda has become inoffensive. The Spanish Judge, Baltasar Garzon who, over the years has studied the phenomenon closely, is worried by the negative consequences, and advises to get out of the “black or white” dilemma. “In the 90’s, we looked at the scattered groups, then Al Qaeda came into being; now we say that it no longer exists and no longer represents the threat of the past. We are making the same error of 10 years ago”: these are his words entrusted to the New York Times. Also Peter Bergen, who together with Paul Cruickshank opened the debate on the decline of Al Qaeda, has taken pen and paper to make himself clear. And if the affirmations of Sageman are not completely rejected, the maximum attention must be invoked. “The danger of the Al Qaeda followers is not extinct and the influence of Osama is larger than many analysts imagine. His Jihad is even stronger than when he was able to flee from the mountains of Tora Bora, in the winter of 2001. The Taliban are springing up again in Afghanistan and the extremist factions in Pakistan have grown in a very aggressive way, to the point of threatening an important city like Peshawar. The Islamists in Europe and in North Africa continue to enjoy the benediction of Osama and the label of Al Qaeda”. The hard core is probably reduced compared to the pre-11th September golden epoch. Estimates from the Egyptian Intelligence speak of 200 men, perhaps fewer. For the Americans, the number is somewhat higher: from 300 to 500. Below this rung, those factions united by simple ideological relations move with great intensity. They are probably small, with ambitions above their real capacity, but they have the resources to do harm. Three cases to substantiate the facts. In Algeria “Al Qaeda in the land of the Maghreb”, after surrenders and arrests, one can put a maximum of 400 militants in prison camps. Few to change history, but many to sow terror with tactics copied in the Qaedist academy; sufficient to sneak into nearby Countries (Tunisia, Mauritius, Morocco) with their own presence or through a joint venture with local nuclei. In Morocco, the police reported to have neutralized two hotbeds that planned to hit western and tourist targets. In Turkey, a commando attacked the US Consulate of Istanbul: actions by amateurs with scarce possibility of success which, nevertheless, confirm that the terrorism danger still has roots.
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