The strategy of Japan against terrorism
There was a time, not too long ago, when the Japanese society captured the attention of the Western analysts. It was not only the need to know a system which, in economy, was considered unique in the world, but there was something more, which went further than the fascination for the exotic land of the Rising Sun. The Japanese culture was showing itself able to adopt some of the Western schemes and, at the same time, to jealously guard many of its own characteristics: this blend rendered the system particularly effective. In the eyes of the politicians and Western sociologists, Japan could constitute an example of a possible development alternative. Today, the situation has changed: while other systems have captured our attention, Japan has revealed many limits: differences which are difficult to understand. Among these there are several which concern the management strategies of the security system. In this regard, the article offers an analysis of the instruments adopted in that country to impede diverse forms of terrorism. The difference between what happens in Europe and the dynamics of Japan are so obvious as to give rise to interesting reflections.
The 11th September, 2001, terrorist attacks had a considerable impact on the perception of security in countries all over the world. Certainly, terrorism is not a new phenomenon: the “nine-eleven” events have had the effect of modifying the perception of national security by placing attention on subjects which were previously under-estimated or ignored. The terrorist threat has suddenly risen to the top of the priorities list for the defence agencies of almost all the world States.
The anti-terrorist strategy employed by the western powers, in particular, by the United States, consisted principally, in using actions of demonstrative force, as reprisal or as an instrument of pressure against non-state groups or governments. The dimensions reached by the “war against terrorism” - which has led to the invasion of at least two States over the period of a year and a half - are without precedence, but on close analysis the principles are those already adopted in the past.
In this article, I shall try to show how the anti-terrorist strategy of Japan differs from that of the major western powers. We shall see that the paradigm used by the Japanese government is a pragmatic "case by case" approach, using a diplomatic strategy on an international scale. We shall point out, therefore, the internal structures which deal with crisis management, and the Japanese philosophy towards the fight against terrorism.
Afterwards, we shall examine the substance of the two most shocking terrorist attacks that have happened in Japan: the cases of Aum Shinrikyo and Tupac Amaru. Finally, we shall see the changes in the Japanese strategy following these two events and, in particularly, following the attacks of the 11th September.
Following a line of continuity with the traditional policies of counter-terrorism, Japan, on the one hand, has tried to improve its ability to respond to crises, including those caused by natural disaster, and on the other, to enhance international collaboration in the police and intelligence sectors.
Counter-terrorism in Japan
Terrorism, in Japan, is conceived as one of the problems in the vaster field of crisis management. There is no legal or executive framework which exclusively handles counter-terrorism, although certain activities are incorporated within a wider context. The responsible authority is The National Agency of Police (ANP – keisatsuch˘) under the supervision of the Commission of National Security.The ANP deals with a wide spectrum of activities related to security: from the management of highway traffic to mobilization in cases of disasters and natural catastrophes.
Terrorism is, therefore, included in the anti-crime system, favouring, in the case of international terrorism, the cooperation and exchange of information with foreign police organizations. Furthermore, a case by case treatment is preferred, giving maximum priority to the protection of the victims, rather than to the repression of terrorism. The Japanese authorities, as in the case of natural disasters, try to limit the loss of human life, leaving the task of judgement and punishment of those responsible to the judicial authorities.
As previously mentioned, there is no specific body for counter-terrorism, as there is in Italy, Great Britain and the United States, but following the recent crises, the Special Attack Squad has been instituted, which is very efficient in armed intervention and intelligence (1) . Furthermore, terrorist crises which involve Japanese citizens abroad are handled by the Special Office for Japanese Citizens, (Jap. h˘jin tokubetsu seisakushitsu) within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs structure (gaimush˘).
As David Leheny, professor of East Asian Studies in the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Wisconsin, has shown, Japan preferred to avoid a rigid counter-terrorism policy, trying, instead, to safeguard, at all costs, the lives of its own involved citizens. This has almost always led to negotiations with the terrorists (2) .
For example, in the case of the Japanese Red Army (ARG) plane hijacking, in 1977, a six million dollar ransom was paid to secure the release of the hostages. Although since 1996, Japan has adhered to the international conventions against terrorism and adopted the “no concession” principle in dealing with terrorists, it appears that, notwithstanding, ransom payments have been made.
Also Japanese companies are ready to help employees who have been taken as hostages, by complying with the kidnappers’ requests. For instance, in 1996, Mr. Konno, President of the American branch of Sanyo Video Components (SVC) was kidnapped while he was in Mexico, where numerous factories of the company are situated. The company went immediately into action to obtain his release for a ransom sum of two million dollars. In the same manner, the government intervened to save four geologists in Kyrgystan and three citizens in Iraq (3) .
Although it might be thought that the payment of ransoms could create a vicious circle: the increase of kidnappers and kidnappings, there does not seem to be corresponding statistics between the willingness of a country to pay and the incidence of the attacks (4) . Martha Crenshaw, expert in terrorism studies at the Wesleyan University of Middletown, has shown the scarce effectiveness of coercion policies on the proliferation of terrorist groups (5) .
During its recent history, Japan has had to face two serious crises connected with terrorism.
The first one, in 1995, was a problem of an internal nature: the attack by the religious sect, Aum Shinriky˘, which took place in the Tokyo Underground during the rush hour. The second, between 1996 and 1997, was the most serious case of hostage crisis that the country had ever had to face: the troops of the revolutionary movement, Tupac Amaru (MRTA), attacked the residence of the Japanese Ambassador in Lima, taking approximately 600 hostages.
Both these incidents, in different ways, deeply shocked the Japanese public opinion and forced the government to take more adequate measures to cope with the crisis. The uncertain way in which the government responded to those two terrorist crises, together with the following earthquake of Kansai, on the 17th of January, 1995, generated a climate of misgiving regarding the security structures.
A great amount of criticism arose against the government’s inability to intervene rapidly enough to limit the loss of human life. Since then, political pressure has been strong, with an end to increasing the efficiency of the crises management agencies and, above all, to improve the rapidity of intervention (6) .
The Tokyo Underground attack
The case of the Aum Shinriky˘ (Aum) sect was the first terrorist action conducted on a large scale using bacteriological chemical arms. The sect was founded in 1987, by Matumoto Chizuo, known as Asahara Shoko. The professed doctrine included mystic and millenary elements of Taoism, Christianity and Hinduism combined with Tantric Buddhism. The ultimate scope of the organization was that of reaching political power, replacing the State and guiding Japan through the end of the world.
Asahara was convinced that the only way to save Japan was by accelerating the Apocalypse. To do this, it was necessary to generate a catalysing destructive event; consequently, the sect procured arms and autonomously produced nervine gas. The organization enjoyed relative immunity from the Police, thanks to the legislation which protects religious activity (7) .
Asahara, in the belief that the disastrous earthquake of January, 1995, was the confirmation of the truth of his prophecies decided to catalyse the destruction of the constitutional order. On the morning of the 20th of March 1995, certain devices were left on board five different trains of the Tokyo Underground system; these devices released the nervine gas. Therefore, simultaneously, at various points of the Underground line, the most serious terrorist attack with chemical arms took place. The total number of victims was less dramatic than initially feared: deaths were limited to 12, while 3800 people were affected by the gas; approximately 1000 people needed hospital care. The event caused a tremendous shock to the Japanese collective imagination, as well as to the whole world. It was, in a sense, comparable to the effect which the 11th of September had on the American people.
The vehement resentment in Japan led to a decision and coordinated police action in dismantling numerous properties of the Aum and the arrest of hundreds of followers, including Asahara himself, captured on the 16th May.
The first reaction of the government was to revoke the religious organization status of the sect (shűky˘ h˘jin). Such status had been granted with much difficulty in 1989 and, on the basis of the 1951 Law, permitted the organization to undertake economic activities to support the diffusion of its religious beliefs.
In 1995, with a very wide popular consensus, the status was thus revoked, sustaining that the scope of Aum had demonstrated to be against public interests. Following numerous requests for compensation from the victims of the attack and with obvious reductions in donations and inscriptions, the sect was forced to declare bankruptcy (8) .
A proposal to apply the Law against subversive activities was also put forward. The 1951 Law was passed to combat subversive activities by communist revolutionary organizations or extremist political groups, but it had never been applied. Its application would have impeded the members of Aum from undertaking fund raising and recruitment activities; from publishing propaganda material regarding its teachings and, furthermore, the forces of law and order would have had full powers to inspect and monitor the activities of the sect.
Obviously, this would have led to the destruction of the organization. The Public Security Agency formally invoked the application of the Law against Subversive Activities, which raised strong criticism from the civil society. In fact, many law experts doubted that the definition “subversive organization” could be legitimately extended to the case of Aum Shinriky˘, and neither was it probable that it would have represented a danger also in the future.
In particular, it was feared that the eventual application of a similar law to a religious organization could create a dangerous precedent. In 1997, the pressure of public opinion persuaded the Commission of Public Security, which had to take the final decision, not to apply the law (9) .
Notwithstanding this decision, the demand for special measures, to ensure that Aum could never represent a danger to the national security, was still very strong. The Assembly, therefore, issued ad hoc laws to authorize the Public Security Investigation Agency (PISA) to monitor the activities of the sect.
In 2003, this law was renewed for another three years, taking into account that the attitude of the sect had been cooperative and no further terrorist activity had been verified.
The Aum case is indicative in showing how the Japanese authorities, instead of destroying the organization responsible for the attack or of creating guiding principles for the management of similar future occurrences, had preferred a very pragmatic approach.
With the creation of an ad hoc law, it was possible to satisfy almost everyone, tranquilizing the other religious organizations, without leaving the guilty unpunished.
Therefore, the absence of a well-defined anti-terrorism structure left a wider margin of action to the security authorities, which could act as they thought fit.
The lack of a well defined counter terrorism structure, therefore, left a wider margin for action to the security authorities, who were able to act as they thought better.
The Japanese Embassy
The Tupac Amaru (MRTA) was a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement, founded by Left militants with the object of liberating Peru from imperialism and subverting the government to institute a communist regime, on the same lines as the Castro Cuban revolution. On the 17th of December, 1996, their leader, Commander Evaristo, led the attack on the residence of the Japanese Ambassador in Lima, while an official party for the birthday anniversary of the Japanese Emperor Akihito was taking place. The result of the attack was the capture of approximately 600 hostages, without casualties. Among the prisoners were the Japanese Ambassador, Morihisa Aoki and prominent people of the Peruvian Government, besides many foreign diplomats and managers of Japanese business companies.
The kidnappers demanded the release of all members of the MRTA held in prison; the payment of a “war tax”; the possibility of escaping, with no interference, into an area of the Peruvian jungle and changes in the economic policy (above all, the inversion of the privatization policy). Almost at once, approximately 200 hostages, women and elderly people, were liberated as a gesture of good faith. On the 19th of December, the Japanese Government sent the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ikeda Yukihiko, to Lima to cope with the crisis.
A task force was formed, composed of Sato Shun'ichi, Director General of the Ministerial Bureau for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, and Terada Terusuke, Ambassador in Mexico. The line of conduct adopted by the Peruvian President Fujimori was not to negotiate with the terrorists, yet, at the same time, respecting the Japanese position which imposed the rescue of the hostages as an absolute priority.
The western press emphasized the difference of approach, underlining that in similar situations, Japan had always negotiated with the terrorists.
The U.S. Government, in its turn, put pressure on the task force to make no concessions. In order to resolve this complex situation a Commission of Guarantors was instituted to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. Besides representatives of the Peruvian Government and the MRTA, the Commission was made up of exponents of the Catholic Church, the Red Cross and the Canadian Ambassador, Anthony Vincent (one of the released hostages), as third parties (10) .
During the period immediately following the hostage taking, the Japanese press appeared divided on the judgement to be given regarding the attitude of the Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto (1996-1998) and of the Peruvian President Fujimori (1992-2000). Two of the major daily newspapers, the Asahi Shimbun and the Mainichi Shimbun, held opposite opinions concerning the best way of negotiating with the terrorists. The former, in the editorial of the 20th December, gave priority to the rescue of the hostages, supporting the traditional line of the Japanese diplomacy, warning against the possible risks connected to the hard line approach. The latter, on the contrary, praised the approach of Fujimori, who had been able, during his presidential mandate, to fight the terrorists very efficiently, through a severe and inflexible policy. In the same manner, the conservative daily, the Yomiuri Shimbun, second largest distribution in Japan, supported the Peruvian President and urged Prime Minister Hashimoto to cooperate with him to resolve the crisis. In a more critical vein, the Tokyo Shimbun, stated in their editorial of the 19th of December, that Japan should review its policy on ‘crisis management’ (11) . During the subsequent negotiations, numerous hostages were progressively released, so that, by the 26th of January, the prisoners numbered only 72. None of the kidnappers’ requests were granted, in line with the basic counter-terrorism policy of Fujimori. Therefore, on the 22nd of April, a commando composed of the Peruvian Armed Forces and special police units stormed the residence and freed the hostages. One prisoner and two soldiers lost their lives during the shooting, while all the 14 kidnappers were killed. Already seriously weakened, the Lima Embassy incident was the ‘swan-song’ for the MRTA (12) .
The violent conclusion of the crisis produced, on one side, the admiration of those who had sponsored the hard line policy against terrorism, on the other, criticism on the rashness of such a decision was voiced: yet the gratitude for the liberation of the 24 Japanese citizens greatly exceeded the perplexity on the modus operandi. According to the official version of the facts, Alberto Fujimori had authorized the military intervention on territory controlled by Tokyo, without, however, notifying the Japanese authorities.
The reason for this lack of notification was in order to maintain a surprise effect, but also to avoid objections from the Hashimoto government, which supported a peaceful solution.
The outcome of the events was extremely positive for the Japanese Prime Minister, Fujimori: his decision, declared unilateral by both parties, was an advantage for him: since, in that way, he found himself in a position out of which he could not appear in a negative light. In fact, should the police raid have concluded in tragedy, he could have blamed the Peruvian President, who acted without giving him any notification. If, on the contrary, he had been consulted, he would have undergone very strong internal pressure and probably, would have been forced to impede the rescue operation (13) .
For Prime Minister Hashimoto, unawareness, real or for his own convenience, was, in fact, a blessing.
The success of the military operation raised numerous questions from both the media and political representatives, on the effectiveness of the ‘crisis management’ measures in force, which were supposed to safeguard the security of Japanese citizens abroad. In a discussion of the 23rd April, 1997, Ozawa Ichiro, leader of the new Liberal Party, criticized the ‘soft’ policy of the government, arguing that the lack of guiding principles was the major problem of Japan and this conveyed scarce confidence, at an international level, in the ability of the Country to respond to crises (14) .
Some observers criticized the counter-terrorism strategy. On the 24th of Aril, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun daily newspaper commented: “the methods of President Fujimori prove that, in the era of terrorism, a strong policy of ‘no concessions’ is the most efficient means of ‘crisis management’. The actions of the President impart a great lesson to Japan. […] In the final analysis, the safety of the hostages was preserved by the method which Japan had most opposed” (15) .
The Yomiuri Shimbun approved the decision of the Peruvian President, describing the operation as “almost perfect” and justifying the lack of consultation with the Japanese government, considering it indispensable. The Asahi Shimbun, instead, raised doubts on the idea that the hard line is always the best idea to follow in every circumstance, yet admitting that in the specific case it had been inevitable.
The Tokyo Shimbun expressed approval for the work of Prime Minister Hashimoto, who though not interfering with Fujimori’s decisions, had firmly maintained the principle of considering the safety of the hostages as the first priority (16) .
The Japanese press was almost unanimous in urging the government to outline a new policy, involving both private and public sectors, so as to be prepared for the worst; the laws in force, in fact, seemed to be gravely inadequate.
In this emergency, however, the lack of particular laws or a rigid organization led to a positive outcome. The government, in fact, had ample margin of flexibility in the negotiations, both with the terrorists and with the Peruvian Government.
The elasticity of not having to keep to a pre-established general principle (e.g. “no concessions to the terrorists”) gave the possibility of being able to evaluate the pros and cons of each situation. This provoked a long period of negotiations and evaluations, but the crisis was finally resolved with success.
The internationalist strategy
and the post-11th of September
Following the Lima events, Japanese interest in the organization of international collaboration steadily increased: a collaboration which was able to improve significantly the response to terrorism.
In his speech to ASEAN, on the occasion of the official visit in January 1997, Prime Minister Hashimoto urged the member countries to increase cooperative efforts regarding intelligence, emphasizing that, together with the environmental problem, terrorism is a challenge which must be met by the international community in a united and compact manner (17) .
In his speech at the 140th Session of the Assembly the same way, he proposed his intention to implement this commitment (18) .
Ever since, the Japanese people have shown a keen interest in international cooperation regarding anti-terrorism, especially in the area of intelligence and police operations. Also after the 11th September attack, the Japanese leaders have shown reluctance to pursue a “no concessions” policy, usually preferring to attempt the line of negotiations.
The Assembly approved the “Anti-terrorism Special Law”, which permitted the sending of troops for logistic support (transportation and supplies) to American soldiers engaged in the war against Afghanistan, and subsequently, to facilitate the transportation of food and medicines to the war refugees.
Rather than outlining a long-term policy, the Assembly put forth the measures to be adopted to support the American military campaign (19) .
The special Anti-terrorism Law does not deal with terrorism in general, but with the specific attacks of the 11th of September. Furthermore, it does not prescribe support to U.S. forces, in general, but only to those troops employed in the fight against those responsible for that specific attack (20) .
As well as military support, Japan has been active in multi-lateral bodies, such as the United Nations, ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC and ASEM, in an effort to promote a reinforcement of global anti-terrorism standards. Not only, but Japan also paid three thousand billion yen in the war against Afghanistan, not counting the investments for reconstruction: a sum which is more than double that spent for the first Gulf war.
It is clear from the ASEAN report of May 2002, on the anti-terrorism measures adopted after the 11th September 2001, that the most important initiatives are those concerning the air travel safety and the freezing of bank accounts used to finance terrorism (21) .
In the ASEAN report of October, 2002, which presents the concrete measures adopted by Tokyo, six areas were pointed out which necessitated international cooperation, and in which Japan had already invested resources (22) .
The areas indicated were: immigration control, air travel safety, cooperation of the customs, exportation control, police and law enforcement, measures against the financing of terrorists.
In January 2004, when the American authorities declared the end of the hostilities in Iraq, the Assembly, on the basis of the UNO Security Council Resolutions and, in particular, the Resolution N░ 1511, approved the “Special Law to Assist the Reconstruction of Iraq”. The law established the dispatch of nearly a thousand soldiers of the FAD (so far only 550 units have arrived), with the purpose of supporting the occupation forces and to help the Iraqi population.
The troops are established in Samawah, a town in the South of Iraq. It is considered a very low risk area for the soldiers, according to an investigation report, because it is situated far from areas of armed clashes with the guerrilla forces (23) .
To be frank, the military intervention seems to be a facade, which is intended to win “political credit” with the United States: credits to use in the solution of the North Korean crisis, and the question regarding the increase in permanent members of the UNO Security Council.
In Japan terrorism is not considered the most important threat, but rather, a threat of the same importance as others connected to security. Unlike the United States, where the primary attention is given to the capture and destruction of terrorist groups, Japan gives maximum priority to the protection of human life. In Japan, a legal or executive structure entirely dedicated to terrorism does not exist. At a judicial level, terrorism is considered as a crime like any other, and is dealt with case by case.
On certain occasions, as in the case of the Aumn Shinrikyo, ad hoc legal instruments are created. At the executive level, the structures which deal with the normal administration and which intervene in crises of national security (e.g. in the case of natural catastrophes) are also responsible for the management of problems connected with terrorism.
As far as the fight against international terrorism is concerned, the Japanese Government has preferred to urge the creation of an international system of collaboration, rather than invest conspicuous resources in the development of a special anti-terrorist body and reinforce control on the civil society by the forces of law and order. In the knowledge that for one State to fight terrorism alone is impossible, however strong, rich or technologically advanced it may be, Tokyo has preferred to take the path of internationalism, holding it to be the most effective choice.
In fact, the problems connected to the war on terrorism cannot be considered the task of one State only because all States are intimately tied to the process of globalization. The international terrorist organizations exploit the perverse mechanisms which the Polish sociologist, Zygmunt Bauman calls “liquid modernity” (24) . They draw from the popular resentment of the impoverished countries and are able to obtain and to hide their financial backing, exploiting the undesirable mechanisms of the world financial market. Organizations like Al Qaeda can count on the complex weavings of legal societies (construction companies, charitable organizations etc.,) and illegal activities (trafficking of drugs, arms, people) utilizing the opportunity of globalization like any multi-national company.
Al Qaeda is, in fact, very similar to a global multinational company (25) . One of the main reasons for which the war on terrorism will presumably never end, lies in the fact that there are strong interests that perpetuate the conditions of an international order, with as few rules and regulations as possible (26) .
The construction of an over-national order or theglobalization of justice and intelligence (27) are the possible instruments to control and handle the fluidity of the international relations; the accomplishment of such projects, however, encounters numerous obstacles. In fact, according to numerous political experts, we can observe the difficulty of abandoning the schemes of the Cold War and accepting the crisis of the national State (28) .
Probably, Japan has had fewer problems in adapting to such changes, at least, in terms of security. In fact, since the end of the 2nd World War, the Constitution forbids any kind of armed forces and the national security has been guaranteed through the alliance with the United States and, above all, through some very able diplomatic work (29) .
The resistance of Japan to utilize the traditional instruments of the national State (power politics and the balance of power) had led analysts to coin a new paradigm: the concept of “civil power” (Jap.minsei taikoku). Hans Maull has defined the concept of civil power on the basis of three parameters:
- 1 acceptance of collaboration in order to pursue international objectives;
- 2 concentration of non-military means, but prevalently economic for international interaction;
- 3 willingness to develop over-national structures in order to manage general problems of particular importance (30) .
Therefore, a civil power would be a State which has understood how best to adapt to the new challenges of the international system and has abandoned interpretative schemes held to be obsolete.
Subsequent analyses have replaced such a concept with that of a post modern country, which has, in other words, overcome the modern State logic.
As it has been stated recently, such a definition could be extended also to the States which form the European Union (EU) (31) .
By utilizing the instruments of civil power, or post-modern countries, Japan has been attempting, for the last 50 years, to reinforce the creation of a system of rules and international collaboration.
It is the second major contributor of the United Nations and of many other international institutions and it is strongly committed to strengthen the regional organizations, i.e. the ASEAN or the ASEAN Regional Forum. We have more than once commented on the non-existence of a specific anti-terrorism policy, but the efforts at an international level, alongside the generosity and readiness to send economic and humanitarian aid to zones in difficulty, represent a wide-range strategy in which the fight against terrorism takes a central position.
With its double strategy (internationalism and ‘case by case’ management of terrorism) Japan could have found a more efficient system to face the new challenges of security posed by globalization.
(1) See Mahwah, “Japan”, in Yonah Alexander (by), Combating terrorism: strategies of ten countries, Michigan, 2002, pgs. 350-373.
(2) David Leheny, “Tokyo Confronts Terror” in Policy Review, No.110 December, 2001, available on internet site http://www.policyreview.org/DEC01(leheny.html.
(4) Christopher B. Johnstone, op.cit.
(5) Martha Crenshaw, “Terrorism, Security and Power”, Middletown 2002, available at site address http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/papers/018/018012CrenshawMa.pdf..
(6) See Marwah, op.cit.
(7) Meredith Box, Gavan McCormack, op.cit.
(8) Mark R. Mullins, “The Legal and Political Fallout of the Aum Affair”, in Robert J. Kisala, Mark R. Mullins ed., Religion and Social Crisis in Japan: Understanding Japanese Society through the Aum Affair, Palgrave, 2001, pgs. 71-86.
(10) Johan Galtung, Dietrich Fischer, “The Lima Hostage Crisis: A Possible Conflict Transformation” in TRANSCEND, 11 February 1997, available on internet site http://www.transcend.org/LIMA.HTM; “The Peru Crisis and the Japanese Media”, in Foreign Press Center, 19 February 1997 available on internet site http://www.fpcj.jp/e/shiryo/jb/j42.html.
(11) “The Peru Crisis and the Japanese Media”, cit.
(12) “Lima Hostages Freed”, in Foreign Press Centre 30 April, 1997, available on internet site http://www.fpcj.jp/e/shiryo/jb/j9712.html.
(14) Christopher B. Johnstone, “Lessons Learned in Peru; Tokyo takes stock as ex-hostages return home”, Japan Economic Institute Report, No. 17, 2 May, 1997, available on internet site http://www.jei.org.Archives/JEIR97/9717w4.html.
(16) “Lima Hostages Freed”, cit.
(17) Ryűtar˘ Hashimoto, “ASEAN” (Seikakuenzetsu nichi ASEAN shinjidaihe no kaikaku – hirokuyori fukai paatonaashippu), 14 January, 1997, available on internet site http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/kirokuy/-hashi/arc-97/asean/enzetu.html.
(18) Ryűtar˘ Hashimoto,”140” (dai 140 gaikokukai niokeru ikeda zengaimudaishin no kaik˘enzetu) 20 January, 1997, available on internet site http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/09/ei-0120.html.)
(19) Nukaga Fukushiro, op.cit.
(20) David Leheny, op.cit, Nukaga Fukush,op.cit.; for the analysis of the war in Afghanistan, see Chapter II “Themes of the war on terrorism launched by the USA”.
(21) “Japanese Report on Implementation of the APEC Leaders Statement on Counter-terrorism”, available on internet site http://www.mofa.go,jp/policy/economy/apec/2002/terro.html.
(22) “Japan’s Actions and Measures on Capacity Building for Combating Terrorism –Supporting capacity for counter-terrorism in Asian regions”, available on internet site http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/apec/2002/announce-2.html.
(23) “Japan says its Iraq base safe as poll shows opposition to deployment”, in Channel News Asia, available on site internet http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp-asiapacific/view/115974/1/.html.
(24) Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid ModernitÓ, Bari 2002.
(25) John Gray, Al Qaeda and the significance of modernity, Roma, 2004.
(26) Zygmunt Bauman, “Live and Die in the Ground of Planetary Frontier”, in Missions Today, Brescia 2002, available on the internet site http://www.saveriani.bs.it/missioneoggi/arretrati/2002-07/baumen.htm.
(27) Ciro Sbail˛, “Primato politico e primato giudiziario” in Gnosis No. 3. Anno XI, Rome, 2005.
(28) John Gray, op. cit.; Zygmunt Bauman ModernitÓ Liquida (Liquid Modernity), cit; Ciro Sbail˛, “La Nuova Sintasse del Terrore e la Crisis dello Stato nazionale” in Gnosis No.1.2005, Roma, Rockmore, Margolis, Marsoobian (ed), The Philosophical Challenge of September 11th, Oxford, 2005.
(29) Even though more extended interpretations have permitted the creation of an army, the limit to its utilization has always been for the defence of territory under foreign attack. The Japanese politicians have preferred to maintain the self-imposed limit of the use of armed forces. The society is perfectly identified with the image of “civil power” or “pacifist country” of Japan.
(30) Hanns W. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The new civilian powes”, in "Foreign Affairs", Vol. 69 n.5, 1990 pgs. 91-106.
(31) Robert Cooper. Director General for the external relations and military political affairs of the EU, stated that globalization is producing a re-birth of the empire: not a colonialist and expansionist type empire, but “defensive and cooperative”, which he calls network post-modern. The extension of this new type of empire is based on the willingness of the other States to adhere to it: renouncing, in part, to your own national sovereignty in exchange to gain security and prosperity. Widening this network based on adhesion and cooperation would diminish the conflict tensions and, at the same time, reinforce the defensive resources, without having to resort to militarization. Robert Cooper, “The End of the Nations”, Turin, 2004.