The notion of intelligence

The perception the common citizen has of the world of intelligence is, often, unknowingly influenced – and sometimes distorted – by suggestions from literature, the cinema and the press, which rarely provide a reliable representation.
Therefore, I believe it is useful – before examining how and why the Services must be reformed – to pose two preliminary questions, which, in their simplicity, could appear almost provocative. Do we really know what the Intelligence Services are and are we certain that in a democratic country they are really necessary.
With reference to the first question, it is necessary to know that in Italy, unlike other countries, a diffused knowledge of the nature and finality of the intelligence does not exist. This is due to reasons of a cultural and historical character, connected, among other things, to the modality with which our national unification came about. It was more the fruit of the
great enthusiasm of the Renaissance ideal and the able diplomatic strategies of Cavour, than the systematic action of the regular armed forces: efficient and well-trained.
The result of these circumstances is that in Italy, unlike what has happened, for example, in the United Kingdom, France or the United States, a real culture of defence and national security in which intelligence constitutes an essential component has never really been established. To supply an answer to my first query, I shall make recourse, therefore, to the words of the Italian statesman who, perhaps more than anyone else, has been concerned with the subject, becoming an undisputed expert, the emeritus President of the Republic, Francesco Cossiga.
According to the definition President Cossiga furnishes, the intelligence is “the collection of every type of information, news, documents and material which concern the formulation and execution not only of the military policy, but also the foreign policy, the economic policy and the financial policy of the Country, as well as the defence against external dangers of aggression towards the security of the State and the civil, economic and social well-being of its community” (2) .
In reality, the collection of information can be carried out in different ways: through the employment of human resources (the classical “spy” and, more generally, the activity of HUMINT) or the utilization of modern technologies (for example: interceptions or the use of satellites); through the acquisition of secret information or by the means of monitoring and analyzing of the so-called “open sources” (literature, press, television or internet).
Therefore, the information and security services must have, not only the “007”s of the celebrated stories and spy films, but also and, above all, competent technicians and experts of all the disciplines which could be of interest to intelligence: from economy to linguistics, from history to nuclear physics, from informatics to law.


The necessity of the
Intelligence Services

With the nature and objectives of the intelligence activities clarified in these terms, it is now possible to give a reply to my second question.
If the role and function of intelligence are those which I have synthetically stated, it demonstrates, in fact, that the following thesis – sometimes, more or less explicitly stated in political debate, is totally unfounded – i.e. that the presence of information and security services would be typical of totalitarian regimes, but would have no reason to exist in a democratic order, because their role would be already assured by the armed forces and the police.
The reality is very different. In fact, the information and security services have duties and tasks which are totally distinct from those of the armed forces and police: the former furnish
the political authorities with all the information and the assistance necessary for the elaboration of efficient devices for national security, the latter are called in to concretely carry these devices into effect.
Furthermore, it is necessary to remember that the intelligence services may need to perform, in the interests of the nation, “non-conventional operations” which could entail the violation of lawful regulations and, therefore, it would be exceptionally inopportune to entrust operations of this nature to the armed forces or the police, insomuch as their principal institutional mission is the most rigorous respect for legality.
For this reason, as is clearly demonstrated in the Anglo-Saxon experience, also States of consolidated democratic tradition hold it legitimate and necessary to be in possession of efficient apparatus of intelligence, which are, naturally, subject to a rigid discipline and to a strict system of control.


The reforms of the services in the
Italian experience

In examining the Italian experience, it can be stated that the subject of reform constitutes a recurring theme in the history of our information and security services.
It is known that the institution of stable bodies of intelligence is relatively recent in our Country although the activity of espionage has a long tradition also in Italy.
Besides, as is effectively observed, not without a minute dose of malice, by the Anglo-Saxon doctrine, the spy profession is the “second oldest profession in the world” and from this point of view, the Italians are certainly no exceptions.
If we limit ourselves to the last two centuries of history, it is sufficient to recall the important contribution supplied to the Sabaude strategies by illustrious ‘secret agents’ such as Luigi Carlo Farini (3) , Carlo Boncompagni (4) or the celebrated Countess Paolina di Rasini and Virginia di Castiglione.
Apart from a brief, unfortunate interval in the second half of the 1800’s (5) , only in the first years of the last century, the Kingdom of Italy decided to have a military centralized informative structure.
What is more, this structure did not give particularly brilliant proof of itself, substantially unprepared and taken by surprise by the outbreak of the First World War, during which it was unable to adequately oppose the efficient Austrian espionage.
So, in Italy, already by the end of the 1st World War, discussions were directed, for the first time, towards the need to reform the national information and security apparatus.
Therefore, in 1916, the “Information Service of the Supreme Command” was created, in which its Department of Counter-espionage was, however, very soon responsible for certain illegal operations. Parallel to the creation of the military informative services, analogous structures were introduced into civil administration, under the wing of the Ministry of the Interior. The establishment of the Fascist Dictatorship brought about a radical re-arrangement, both military and civil, of the informative Services.
In particular, in 1925, the SIM, (Military Informative Services) was instituted, which beyond its function of a military espionage and counter-espionage service, it assumed new responsibilities in matters of controlling opponents of the regime.
Consequently, with this change, a second reform of the national services was realized, which produced painful results in terms of repression of liberty and the democratic life of the Country.
After the conclusion of the 2nd World War, the SIM was inundated by criticism consequent to the disclosure of information concerning its activities during the Fascist period and was, consequently definitively dissolved on the 31st of December, 1945.
A phase of great uncertainly followed, during the course of which, informative activities were reduced to a minimum: perhaps, also due to the will of the Allies to impede the reconstruction of intelligence services before knowing the definitive international position of Italy.
With the elections of 18th April, 1948, and the adhesion of Italy to the Atlantic Pact, premises were created for the resumption of activities and it was decided to proceed with a new reform: the third.
In 1949, the SIFAR, (Armed Forces Information Service) was instituted, which operated until 1965, when, with a further reform, it was substituted by the SID (Defence Information Service).
It is known how on the activities of these two services – which operated in the most delicate phase of the confrontation between the Left and Right factions – criticism, disapproval and suspicion were concentrated, above all, for the activity of keeping dossiers, to the detriment of politicians and private citizens, and for the obscure role played in certain dramatic affairs of our Country.
For these reasons, in the second half of the 70’s, all the political powers convened to legally define a rigorous discipline of the services, which ensured institutional loyalty and respect for democratic principles, in order to prevent the risk of further deviations or abuses.
The 5th reform of the services was thus defined with the Law, No. 801, of 1977, which, for the times, contained elements of great newness and represented a most advanced discipline, also when compared to the foreign experiences.
With this law, the following services were instituted: the SISDE, for democratic security; the SISMi, for military security, and the CESIS, a body for the coordination of their work. The responsibility and top direction of the information policy and national security was attributed directly to the President of the Council of Ministers.
A positive and important element was the introduction – even if only in a subdued form – of parliamentary control of the work of the intelligence bodies, through the institution of the Parliamentary Committee for the information and security services and for the Secret of State. The Committee has the fundamental task of verifying that the activities of the information and security services are performed within the limits established by law and, to this end, can ask the Government for information, and formulate proposals and observations.


The reasons for a new reform

After the long series of reforms and counter-reforms briefly mentioned here, the discipline of the information and security services has remained substantially unchanged for the last thirty years.
In the meantime, the world has undergone a process of transformation without precedent: on a geo-political level, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the 11th September attacks have definitively changed the international scenario, while on the economic level the technological development and globalization of the markets have introduced further elements of complexity.
In the face of the new challenges posed by the Twin Towers attacks and by the threat of terrorism of fundamentalist matrix, our intelligence has demonstrated an excellent overall capacity of reaction.
Although having been confronted with sudden, unexpected transformations of scenario and a normative framework which is, by now, obsolete, in these last years our services have been able to define new strategies and, in the fight against terrorism, reconvert its informative network in the Middle East.
This network has been improved to the point of enabling our intelligence, not only to accomplish brilliant results in contexts held to be impenetrable by any other western service, but also has allowed the possibility of furnishing a concrete contribution of information and analyses to our allies employed in the international fight against terrorism.
Obvious proof of the precious work performed by our services in these years, is seen in the fact that Italy although being present with the peace keeping forces in Iraq, has not suffered attacks on its own territory, unlike Spain or the United Kingdom: and this certainly cannot be held as a result of mere chance.


The contents of the reform examined
by Parliament

Notwithstanding the successes achieved by the national services, there still remain the inadequacies of the laws in force and the need to proceed with a radical re-definition of the system and structure of the intelligence bodies, as well as the up-dating of the instruments at their disposal and of their operative capacity.
For these reasons, Parliament has recently begun to examine some intelligence reform proposals, with the objective of remedying the limitations which the Law of 1977 has progressively made evident.
Also, the presiding Committee has offered a contribution of reflection and experience on such questions, elaborating a proposal (6) – shared by all the political powers within the Committee – which has been, for the most part, approved and accepted in the unified text adopted as the basic text of the Commission of Constitutional Affairs (7) .
In utmost synthesis, the guide lines along which the proposal is developed may be summarized in the following terms:
a) The structure of the informative system
In the first place, the strengthening of the role of policy direction by the President of the Council of Ministers is foreseen, which – by means of a stronger structure of coordination than the present CESIS – the same will finally be in condition to have real control of the services and will be able to direct actions in the interests and for the defence of the Republic, assuming the consequent responsibilities before Parliament.
Furthermore, the structure of the services will be modernized, for which a new framework of irrefutable regulations and definite responsibilities will be outlined.
As far as the organizational profile is concerned, it has been preferred to adopt the “two-track” model, that is, based on the presence of two distinct services; one for the purpose of operating abroad (the SIE), and the other active on national territory (the SIN).
This choice has been made in the conviction that uniting all the intelligence functions in one single service would determine an excessive concentration of power, difficult to governing, potentially dangerous for the democratic institutions and in addition, inefficient because it would require a bureaucratic structure of elephantine proportions.
The two services, instead, guarantee a greater specialization in the respective areas of interest. They are more easily manageable and do not permit a work overload, taking into account that many of the common functions (such as recruitment, formation and training of personnel) can be done at central level.
Moreover, the “two-track” model is the most diffused in the principal Western States, with the exception of the United States, whose intelligence system is characterized – as is well-known – by the presence of a veritable “galaxy” of agencies.
The two services will be coordinated, one with the other, by a purposely constituted department c/o the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (the DIS). With regard to this matter: in the course of the parliament debates on the subject, it has been discussed at length, whether the department should be responsible to a minister or to an under-secretary. Finally, a “flexible” solution was preferred, which will allow the President of the Council of Ministers to choose whether, and to what extent, he should delegate the functions which are not exclusively reserved for himself, and whether the person to whom the functions are delegated should be a Minister without portfolio or an Under-Secretary of State.
Personally, I feel that whatever solution is finally adopted, the most important element is that the overall coordination is effective, and that the final management responsibility of the intelligence bodies with regard to Parliament and the Country remains clearly with the President of the Council of Ministers.
The two services are divided according to a territorial criterion, also the competence in matters of counter-espionage, i.e. the complex of activities concerned with avoiding that agents of foreign States or hostile organizations can appropriate secrets which are essential to the security of the Country or infiltrate to interfere with the decisional processes of our institutional and economic system.
Altogether, the reform rationalizes the activity of the intelligence bodies, increases the efficiency and avoids the overlapping and conflicting responsibilities which presently exist in the relations between SISMi and SISDe.
b) Functional guarantees
Another important new element is constituted in the introduction of the so-called “functional guarantees”, i.e. of a discipline which, in exceptional cases and with precise guarantees, permits those belonging to the intelligence bodies to behave in ways which are in contrast to lawful comportment. In fact, the laws presently in force do not provide for the possibility that agents of the services can be authorized to perform, in defence of national security, acts of a criminal configuration. This determines paradoxical consequences: the agent, for example, who breaks into a terrorist hide-out to look for or examine plans of a possible attack, risks being condemned for unlawful entry, unless the matter is covered by the opposition of the Secret of State.
If the new discipline is definitively approved, a similar risk can be avoided without any abnormal recourse to the institute of the Secret of State.
In fact, it being understood that which has been provided by Article 51 of the Criminal Code, the personnel of the security services – who have been legitimately authorized to behave in a manner which, under the Law, is considered criminal behaviour – will not be liable to punishment, provided that the actions are indispensable to the institutional ends of the services.

In no case can an agent be authorized to perpetrate crimes directed to put in danger the life or injure the physical soundness, the individual personality, the personal liberty, the moral liberty, the health or safety of one or more people.
Furthermore, the special cause of justification will not be applied in reference to crimes of attacks against constitutional bodies and against regional assemblies, to attacks against the political rights of citizens, as well as – except for specific cases identified by law – to crimes against the administration of justice.
Further guarantees have been introduced to protect the activities of political parties, union organizations and professional journalists. More generally; expressly provided is the prohibition to authorize the carrying out of crimes for which the opposition of the Secret of State cannot be granted, except in cases of infiltration into criminal organizations, such as the mafia or subversive formations.
c) Parliamentary control
Up to this point, the series of interventions described determines an objective strengthening of the powers available to the Services.
For this reason, a parallel reinforcement of the function of parliamentary control is provided for in the proposed reform, because only in a system characterized by an efficacious democratic control is it possible to contain the risk of abuse or deviations in the work of the Services.
In particular, the Parliamentary Committee is attributed with significantly greater powers and competency than is presently provided, which will allow the control of intelligence activities in all its aspects, including the operative, managerial and accounting aspects.
As an example, it is worth mentioning that – in addition to the ordinary periodic hearings of the President of the Council of Minister, the Minister or the delegated Under-Secretary, the Ministers of the CISR (the Inter-ministerial Committee for the security of the Republic), the Director General of DIS and the Directors of SIE and SIN – it is provided that the Committee, in exceptional cases, can order, with justified and valid reasons, the hearing of employees of the Information and Security System.
Furthermore, the Committee is attributed with the general authority to hear any other person not belonging to the Information and Security System, who is able to furnish information or evaluations held to be useful to the objectives of the exercise of parliamentary control.
It is considered the duty of all subjects heard by the Committee to report, with loyalty and completeness, the information, in their possession, concerning the matter of interest to the Committee
In addition, there is an appreciable increase in the Committee’s power to acquire copies of acts and documents in the possession of the Information and Security System, the Public Administration or the Judicial Authority, and likewise, expressly provided for the first time is parliamentary control on the documentation of expenses relative to the concluded operations.
A significantly innovating factor regarding the discipline in force is that the Committee has also been given important consultative functions. In fact, this body is called to express its own opinion – obligatory, but not binding – on the schemes of regulations provide by law, as well as any other scheme of decree or regulation concerning the organization and state of the personnel.
Moreover, it is provided that the President of the Council of Ministers prudently informs the President of the Committee regarding the nominees for the appointments of directors and deputy directors of DIS, SIN and SIE. In this way, the possibility of exercising the functions of control also in this delicate question is assured, without creating any undue form of co-management between the Executive and Parliament.
d) The Secret of State
Proceeding with the scrutiny of the contents of the reform, the new discipline of the Secret of State merits particular attention. The new discipline limits the use of this institute to only cases in which it is effectively indispensable for the protection and security of the Country and its citizens.
The Secret of State covers acts, documents, information, activities and anything else, the diffusion of which can cause harm to the soundness of the Republic, also in relation to international agreements, to the defence of the institutions established by the Constitution at its foundation, to the independence of the State with respect to other States and to the relations with them, to the preparation and to the military defence of the State.
Furthermore, for the first time, a maximum limit of duration of the Secret of State has been introduced, which can be effective for a period, on the whole, of not more than 30 years.
The new discipline concerning protection by the Secret of State, during the course of judicial proceedings, is of considerable interest.
Not only is the obligation confirmed for public officials, public employees and those entrusted with a public service to abstain from testifying on facts covered by the Secret of State, but it is likewise provided that this last can be opposed by the judicial authorities or by any witness, even if he does not belong to the aforementioned categories.
A specific discipline is introduced – even though with certain inconsistency – for the hypothesis in which the Secret of State is opposed by an investigated or indicted person.
Under the procedural profile, the confirmation of the opposition of the Secret of State is subjected to a regime analogous to that provided by the Law, No. 801, 1977. In fact, the President of the Council of Ministers is obliged to communicate to the Parliamentary Committee each case of confirmation of the opposition of the Secret of State, indicating the essential reasons. If the Committee considers the opposition to be unfounded, it will refer to both the Houses for consequent evaluations.
A new provision of importance in this regard is that in no case can the Secret of State be opposed to the Constitutional Court. In this way, it is understood to entrust to the Court, in a matter of controversy between branches of government, the delicate task of mitigating the different interests – public or private – which can concretely enter into contrast with the necessity to protect information covered by the Secret of State.
It is not possible in this occasion to explain in detail all the other important changes provided in the reform, with reference, for example, to the secrecy classifications (which are, finally, clarified in a detailed legislative discipline), to the relation between Intelligence and Magistracy (subject to a regime inspired by the principals of loyal cooperation between institutions), to the modality of recruitment and formation of the personnel (the importance of which, with regard to the efficiency of the services, needs no explanation).
I shall limit myself, therefore, to a brief conclusive consideration.
It would be ingenuous to expect that a new law can, suddenly, eliminate all the difficulties and limitations which have characterized the activities of the national intelligence services in the last 10 years.
However, I am convinced that up to now Parliament, with the concurrence of all the political powers, has performed a good job and I hope that – compatibly with the difficult political-institutional phase that the Country is going through – we do not want to lose the precious occasion of solicitously approving a reform which can truly improve the efficiency, professionalism and reliability of our services, in a context of adequate controls and guarantees.
If this objective is accomplished, the reform will constitute a success not of the political sector, but of the Country as a whole, which, in this way, will make a further step to guarantee its citizens a future of greater security in democracy and freedom.